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A BRIEF HISTORY OF EUROPE

From 1789 to 1815
THE HISTORY OF EUROPE
FROM 1862 TO 1914
BY LUCIUS HUDSON HOLT AND
ALEXANDER WHEELER CHILTON

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF GOVERNMENT
BY LUCIUS HUDSON HOLT
A BRIEF
HISTORY OF EUROPE
FROM 1789 TO 1815

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WITH MAPS OF MILITARY CAMPAIGNS DRAWN BY
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Set up and electrotyped. Published August, 1919.
PREFACE

This history has been written in the endeavor to present in brief compass the story of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period in proper perspective against the background of general European conditions.

In the account of the Revolution, the authors have attempted to give a fair and impartial estimate of causes and incidents, and to show the reaction of the other states of Europe against events in France. In the account of the Napoleonic period, they have tried, so far as space permitted, to keep before the reader the general European conditions as these affected, and as they were affected by, the policies of the great Emperor.

A feature of special importance is the unusually complete presentation of the more important military operations of the period. Without going into technical details the authors have striven to give an accurate and readable account of the strategy and maneuvers by which the campaigns were won or lost.

In the division of work, the authors have followed respectively the lines laid down in their previous book, European History, 1862–1914. The Professor of English and History has undertaken the outline of the political history: the Assistant Professor that of the military campaigns.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance rendered by Captain William Kelly Harrison, Jr., in drawing the maps for use in the study of the campaigns, and by Major Charles A. King, Jr., in reading the book in manuscript and offering many valuable suggestions. The polit-
PREFACE

ical maps have been reprinted from *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe* with the kind permission of the author, Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes.

L. H. H.
A. W. C.

West Point, New York,
July, 1919.
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THE HISTORY OF EUROPE
FROM 1789 TO 1815

CHAPTER I
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE

To visualize life in the Europe of the latter half of the eighteenth century requires a vigorous and sustained effort of the imagination. So accustomed have we become to steam transportation by railways and ocean liners, to electric communication by telephone and telegraph, to machinery contrived for manufacture on a large scale, to huge centers of population with their complicated economic, social, and governmental problems, and to liberal and democratic ideas of the rights of the individual and the nature and purpose of political organization, that the consideration of conditions in Europe during the eighteenth century plunges us suddenly into a strange world. Though we all realize vaguely that there was a time when these modern marvels of communication, transportation, and manufacture, and these present-day conceptions of economic, social, and political issues, did not exist, we commonly fail to appreciate the nature and extent of the resulting differences in the conditions of individual, community, and national and international life. Yet in order to gain any adequate idea of the truly revolutionary nature of the events which convulsed Europe in the years between 1789 and 1815, and which were the birth-throes of a new epoch in modern history, we must have in our minds the background of the
social, economic, and political conditions in which these events found their origin and development.

A. SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Looking broadly at social conditions in Europe of the later eighteenth century, we distinguish at once a difference between life in eastern Europe and life in western Europe. We may draw a rough dividing line along the river Elbe and say that the countries to the east were more primitive, nearer to the feudal conditions, than those to the west. In their progress toward our modern form of civilized community life, Prussia, Austria, Poland, and Russia were distinctly behind the Rhine countries, the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain. The power of the nobles in the east exacted from the peasantry the utmost endurable burdens in labor and time: in the west this power had waned until it survived only in a number of petty traditional rights and privileges. The chasm between noble and serf in the east had become so wide through generations of oppression on the one hand and acquiescent suffering on the other that it seemed impossible to bridge: this chasm had been so nearly filled in the west by the growth of the bourgeoisie, the middle class of society, that passage from one stratum to another was easily possible.

i. Central and Eastern Europe

In the feudal ages, it will be remembered, human society in Europe consisted of the lords, or seigniors, on the one hand, and of the serfs on the other. The sole industry was agriculture: the sole profession war. The serfs tilled the land for the seignior: the seignior protected his serfs from attacks or depredations from their neighbors. Social conditions in the eighteenth century in central and eastern Europe had changed little from these conditions of the feudal ages. The sole industry was still agriculture: the only
classes of society were the nobles (including the clergy) and the peasant. The middle classes, the bourgeoisie, the small traders, business men, skilled and intelligent artisans, mechanics, and the like, who have had a determining influence in modern liberal and democratic states, constituted then an insignificant element in the population: they were the growth of a later period in these sections of Europe, a development subsequent to the French Revolution. In gaining our idea of the social conditions of the time we are treating, we may focus our attention upon the peasantry and the nobility, and give but a passing glance at others.

The vast mass of the people were, of course, of the peasant class. These lived, not in nominal serfdom as a rule (except in Russia), but in an equivalent state of subjection to their respective lords. They were not free to leave their land without their lord’s consent. They were required to spend from three to six days a week in the cultivation of their lord’s land. Though in most countries they had technical ownership of their own small plots, they were not free to sell or mortgage their land and could work upon it only in such spare time as remained after they had satisfied the requirements of their lord. They could not marry without their lord’s consent. Their children were at an early age pressed into their lord’s service at a nominal wage and kept there until their maturity. They were housed in miserable hovels grouped in small villages. Indeed, it is difficult to exaggerate the misery and wretchedness in which the ordinary peasant beyond the Elbe passed his life. So many were the demands of his masters that often the only time he had to work upon his own small allotment of land was in the evening by the rays of the moon. At any instant he might be called from his plow and torn from his family to be plunged into a war whose cause he knew not and whose issue meant nothing to him. To be left in peace and to have time to exact a bare livelihood by unremitting toil upon his land were his highest expectations. The African slave in
America had as many privileges and lived actually under better conditions than the peasant of a Prussian, Austrian, Polish, or Russian proprietor.

The comfort, grandeur, and occupation of the nobles showed in startling contrast to the squalor of the peasantry. Though the absolute independence of the separate nobles in the feudal ages had very generally given way to the political overlordship of the Czar, Emperor, King, Prince, Archduke, or the like in large states, the lord continued to be in his own local lands an autocrat of unquestioned authority and power. He profited by the labors of his peasants. His household was provisioned by them. His armies were recruited from the able-bodied among them. His retinue of servants and attendants was drawn from their children. He maintained complete control over the administration of the villages within his domain. He was the court by whom cases might be decided, a court in which he himself could not be sued without his own consent. He was at once executive, legislative, and judiciary in the affairs of his district. In the wider field of the state, he was a member of the only class which might influence the decisions of the monarch. He and his colleagues were the prop of the monarch, the body from which the sovereign chose advisers. If he so desired, and if his sovereign appreciated his qualities of mind and character, he might rise to high administrative and executive positions in the state and wield an influence which would be felt beyond its borders. By right of his noble birth, all avenues of advancement were open to him. He naturally signalized his superior station in life by the size of his castle, the splendor of its appointments, and the refinements of his social life. He regarded himself, and was regarded by others, as a privileged being living on a plane above that of the mass of men, subject to no will but his own and bound by no conventions save those which he might care to observe. An Austrian nobleman is reported to have said that no one below the rank of count deserved
the name of human being: though the statement may seem extreme, it not inaccurately represents the general opinion the nobility held of themselves and of others.

Among the privileged classes we have included the clergy. It is difficult, however, to make such sweeping generalizations concerning the clergy as we have concerning the peasantry and the nobility, for no such uniformity in religion and in the position of the clergy existed. Many of the north German states, including Prussia, were preponderatingly Protestant in religion. Austria, Poland, and the states of Italy were almost solidly Roman Catholic. The great Slav power, Russia, had become the chief representative of the Greek Catholic (the eastern branch of the Roman Catholic, which had developed along radically different lines from the Roman Catholic). In all the countries, however, the clergy were recognized as a privileged order, ranking with the nobility. They were exempt from taxation and from forced labor, were able to own property, and were free to move from place to place without restriction. Many of the higher clergy had immense incomes, dwelt in great palaces with retinues of servants, and in every way adopted the mode of life of the lay nobility. The lower clergy, though often as poor as the mass of their flock, yet gained certain peculiar rights from the dignity of their calling. In states like Austria and Russia, where the government officially acknowledged and supported the religion of the mass of the people, the hierarchy of the clergy were hand in glove with the administrative nobility. In Prussia, where nominal religious freedom was the official attitude, the clergy existed and worked more independently.

The simplicity of the social system of the rural districts, divided as it was into nobility (including clergy) and peasantry, was developed into complexity in the few towns and cities. We must keep in mind, however, that the towns and cities were few in number and relatively small in population. It was not until after the middle of the century
that Berlin numbered over 100,000 inhabitants. The conditions we have outlined concerning the peasantry and nobility, therefore, obtained most generally throughout the countries indicated. The extremes of the social scale in the towns and cities were similar to the two classes of the country, the nobles at the top, and a large mass of ignorant and wretched unskilled workers at the bottom. In between, however, were other classes practically unknown in the rural communities. Above the unskilled workers were the artisans, commonly apprenticed to some master and looking forward to the time when they themselves in turn would be masters in their craft. Above the artisans were the masters, members of the “guild,” or association of master workmen, each industry having a “guild” of its own. Above the masters, or guildmen, were the great merchants and men of industry, often themselves graduates from the guilds into the wider opportunities of trade. Above the merchants were the professional men of all kinds, doctors, lawyers, scholars, and the like. And at the top were the nobility, controlling here as in the country the legislative, judicial, and administrative details of the government, and regarding themselves as on a plane above that of the remainder of society.

Such, in broad general outlines, were the chief features of society as it existed in states to the east of the Elbe during the later eighteenth century. Though individual exceptions may be noted in different localities to each point mentioned, these outlines present a substantially accurate statement of the typical conditions in these territories. We may, then, turn to the countries to the west.

ii. Western Europe

In western Europe as in eastern, agriculture was the chief industry of the mass of the people, but social conditions were different. Although the two classes in the rural districts, the nobility and the peasantry, still remained from
the feudal ages, the nobles retained merely shreds of their ancient power in the form of some special privileges, and the peasants suffered only a few humiliating reminders of their former serfdom. It has been customary to emphasize the misery and wretchedness of the peasantry in France, yet in comparison with conditions to the east of the Elbe, the French peasant was well off.

Perhaps the most marked differences between the lot of the peasant in the west and that of his brother in the east lay in his individual freedom and his ownership of land. The peasant of the west, except in the very few cases where actual serfdom survived, was free to change his abode, his occupation, or both. More important, he could own land, and could sell, lease, bequeath, or mortgage his property. The thrifty peasants had taken advantage of their opportunities. It is estimated that more than one half of the arable land in France, for example, was owned by peasants. Many prosperous farmers rented large areas which they worked for their own advantage. Other peasants worked proprietor's lands on a share basis, being furnished with house, a part of the stock, and seeds, and being given one half of the annual produce. Though methods of cultivation were primitive, and yields therefore relatively small, the pride of ownership, the individual independence, and the expectation of material gain made the western peasant's lot far brighter than that of his neighbors in the east.

Such was the brighter side of the peasant's condition. Free though he was, the burdens laid upon him were exceedingly heavy. He had in the first place humiliating reminders of his ancestors' position under the feudal system in the nature of "seigniorial" charges or dues and of a certain amount of forced labor upon public works. The seigniorial charges were annual payments legally exacted by the lord from the peasant proprietor for the use of the land, or were dues paid to the lord in case the land were sold. These payments were not large, were, in fact, irritating
rather than burdensome. The forced labor, called in France the *corvée*, consisted of from eight to forty days of work annually upon the roads. Here, again, this labor was not exorbitant, but it often was imposed at a time when the peasant’s work upon his crops was most necessary. In addition to these direct reminders of serfdom, heavy taxes were laid upon the peasants to provide income for the state and its ally, the church. Again using France as an example, we find the peasant called upon to pay the church *tithes*, amounting to about one twelfth of his annual produce, the state *taille*, levied upon the supposed net income of the individual, the poll tax, and a tax called the *vingtième* (the twentieth), which was expected to take five per cent of the income. It has been estimated that through these various taxes the government collected over fifty per cent of the peasant’s net income — truly, a burdensome levy. Travelers in western Europe at this period bear testimony to the appearance of poverty of the peasantry, a poverty produced by the extortions of the tax collectors. And yet, knowing human nature and taking into account the crude and unscientific methods of levying taxes at that time, we may well believe that much of the appearance of poverty and wretchedness was external only. This was due to the efforts of the peasants themselves to deceive the government agents with respect to their actual material wealth and thus to escape heavy taxation.

The superior station of the nobles in the west was attested, as has been said, by certain special rights and privileges. Important among these privileges was their exemption from most of the forms of taxation. They were, of course, by right of their inheritance from the feudal seigniors, exempt from any manner of labor upon public works, such as the *corvée* in France. Again, by the same right, they were exempt from taxes of the nature of the French *taille*, it being held in theory that they rendered direct military service to the monarch in the place of this tax. Further,
the prestige of their position enabled them to escape their proper share of any income taxes. In short, their contributions to the finances of the state were ordinarily far less than their proportionate wealth warranted. The income of the nobles was derived from various sources. Many of them were landowners, and had an income from leasing their farms. Many others had a large and steady annual income from the feudal charges or dues. Many sought and gained lucrative sinecures in the service of their monarch. In western Europe, as in eastern, all avenues of advancement were open to those of noble birth. From the nobility the sovereigns chose their advisers and their administrators. A nobleman, if he so desired and if he basked in the favor of his ruler, might play a leading part in affairs of state and wield an influence not only in national but also in international affairs. Though genius might occasionally raise a man of mean birth to high position—a miracle unknown in the states of central and eastern Europe—the noble always had the inner track on the road to preferment. Naturally, in western as in eastern Europe, the nobleman's scale of living was consistent with his opinion of his own position. As western Europe had progressed more rapidly in modern civilization than had eastern, the nobleman's life was graced with greater refinement and comfort. Paris had, since the time of Louis XIV, set the standard of fashion for all of Europe. The French noblemen were, therefore, always a step in advance of their neighbors in the art of living, and their influence was communicated more directly to their immediate vicinity. The nobility of the west, then, constituted a privileged class as in the east. Their opportunities in the life of the nation were equally great. Their standard of living was well raised above that of the peasantry. But their power and authority (except where they entered administrative or executive positions under the sovereign) in their local districts had degenerated.
The social status of the clergy was much the same in western Europe as in the states beyond the Elbe. They formed a privileged class, ranking with the nobility. The tithes, exacted under the authority of the state, went for their support. The higher clergy often enjoyed a princely income from this source, and followed the life of the fashionable nobility in the towns and cities, even to participation in political affairs. The lower clergy, as the parish priests, were often underpaid and lived under conditions similar to those of the peasantry, but even these occupied a unique social position because of their calling.

In the life of the towns and cities we find the most marked difference between social conditions in western Europe and those in eastern. Not only were these centers more numerous and more populous, but their activities were more varied and flourishing. Manufacturing had been artificially stimulated in France by the economist Colbert in the reign of Louis XIV and had ever since had the special favor of the French government: consequently, in France and in the neighboring countries to which the inspiration passed, a large and increasing class of skilled and intelligent artisans formed an important element in the town population. Through the numerous ports on the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Atlantic seaboard, a constantly growing commerce passed, giving occupation to numerous keen, active, and prospering merchants. The increase in wealth and the rise in the general standard of living in the towns and cities made opportunity for the small trader, shopkeeper, and business man. The number of such multiplied rapidly. Professional men, especially lawyers, flourished as the place, need, and opportunity presented themselves. A vigorous intellectual life sprung up, involving not merely the nobility and the scholars, but all ranks of society. Thus developed a healthy and prosperous bourgeoisie, or middle class, in society, alert, intelligent, and interested in issues of the day. This class filled the gap
which existed in rural communities between the nobility and the peasantry. This class it was which, a few years later, in various countries of western Europe, supported and carried through the revolutionary movement initiated in France.

B. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The first, and perhaps the most striking, general difference between economic conditions of today and of the later eighteenth century lies in the speed and volume of business. We work today at a pace and in a volume which would have astounded our forefathers. Lacking steam transportation, facility for communication by telephone and telegraph, and mechanical marvels for rapid production, the men of the eighteenth century conducted their mutual affairs in a more leisurely way. Economic methods in those days were by no means as complex and as highly specialized as they are today.

The chief industry in Europe, as has been emphasized, was agriculture. At least ninety per cent of the people spent the major portion of their time in the cultivation of the land. Methods and implements, however, had improved little over those of primitive times. Although agricultural societies existed in which theorists propounded their ideas, and though a few notable inventions in tools had been made, neither the ideas of the theorists nor the improved tools of the inventors had been put to any general use. In a population so entirely dependent upon agriculture, thinkers realized, of course, the advisability of improving methods, but stood aghast at the inert weight of ignorance, stupidity, and tradition they would have to raise. To let matters go on as they had in the inherited inefficient way was easy: to force improvements and new methods upon a dull and unwilling peasantry was very difficult. Hence, no care was taken to select seed for the production of better and more prolific varieties. No use
was made of what practical improvements in the implements of cultivation had been invented. Little effort was exerted to breed better stock. Scientific knowledge of the proper use and the advantages of fertilizers was extremely limited. The peasant plowed and reaped with methods and tools not far different from those of ancient Egypt. His stock was commonly small and weak. The common method of restoring the yielding power of worked-out land was to leave it fallow, running to grass and weeds, for a year or more. Added to these inefficient methods was the natural apathy of a degraded and oppressed peasantry in the greater part of Europe. The peasant east of the Elbe, especially, had no incentive to do good work, for his labor was largely spent upon his lord's lands and the profits accrued to the proprietor. Slave labor has never proved efficient, and the labor of the peasantry in central and eastern Europe, under conditions so nearly those of slaves, gave most unsatisfactory results. Thus the art or science of agriculture was backward, the yields relatively small, and in a country given over to farming a large proportion of the population lived constantly on the verge of famine.

When we turn from the vast agricultural lands to conditions in the towns and cities, we find industry still in the grip of the descendants of the medieval guilds, or corporations of craftsmen. Although these guilds had declined materially from the power and influence they had wielded during the thirteenth and fourteenth century, they still remained the most conspicuous feature of industrial life. They were, in essence, close associations of the master workmen—one association for each craft—intended to preserve to their members a monopoly in the specific industries. Thus the weavers' guild included all the master weavers and had the power to prevent others from engaging independently in the weaving industry; the shoemakers' guild included all the master shoemakers and prevented others from engaging in this trade; etc. Inasmuch as the
masters in the guild profited more as their numbers were less, they commonly put many obstacles in the way of the apprentices and journeymen who were ambitious themselves to gain membership in the association. In this way, of course, the power of the masters of the guilds was being continually exerted to retard the natural expansion and development of industry. Free competition among skilled workmen was rendered impossible. No workman could learn a trade except through apprenticeship to a master in a guild; and then, after years of work in this capacity, he might find himself barred from further progress by the selfishly conservative policy of the guild.

Both in the trade in grain and in the management of industry, unwise and unscientific governmental interference tended to hinder natural expansion and development. This interference took two forms: first, taxation, and second, direct regulation. Owing to their great extravagance, and to the lack of any system in their finances, the various governments were always in dire need of more money. The obvious and easy way to get such money was by the levy of taxes upon production. Hence, increased industry in the fields or at the loom was met by increased tax burdens laid upon the producer. Ambition and enterprise were curbed; trade lagged; individual initiative was discouraged. Governments persisted in their short-sighted policy of killing the geese that laid the golden eggs. Again, by governmental decrees the governments endeavored to regulate economic conditions. Though the intention was often laudable, the means adopted were usually the opposite. Thus in the effort to keep the price of grain low to consumers within a country, the government, ignoring the inexorable laws of supply and demand, would regulate the place and method of its sale and establish maximum and minimum prices. In an effort to standardize craft products, the government, disregarding the possibilities of inventions which might materially change conditions of
manufacture, would regulate the amount of raw material and the quality of the production. Thus both in the vast grain industry of the rural districts and in the limited manufacturing industry in the urban districts, we find progress checked at every turn by conditions within the individual industries and by governmental interference from without.

When we pass from industry to commerce, that is, to a consideration of trade and exchange in the articles of production, we find similar handicaps to flourishing development. The selfishness of the separate states, and within the states the jealousy of their traditional rights on the part of the provinces, and within the provinces the inherited privileges of the seigniors, led to the imposition of tariffs at every boundary line and at most rivers and roads. Though the amount in question was in each instance relatively small, the total was considerable, not to mention the annoyance of having commodities held up from fifteen to thirty times between the producer and his market for payment of the tariffs. As examples of the amount and annoyance of the tariffs, the following will suffice: cloth exported from Carcassonne in southern France to a market in northern France paid fifteen per cent of its value in tariffs on the way; goods going via the Rhine River from Strasbourg to Rotterdam were stopped thirty times for the collection of tolls.

The channels of international trade were clogged from similar causes. To be sure, British cloths of superior weave and texture found their way to the French, Prussian, and Russian markets, French silks and wines were exported, the Russians sent their furs, the Far East yielded its spices, and the colonies each its indigenous products. Governments, however, watched commerce with a jealous eye, ever anxious to have the balance of trade in their own favor, yet constantly by unwise measures thwarting the natural growth and progress of international business. On one occasion a government, fearing the depletion of its food supply, would
forbid the exportation of grain, thus barring its citizens from the advantages of the higher price obtainable in a foreign market. Again, a government, desiring to force the use of home-made products, would impose a prohibitive tax upon certain grades of imported goods, thus arbitrarily shutting off the supply. Especially did each country jealously regard its colonial markets as a commercial investment, demanding an absolute monopoly of the colonies' trade in return for the military protection it afforded its distant subjects. Freedom of trade was the dream of unregarded theorists. National selfishness, misdirected, forged the shackles which bound commerce.

With the vast and easy current of international commerce in peaceful days of modern times in our mind, it is difficult to realize the narrow and sluggish flow of such commerce in the eighteenth century. We must keep in mind the increase in raw materials caused by improved scientific methods of cultivation, the increase of commodities manufactured from such raw materials by modern machinery, the additional demand due to the added population, the opening and settling of new lands, the general rise in standards of living, the modern speed of transportation by railroad and steamship, and the wisdom of modern governments in breaking down customs barriers and adopting the principles of economists in their attitude toward industry and commerce. In the eighteenth century, economically, we are still in the dark ages.

C. POLITICAL CONDITIONS

When we speak of the politics of the later eighteenth century in Europe, we are dealing with a game which, before the French Revolution, only princes played. The ignorant peasant, in the greater part of Europe bound to the soil which he cultivated, was under the conditions incapable of speculation either upon local, national, or international politics. The bourgeoisie, distributed in the few
towns and cities in general, servilely followed the lead of the nobles. The modern newspapers and periodicals, with their vast influence in the formation and guidance of an independent and intelligent public opinion, were practically unknown. When we speak—as we shall, following a natural method—of the policy of Prussia, or of Austria, or of Russia, it must be remembered that we do not refer to the policy of all, or even of any considerable part of the people of these countries, but to the policy arbitrarily adopted by the reigning prince and his small circle of noble advisers. The peasant had no policy: his only desire was to be allowed to gain his livelihood from his land. When he warred, it was in accordance with the demand of his lord, not because he had any conception of the issues at stake, or because, indeed, he had any special sense of nationality or patriotism. The prince with his nobles played the game: the mass of the people blindly and unknowingly responded to his call and accepted the results.

Not that princes were unaware of the responsibilities of their position. The best political theory of the time demanded that the prince should exert himself for the good of his people. It was generally understood throughout the classes which spent any thought on the matter at all that government existed for the furtherance of the safety, welfare, and prosperity of the governed. It was Frederick the Great of Prussia, one of the most arbitrary despots of the age, who proclaimed himself the first servant of his people. The later eighteenth century was the period of what has become known in history as the age of the Benevolent or Enlightened Despots, i.e., of autocratic rulers who according to their lights administered their respective countries with an eye to the general good. Frederick the Great, King of Prussia from 1740 to 1786, Catherine II, commonly called Catherine the Great, who ruled Russia from 1762 to 1796, Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor from 1765 to 1790 and ruler
of Austria from 1780 to 1790, Charles III, King of Spain from 1759 to 1788, Gustavus III of Sweden, and the Archduke Leopold of Tuscany, were all monarchs who were familiar with the advanced political philosophy of the day. They associated with themselves men of learning and judgment, and labored long and unceasingly along what they believed to be the right lines for the improvement of general conditions within their respective countries.

These monarchs did not, however, because of their advanced and enlightened ideas of the responsibilities and duties of their positions, abate one jot of their belief in the principle of autocracy. The modern theory that government should be more or less directly under the control of the governed grew from the ashes of the institutions destroyed in the fires of the great revolutionary period of 1789-1815. This theory formed no part of the political philosophy of the period of the Benevolent Despots. The autocrats of the earlier period still retained the conception of the divine origin of their power and of their superior ability for its exercise.

From the conditions we have outlined above, it followed that international politics consisted of intrigue among the various princes, each striving to add to his dominions regardless of the method of acquisition or the homogeneity of the resulting population. The principle of nationality, i.e., that people of the same race had an inherent right to a government of their own, was unrecognized before the French Revolution, was, indeed, an outgrowth of that Revolution. Racial boundaries were regarded as unimportant. Princes intrigued to add to the number of "souls" in their territories irrespective of blood, language, or religious affiliations. Austrian and Spanish princes ruled Italian states; the Austrian house governed what is now Belgium; the unfeeling disruption of Poland in the latter half of the eighteenth century offered opportunities to Russia, Prussia, and Austria to aggrandize themselves.
No sympathy was extended to subjects thus living under, or brought under, the dominion of foreign princes.

To summarize: In the later eighteenth century the great mass of the people were still unenlightened in a political sense and incapable of exerting pressure upon national policy by an intelligent public opinion. Personal liberty of thought, expression, movement for the people at large was unknown. States were thought of, named, directed, and typified by the persons of their sovereigns. Although monarchs in the leading states followed the dictates of advanced political philosophy in their performance of their duties, they still upheld the principle of autocracy and regarded themselves as divinely authorized and gifted for absolute government. And international politics consisted of the intrigues of princes to add to their dominions, irrespective of ties of race, language, or religion.

With these general ideas of political conditions in Europe of the later eighteenth century, we may now consider in more detail the governments of the leading separate states. These are of special importance in our study for, although as we have noted the princes had no body of intelligent public opinion upon which to rely, their governments controlled and directed the destinies of the millions of men in Europe. Historians are not without justification, therefore, in devoting their space to the domestic and international politics of the governments of the European states.

We should first get an accurate notion of what the political subdivisions of Europe were in the latter half of the eighteenth century. We may use the map of modern Europe as the basis of our description in order to gain at the same time an idea of the vast changes which have taken place. Beginning with the east, we find Russia then as in 1914 the greatest state territorially in Europe. The Russia of that period, however, had not thrust herself so far into the heart of Europe as she has since done, for Finland was a part of Sweden, and Poland was a great independent
kingdom stretching from Posen to the Dnieper River, and from the Gulf of Riga to within about one hundred miles of Odessa on the Black Sea. To the southeast, the Turkish empire than embraced all of modern Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece, and stretched across the Bosphorus, as today, into Asia Minor. Central Europe was cut up into a large number of independent units, loosely bound politically into the so-called Holy Roman Empire. Of these independent units the most important were Prussia, stretching along the Baltic in the north, with scattered dependencies up to the Rhine, and Austria, including Hungary, to the south. The remaining units, ranging from insignificant states with a few thousand inhabitants to kingdoms of the size of Bavaria and Saxony, reached through central Europe from the Baltic and North seas to Switzerland. In the south, the Italian peninsula was cut up into a number of independent states, the most important of which were the Kingdom of Naples, which reached from Naples south, and included the island of Sicily, the States of the Church, which extended in a broad belt from Rome northeastward to the head of the Adriatic Sea, and Venice, Lombardy (or Milan), and Piedmont (including the island of Sardinia) in the north. Denmark at this time possessed what is now Norway; and Sweden, still retaining some remnants of its former greatness, had dominion over Finland. Tucked away in the northwest was independent Holland, and, south of it, the Austrian Netherlands. France, Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain had substantially the same boundaries as in modern times.

Of the units we have mentioned, the most important actors in the drama we are about to follow were Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and Great Britain. These states featured in events from beginning to end: the other states either furnished merely the battleground for the opposing forces, or injected themselves only occasionally into the action. Leaving France for extended treatment in the
next chapter, we shall consider here political conditions in Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England, and outline the nature and government of the Holy Roman Empire.

i. Russia

Catherine II of Russia, Catherine the Great, succeeded to the throne in 1762 at the age of thirty-three, after a palace revolution engineered by her favorites had dethroned and assassinated her husband, Peter III. She was a German princess by birth, married to the Grand-duke Peter of Russia by the influence of Frederick the Great of Prussia with the idea of cementing friendship between Russia and Prussia. Her education, as was customary at the time in German princely families, was largely in the hands of French governesses and tutors. With great good sense, Catherine, once her future was determined for her, set out to fit herself for her assured position of Empress of Russia. She learned thoroughly the Russian language, adopted the orthodox religion of the Greek church, accustomed herself to the conventions of Russian society, and tried to understand and appreciate the nature and needs of the Russian people. A woman of strong and determined character, she found herself wedded to a degraded degenerate without ambition, taste, or decency. She could not but despise him, and he in turn both hated and feared her. A few months after Peter’s accession to the throne in January, 1762, a group of her favorites, realizing his utter inefficiency and willing to advance their own fortunes by placing Catherine in sole power, proclaimed his deposition and Catherine’s elevation to the throne as empress. A few days later Peter’s death by “apoplexy” was announced. He was probably murdered. Though Catherine was not directly guilty of this murder, she connived at it. The assassins, though generally suspected, were never punished.

Once empress, this German-born and French-educated woman showed a force of character and talent for govern-
ment which marked her as an unusual genius. Though her private life was immoral and the story of her amours was common gossip throughout the court society of Europe, though she had no innate love of the arts, she exhibited a practical sense and judgment in affairs of state and a passion for her adopted country which firmly secured her position in the opinions of her contemporaries and have won the admiration of succeeding generations. In internal affairs, Catherine was responsible for the organization of local administration in provincial governorships which persisted until the Russian Revolution in 1917. By this innovation the centralized administration, which had proved inefficient because of the vast extent and varied interests in the great empire, was replaced by a system under which the country was divided and subdivided for local government into areas which local governors and provincial governors-general could manage. The ultimate direction and control, of course, was to remain in the hands of the sovereign; but the administration of purely local interests was under this system left in the hands of those who could best appreciate the needs and interests of the people concerned. The complete working out and installation of this system, thus so briefly stated, occupied twenty years of Catherine’s reign. The system marked an immense advance in efficiency over the previous chaotic conditions. That it did not accomplish more perfect results in following generations was due not so much to the faults of the theory as to the corruption and inefficiency of the officials.

In her policy toward serfdom, Catherine theoretically advocated the uplift of the serf socially, economically, and politically, but in practice was forced by conditions to support and continue the existing status. Government in Russia was to all intents and purposes carried on by a well-understood alliance between the sovereign and the nobility: anything which Catherine might do to antagonize the nobility would create an intense opposition. The no-
bility, naturally, since it lived upon serfdom, considered serfdom as a necessary institution in the empire. Hence, though Catherine endeavored to give an opportunity for improvement in the status of serfs, and actually appointed a Legislative Commission to deliberate upon ways and means for admitting serfs to limited rights in local affairs, the dead weight of the nobility thwarted all her efforts. It is to the credit of her reputation for liberalism, however, that she had the interests of the serfs so much at heart and actually projected schemes for their gradual emancipation.

Again in the matter of the laws and the courts, Catherine showed advanced ideas. She felt the need of a thorough revision and codification of the body of existing law, and even went to the length of drawing up herself a draft of the general principles to be followed by the appointed commission. Here, however, as in the case of serfdom, we have to credit Catherine with good intentions rather than with practical results, for the magnitude of the task prevented the commission from ever recommending radical changes.

In her policy toward the economic life of the country, Catherine achieved more. She favored freedom of trade and manufacture, and, inasmuch as these interests were slight and did not materially affect the nobility, was able to promulgate decrees to bring about these conditions. She removed export duties, abolished monopolies, permitted without special authority the establishment of factories by private enterprise, and appointed a Trade Commission to handle matters connected with commerce. Especially notable were her interest in the waterways throughout the country and her efforts for their improvement. Thus her policy in general stimulated the growth of industry and trade in the empire. Here, as in administrative reforms, failure to achieve more was due to the incapacity and corruption of many of her agents and to the ignorance and stupidity of the masses of the population.
Catherine appreciated keenly the need for general educational reforms throughout the country, but she was thwarted by the social and political conditions. Education on a scale involving the serfs was, in the opinion of the great landed nobility, impracticable and undesirable. She provided, however, special schools in St. Petersburg for the children of the privileged classes, cadet corps for the boys and boarding schools for the girls, and planned that the capital of each governmental district should have a national school. But in the latter project, as in so many others, she encountered obstacles of ignorance, superstition, incapacity, indolence, and corruption,—obstacles which one sovereign in a single generation could not hope to overcome. The few schools she founded remain to her credit. The new universities and the system of national schools in the provinces never materialized.

We have indicated in the above paragraphs a few of the interests which occupied the time of this notable sovereign. They give but a partial view of the diversity and activity of Catherine's mind and character. She journeyed constantly through her empire, striving to see in person the effects of her reforms. She created an Imperial Medical Commission and founded hospitals. Entirely irreligious by nature, she carried through a scheme for the secularization of the church lands and made the clergy the paid servants of the state, at the same time affirming her allegiance to the orthodox faith of the Russian people. She consistently endeavored to further the complete Russification of her non-Russian subjects. She wrote voluminously, not only official reports and instructions, but memoirs, columns in a fashionable periodical, plays (which were actually performed), and letters to a number of correspondents, of whom Frederick the Great and Voltaire were the most conspicuous. Force, brilliance, genius, vigor were apparent in all that Catherine did: she deserved the title of Catherine the Great.
More notable than her internal reforms were her successes in her foreign policy. Russia’s chief contemporaries were Turkey to the south and Prussia and Austria to the west. Hostility to Turkey was traditional in Russian circles: hostility to Prussia or Austria was spasmodic. It fell to Catherine’s lot to carry through two wars against Turkey, and to intrigue successfully to keep the peace with Austria and Prussia, yet to continue clear of any alliance which would impede the independence of Russia.

As a result of her first Turkish war (1768–1774), she separated considerable territory in the neighborhood of the Black Sea from her enemy. The most important parcel was the Crimea, which she definitely annexed in 1783. In 1787 war with Turkey again broke out, and the great Russian victory at Ochakoff (1788) insured Catherine in all the gains she had made before. Early in 1792 the treaty of peace was signed.

The most important single event in the relations between Russia and her western contemporaries during Catherine’s reign was the first partition of Poland. This once powerful country had fallen into a sad state of decay. Its government consisted of a sovereign elected by the nobility, and deliberative and legislative Diets composed of members of the nobility. Public political life consisted in the rivalries between the noble families in the struggle for power. These rivalries paralyzed government and kept the entire country in a state of continual anarchy. With the development of powerful and unified neighbors all around her, Poland was marked for extinction: only the jealousies of the great powers had saved her for generations past. For two centuries before Catherine came to the throne, the emissaries of European powers had intrigued in Polish politics. Catherine, therefore, was doing nothing new when she entered the arena. Her vigor and unscrupulous aggressiveness, however, gave Russian intrigue a new character. In 1764, by agreement with Frederick the Great, she secured the
election of her favorite, Stanislas Poniatowski, as King of Poland. She is credited with having suggested to Frederick's ambassador at St. Petersburg a few years later the advisability of dividing up Poland to their mutual profit. Austria, of course, had interests which could not be disregarded, so Maria Theresa was invited to join the agreement. In 1772, the first partition took place, Poland losing approximately one third of its land and population. Russia gained a rather more important section than either of the other countries. Catherine's policy justified itself in her eyes and in the eyes of Russian political circles by its success.

Catherine's foreign policy thus consisted in the assertion of Russia's power for what she conceived to be Russian interests. She kept herself consistently free from alliances unless such alliances tended to yield national gain for Russia. Particularly in the case of Prussia and Austria, who individually were continually bidding for her friendship, did she stand aloof, preferring to render Russia's position stronger by the possibility of casting her weight on one side or the other at any critical moment. There was nothing altruistic in such policy, to be sure, but no governments at that time were altruistic. In the game of princes, Catherine played her hand exceedingly well. Her reign resulted not only in large and important territorial additions, but in an increase of prestige for Russian diplomats in the councils of central European statesmen. As Peter the Great is credited with having introduced Russia to western Europe, Catherine may not unjustly be credited with having established Russia's position among the great powers of Europe and having made Russia a factor henceforth to be reckoned with in diplomacy. Catherine II was still Empress of Russia at the time the French Revolution broke out, not dying until 1796.
ii. Austria

The reins of government in the Austrian dominions at the time of the beginning of the French Revolution were in the hands of Joseph II, one of the most remarkable and thorough-going reformers among the Enlightened Despots. Born in 1741, instructed from his early boyhood in the mechanical details of governmental administration, thoroughly acquainted and wholly in sympathy with the liberal and progressive political theories of his age, Joseph succeeded to the throne upon the death of his mother, Maria Theresa, in 1780. He was then a man of thirty-nine, equipped, apparently, as few monarchs of his time were, with the mental qualities, the education, and the training suitable for success. He was serious-minded, taking a noble view of the responsibilities of his position, and set out at once to make his reign notable for its reforms. Thoroughly masterful and despotic in nature, he eagerly seized the opportunities of his position. Unfortunately for him and for conditions within Austria, he lacked judgment, that judgment which saved Catherine of Russia so many times from attempting innovations which social and political conditions were too backward to permit. He failed to appreciate the nature and extent of the inertia and opposition his attempts to raise Austria from medievalism to modernism would face. Thus the record of his reign becomes a statement of noble failures, of well-intentioned decrees nullified by sullen opposition and open rebellion. He died in 1790, just after the outbreak of the French Revolution, a sad and embittered man.

With all the enthusiasm of a heaven-sent reformer, Joseph, immediately he inherited the throne in 1780, initiated his measures to cure Austrian society of all its evils. In 1781, he issued a Patent of Tolerance, giving freedom of religious worship within his dominions. Along the same lines, he later decreed the suppression of the contemplative religious
orders, characterizing them as useless, and thus decreased largely the number of monasteries and convents. Further, he interested himself in the education of the secular clergy in his domains. In order to broaden such education, he replaced the regular diocesan seminaries by general seminaries having a curriculum including secular as well as theological studies. By these changes, the education of the clergy was actually directed by the government. As was to be expected, these reforms incurred serious opposition from the Catholic church. The Pope, departing from his custom, visited Vienna in person at one time to plead against Joseph's decrees.

The sovereign endeavored to replace the old and outworn judicial system with one more suited to contemporary conditions. He therefore swept away the former courts and substituted an admirable uniform judicial hierarchy, ranging from numerous local courts in small areas to the High Court sitting in Vienna, with provisions for appeal from one rank of court to another. At the same time he decreed a radical revision of the penal code along enlightened lines, abolishing torture and the methods of the inquisition and restricting materially the list of crimes punishable by death. In no field was the wisdom of the monarch more clearly displayed than in these reforms, but he met the utmost difficulty in finding the men to carry through details of the new system. Its partial failure was due, not to faults in the Emperor's plan, but to the incapacity and lack of sympathy of his agents.

The energetic reformer had been struck by the misery of the peasantry in his travels through Austria before he ascended the throne. The feudal system had held out longer therein than in other parts of Europe, except Russia. In large sections, as in Moravia and Bohemia, actual serfdom still existed, with crushing burdens laid upon the peasantry by the overlords. Joseph undertook as Emperor to rectify and improve conditions. He abolished serfdom
throughout the Slav provinces, and secured to the peasants the right to own land, to marry according to their own choice, and to move freely from place to place. This reform, so admirable in theory, turned an important body of the nobility, which he sorely needed for his political support, against him. We cannot but compare Catherine's action under similar circumstances: though theoretically favoring the emancipation of the serfs as whole-heartedly as Joseph did, her superior judgment warned her that emancipation was not a politically wise step under the conditions. Joseph, headstrong and confident of the correctness of his ideas, issued his decrees and suffered the consequences.

The opposition to Joseph's government flamed forth in rebellion during the latter years of his reign. Between 1787 and 1789 the Austrian Netherlands revolted, the leaders rising to defend their ancient institutions. The revolutionists were, indeed, the conservative element, led by clerical influence and aroused by the successive decrees for religious freedom and toleration and for the decrease of monastic Orders. These conservative elements were supported by the administrative circles when Joseph's later decrees disrupted the existing judicial and civil system in the provinces. At the same time, serious trouble had arisen in Hungary. There, as in other parts of his dominion, Joseph's religious reforms had been badly received. Also, indications that he favored a more liberal treatment of the peasantry, and his innovations in the judicial and administrative systems alarmed the privileged classes of Hungary, who had so long profited from the old conditions. He faced formidable disorders in this great and supremely important part of his empire. Though he was finally able, by pouring troops into the disaffected regions, to prevent disaster, the extent and force of the opposition broke his spirit. He finally awoke to the universal discontent which his well-intentioned reforms had created throughout his dominions. In bitterness of spirit he decreed at the end of January,
1790, the annulment of his reform measures (with the exception of the abolition of serfdom) and the restoration of conditions in the empire to those existing at the time of his succession to the throne. A few weeks later he died, and was succeeded by his brother Leopold II.

Austria as left by Joseph at the beginning of the French Revolution was internally in a dangerous state. The lack of tact and judgment on the part of the sovereign in carrying through his well-intentioned reforms had alienated the most powerful elements in the country. At a period when the government was shortly to need all its united resources to meet the inroads of a new and determined invader, Joseph’s policies had actually tended toward national disorganization. Austria was politically and militarily weaker at the close of his reign than she was at its beginning, less capable of resisting the forces set in motion by the French Revolution.

iii. Prussia

Frederick II, Frederick the Great, of Prussia, after a notable reign of forty-six years, died August 17, 1786. He was succeeded by his nephew, Frederick William II, a man then in his forty-second year. Frederick William II remained King of Prussia during the beginning and early years of the French Revolution.

Frederick the Great had during his long reign raised Prussia from a small unregarded state in Europe to the position of one of the great continental powers. As a youth, he had greatly offended his martinet of a father, Frederick William, by his frivolous tastes, his apparent lack of interest in the army (so dear to the old King’s heart), and his stubborn opposition to the royal plans for his education. As he grew to manhood, however, he yielded himself, after some terrible experiences of the results of his opposition, more fully to his father’s will. From the time he was twenty years old (1732) until he ascended the throne
(1740), he performed the duties set for him by Frederick William so thoroughly that he regained in a great degree the esteem of the King. At the same time, he continued to be a diligent student of philosophy, history, and poetry.

At his accession to the throne upon the death of old Frederick William (May 31, 1740), all traces of the frivolity which had marked his youth were effaced. He took his position and his duties most seriously. Considering himself as the "first servant of his people," and believing it to be his duty to raise Prussia's prestige and place in Europe, he clearly discerned that the two foundations of his policy must be a sound financial system and a powerful army. He had inherited from his father a goodly state treasure and a strong army: these he undertook to increase in every practicable way.

A few months after his accession, he plunged his country into war with the new Queen of Austria, Maria Theresa, in an attempt to enforce Prussia's traditional claims to Silesia. His victories in this First Silesian War (1740–1742) and in the Second Silesian War which followed (1744–1745) gained him the territory he desired and focused the attention of European chancelleries upon him. He became the most famous sovereign of his time.

His great military reputation was gained, however, in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), brought on by Maria Theresa's attempt to regain Silesia. Emerging finally successful from this war, he had twenty-three years of peace at the close of his reign.

His greatest qualities as a sovereign were displayed by his policies during this period of peace. His "enlightenment" in no way encouraged liberalism in government: he was absolute monarch in his dominions. Indeed, his success as absolute monarch increased the prestige of the institution in Prussia and rendered the people of that country less likely to appreciate the liberalism loosed by
the forces of the French Revolution. By Frederick's orders, all kinds of public questions, important and unimportant, were submitted to him for decision. He was a keen and accurate judge of character, and appointed to public offices a group of clear-thinking, hard-working, efficient men, who were stimulated to do their best by the knowledge that Frederick himself was always in touch with what they were doing. He personally took the most intense interest in the finances of his kingdom, gaining a reputation for niggardliness by his care for trifles: yet his interest and care were responsible for the rapid recovery of Prussia after the disorganization and virtual bankruptcy of the country following the Seven Years' War. He instituted plans for the encouragement of agriculture throughout his lands, going so far as to lend the army horses and to furnish seed to many landowners whose property had been devastated by war, and arranging for the draining and cultivation of huge areas of swamp land. He began measures for the codification of laws in his kingdom, a huge task not finished until eight years after his death. Above all, he exerted himself continually to keep his army in the most perfect condition and training.

His success as a sovereign was proved, according to the standards accepted at the time, by the changed conditions in Prussia at the time he died. He had found Prussia a state of four and a half million people, regarded as of the second rank politically in the councils of Europe: he left Prussia increased twofold in territory with a population of seven and one half million, recognized as one of the great continental powers. At his accession, Austria was the single great German power: at his death, Prussia shared German power with Austria, beginning a rivalry which was not settled until the field of Königgrätz in 1866. He had waged the most devastating of wars, draining his country of both money and men: yet at his death his policies had so recouped Prussian resources that he left seventy million
thalers in the state treasury (c. $49,000,000) and a perfectly equipped and drilled army of 200,000.

Frederick William II, whose task in carrying on Frederick the Great's policies was clearly outlined for him at his accession, failed miserably. His reign marks the beginning of the descent of Prussia into the Valley of Humiliation, whose nadir was reached in Napoleon's time. Personally, he was a gentle, well-meaning man, but lacked force of character, aggressiveness, and a grasp of the principles of wise government and administration. A vein of mysticism in his nature made him a prey to the quacks who abounded at a period so famous for its spiritualists, alchemists, and pretended wise men. He became a member of one of the well-known secret "Orders" of the age, and allowed himself to be influenced in his policies by some of the charlatans in his "Order." Frederick the Great must have turned in his grave did he know the weakness and incapacity which his successor showed in governing the magnificent heritage he had bequeathed.

Frederick William II's narrow religious views were indicated when he reversed the policy of tolerance followed by his predecessor and established a censorship to forbid discussion of all questions of religion or dogma. Candidates for the ministry had to submit to the most rigid tests of orthodoxy, and the famous philosopher Kant was reprimanded for the tone of one of his works.

The immense fortune of over seventy million thalers accumulated by Frederick the Great in years of scrimpming and sacrifice, Frederick William II dissolved in less than nine years. To gain a temporary popularity, he remitted many of the taxes his uncle had levied and replaced them by none other, so that the income of the government steadily decreased. Whereas the Prussia of Frederick the Great's time was financially independent, Prussia under Frederick William II descended to the financial status of her great rival, Austria, and became unable to carry on an aggressive policy without liberal subsidies from without.
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE

Frederick the Great had taken the keenest interest in his army and had welded the interests of the officer class to those of the monarchy by his own leadership and by his grants of special privileges. Frederick William II took no interest in his army, turned its management over to a specially constituted board, made no effort to replace incompetent and superannuated officers, and allowed this great prop of the monarchy and insurance of Prussia’s position in Europe to degenerate sadly in efficiency.

Frederick the Great had shown especially by his brilliance in his foreign policy: his successor failed here as elsewhere. His vacillation and indecision cost Prussia advantages in the rivalry with Austria for prestige in the Holy Roman Empire. His futile expedition into Holland to maintain the part of his sister, the wife of the Prince of Orange, had no result for Prussia but to dissipate its resources. His neglect of the opportunities offered by the French Revolution lowered Prussian prestige and lost him the chance to become practical arbiter in central Europe.

Thus in every department of political affairs Frederick William II broke with the policies of his predecessor. The decay, once begun, proceeded rapidly. By the time the French Revolution had been accomplished and Napoleon had assumed leadership, Prussia had become but an empty shell of the splendid state Frederick the Great had left. Frederick William II died November 16, 1797, leaving it to his son and successor, Frederick William III, to see the full fruition of his weak and incapable policies.

iv. The Holy Roman Empire

No account of political conditions on the continent would be sufficient which did not indicate the nature and government of the Holy Roman Empire. The title, it was once wittily said, was a misnomer, for this central European agglomeration of states was neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. The territories nominally part of this
"Empire," however, stretched through central Europe and played an important part in the events of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period.

Historically, the Holy Roman Empire came into being in 962 A.D., when Pope John XII crowned Otto I as Emperor, intending to renew under the auspices of the Catholic church an empire as broad and as great as that of ancient Rome. Actually, however, the Holy Roman Empire never fulfilled the Pope's intentions, for it lacked the organization, unity, and centralized power which characterized Rome at its height. The Holy Roman Emperor had but shadowy authority over the mighty feudal lords whose territories formed a part of the Empire. The tendency toward the development of individual political states was far greater than the tendency toward unity. If we were to trace in detail the history of the Holy Roman Empire from its foundation in 962 to its condition at the outbreak of the French Revolution more than eight centuries later, we should record the various stages marking the decrease of central authority and the crystallization of state lines.

By the end of the eighteenth century the disintegration of the Empire had proceeded far. Italy and Burgundy, which had originally been important components, had been detached, and only "The Germanies," that is, the lands in central Europe peopled by Germans, remained. More than three hundred separate units could be counted, ranging from Austria and Prussia down to petty dukedoms or counties comprising a single castle with a miserable peasants' village at its base. Indeed, if we should include all the imperial baronies, the number of units would be over twelve hundred.

The Empire, however, still maintained a kind of political organization. The central Diet was composed of three colleges, the college of the Electors, the college of Princes, and the college of Free Cities. In these colleges the separate units of the Empire had their representatives. When
all these colleges agreed upon anything—a most rare occasion—their decision was presented to the Emperor for his approval as a conclusum of the Empire. The Emperor himself was elected, not hereditary. The election for generations past, however, had fallen to the head of the Austrian Hapsburg house.

Theoretically this organization might have been efficient: practically it was the reverse. The intense rivalry of Austria and Prussia, the selfish aims of each individual unit, the lack of any genuine national feeling or pat riotism, combined to defeat efficiency. The Holy Roman Emperor, though crowned with all the traditional ceremony, wielded influence, not because he was head of the Holy Roman Empire, but because he was head of Austria. Any attempt of an Emperor to exert more than a nominal authority aroused instant opposition among the other states. Each individual unit, instead of considering itself bound to further the interests of the Empire as a whole, sought only to secure its own independence and safety and to aggrandize itself if possible at the expense of its neighbors. Mutual jealousy and suspicion took the place of patriotism. "The Germanies" of 1789 revealed nothing of that solidarity which has marked the national life of the German Empire since 1870–1871.

v. England

Across the English Channel, social, economic, and political life had developed along lines markedly different from those on the continent. The early abolition in the seventeenth century of the relics of feudalism had favored the development of the independent and self-reliant peasant-farmer. Though nobles retained their titles, they preserved none of those irritating and often burdensome privileges which on the continent distinguished the nobility as a class from the peasantry. Taxes were levied alike against noble and farmer, rich and poor. Forced and humiliating labor was unknown. Further, the successes in the Seven Years’ War
(1756–1763), under the inspiring leadership of William Pitt (Earl of Chatham), had stimulated national patriotism and had won for Great Britain vast colonial possessions in Canada and India. In industrial development, England was decidedly in advance of her neighbors across the channel. The forerunners of modern machinery, calculated to increase marvelously the speed and quantity of production, were just being introduced. The number and the prosperity of the bourgeoisie, the middle class, which formed the bulwark of liberal institutions in England, were increasing by leaps and bounds. Isolated as she was geographically from the continent, England in her internal social and economic conditions had progressed much more rapidly than her contemporaries toward modern standards.

The differences were even more notable, however, in the English political institutions. Whereas on the continent the sovereigns ruled in their respective states, in England Parliament ruled. England had already become a Limited Monarchy, as distinguished from the absolute monarchies which prevailed elsewhere throughout Europe. The unique features in the English system were the Parliament, the Cabinet, and the position and powers of the King.

Although parliaments were not unknown in states upon the continent, they had played but an unimportant part in political life. In England, however, the Parliament had at the beginning of the eighteenth century signalized its control over the government by passing over the legitimate claimant to the throne because he was a Catholic, and summoning George, Duke of Hanover, member of a collateral branch in the English line, because he was a Protestant. The ascendancy which the Parliament thus established over the person of the sovereign it never lost in succeeding years. An inner council of Parliament, called the Cabinet, composed of the leaders of the dominant political party and headed by the Prime Minister, determined the policies of the government, and presented them to the King for
confirmation. Although in theory the King retained the power of veto, in practice he was forced to accept the proposals of the Cabinet, supported as they were by a majority in Parliament. He could, of course, by his personal influence and by the wisdom of his advice, wield an enormous influence with his Cabinet, but in the last analysis he could not resist its decision without running the risk of losing both his crown and his head. Thus where upon the continent we have emphasized the character and policies of the sovereigns, in England we must consider both the sovereign and the Prime Minister—perhaps we should reverse the order and say, the Prime Minister and the sovereign.

George III, the third in direct line from that Duke of Hanover who was summoned to the throne in 1714, began his reign in 1760 and was King through the entire revolutionary and Napoleonic period. Resenting the limitations upon his power, he endeavored under the existing forms to dictate himself the national policy. Ten years after his accession to the throne (1770) he obtained a subservient Prime Minister, Lord North, through whom he accomplished his purpose for a time. The tragic result of his policy for England was the loss of the American colonies by revolution in the years from 1775 to 1783. Before the final treaty was signed, the strength of parliamentary and public opposition forced Lord North from his office (1782). There then ensued a bitter conflict in which the obstinate King endeavored again to obtain a ministry of his own choice, a conflict ended by practical victory for Parliament in 1784 when William Pitt, son of the Pitt who had been Prime Minister during the Seven Years' War, was appointed to head the government. The younger Pitt continued Prime Minister, with one break between 1801 and 1804, until his death in 1806. At his elevation he was a man of but twenty-four years of age. It was he, and not George III, who carried England through the strain occasioned by the French Revolution and the early years of the Napoleonic wars.
CHAPTER II

FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION

When revolt flames up in a country, the spark that sets the fire is usually lost to view in the general conflagration. Thus it was in France. The immediate cause of the revolution was the vicious financial system (or lack of system) which had brought the country face to face with national insolvency, but when the spirit of rebellion was once aroused, all persons with real or fancied grievances of any kind pressed their demands for reforms along all lines. To appreciate the causes of the universality of this revolution in France, then, we must gain a clear understanding of general conditions in the country as well as trace the successive incidents which brought on the financial crisis.


i. The Peasantry

The France of the last quarter of the eighteenth century had a population of approximately 25,000,000, of whom ninety per cent were peasant-farmers. Serfdom had practically disappeared, not more than a million and a half of serfs remaining in the country, and the peasants had liberty of person, freedom to move from place to place, the right to marry according to their choice, the legal power to make contracts and to own, mortgage, lease, and bequeath land. Indeed, as a class the peasantry had prospered in France, compared with the conditions of their neighbors in other continental countries. Though their lives seem pinched and barren according to our modern standards, their natural
industry and thrift yielded them a living and enabled large numbers to become landed proprietors on a small scale. It has been estimated that one half the arable land in France belonged to the peasants, and records show that from year to year members of the peasant class were adding to their holdings by purchase.

At the same time the peasant was subject to many irritating and humiliating reminders of the previous condition of servitude of his class. He alone bore the burden of the tax called the taille, levied directly in accordance with the supposed wealth of the individual. The nobility were exempt from payment of this tax on the theory that they rendered direct military service to the King in its place; and the corporations of the towns usually paid a lump sum for exemption. Liability for the taille had thus become, not merely a financial burden, but a mark of social inferiority. The tax, and the conditions under which it was assessed and collected, were important among the "abuses" of which the peasants complained.

A direct survival of the feudal conditions was the system of charges or dues which descendants of the former seigniors were legally able to collect from the land of the peasants. Thus, although a peasant might own his land, and mortgage, lease, or sell it, that land was always subject to an annual payment to the lord. Often, too, in case of the sale of land, a definite proportion of the sale-price went to the lord. Further, the peasant was required to have his grain ground at the lord's mill, his grapes pressed in the lord's winepress, his flour baked in the lord's oven. For each service he had to pay a fee which went to the lord. And still further, at the important road and river crossings he had to pay toll which likewise swelled the lord's income. The actual financial burdens imposed upon the peasantry by these vestiges of feudalism were not for any single individual heavy, but they were constant and exasperating reminders of an outlived system, which aroused the keenest resent-
ment among the people. Throughout most of France, too, the lords themselves seldom exiled themselves from the pleasures of Paris to the vicinity of their ancestral estates. Hence, the collection of these dues and tolls lay in the hands of bailiffs whose efficiency was measured by the amounts they turned in. Constant trouble resulted. The disputes between the peasants and the lords' bailiffs over questions of seigniorial dues, charges, and tolls filled the rural courts and furnished a living for a host of petty lawyers.

The peasant also resented the inherited privileges of the nobility in regard to hunting. This sport was legally reserved to the noble class, and game could not be harmed by the peasant. Each seignior, too, had the right to keep pigeons to an unlimited number, pigeons who found their food in the peasant's grain fields. Any peasant who killed one of these birds was liable to imprisonment. Such privileges were no slight matter to the peasant. Large tracts of arable land in the neighborhood of hunting preserves were left untilled.

The peasants, again, were the only class of the population subject to the royal corvée, consisting of labor for from eight to forty days annually upon the highways. This labor was exacted often when the peasant's attention to his crops was most necessary. Exemption from the corvée was a privilege of the nobility, and a natural right of the townspeople. This labor added one more grievance to the long list of complaints of the peasantry.

Added to the burdens imposed upon the peasant by the survivals of feudalism were the taxes levied directly or indirectly upon him by the government. The capitation, or poll tax, was one, to be sure, levied upon all heads of households in France, but its weight was proportionately heavier upon the peasant than upon the wealthy nobleman. The nobles were rated for this tax according to their personal declaration, and commonly escaped the greatest part of their legitimate share. The whole body of the clergy had
for years compounded with the government for its portion of the tax by a free gift (don gratuit) to the King at five-year intervals, such gift, however, amounting to much less than the tax would have yielded. The townspeople were more directly taxed, and paid more nearly their proportionate quota. But the peasant at the bottom of the scale, helpless individually to resist injustice, paid, it is estimated, eight times his just share of the burden.

The indirect taxes, collected through duties laid upon such articles as tobacco, powder, saltpeter, were commonly farmed out by the government. By this system, the government leased to the Farmers-General (as the leasees were called) for a lump sum paid in advance the right to assess and collect these duties, the Farmers-General profiting by the amount yielded by the duties over and above the sum paid to the government for the concession. The system gave enormous profits to the Farmers-General, who used all means to exact every possible payment from the people. The agents were intensely hated throughout all of France. Voltaire, in a circle where stories of famous robbers were being told, when himself pressed for a tale, started: "Once upon a time there was a Farmer-General;" then stopped, waited a moment, and added: "That is all."

Such were some of the most noteworthy grievances, or "abuses," under which the peasant suffered. By one writer he is termed "the beast of burden of the old régime." The brand of social and political inferiority and the greatest part of the weight of the direct and indirect taxation fell to his lot. He is estimated to have paid in excess of fifty per cent of his income in dues, charges, or imposts of one kind or another. That he thrived at all under such a burden is to be marveled at; that he was bitterly discontented is natural. He was ready for revolution so long as it offered the promise of lifting some of the burdens from him. He had no altruistic ideals. He held no high theories of government. His lack of education, inexperience in political affairs, and
long unremitting toil in subordinate positions barred him from taking the initiative or leadership. But he had come to such a pass that he was willing to throw himself wholeheartedly into any movement which might better the hard conditions of his ordinary life. Selfish as his motives must be acknowledged to have been, they were yet the keenest spur to his action, an all-sufficient reason which kept him true to the revolution, once started, from its beginning to its end.

ii. The Bourgeoisie

The peasantry, as we have said, were the most numerous and, on the whole, the most important element in the population of France: next in numbers and importance were the bourgeoisie. Bourgeoisie, derived from a word for town, originally was applied to the class of people living in towns as distinguished from those living in the country. By extension of meaning the word came to be used as a general term for persons of the middle class of society, i.e., belonging neither to the peasant or laboring classes nor to the nobility. In the bourgeoisie would be included merchants, shopkeepers, master craftsmen, and professional men of all kinds. In France in the last quarter of the eighteenth century this element contained some two million persons, concentrated almost wholly in about 80 towns or cities containing 10,000 or more inhabitants.

What the bourgeoisie as compared with the peasantry lacked in numbers, it made up in intelligence, vigor, and prosperity. The average man of this class had need of sharp wits to keep his place in the keen competition with his fellows in business. He was well educated in the endowed schools of his town. He was widely read in the social and political philosophy of the day. He had a part, though small, in the local administration. He had property and capital. From his class came the brightest lawyers, judges, doctors, professors, financiers, and civil adminis-
trators. A common class interest and property interest bound the individuals together. The bourgeoisie was the most recent, indeed the only new, development in French society since the feudal ages. It was unfortunate for the monarchy that it did not recognize and appreciate the qualities of this new class.

The very intelligence, vigor, and prosperity of the bourgeoisie made its members the most damning critics of the incapacity of the government. The bourgeois had no inherited awe or fear of the nobility. He felt no special reverence for the members of the Catholic hierarchy. He had, indeed, come to feel that the person of the monarch himself did not have the peculiar sanctity which the Middle Ages had ascribed to him as vice-regent of God. He resented the arrogance and insolence of the nobles. He was indignant at the narrow class distinction which barred him from commissions in the army and navy and from service in the diplomatic corps. He objected to the continual official interference with the normal course and development of industry and commerce. He understood the waste in high places that was so largely responsible for the financial stringency of the country. He sought for himself the wider opportunities that would come with the breaking of the traditional political and social barriers. He wanted a greater share in the local and national government, a place proportionate to his wealth, ability, and education.

So he, as well as the peasant, was ripe for a revolution which promised reforms. He, however, had political theories, untested though they were by practical experience, and was willing to assume the leadership. He had had his imagination fired by the success of the Americans in their revolt from 1775 to 1783 and was proud of France's part in helping them. The peasantry constituted the body of the French Revolution: the bourgeoisie, the brains.

In all the towns and cities there existed a class, usually disregarded, known later as the proletariat. These people
corresponded roughly to what we often call in modern days the submerged tenth of society, that portion whose normal life is passed in poverty and misery. They furnished the common laborers, the drivers, the hod carriers, the bricklayers, and the considerable multitude of mere scavengers and hangers-on of society. Without education or fixed occupation, they had no chance to rise in life, and lived on the verge of starvation most of the time. They were the first to suffer from any lessening of the food supply, and, with unscrupulous leadership, the most daring and unprincipled of all classes. Although as a factor in social conditions they are always important, they merit treatment here solely because of the significant part they played later in the darker and more terrible part of the Revolution.

iii. The Nobility

The nobility, the class which profited by the survivals of the feudal system, and which stood intrenched in its privileges, was certain to resist with all its power any measures of reform. The nobility, indeed, formed a select group in French social life, into which every child of noble parentage was born, and into which a few not of noble birth might enter by virtue of their official position. Although bitter animosity existed in many cases between the old nobility, tracing its lineage from former seigniors, and the new nobility, raised from the wealthy bourgeoisie by appointment to, or by open purchase of, an official position, the nobles as a whole stood together in their opposition to any change in the political and social structure of the Kingdom. In numbers, however, they were unimportant compared with the peasantry and the bourgeoisie. There were probably less than 150,000 of them in the Kingdom.

The noble, however, had all the prestige of tradition and position. He alone was eligible for commissions in the army and navy and for diplomatic service. Since he was freely admitted to the presence of his sovereign, with whom
so many lucrative and important official appointments originated, he had unusual opportunities to secure good positions in the government. He profited without labor on his part from the numerous seigniorial dues, charges, tolls, and the like, inherited from an obsolete system. Though he might not be rich, his social position was assured, and he often exhibited a careless arrogance and insolence before those whom he considered his inferiors. He had every motive in the existing conditions and in prospect of future opportunities to uphold the old régime.

And yet, the position of the noble in the country at large was not strong. Where his ancestors, the feudal lords, had lived in the country and identified themselves with their local districts, were known to and often beloved by their peasantry, the noble of Louis XVI's time found his sole pleasure in the towns, especially in Paris. He spoke of residence upon his ancestral estates as "exile." He was commonly represented there by his agent, or bailiff. Any personal consideration the peasantry might have felt in former times for their lords, they had long since ceased to have for the noble whom they rarely saw and whose power was exercised through the hands of the hated bailiff. Again, the noble was often not wealthy, thus lacking the power which comes from the ownership of considerable property. He was, however, prohibited by the narrow prejudices of his class from engaging in any lucrative calling. In many instances he presented to the prosperous bourgeoisie a pitiable if not contemptible figure, living on a miserable income, refusing to engage in any business or profession which might benefit him materially, yet arrogantly maintaining his social superiority. Another prejudice of his class forbade him to marry a woman not of noble birth. He could not, therefore, recruit his failing fortunes and extend his influence in other classes of society by marriage with a scion of one of the wealthy families of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, the noble was himself a useless survival of an obso-
lete and, on the whole, discredited system. He was an isolated figure, clinging proudly to the frail glory of a title and an inherited social distinction, in the midst of the new and vigorous life surging around him.

iv. The Clergy

The interest of the Catholic church and its clergy were, like those of the noble class, bound up closely with the existing régime. The Catholic clergy were the sole authorized spiritual teachers of the people. The Catholic religion was the only religion officially recognized by law. The clergy formed the highest of the three “estates;” or political Orders, in the country. The church was vastly rich. Their wealth and their privileges made the clergy an exceedingly important element in French life. They and their property were exempt from all manner of obligations or taxes, though they gave at five-year periods a free gift (don gratuit) to the King which may be considered as a substitute for the taxes they might justly be expected to pay. They were said to own about one fifth of the soil of France, and to have revenue from the tithes (i.e., church taxes legally collected, amounting to approximately one twelfth of a man’s income) and from their lands of almost 200,000,000 livres a year (about $40,000,000). The members of the clergy numbered about one hundred and fifty thousand.

The clergy, however, were not so united in their class consciousness as were the nobility and the bourgeoisie. A sharp line of demarcation existed between the higher clergy and the lower clergy. The latter, drawn mainly from people of the middle class or from the peasantry, worked hard in their parishes for miserable salaries. Though their education was not usually broad and liberal, they were ordinarily men of godly lives, sincerely devoted to their labors. As their time was spent wholly with the peasantry and bourgeoisie of their parishes, they appreciated the
grievances people of these classes felt against the existing régime, and sympathized with them.

The higher clergy, on the other hand, were appointed from the ranks of the nobility. Many of them enjoyed immense incomes from the tithes of parishes they seldom visited, and lived the life of the wealthy lay noble. They were more commonly courtiers and men of the world than pious and godly priests. Conspicuous as they were because of their position and profession, they too often cast discredit upon the church and their religion by their worldly lives.

Thus the division of interests within the clergy paved the way for division when the critical days of revolution came. The lower clergy, with little to lose and everything to gain, were influenced by a sympathy with their parishioners, and a natural long-standing human jealousy of their superiors, to side with the peasantry and the bourgeoisie. The higher clergy, drawing their great incomes from sinecures in the gift of the sovereign, and allied by birth and association with the nobility, threw themselves enthusiastically into the cause of the King and the maintenance of the existing régime.

B. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS AUTHORS

We have upon several occasions in the preceding pages referred to the political philosophy of the day. It is worth our time to outline briefly the nature of this philosophy and say something of the authors, for literature of this class furnished to leaders of the Revolution their ideas of what government and society should be.

The marvelous achievements of scientists during the eighteenth century, including such work as that of Sir Isaac Newton, von Leibnitz, Joseph Priestley, Lavoisier, and Cavendish, aroused thinking men everywhere to the possibility of new and theretofore unsuspected facts, not only in the world of matter, but in the world of politics and
society. The logical reasoning by which the scientists obtained their results suggested that a similar reasoning applied to social and political conditions might reveal flaws in the existing system and open the way to constructive theories of a better order of things. Hence, the writers in the field of what would now be called sociology, political economy, and political science attempted to apply the rule of reason to existing institutions, to measure everything by logical and rational standards.

Nowhere did these rationalistic critics flourish more abundantly than in France—and hardly anywhere could they have found more to criticize. The most famous and most influential among them was François Arouet, or, as he called himself, François Voltaire (1694–1778). Endowed with a keen and active mind, boundless courage, and a ready pen, he attacked in poetry and prose the outworn system in his own country. He resided for a time in England and conceived great enthusiasm for English methods and institutions, publishing *Letters on the English* in which he exalted the English at the expense of French conditions. He directed his attacks especially against the Catholic church and all the “abuses” that had grown up around it. In 1764 he published the *Handy Philosophec Dictionary*, a collection of witty essays which brought upon him the condemnation of the *Parlement* of Paris for his attack upon “all that was sacred in religious teachings, mysteries, and authority.” A voluminous writer, Voltaire returned again and again to the attack in his epics, dramas, essays, romances, and histories. Though often in danger of his life, he attained the greatest popularity among the bourgeoisie and the more liberal section of the nobility.

Voltaire was magnificently supported in his crusade against ignorance, superstition, and injustice by his contemporary, Denis Diderot (1713–1784). Diderot planned to produce an encyclopedia which should contain the latest advances men had made in the various branches of human
knowledge. He associated with himself in the enterprise the most noted scientists of the age. The completed work, in seventeen volumes and eleven additional volumes of engravings, proved to be a forceful rationalistic argument. Over four thousand copies were subscribed for at the time of its appearance. Thousands of readers were converted by its text to the principles of the liberal authors.

Most radical among the writers in these fields, and most direct in his influence upon the theories which flourished during the Revolution, was Jean Jacques Rousseau (1713–1778). Rousseau presented in brilliant style arguments to support the theory that men were over-civilized, that all the evils of society developed from the fact that man had grown away from his natural environment and methods of life. He preached a return to nature, and his theme struck a responsive chord in many of his contemporaries wearied by the constant round of artificial duties and amusements. He clung to the same thesis when he attacked the constitution of society in his most famous book, The Social Contract (1761). He maintained that government, law, conventions were the result of a mutual compact in which all members of society had agreed at the dawn of history. He begins his book with the famous sentence: "Man is born free and yet is now everywhere in chains;" and endeavors to prove that the real sovereign should be the people, and that a republic is the best form of government for a state. We shall recognize the results of his teachings later in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and in the promulgation of a Republic after the overthrow of the monarchy.

Such were among the most notable writers who were stimulating thought and influencing public opinion among the bourgeoisie in the later eighteenth century. Along many other lines, too, the rule of reason, when applied to existing life, brought forth scathing criticism and constructive suggestions. An Italian, Beccaria (1738–1794), in a famous volume entitled Crimes and Punishment, an-
analyzed the judicial and penal codes and proposed reforms. In England, Adam Smith (1723–1790) published in 1776 his *Wealth of Nations*, from which the science of political economy dates. Montesquieu (1689–1755) in France dissected the legal and political constitution of France, and advocated the strict separation of the agencies for the executive, legislative, and judicial duties of government as the best guarantee against tyranny of the sovereign. These various writers had a wide audience among the bourgeoisie, and, too, among the most liberal elements in the nobility. It was the fashion for the wealthier citizens of the bourgeoisie to keep abreast of the literature of the times. They thus kept themselves alert, critical, and ready as a class with constructive theories of reform.

C. THE GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE

Unsatisfactory social or economic conditions invariably lead men in modern democratic states to blame the government. A financial panic, crop failure, military or diplomatic reverse, or general industrial depression will change enough votes today to oust the representatives of a party from their control. Although politics as we know it did not exist in the absolute monarchy of France, the same tendency to blame the government was rife among the discontented classes. It is well, therefore, to gain an idea of the main features of the system of government as it existed under Louis XVI.

Under the ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin, the Kings of France had contrived during the seventeenth century to break the power of the last of the feudal nobles and to centralize administration in the hands of the monarch. Louis XIV, after the death of Mazarin in 1661, with unusual ability personally governed the state, and by his success strengthened the influences making for centralization. In the years following his death in 1715, the system he had established remained essentially the same, though
his successors showed none of his capacity for the business of government. France was, therefore, a highly centralized monarchy, the ultimate executive, legislative, and judicial power resting in the hands of the King alone.

As behooved so high a personage, the King surrounded himself with the pomp and luxury of a brilliant court. Louis XIV had built for this purpose an enormous palace at Versailles, a sleepy little town a dozen miles from Paris, and there his successors commonly lived. The cost of maintenance of the royal household and court was a heavy drain upon the resources of the country. "The military and civil households of the King and of the royal family," writes E. J. Lowell, "are said to have consisted of about fifteen thousand souls, and to have cost forty-five million francs per annum." And the King added to this expense enormously by his generous distribution of gifts, appointments, and pensions to his favorites. For he was the first gentleman of France, and it was his duty, as he conceived it, to support his position in befitting style and to show prodigal liberality to those of his own caste. In the fifteen years between the succession of Louis XVI to the throne and the outbreak of the Revolution, years when France was in the grip of the worst financial crisis in its history, the King is said to have presented to his favorites more than one hundred million dollars in gifts.

Since no one man, however able, could handle the numberless administrative details involved in the government of a state of twenty-five million people, a great complex bureaucracy of officials had developed for the King's assistance. The existence of this bureaucracy, however, in no manner limited the powers of the sovereign to assume authority in any particular case. At the head of the bureaucracy, and hence, at the head of actual government in France, was the King's Council. This Council, containing about forty members including the several ministers of state and a number of persons without other official posi-
tion, was divided for practical operation into four committees, known respectively as the Council of State, the Council of Dispatches, the Council of Finance and Commerce, and the Committee on War. The King was, of course, head of the Council, and actually presided at many of the sessions of the committees. The Council was the supreme executive, legislative, and judicial authority of the Kingdom, exercising its power always in the name of the King. All matters of foreign policy or domestic concern were ultimately decided by the Council. Not only the important affairs of state, decisions of war or peace or taxes, but such petty matters as the building of a bridge or the repairing of a church in some small town, came up to the Council.

The agents of the Council, directly appointed by and responsible to it, were known as Intendants. These numbered thirty-two, each governing a district known as a Généralité, and assisted by a number of sub-delegates. As personal representatives of the royal power, the Intendant conducted the entire administration of his Généralité. He supervised the collection of the direct taxes, apportioning the share of his Généralité in the taille among the several parishes, and named the individual dues in the capitation and the vingtième; he had authority over the rural police and the militia; he had charge of public works and public charity; and he was empowered to oversee all acts of local bodies in administration. He was not ordinarily one of the noble class, but rather a lawyer, trained in the administrative service. As centralization of power in the hands of the King had proceeded in France, the authority, duties, and responsibilities of this royal agent had necessarily increased, until he and his colleagues had become regarded in their several Généralités as the actual government of France.

Between the Généralités, the largest administrative unit sometimes containing as many as two million people, and
REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE
1789 - 1796

Scale of Miles
0  25  50  75  100  150  200

The Old Provinces (Gouvernements)
The New Departments

French Conquests by 1785
(Peace of Basel)
the rural village, or commune, the smallest administrative unit, no subdivision existed. Outwardly the commune possessed some powers of self-government. The general assembly of all inhabitants paying the taille constituted nominally the supreme authority. This assembly had the management of the communal property; was charged with providing repairs for bridges and churches; and chose the communal officers. Actually, however, the assembly was a feeble body. The Intendant controlled its every act. He had power to summon it. He confirmed or disapproved its nominees to office. His sanction was necessary before any of its decisions or recommendations could be put into effect.

Though the towns and cities had won powers more free from the control and interference of the Intendant of their Généralité, they had abuses peculiar to the conditions of their development. Each town had gained its own charter, giving it certain rights to self-government. These charters, however, were by no means uniform, so that some towns of importance had been able to obtain greater privileges than others. Ordinarily the two administrative bodies in town government were the General Assembly and the Town Council. Whereas originally the General Assembly had comprised most of the citizens of the town, its membership had gradually become extremely limited, often including not more than sixty or a hundred persons. In most cases, the great craft guilds formed the most important element in the membership. This small General Assembly elected the Town Council, which constituted the real executive of the unit, with powers in local affairs, such as the purchase or sale of property, the making of loans, the direction of the town police, and the like.

Thus, to summarize, the most notable feature of the administrative system in France was the existence of a great bureaucracy, with the King and the King's Council as its head and the thirty-two Intendants as its direct agents. Local self-government was not known or encouraged, ex-
cept in the few towns where its exercise had fallen into the hands of a small number of citizens. The officials of this bureaucracy, though often hard-working and capable men, were overwhelmed by the mass of details of administration. Their government was inefficient. Public business was delayed. Though they often realized their inability to do well all the tasks that fell to their lot, they were part of the system and were jealous of their position and powers, unwilling to intrust to others what they had to leave undone. The reputation of the government as a whole therefore suffered because of the faults inherent in the bureaucratic system.

If we turn from the administrative branch to the equally important judicial branch we find a still worse state of affairs. Though the increase of royal power had naturally been accompanied by the creation of a system of royal courts, the previous courts had never been suppressed. No thoroughgoing reform and reconstitution of the judicial system had been attempted. Thus in addition to the royal courts were the ecclesiastical courts, administering ecclesiastical law; the numberless feudal courts, over which the descendants of the seigneurs had jurisdiction; and the municipal courts of the towns and cities, guaranteed by their respective charters. The confusion of jurisdiction under such circumstances was great, and formed one of the grievances of the people at the time of the Revolution.

We need notice for our purpose only the royal courts. These were of three degrees: (1) the Parlements; (2) the Presidiaux; and (3) the Bailliages and Sénéchaussées. The two lower grades handled civil and criminal cases of lesser importance. The highest grade, the Parlement, was not only the supreme court of the country but also had the traditional function of registering the edicts of the King. This latter function was interpreted by the Parlements as giving them an implied right to criticize a new law before registering it. With them it was a question, indeed, whether
they might not actually nullify a law by refusing to register it. Their beliefs with regard to their prerogatives in this connection, and their attempt to exercise these prerogatives, played an important part at one stage in the development of the Revolution.

The most glaring fault in the judicial system, in addition to the multiplicity of courts of different authorities, was the lack of guarantees of personal freedom and of individual equality before the law. Many of the judgeships in the lower courts were openly bought and sold. The judges were venal. Wealthy suitors were thus able to influence decisions. The King and his Council had the right at any stage of proceedings to remove any case from the court in which it was being tried and have it tried before himself. The King also exercised the power of arbitrary imprisonment by means of what was known as a lettre de cachet, that is, an order under the privy seal. Such conditions inspired among the people a thorough distrust of, and hatred for, the judicial system of the country.

D. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN FRANCE

Sharp as their grievances were, the people of France as a whole were dumb until a general financial crisis brought about conditions whereby their King afforded them opportunity to speak. And when once they had formulated their grievances in accordance with the King’s invitation, they were encouraged in the hope of reform. The actual preparation of a statement of the “abuses” brought full consciousness of their nature and their magnitude, and inspired a resentment which brooked no opposition to projected reforms.

The general financial crisis which precipitated the movement for reform and the Revolution had its ultimate source in the extravagance of Louis XIV, who wasted the resources of the richest country on the continent in futile wars and personal luxury. His incapable successors, Louis XV and
Louis XVI, failed to remedy the disorganized finances either by a reform in the system or by personal economy. The situation was serious at the accession of the well-intentioned but weak-willed Louis XVI in 1774. It became more acute as the years passed without decisive reform. It came to a climax in August of 1786, when the controller-general of the finances was forced to inform the King that France was at the point of bankruptcy, and that nothing would save the state but a radical reform of the "whole public order." It was not, apparently, until August of 1786 that the King really began to appreciate the gravity of conditions. During the dozen years of his reign preceding this date, Louis XVI's ministers had been able to keep the state going only by constant borrowing. A succession of finance ministers had, with full knowledge of the deficits running between sixty and eighty million livres ($12,000,000 and $16,000,000) a year, feared to disclose to the King and his Council the true state of affairs, and had covered up the deficits by floating loans. But the process could not keep on indefinitely. The credit of the government became so impaired that further loans could not be obtained. New measures had to be considered.

When Calonne, the finance minister (Controller-general of Finance), revealed to Louis XVI the desperate condition of the treasury, he urged the assembly of a Council of Notables, composed of members of the three estates, or orders, of the Kingdom (the clergy, the nobility, the Third Estate or the commoners) appointed by the sovereign, to advise with the King concerning the levy of new taxes to meet the expenses of the government. There were precedents for the summoning of such a Council, but these precedents were few and remote. The very act of assembling an advisory Council, however, constituted a confession of incapacity on the part of the King, and was not in accord with the theory of absolute power which Louis XIV had bequeathed. Louis XVI hesitated four months before act-
ing upon his finance minister’s advice, allowing Calonne to struggle along in the interval as best he could. The following December he yielded, appointed the members, and made preliminary arrangements for the meeting.

The opening session of the Council of Notables was held February 22, 1787. Its membership in no wise represented proportionately the interests of the Kingdom, for out of a total of one hundred and forty-four, forty-six were nobles, eleven were of the clergy, twelve were members of the King's Council, and thirty-eight were magistrates of the higher courts, making altogether one hundred and seven whose interests were bound up with the existing system. Yet the meeting of this Council, unrepresentative though it was, marked so distinct a departure from previous methods that the entire country throbbed with interest and anticipation.

Before this Council Calonne stated frankly the financial condition of the country and his projects for reform. He stated that one and a quarter billion of livres ($250,000,000) had been borrowed during the last decade and that many sums were at the moment, when the treasury was empty, due to creditors. He announced that the existing taxes could not be increased, so that the only practical reform lay in the suppression of the privileges of the clergy and nobility, thus rendering persons of these classes liable to their proportionate share in the financial burden, and lightening the load upon the bourgeoisie and peasantry. He proposed the suppression of the corvée and the vingtième, the reduction of the taille and of some of the indirect taxes, the creation of provincial assemblies, freedom of grain trade from governmental regulation, and numerous economies in administration. All of these were measures to conciliate the people. At the same time he explained a scheme for new taxes,—a land-tax, payable by all landowners upon the assessed value of their lands, and a stamp-tax.

The Council was aghast at Calonne's statements and
proposals. Intense opposition at once developed. The abolition of their time-honored privileges was too bitter a pill for the clergy and nobility to swallow. Members of the Council called for a financial statement giving accurate figures and revenue and expenses, showed the insufficiency of Calonne's proposals to meet the immediate needs of the government, and argued the practicability of strict economy to overcome the deficits. Precious weeks passed away with nothing accomplished.

In the meanwhile the nobility outside of the Council, incensed at the proposals to suppress their privileges, intrigued to undermine Calonne's position with the King. The Queen, Marie Antoinette, was most active in these intrigues, and because of her influence over Louis XVI was responsible for their success. April 8, 1787, the Controller-General was dismissed and at the end of the following month the Council of Notables was dissolved. Under a new minister, Loménie de Brienne, appointed not Controller-General but Chief of the Committee of Finance in the King's Council, the King once more attempted government along the old familiar lines.

The policy of Loménie de Brienne precipitated a bitter conflict between the government and the Parlements. Loménie de Brienne was forced by the immediate necessities of the government to advise the King to order by edict some of the reforms and some of the taxes which the Council of Notables had refused. The Parlements, especially the Parlement of Paris, registered the reforms, such as free grain trade and the replacement of the corvée by a payment in money, without comment or criticism, but immediately opposed the levy of a stamp-tax, the first of the new taxes proposed. In the discussions the Parlement of Paris prepared an address to the King, declaring that only the nation as represented in the Estates General could authorize a new permanent tax. The King and Loménie de Brienne, before the question of the stamp-tax could be decided, forwarded to the Parlement for registration an edict
imposing a general land-tax, such as Calonne had presented to the Council of Notables. Again the Parlement refused to act, and demanded the summoning of the Estates General. Thereupon the King, in accordance with ancient custom, held what was known as a lit de justice at Versailles, August 6, 1787, and declared by virtue of his supreme power that the edicts were registered. The Parlement of Paris protested, and formally declared the registration null and void, following up this declaration by renewed demands for a meeting of the Estates General.

This conflict of authority between the King and the Parlements, especially the Parlement of Paris, aroused the bourgeoisie as no previous incident in the political situation had done. The bourgeoisie was composed of men of affairs, as we have seen, and they had during the past few troubled years analyzed the situation from a practical standpoint. They believed that the cause of the financial difficulty lay in the exemptions of the privileged classes and the extravagances of the government. They wanted reforms, and not new taxes. They welcomed the resistance of the Parlements as a step in the right direction, and applauded their stubbornness. In Paris, especially, where the most numerous, most prosperous, and most intelligent of the bourgeoisie dwelt, the Parlement's action was immensely popular. When the Parlement was temporarily banished from the capital, riots broke out in the streets. When the Parlement returned to Paris, September 24, 1787, and the King consented to suppress the edicts for a stamp-tax and a land-tax, the people welcomed it with the enthusiasm engendered by a sense of victory over the sovereign.

The demand of the Parlement for a meeting of the Estates General had in particular struck a responsive chord in the hearts of the people. As popular respect for the authority and person of the King had declined during the demonstration of his incapacity in the preceding months, popular hopes of the advantages to be gained by a meeting of the
Estates General steadily rose. People knew little of what the Estates General were — it had not been in session for a hundred and seventy-five years — but looked forward to a body of representatives of the various classes of the people as better qualified than the King and his advisers to appreciate the popular grievances and formulate measures of reform. Before the continued pressure of opinion in influential bourgeois circles, accompanied by increasing disorder amounting to actual rebellion in sections of the country, the King yielded. He seemed, indeed, to have no other recourse. His treasury was empty, the nation’s creditors were pressing for payment, important elements of the people were demanding the convocation of the Estates General before they consented to new taxation, and his ministers had failed to find any way out of his difficulties. With some trepidation and regret, therefore, the King by royal decree of August 8, 1788, announced the meeting of the Estates General for May 1, 1789.

In the interval between his decree and the meeting of the Estates General, the King made a bid for popularity by dismissing Loménié de Brienne. He replaced him with Jacques Necker, a wealthy Swiss-born Protestant banker who as Director of the Treasury and Director-General of Finances in France from 1776 to 1781 had gained the confidence of the people by his practical reforms. This time, upon Loménié de Brienne’s retirement (August 25, 1788), Necker was made Minister of Finance and became a member of the King’s Council. The bourgeoisie were enthusiastic over the appointment. Necker, however, made no attempt to do more than tide the government over until the meeting of the Estates General. By his personal influence he managed to scrape together small amounts of money from time to time in order to pay the most pressing demands upon the treasury. He in common with all the ministers and all the people could see no salvation except in the action of the Estates General.
E. THE ESTATES GENERAL AND THE FORMATION
OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The elections to the Estates General were held during a period of great distress throughout France. The harvest of 1788 was exceptionally poor. In the autumn the government took measures in its mistaken efforts to alleviate conditions to restrict the grain trade. These regulations increased the panic, and, by causing the individual hoarding of grain in the rural districts, intensified the distress of the poorer urban population. In addition, all of western Europe experienced the most severe winter weather. The rivers were frozen, hindering the natural means of transport, and even the harbor of Marseilles in southern France was covered with ice. Many of the poor died of starvation and cold. Serious disturbances were common, not only among the proletariat in the cities, but among the peasantry. Under the conditions the government hesitated to use extreme measures to suppress the disorders, but its clemency was interpreted as weakness and actually resulted in the spread of disorder. Rumors of the speculation in foodstuffs by members of the ministry helped further to discredit the administration. The people were, therefore, in an exceedingly dangerous frame of mind as the time for the meeting of the Estates General drew near.

Anxiously as the people of all classes had looked forward to the meeting of the Estates General, none could know the view its members would take regarding their powers and duties. The last meeting had been in 1614, one hundred and seventy-five years before. It had then been literally an assembly of the Estates, or Orders or Classes, of the Kingdom. The clergy, the nobility, and the Third Estate, or Commonalty, each with its own interests and traditions, had acted separately. The assembly as a whole had no powers of legislation: it had merely the power to petition the King. On his side, the King was not bound to observe
this petition. His absolute authority was subject to no restrictions from the Estates. Undoubtedly when Louis XVI summoned a meeting of the ancient Estates General for 1789 he expected a body of the same obsequious kind as that of 1614. In his summons he ordered in general terms that the deputies be instructed and empowered to propose, advise, and agree to measures concerning the needs of the state, the redress of grievances, and the general and individual welfare, and he pledged himself to execute what should be agreed upon between him and the Estates. Firmly believing in his own unlimited authority, Louis XVI certainly did not intend in any way to surrender his own legislative or executive rights to the Estates. But he failed utterly to comprehend the changed conditions in France during the hundred and seventy-five years that had elapsed since the previous assembly. He failed to estimate the different relative importance of the Estates, especially to realize the growth of the Third Estate, or Commonality, in numbers, wealth, and intelligence. And he failed especially to appreciate the discredit which had attached to him and his government as a result of the incapacity shown during the recent decade. The important elements among the people had no idea that the Estates General was to be merely a petitionary body, without authority or legislative power. Pamphlets appeared by the thousand, spreading in popular form the liberal theories of the political philosophers. The Estates General was to be a real parliament of the people, charged with the task of reforming all abuses, reconstructing the administration and the government, and reconstituting society. Their very inexperience in practical politics made the difficulties in such a great program seem trifling to these pamphleteering theorists. They succeeded in awakening among the people at large the highest expectations of what the Estates General should accomplish.

Elections began in January, 1789, and dragged on through the following months. The royal decrees had made the suf-
frage in the various classes very liberal. In the clergy, all members had the vote, from the Archbishops and Bishops down to the parish priests. Every noble twenty-five years of age or above had the vote. In the Third Estate, every Frenchman twenty-five years of age or above, whose name was inscribed on the tax register, had the vote. Thus only the very poorest laborers and the actual paupers were excluded from the franchise.

At the same time that the elections were held, voters were invited to draw up a list of grievances, known as the cahier (from its full title, cahier des plaintes et doléances). It is from the contents of these cahiers that the modern historian gains much of his information concerning the social, political, and economic abuses of the late eighteenth century France. The representatives of the people, responding to the King’s invitation, presented in each district an astonishingly frank and direct statement of their grievances and of the reforms advocated. It was, perhaps, in the formulation of the cahiers that the people first became fully conscious of the nature, number, and extent of the abuses of the old régime. The deputies were pledged to present these cahiers before the Estates General.

Monday, May 5, 1789, the eleven hundred and eighteen deputies met in a great hall of the palace at Versailles for their first business session. In numbers, the members of the Third Estate were equal to the combined membership of the clergy and nobility. By decree of the King, the deputies had followed the traditions of 1614 in the matter of dress, so that the clergy and nobility appeared in all the splendor of their official garb, whereas the representatives of the Third Estate were in plain black. The ancient formalities, too, were carefully observed, the clergy and nobility being allowed to enter and take their seats while the Third Estate were kept standing in the entrance way. The King in person opened the session. He was followed by the Keeper of the Seals who in a long address outlined a
large number of reforms for the consideration of the deputies. Then Necker, the Minister of Finance, submitted a lengthy report on the condition of the treasury. These preliminaries took up the whole of the first day's session.

The next morning the real nature of the immediate problem before the Estates General became apparent, for when the deputies of the Third Estate reported at the hall, they found themselves alone. The nobility and clergy, having resolved to organize and deliberate after the ancient fashion in separate bodies, had met in different halls. The deputies of the Third Estate were determined that all three Orders should be organized, and should meet, deliberate, and vote as a single body. They sent committees to the other Orders to invite them to join the representatives of the people; and they held conferences with the leaders of the other Orders; but these were without practical result. The weeks dragged by with nothing done, the deputies of the Third Estate refusing even to organize except temporarily, for fear such organization might be accepted as agreeing to deliberation by separate Orders. Finally, June 10, 1789, it was moved and carried that for the last time the representatives of the Third Estate should invite the clergy and nobles to joint organization. When no answer was received to this invitation, the deputies organized themselves (June 12–14) and adopted the name (June 17) of National Assembly.

The act of the deputies was in defiance of precedent and of the power of the King—it was, indeed, the first step in revolution. Their new National Assembly usurped its position and, though allowing admission to members of the clergy and nobility as individuals, refused to recognize these Orders as Estates of the Kingdom. Their only defense for their revolutionary decision was one based on reason, namely, that the representatives of twenty-four millions should prevail over the representatives of a few hundred thousand.
Three days later, June 20, 1789, the King’s agents, without previous warning to the deputies of the Third Estate, barred them from their hall on the excuse that arrangements had to be made for a royal session a few days later. The discourtesy of this act done in the King’s name incensed the deputies. Adjourning to a neighboring hall used often as a tennis court, the nearest room large enough to accommodate them, they took a solemn oath never to separate until a constitution had been established. Every deputy but one subscribed solemnly to this oath. The “Tennis-Court Oath,” as it is commonly called, was evidence of the sincerity and earnestness of the Third Estate.

In the meanwhile, the King and the nobility failed to take seriously the acts of the Third Estate. They were blind to the true significance of what had been done. The clergy, on the other hand, swayed by the large representation of the lower ranks, the curés, parish priests, and the like, were more influenced by the stand the Third Estate had taken. Individual members of the clergy began to join the Third Estate June 13, and on June 19 the whole body decided by a vote of 128 to 127 to yield. June 22 the bulk of them took their seats with the members of the Commonalty. The strength of the position of the Third Estate during these weeks had, indeed, been strong. The other Orders could do nothing without it. Its passive refusal to organize separately had prevented all action by the Estates General. Encouraged by their success in winning over most of the clergy, the Third Estate awaited with keen anticipation the royal session announced for June 23. All Orders recognized that the action of the King and his government on that day would be decisive.

Enormous crowds lined the streets of Versailles to watch the assembling of the deputies for the royal session. Spontaneous demonstrations of enthusiasm for the Third Estate broke out, but none was evident for the nobility or for the King himself. The deputies of the Commonalty were again
humiliated by being forced to wait at the entrance until clergy and nobility were seated. In the meeting the King's secretaries announced that it was the King's will that the distinction between the separate Estates should be observed. The acts of the Third Estate were declared null and void, and a long list of reforms was read. The King in person then spoke, saying that if the Estates General failed to help him, he alone would take measures to insure the happiness of his people, and directing that the three Estates meet the following day each in its separate chamber. The King's speech ended the session. Upon his withdrawal, the bulk of the nobility and a number of the clergy also withdrew. The remainder of the deputies kept their seats. When summoned to withdraw, their most prominent spokesman, Mirabeau, replied that they would not leave except at the point of the bayonet. Before such contumacy the King took no effective measures, still failing to appreciate, apparently, the significance of their opposition: The deputies proceeded to declare that their previous decrees were in force, contrary to the expressed statement of the King, and that the persons of members of the assembly were inviolable. The meeting thereupon adjourned.

The nobility now showed signs of yielding to the commons. June 25, forty-seven of them left their own hall and joined the commons. The final signal of surrender was given when the King himself receded from his position and urged personally (June 27, 1789) the remainder of the nobility and of the clergy to join the assembly. The National Assembly was now complete, all three Orders being fully represented, meeting together, and voting together. The Estates General had in these weeks of trial and conflict become transformed by the act of the representatives of the Third Estate into the National Assembly.

This transformation marks the completion of the first definite stage of the French Revolution. The representatives of the Third Estate had won a notable victory. Over-
throwing precedent and defying tradition, they had constituted themselves a National Assembly and had forced the submission of the other orders. The body summoned according to ancient style had proved itself most modern in its ideas, had refused to be merely petitionary, and was on its way to becoming a regular legislative, if not an executive, assembly. The King and his Council had foreseen nothing of these results: they were too blind to interpret their significance for the future.
CHAPTER III

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE REVOLUTION
1789–1791

The representatives of the people had won the first battle in their campaign for reform. The task still ahead of them, however, was far more difficult than the inexperienced deputies realized. The adherents of the old régime were not to give up after the loss of a single fight. The financial pressure was to force itself upon the assembly at moments when the deputies sorely needed time for other matters. The disorders throughout the country were to cast almost unbearable executive and administrative burdens upon men already engaged to the uttermost with a legislative program of reforms. And the formulation of a constitution was to develop differences of opinion among the deputies which on several occasions threatened disaster. The National Assembly expected to finish its work and dissolve within a few months: it was actually in session more than two years, from June 27, 1789, to September 30, 1791.

A. CHIEF FIGURES IN THE FACTIONS IN FRANCE

The natural leader of the court and the nobility was, of course, the King. A poorer figure for such a leader in so critical a period can scarcely be imagined. When he ascended the throne in 1774 upon the death of his grandfather, the ill-famed Louis XV, Louis XVI was a youth of twenty, large, ungainly, shy, sluggish, and indolent. He was ill-fitted to shine in a court of the kind Louis XIV had established. He had interested himself, curiously enough, in the trade of a locksmith, and whiled away hours in his
little workroom practicing this occupation. He enjoyed, too, the pleasures of the chase. He was morally admirable, a devoted husband and a fond father. He was naturally well-meaning, generous, and kind-hearted, but his very mercy proved a weakness with his rebellious people. Above all, he was unready and vacillating at times when steadiness, constancy, and decision were essential for the safety of his crown and the welfare of his kingdom. As a private citizen he might have been a commonplace mechanic: as a King of France in a critical period, he ruined himself and brought untold suffering upon his country. The fall of the monarchy was due to the weakness and incapacity of the monarch.

Louis had been married at sixteen, while he was heir-apparent, to Marie Antoinette, daughter of Maria Theresa of Austria. This marriage had been arranged by Maria Theresa to cement the political alliance then existing between France and Austria. Marie Antoinette was but nineteen when she became Queen of France. Her position was extraordinarily difficult, for the Austro-French alliance was not popular. Especially after the revolution began this "Austrian woman," as she was called, became the focus of general suspicion. In ordinary times Marie Antoinette would have adorned the throne. She was beautiful in person, equipped with all the social graces, and possessed of an indescribable charm of manner. She proved herself, however, unable to appreciate the character, extent, and force of the revolutionary movement. Extravagant by nature, she failed to check her expenses even when France was on the verge of bankruptcy. Incapable by birth, environment, and education of sympathy with the mass of the people, she never understood the necessities and passions which were the driving power behind the revolution. When her more lively personality had gained its influence over the phlegmatic King, she used her advantage to spur him to spasmodic and dangerous acts of opposition. We may feel
great sympathy for Marie Antoinette, thus cast unwittingly into the maelstrom of politics of the revolution, but her ignorance and her misguided interference played a great part in hastening the ruin of the monarchy.

In the National Assembly one figure soon topped the rest on the popular side — the Count de Mirabeau. Mirabeau, scion of a noble family of Provence, was born in 1749. His youth and early manhood were marked by constant quarrels with his irascible father and by a series of more or less disgraceful love intrigues. His father obtained lettres de cachet from the King time and time again to imprison this unruly youth in punishment for excesses. Mirabeau spent part of these years in practical exile in Switzerland, Holland, and England. He studied assiduously the government of these countries, made comparisons with French institutions, and wrote scathing criticisms of the latter. Before the revolution he was conspicuous for his defense of the cause of popular liberties. When the King convoked the Estates General, Mirabeau offered himself to the nobility of his native district, but his writings had discredited him with them. He then appealed to the Third Estate. The fact that the nobility had rejected him was a strong argument in his favor with the Third Estate, and he was chosen deputy both from Marseilles and from Aix. As deputy from Aix, he was present at the opening session of the Estates General May 5, 1789. That he won a commanding place was due solely to his superior ability, for neither faction had confidence in him. The nobles looked upon him as a renegade: the people distrusted the possible influence upon him of his noble birth and traditions. He emerged from the crowd because of his vision, his enthusiasm, and his practical sense. At every crisis in the deliberations his voice was heard. He had indomitable courage, clear logic, passionate fervor, and a definite policy. He never was able to gather around him a party. The great influence he had upon the course of events was wholly the result of his courage, his
reasoning, and his vigor. As we gain a clearer perspective of the French Revolution, Mirabeau appears as one man, indeed as the only man, in public affairs who had the necessary vision to comprehend the drift events were taking, and the judgment to advise measures of relief.

B. THE KING AND NOBILITY VS. THE PEOPLE

We cannot wonder that the King and the nobility failed to appreciate the crumbling of the edifice in which they and their predecessors occupied such privileged positions — few people living in the tumult of events which mark the fall of one order of human society and the rise of another are able to estimate justly the situation. It is not surprising that, after the first success of the Third Estate in the formation of the National Assembly, the King and the nobles prepared a counterstroke which was intended to restore the status quo in France.

Louis XVI himself had been temporarily aroused from his customary apathy by the defiance of the Third Estate. The Queen and the indignant nobles at the court prodded him to action. Under their guidance he planned to dismiss Necker, reorganize his ministry, and resume his former powers aggressively. To meet any popular disturbances, he ordered a concentration of troops, especially of foreign mercenaries free from revolutionary contamination, near Paris and Versailles.

It was, of course, impossible to conceal the troop movements from the National Assembly. The deputies of the Third Estate, distrusting the King, spread the news and imparted their fears to the people. July 8, 1789, the National Assembly took official cognizance of the military preparations and on motion by Mirabeau voted to request the King that the troops be withdrawn. Two days later the King, feeling secure in his preparations, refused the Assembly's request, stating, however, that he had no designs against the deputies. He and his agents secretly hur-
ried their plans. The following day, July 11th, the King dismissed Necker and his supporters in the ministry, and directed him to leave the Kingdom secretly and immediately. Obedient to his sovereign’s request, Necker started toward Switzerland that same evening.

At this critical moment, Paris came to the rescue of the assembly and set an example of revolt which in the following weeks was imitated throughout France. Radical political discussion had flourished in the capital. The harvest failure in 1788 and the severe winter of 1788–1789 had caused tens of thousands of half-starved wretches to flock to Paris to live upon the municipal charity. The proletariat was thus swollen in numbers in the city. A keen sense of their wrongs filled the minds of these poor people. Their only salvation lay, they thought, in the success of the National Assembly. A rallying place was furnished in the square before the Palais-Royal, home of the profligate and unprincipled Duc d’Orleans, cousin of the King. There they assembled day and night, stirred by the harangues of revolutionary demagogues. Through the crowds during July 12th the rumor passed that Necker had been dismissed. An impassioned young scribbler, Camille Desmoulins, gave the throng purpose and activity. He leapt upon a table, shouting that Necker had been dismissed, that his departure was the signal bell for a St. Bartholomew’s massacre of the patriots, that the Swiss and German mercenaries were to march against them. The crowd took fire at his words and surged away to find arms.

The next two days were days of uncontrolled riot in Paris. The mob looted the gunshops, took the guns and ammunition in the Hotel de Ville (City Hall) and the Hotel des Invalides, and sacked stores and houses. The police disappeared and the royal troops, decimated by desertion and left without orders, were withdrawn beyond the city barriers. On the 14th, the mob concentrated in front of the Bastille, the last remaining position in the capital held by the King’s soldiers.
The Bastille had once been a fortress but in recent years had been used as a state prison. Stories were abroad of unlit subterranean dungeons and of instruments of torture therein. To the maddened mob the frowning walls seemed the embodiment of the evils of despotism. Yet its ten-foot thick masonry could defy any artillery the crowd could bring against it. Though manned by but a handful of Swiss mercenaries, it could have stood a siege. The governor, however, chose to parley with the crowd. In an unguarded moment he let the massive drawbridge down for a deputation. Masses of men swarmed across it into the court, and the governor, upon promise of safety for himself and his men, surrendered the fortress. The unruly crowd disregarded the promise of its leaders and in a most brutal fashion murdered the governor and most of his soldiers.

The anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, July 14, 1789, is still celebrated as a national holiday in France. Though the event in itself was unimportant, for the place had little or no strategical value and no unlit dungeons or instruments of torture were found, the people regarded it as marking the surrender of the most striking symbol of the old régime. As such, its fall meant to the people the end of autocracy, the beginning of a new era.

The disorders quickly communicated themselves to the provinces. Throughout the length and breadth of France an unreasoning panic seized the people, especially the peasants. Rumors that brigands were coming led the people to band themselves together for protection. The agencies of the government everywhere abdicated. Authority was unknown. When the first fear passed, the peasant leaders began to attack the chateaux of the nobles, each chateau being to the district a symbol of the old régime as the Bastille was to Paris. Sacking and burning, seeking especially for destruction the old manorial records containing the list of seigniorial charges and dues, the peasant bands ravaged the country. France descended to anarchy.
Yet not all the work of these tumultuous weeks was
destructive. The bourgeoisie in Paris had, at the height of
the disorders, recognized the need for the establishment of a
municipal authority to take the place of the wreck of the
royal power in Paris. Their representatives, therefore, had
organized a local government, chosen a mayor, and made
plans for a municipal council to be elected by the voters in
the several districts of the city. At the same time, they
provided for the organization of an armed civic soldiery to
be known as the National Guard, and appointed the Marquis
de Lafayette its commandant. Other communes quickly
followed the example of the capital. The form of municipal
government thus organized survived in its main outlines the
Revolution. The National Guard became in the trying
years of foreign warfare the chief dependence of the gov-
ernment.

The insurrection in Paris and the disturbances through-
out the country defeated the King's intended coup d'état.
July 15, Louis XVI appeared before the National Assembly
and stated that the troops would be withdrawn. A week
later, July 21, Necker was recalled amid the rejoicing of the
people. The nobility, however, realizing now the wreck of
the royal authority, began to leave France, deserting their
homes and their property. During the summer and autumn
of 1789 about seventy thousand of these "émigrés" fled
across the borders. The success of the popular uprising of
July was so great that these émigrés saw no hope in the im-
mediate future except from intervention on the part of a
foreign power.

C. WORK OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The National Assembly in the meanwhile proceeded in its
efforts to reorganize France. Its various committees were
hard at work upon the material for a constitution. Its
efficiency was seriously handicapped by the inexperience of
many of its members, the constant succession of deputa-
tions from all parts of France, the long set speeches, the lack of rules governing debate, and the failure to keep order among the spectators. It was, indeed, remarkable that it was able to produce results at all.

One important part of its labors was achieved in a peculiar way. A committee, appointed in July to investigate the disorder in the Provinces, presented its report to the Assembly in the session of August 3. It proved to be a gruesome recital of pillage and outrage, perpetrated by a peasantry in their reaction against the system so long responsible for their oppression. The following evening (August 4–5) members of the nobility, stung by implications that they were selfishly clinging to their traditional rights, began to offer motions for the suppression of privileges. The first motion was to proclaim equality of taxation. This was followed by one to make all men equal before the courts; by another to admit all men to offices in the public service; by another to abolish the rights of the chase. The contagion of self-sacrifice rapidly spread. A madness of liberalism seized the deputies of the privileged orders. In a few hours successive motions carried by acclamation swept away the whole body of special rights. The slate was wiped clean for the National Assembly to write out a new social order. Never has the impulsive generosity of the best elements of the French people shone forth so brilliantly. The wisdom of such hasty legislation on matters of such great import may be questioned: the motives cannot but be praised.

With the way thus cleared, the Assembly set to work upon the constitution, debating it provision by provision. After long discussion it agreed that the body of the document should be preceded by a Declaration of Rights. Many days were spent in framing this Declaration. As read to the Assembly August 26, 1789, this Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was a noble statement of principles to guide the Assembly in its endeavor to reorganize
France. It proclaimed the liberty and safety of the individual, security of property, and freedom of speech, publication, and religious belief. Its paragraphs reflected the reaction from the abuses of the old régime. In its preamble it acknowledged the force of the American example: "Our soil should by right be the first to which this grand idea, conceived in another hemisphere, should be transplanted. We coöperated in the events which gave North America her liberty, and now she shows us on what principles we ought to base the preservation of our own." The Declaration of the Rights of Man stands with the Declaration of Independence as one of the notable documents in the history of democracy.

After the report on the Declaration of Rights had been submitted, the National Assembly began discussion of the important articles in the proposed constitution bearing on the executive power and the organization of the legislative body. This discussion occupied most of the following month (September, 1789).

D. REMOVAL OF THE KING AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The position of the King, following the revolt of July, had been pitiable. He was but a passive spectator of events. His nobles had fled the country in great numbers, led by his own younger brother, the Comte d'Artois. His royal administration had broken down. His authority had ceased. His advice was not asked. He had become in a few months a puppet King. Though the country was disorganized, local authority not obeyed and taxes not paid, people were looking, not to the King, but to the National Assembly for their orders. And the National Assembly, without his royal sanction, was framing a constitution which would forever limit him in his authority.

A more pressing danger existed in the conditions within Paris. The proletariat had tasted power in the tumults of
July 12–14, and were stirring uneasily in anticipation of another outbreak. Economic conditions in the city were bad. Food was scarce and prices high. The prevailing disorders in the country were adding crowds of poverty-stricken refugees to the capital. The flight of many of the wealthy classes, and the disorganization of industry, threw thousands out of employment. Agitators were ever present in the Palais-Royal to harangue the crowds. Any incident or rumor was enough to start serious trouble.

The King, appreciating the danger of the situation, ordered for protection a regiment from Flanders to reinforce the guard du corps and the National Guard at Versailles. Upon the arrival of the Flanders regiment, the customary banquet was given, October 1, 1789, to its officers. The arrival of the Flanders regiment and news of the banquet proved the signal for an outbreak in Paris. Rumors flew about of another attempt to reinstate the old régime by force. Lurid stories of the banquet were circulated. The red, white, and blue cockade, adopted by the National Guard and already a symbol of liberation, had been trampled under foot, it was said, by the officers pledging loyalty to the King and Queen. Versailles had been banqueting while Paris was starving.

Riot started in Paris the morning of October 5, 1789. A crowd gathered around the Hôtel de Ville clamoring for bread. Members forced their way into the building and distributed a quantity of arms and ammunition stored there. Lafayette at the head of the National Guard hesitated to use force, hoping to persuade the people to disperse. His hesitation gave the mob time to increase. Some one seized a drum, and led the way to Versailles. The crowd in a disorderly march all day long streamed out toward the King. Lafayette with the National Guard followed. In the evening during a drizzling rain, weary and bedraggled, the crowd reached the vicinity of the royal palace. Later Lafayette bivouacked his troops in the squares and posted guards
around the building. The crowd built great bonfires and camped around them for the night.

Early the next morning, October 6, 1789, a few prowlers found an unguarded door, gave a signal which brought others to their aid, broke into the palace, and began to search for the Queen. Marie Antoinette was forced to flee from her rooms. The mass of the crowd surged into the courtyard of the palace. To appease them, Lafayette persuaded the King and Queen to show themselves on the balcony. While there, the King placed a red, white, and blue cockade in his hat, and Lafayette harangued the people, saying that Louis XVI had resolved to confirm the Declaration of Rights and to go with his people to Paris. At noon the King, Queen, and the Dauphin,—the baker, the baker’s wife, and the little cook-boy, as the crowd called them,—surrounded by the triumphant mob, were driven to Paris. The National Assembly, declaring itself inseparable from the King, resolved to accompany him to the capital. Louis XVI went to the Tuileries: the National Assembly a few days later resumed its sessions in a riding-school near by.

The removal of the King and the National Assembly to Paris marked the beginning of a new stage in the Revolution. Both were henceforth subject more directly to mob pressure in the capital. The King was virtually a prisoner in the Tuileries. The most radical elements in the National Assembly had a weapon close at hand in the violence of the proletariat to enforce their policies upon the Assembly.

E. CONTINUATION OF THE WORK OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN PARIS

After the rioting of October 5–6, the National Assembly again took up its consideration of the constitution and the reorganization of government in France. As a preliminary measure it reconstructed by decree the administrative areas of the country.
France under the old régime retained in the number and character of its areas for administration many historical and traditional distinctions. The généralités, previously mentioned, had been recently created, but the dioceses dated back to the break-up of the Roman Empire, and certain of the Provinces represented duchies formerly independent. It was the desire of the National Assembly to destroy these distinctions between the various areas, which often gave rise to consideration of local rather than national interests, and to establish in their stead a new and uniform administrative division. Thus they hoped to inculcate national rather than local feeling, as well as to simplify the operation of government.

They therefore divided France into eighty-three Départements (including Corsica as one); subdivided each Département into six or seven Districts; further subdivided each District into eight or nine Cantons. Each Canton contained eight or nine of the former Communes. The Départements, Districts, and Cantons were wholly new; the Communes, altogether about 40,000 in number, were the only historical divisions retained in the system. For each of these areas the National Assembly provided a government and a judiciary. For both Départements and Districts were created an executive council of five and an administrative council of thirty-six members, and criminal and civil courts. For the towns were provided a mayor and council and local courts. The Cantons, being merely electoral areas, i.e., areas serving as units for election purposes, needed no government. In all the areas, the officers were elected by the people, the suffrage being given to all men over twenty-five who paid in taxes the equivalent of three days' labor.

A more radical readjustment of administration could scarcely be imagined. In a country where previously autocracy had existed, a simple decree revolutionized conditions. The people had the whole power. Where such a change has taken place in other states, it has been brought
by gradual stages during which the people gained experience little by little. The theorists in the National Assembly, however, were anxious to create in a moment the structure of a democratic government. Hence they erased ancient and familiar local divisions to establish a new and uniform system, whereby they might be free to devise what government they desired. Their work is one of the most important and constructive acts of the Revolution, yet under the circumstances it can scarcely be judged wholly wise.

A second preliminary measure was an adjustment of the relations between the state and the Catholic church. The "abuses" which followed from the privileged position of the clergy, and the immunity both of the clergy and of church property from taxation, constituted an important grievance under the old régime. The deputies, therefore, especially those of the original Third Estate, were prepared when they arrived at Versailles to take radical measures to insure state control of the church revenues. Many of them were, if not atheistic, at least irreligious. The rationalism of Voltaire and his attacks upon the evils of the church system had influenced them greatly.

In their consideration of the church problem, the leaders were also influenced by the financial situation. The country had been practically bankrupt in May, 1789. The confusion of the succeeding months had prevented any effective measures for relieving the financial stringency. Money had to be obtained. At the moment, vast properties of the church were the asset most ready at hand.

Debate on the project for taking over the church land began October 10, 1789, and the decisive vote was cast November 2. Thus in less than a month the National Assembly introduced, debated, and passed a measure radically altering the age-long rights and privileges of the church in France. Such haste was due, first, to the need of money, and, second, to the radicalism of the deputies. As finally shaped by Mirabeau, the motion consisted of a declaration
that the property of the church in France was at the disposal of the nation on condition that the expenses of worship, the support of the clergy, and the care of the poor were adequately provided for. At the same time, it was moved and passed that curés (the lowest rank of the clergy) should be paid a minimum salary of 1200 livres (c. $250) per annum with lodging. A little over a month later, December 19, 1789, the sale of a part of the church lands was authorized to meet the needs of the government.

The value of the property thus taken over by the nation was estimated at between two or three thousand million livres (c. $400,000,000 and $600,000,000). To make the property immediately available in cash, the Assembly planned to use it as security for the issue of paper notes, called assignats. This plan was sound, providing that the issue of assignats was limited and that the value of the property was not depreciated by the sale of its most desirable sections or by poor management. At the same time, therefore, that the Assembly authorized the sale of part of the church lands (December 19, 1789), it authorized the issue of the first lot of assignats; four months later (April 17, 1790) the assignats to the amount of 400,000,000 livres were voted and began to be put into circulation. This issue met with dangerous success—success because it relieved the government of its pressing money difficulties; dangerous because it suggested to the inexperienced deputies a reservoir from which issues of money could be authorized whenever the treasury was low. The dangers became evident later, when the deputies voted successive issues—800,000,000 livres additional September 29, 1790, and 600,000,000 more June 19, 1791—with the result that the assignats depreciated rapidly in value.

In the meantime, the taking over of the church lands on the proviso that the clergy should be provided for made it necessary for the Assembly to draw up a plan for further relations between the government and the clergy. The
way was cleared for a sweeping measure by a preliminary law (February, 1790) whereby monastic orders were suppressed and their properties taken over by the state. In May, 1790, came the general plan in a report from the Ecclesiastical Committee of the Assembly upon a proposed law for "The Civil Constitution of the Clergy." By the provisions of this proposed law, the ancient ecclesiastical divisions were wiped out. Henceforth there were to be eighty-three Bishops, one Bishop in each Département. All intermediate ranks between the Bishops and the parish priests and curés were to be destroyed. The salary of each ecclesiastic was fixed. The clergy were to be elected, the Bishops by the electors in their Départements, and the parish priests and curés by the assemblies of their districts. French citizens were prohibited from recognizing the authority of any Bishop whose see was outside the Kingdom—a provision designed against the authority of the Pope. And each member of the clergy was required to maintain his residence in his parish, district, or Département.

Debates upon this proposed "Civil Constitution of the Clergy" began immediately after the submission of the report in May, 1790, and continued for six weeks. The most bitter opposition to its features developed among the clergy. The National Assembly was planning changes in a domain heretofore regarded as wholly under ecclesiastical authority. The Pope was naturally wholly out of sympathy with the law, and the clergy both of their own accord and by inspiration from Rome fought its adoption. The will of the radical element in the Assembly, however, was unyielding. The plan was adopted July 12, 1790, and received the reluctant assent of the helpless King, August 27, 1790.

The "Civil Constitution of the Clergy" was, from the point of view of practical statesmanship, a most unwise measure. The Assembly, anticipating trouble, voted November 27, 1790, to require the clergy to subscribe publicly to an oath "to swear to watch with care over the faithful
of the diocese or parish intrusted to them, to be faithful to the nation, the law, and the King, and to maintain with all their power the constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by the King.” Any cleric who refused to take the oath would be regarded as having resigned his position. January 4, 1791, the roll of the clergy in the National Assembly was called, and one after another the Bishops and priests declined to subscribe. Only four of the higher clergy and less than half of the priests and curates yielded. Under the law the non-juring priests were regarded as having resigned. Many parishes were thus left without priests or religious services. Though elections were at once held to determine successors, the people in the parishes were divided in their allegiance, some holding stubbornly to the old and others accepting the new priests. Disorders broke out in many sections, so serious as to cause troops to be dispatched for their suppression.

i. The Flight to Varennes

Humiliated as he had been by the successive assumptions of power by the National Assembly, the King was aroused by the “Civil Constitution of the Clergy” as he had been by nothing else. He had ever been a devout Catholic, and the provisions of the law had outraged his deepest instincts. Though he realized that his acceptance was forced, and that the Pope recognized this fact, he felt the abiding sense of guilt. He believed, not only that he had done wrong himself, but that his own acceptance might imperil the spiritual welfare of millions of his people.

Stung by remorse, the King again determined to make an effort to resume what he considered his legitimate functions. He still failed to appreciate the universality of the Revolution, thinking that it was the work of a small faction and that, if he himself were free, the greater part of the nation would rally to him. Mirabeau, who had for months past endeavored to assist him by counsel, died April 2, 1791.
Louis decided as a preliminary step to flee from Paris, establish himself among loyal troops at the northern border, and with the help of friendly Powers regain his power.

His plans were carried out with the utmost secrecy. He selected Montmédy, where was stationed a considerable body of dependable troops, as his objective, and intrusted arrangements to a Swedish nobleman resident at the court. No intimation of his purpose was allowed to escape. On the night of June 20, 1791, the royal family in disguise entered a traveling coach and were driven rapidly toward the frontier.

All went well until the carriage reached the town of Varennes, twenty-five miles from Montmédy. There, June 21, 1791, during a delay in obtaining a fresh relay of horses, the King carelessly showed himself at the door of the coach and was recognized. The National Guard of the town was assembled and formally detained him until orders came from the capital. Four days later he was ignominiously conducted back through the streets of Paris to the Tuileries.

The flight of the King revealed to France at large how inalterably opposed he was, in spite of his public declarations to the contrary, to all the principles underlying the Revolution. Though the National Assembly created the fiction that he had been abducted, and passed motions to punish his abductors, the people were not deceived. The King himself was now a prisoner under guard, and groups of radicals were openly discussing his punishment. Some advocated his deposition for treason. A small group, known as Republicans, began agitation for the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a democracy.

ii. The Massacre of the Champ de Mars

The Republicans, especially, were determined to influence the National Assembly. For this purpose they prepared a petition to be presented to the Assembly, calling for the deposition and trial of the King, and placarded Paris with
summons to “patriots” to assemble in the Champ de Mars July 17, 1791, for the ceremony of signing.

On the morning of the 17th, in answer to the summons, an immense crowd streamed out of Paris to the Champ de Mars. The baser elements of the city predominated, seeing the possibility of using this demonstration for a new insurrection. The National Assembly, fearing the temper of the mob and out of sympathy with its purposes, directed the Mayor of Paris to take the necessary measures for the safety of the capital. The National Guard was assembled, marched to the Champ de Mars, and stationed around the speaker’s stand. The Mayor read a proclamation ordering the crowd to disperse, but was answered with shouts of derision and a volley of stones. The National Guard then fired, killing and wounding a dozen or more and so frightened the rest that they fled in confusion.

Such was the “massacre of the Champ de Mars.” Its effect was twofold, to embitter still further the proletariat against the King, and to create intense hostility between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in Paris. The bourgeoisie had accepted gladly the coöperation of the proletariat in the insurrection of July 12–14, 1789, and had connived at the mob acts which had brought the royal family to Paris October 4–5, 1789. But the bourgeoisie had established and kept control of a stable municipal government, and was chiefly interested in maintaining order. Its interests were at bottom incompatible with those of the proletariat. During later days, when the proletariat gained the ascendancy, they took bloody revenge upon the leader of the bourgeoisie for this “massacre of the Champ de Mars.”

F. THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The constitution upon which the National Assembly had been working more or less steadily was now near completion. Certain of its provisions, such as the adminis-
trative division of the Kingdom and the relation of the government to the church and clergy, had actually been put into effect during the Assembly's deliberations. To exhibit their own purity of motives, the deputies finally incorporated a 'self-denying' clause, providing that no deputy who sat in the National Assembly should be regarded as eligible for the succeeding assembly—a mischievous article, in that it insured a new assembly of members practically as inexperienced as the deputies of the Estates General had been in May of 1789. The draft of the Constitutional Act was voted on and carried September 3, 1791. Eleven days later the King publicly took the oath to support it.

The new constitution provided for government by a King and a unicameral legislature. Royalty was to be hereditary in the male line of the Bourbon house according to the rule of primogeniture. At his accession, the sovereign was to take an oath of allegiance to the nation, the law, and the constitution. His person was inviolable and sacred, but he was to be regarded as having abdicated if he failed to take or observe his oath of allegiance, if he took part in any military enterprise against the state, or if he quitted the Kingdom. He was under the constitution the nominal supreme executive, and as such was head of the administration, and had extensive powers of appointment in the higher grades of army, navy, and diplomatic service. He had a suspensive veto upon legislation, operative through two assemblies, but any bill passed in spite of his veto in three successive assemblies, became law without his consent being required. Though it might seem from the above statement that the King had retained important powers in the new government, we must not lose sight of the vast differences between his position under this constitution and his position previously. He now had no control over the duration of the legislative body. He had no initiative in making laws, being empowered merely to suggest to the
Assembly subjects for its consideration. He was unable to declare or to wage war without the consent of the legislature. He had no judicial power. He had no control over the agencies of local government in his Kingdom. And he had no direct or final control of the army and navy. He had, indeed, descended far from the absolute sovereignty of a Louis XIV.

The legislature was to consist of a single Chamber of seven hundred and forty-five members, apportioned among the eighty-three Départements according to area, population, and amount paid in taxes. The deputies were elected by a system of indirect elections. The duration of a legislature was two years and it could not be prorogued or dissolved by the King. The legislative body had full power over legislation, except as qualified by the King's suspensive veto.

...With the completion of the new constitution, and its acceptance by the King, the labors of the National Assembly came to an end. At its final formal session, September 29, 1791, the King attended in person as he had at the opening of the Estates General May 5, 1789. He made the retiring deputies a short speech, concluding with the words: "In returning to your constituents you have still an important duty to discharge; you have to make known to the citizens the real meaning of the laws you have enacted, and to explain my sentiments to the people. Tell them that the King will always be their first and best friend; that he has need of their affection; that he knows no enjoyment but in them, and with them; that the hope of contributing to their happiness will sustain his courage, as the satisfaction of having done so will constitute his reward." In the evening magnificent fêtes were ordered by the King to celebrate the beginning of a new order, and as the royal family drove through the Champs-Elysée, they were greeted with demonstrations of enthusiasm. The people believed that the Revolution was completed.
The dissolution of the National Assembly marks the definite end of the first part, the relatively peaceful period, of the French Revolution. Confronted by the gigantic problems involved in the reconstruction of the entire political and social life of a Kingdom of twenty-five million souls, the deputies had accomplished much. They had swept away completely the system of privileges which had been the chief characteristic of the old régime. They had secured freedom of religious worship. They had abolished torture and punishment by breaking on the wheel. They had established a uniform judicial system. They had put into effect a complete new administrative system. They had opened careers in the military and diplomatic service to all who proved their capacity for advancement. They had brought about the distribution of land among the laboring classes. They had framed guarantees of civil liberty for the individual. No similar body under analogous conditions has ever in so short a time accomplished as much. That their work should have been perfect is too much to expect. Their errors were serious, were, indeed, the direct cause of the later and more terrible phases of the Revolution. They created schism in the Catholic church of France by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. They gave full exercise of the suffrage to great classes of men wholly unaccustomed to the right uses of such power. They gave supreme legislative power to a legislature of a single chamber, in spite of the fact that every contemporary example emphasized the value of two chambers. And, most important of all, in their anxiety to destroy the autocracy of the old régime, they so curbed and weakened the executive authority as to render it unable, even if well disposed, to maintain order and security within the Kingdom.

With all of its virtues, a constitution which had such fundamental errors was doomed to failure. As a matter of fact, it survived less than a year.
CHAPTER IV

EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION

During the two preceding chapters, we have confined our attention exclusively to the course of events in France from May, 1789, to the dissolution of the National Assembly September, 1791. The other governments of Europe, though not indifferent to the Revolution, preferred to regard it as an issue in the internal politics of France. Even the appeal of the émigrés failed to move these governments to intervene. Guided solely by motives of self-interest, Austria, Russia, and Prussia saw no objects to be gained by a war with France comparable with those to be easily won in other quarters. Austria was at the time engaged in war against Turkey (1788–1791), from which she hoped to absorb what is now northern Serbia and western Roumania. Russia was at war both with Turkey (1788–1792) and with Sweden (1788–1790), and was at the same time intriguing against the new government in Poland (established May 3, 1791) to bring about ultimately a second partition for her territorial advantage. Prussia, traditionally hostile to Austria, was holding herself in readiness to intervene for her own advantage in the Austro-Turkish War, and was following with jealous anxiety the Russian intrigue in Poland. The small German states of the Holy Roman Empire could make no move against France without the leadership of Austria or Prussia. Across the English Channel, public opinion was divided with regard to the merits of the Revolution. Strong voices were raised in its defense. Not until the news of the excesses of the radical elements reached England did the government lean to
the opposition, and even then, no hostile move was proposed unless English rights should be infringed upon.

Considerations of internal politics, however, led the French factions to provoke foreign war, war that lasted with few intermissions for over two decades. We have to trace from now on, therefore, both the course of politics in France and the resulting crises in international politics in Europe.

A. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY,

OCT. 1, 1791—SEPT. 20, 1792

Since the convocation of the Estates General in 1789, political life in France had rapidly developed. Though 'parties' in the modern sense of the term with their complex machinery and their platform of policies were unknown, men of like opinions naturally tended to coalesce into well-defined groups. These groups centered about "Clubs," successors in many cases to the informal 'salons' in which the bourgeoisie under the old régime had met for social pleasure and for discussion of economic and political conditions. As these new "Clubs" became important factors in directing the policies of their members in the Legislative Assembly, the most important deserve mention here.

In the early days of the Estates General and the National Assembly, a group of deputies entitling themselves "Friends of the Constitution" met in a hall of an abandoned Jacobin convent. At first composed only of deputies, this group soon admitted many prominent Paris revolutionaries, and established branches in prominent towns of France. By the fall of 1791, the "Jacobins" had over 400 affiliated branches, each in correspondence with the central "Club" at Paris. Through their large membership they exerted a wide influence upon public opinion and upon the decisions of the National Assembly. In the elections to the Legislative Assembly they carried 136 seats, their deputies sitting together on the left of the hall. As the Revolution had pro-
gressed, the Jacobins had become more radical, and had drawn into their membership sections of the restless proletariat as well as the most daring of the bourgeoisie. Their power in the Legislative Assembly lay in their compact and disciplined organization and their willingness to use the spirit of insurrection in the Paris mob to overawe other deputies.

A second radical Club was the Cordeliers, organized in May, 1790, as the "Society of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," and holding its early meetings in the church of the monastery of the Cordeliers. From the beginning it was ultra-revolutionary, encouraging measures against the monarchy and rallying to its support the baser elements of the Paris populace. Its members worked with the Jacobins in promoting insurrectionary movements in Paris in 1792, but later attacked the leaders of the other party for their 'moderation.' It gained importance by the vehemence of its attacks and the radicalism of its policies.

The chief of the more moderate "Clubs" was the Feuillants, an offshoot of the Jacobins. The Feuillants Club was organized in July, 1791, by Jacobins who refused to advocate the extreme measures against the King adopted by the majority of the "Club." Their early meetings were held in the buildings of a former religious order called The Feuillants. They supported the constitution framed by the National Assembly, granting, however, the advisability of some amendment. In the Legislative Assembly they were numerically the strongest group, comprising 264 members on the right of the Chamber, and the King chose his first ministry from them. They did not have, however, the compact organization of the Jacobins, and their moderation found no sympathy with the radical Paris populace.

The absence of national party organization is revealed by the fact that more than 800 deputies in the Legislative Assembly sat in the center, professing no fixed political policies. Elected because of local prominence, they arrived
at Paris, presented their credentials, and awaited developments, ready to throw their votes as expediency might demand. This drifting mass held the balance of power: whichever group could influence it, could rule the Assembly, and with the Assembly, France.

Outside of Paris, the people were drifting politically as were many of their representatives in the Legislative Assembly. All hoped that the Revolution was finished, yet the sporadic disorders and uprisings of the peasantry against their former lords, the continued fall in the value of the assignats, and the general stagnation of trade were preparing the ground for further revolutionary excesses. The French people were restless and unhappy: they were expecting from the Legislative Assembly more than that body could possibly accomplish. Within the capital, the forces of Radicalism — the Jacobins, Cordeliers, and their allies — though not numerically in the majority, had the power that results from organization and daring. Since Lafayette had resigned the command of the Paris National Guard, the *sansculottes* had filled its ranks and undermined its discipline. The newly elected mayor of Paris, Pétion, was an avowed Republican and willing to go to great lengths to aid the radicals. The “Clubs” were functioning perfectly, keeping their representatives worked up to a high pitch of enthusiasm and binding them together with common political interests. Thus the Jacobins and their allies wielded a power out of proportion to their actual number in the one place from which they might hope to dominate France.

The Legislative Assembly believed that, before undertaking internal reforms, it should endeavor to insure the permanence of the Revolution. Two prominent groups still defied this Revolution, the émigrés on the border, and the non-juring priests in France. The first acts of the Assembly, therefore, were directed against the émigrés and the non-juring priests. November 9, 1791, it decreed
that those émigrés who did not return by January 1, 1792, should be condemned to death. November 29, 1791, it decreed that the non-juring clergy should take the oath to the constitution within one week on penalty of expulsion from their living and confiscation of their pay. By these decrees the Legislative Assembly made known its purpose to defend and perpetuate the Revolution.

These decrees placed the King in an embarrassing position. He had, apparently, accepted his constitutional position, but he was unwilling from loyalty to his nobility and his church to approve measures against them. He was not lacking in personal courage. At the sacrifice of much of what was left of his popularity, he used his royal prerogative and vetoed both decrees (November 12 and December 19, 1791).

During these months the factions in the French assembly took advantage of the troubled international relations to force a foreign war. In their initial efforts they were aided by the threats and the ill-judged actions of the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns. After the arrest of the royal family at Varennes, Leopold of Austria, urged by the émigrés, persuaded Frederick William of Prussia to join him in a "declaration" (The Declaration of Pillnitz, August 27, 1791) addressed to the émigré princes, stating that the restoration of the monarchy in France was a matter of common interest. The émigrés hailed this "declaration" with joy, publishing it broadcast, and falsely adding that not only Austria and Prussia but England and the other powers were preparing for intervention.

Naturally the Declaration of Pillnitz served the purposes of the French factions who desired to inflame the passions of the people for foreign war. Even though Leopold after Louis XVI's acceptance of the new constitution in September, 1791, showed that he had no real desire for war with France by withdrawing the Declaration of Pillnitz, certain radical factions continued their agitation. In the Legisla-
tive Assembly, they passed measures requiring the French King to demand that the Elector of Treves disperse the émigrés in his electorate, and to question insolently Leopold on his support of the German princes in their protection of the émigrés. Again Leopold yielded, and advised the Elector of Treves to accede to the French demands. Shortly afterward Leopold died (March 1, 1792), and Austrian affairs passed into the hands of his less competent son and successor, Francis.

Neither the withdrawal of the Declaration of Pillnitz nor the dispersion of the émigrés allayed the sentiment for war. In March, the Feuillant ministry was replaced by a Girondin ministry—a ministry whose members were from a Jacobin group hailing from the Gironde district of southern France. The Girondins ardently desired war, believing that the French people would be united by war in the defense of the Revolution, and that the King would be forced to show his true colors. The King himself desired, not war, but intervention by the foreign powers in his favor. He was still deluded by the belief that the Revolution was the work of but a small group of radicals in France. He and the Queen at this time began their secret communications with their fellow sovereigns. Friends of the King, however, actually connived at the maneuvers of the Girondins in the belief that war would rally the nation, not to the Revolution, but to the King, and would thus be a step toward the restoration of the former conditions.

Before the forces plotting to engulf France in foreign war, the King was too weak to stand. April 20, 1792, he appeared before the Legislative Assembly. His minister read the grounds of complaint against Austria. Louis then added: "You have heard, gentlemen, the result of my negotiations with the court of Vienna: they are conformable to the sentiments more than once expressed to me by the Assembly, and confirmed by the great majority
of the Kingdom. All prefer a war to the continuance of outrages to the national honor, or menaces to the national safety. I have exhausted all the means of pacification in my power; I now come, under the terms of the constitution, to propose to the Assembly, that we should declare war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia." In the vote on the declaration, all but seven voted in favor. It had been hoped that Prussia might be detached from Austria, but Frederick William took the ground that an alliance he had formed with Leopold in February compelled him to consider the declaration of war to be directed against him also. By the vote of April 20, 1792, therefore, France was committed to war against both Austria and Prussia.

B. THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

It was fortunate for France that the volatile Assembly which plunged her into conflict with all Europe did not have control of the war. Although the Revolutionary principles which were spread rapidly throughout the country had not left the army untouched, that fiery ardor for and contagious faith in the new order which marked the armies of a year later, and made them a glorious instrument on which the impulsive leaders might play, were yet to be developed. The soldier on the frontier was still the product of the old régime, trained in its systems, obeying and respecting the officers it supplied him, and, as yet, living and moving in a world apart from the Revolutionaries in Paris. Discipline instead of enthusiasm, a sense of duty rather than patriotism actuated this army in the beginning and carried it on to victory when success seemed impossible. Behind the bulwark of this remnant of the Bourbon Army, France called out and prepared those levies which formed the great armies of the Revolution, but the honor and glory of holding the gate against the united attacks belongs to the old army.
It must not be supposed that the army of France was without flaw. To begin with, it was far below the 170,000 troops which were its peace quota. Three months before war was declared, Narbonne, the Minister of War, reported to the Assembly that it was 51,000 under strength. In addition to the regulars, it contained a militia element of 55,000 which was but little better than useless. It was recruited entirely by voluntary enlistment; and because the pay was poor, barracks bad, and food worse, its recruits were often of a low type. Its officers, scions of noble houses, and, hence, faithful to the King, had deserted in great numbers at the time of the flight to Varennes, and had left the army sadly lacking in experienced leaders. And finally, although the years following the Seven Years' War had witnessed spasmodic attempts to better the organization of the army and improve the condition of the soldier, these attempts were made in the usual torpid fashion of the Bourbons, and the outbreak of the war had found an army with no adequate system of supply or transport, with an ephemeral general staff, directed by a war office whose chief changed with every new political wind.

To make a clumsy organization still more unwieldy, the Assembly, in August, 1791, passed a decree authorizing 160 new volunteer battalions — 101,000 men — of which 60 plundering, turbulent battalions were actually formed. Six months later, a new decree disabled this force most effectively: all volunteers were permitted to return home at the end of a campaign (supposedly December 1); and they were privileged to choose their own officers.

Yet several things combined to make this army a tool sufficiently effective to save the country. Disorderly and drunken as the individual soldier often was, he had in immediate command a non-commissioned officer who was intelligent and zealous. A system of examinations insured certain literary and practical qualities in this part
of the personnel, and gave the army at least one focus. The non-commissioned officers kept alive an *esprit de corps* in the various regiments throughout the unquiet months which preceded the war, and upon the dereliction of their officers, furnished the substitutes for the junior ranks. Under their guidance, the privates soon settled down into ways of discipline, once the forces were actually in the field. Further, the artillery and engineers had escaped the demoralization which had attacked the infantry and cavalry. The volunteers called by the Assembly were brigaded with the regular troops, and soon showed signs of worth.

But the greatest factor in enabling this army to safeguard France until new armies could be formed and trained, was the fact that the canker which had eaten so deeply into the French army had been equally destructive in its effect upon the forces of Prussia and Austria. Even before the close of the Seven Years’ War, the splendid infantry of Frederick the Great had begun to degenerate, and though at the death of the great captain, Prussia was left with the finest army in Europe, with the passing of the old King the fire died, and those evils which culminated in the disaster of 1806 began to show themselves. It was still imposing in appearance, and its well-advertised self-esteem gave it an apparent formidability unjustified by its actual strength and efficiency. Moreover, the suspicion with which the King of Prussia regarded his Austrian ally, and his insistence upon independent commands, gave to his army the finishing touch of impotency.

It is, perhaps, harder to justify the statement that Austria’s army was on the decline. In 1763, she had been at war continuously for a hundred years, and since that date she had twice fought Turkey. Her force was unquestionably the most powerful in Europe, but her commanding generals were always subject to the orders of the Aulic Council in Vienna, and in proof that decay had set in, we have at least one authority who says that her army “was
disgraced by the frequent occurrence of large bodies' laying down their arms." At any rate, we know that her greed for Polish territory kept her attention divided until France, thoroughly aroused, had become an armed nation, against which the numbers and organization of Austria proved wholly inadequate.

When war was declared, France found herself in possession of 82,000 effectives, stationed along her frontiers, and divided into three armies. The names of two of the commanders — Rochambeau and Lafayette — are very familiar to American ears, but the former resigned before activities began. Dumouriez, secretary for foreign affairs of the Girondin ministry, and the real driving power of the war, intended to begin with an invasion of the Austrian Netherlands by Lafayette's army. Nothing could have been more dismal than the attempt. Of the three columns which advanced on Namur, Mons, and Tournai, in late April, 1792, only the one commanded by Lafayette made a creditable showing, the other two fleeing in most shameful fashion. Lafayette was forced to withdraw after having accomplished nothing except to arouse Austria to a realization that war was actually upon her. Immediately, Prussia was asked for assistance under terms of the treaty, and armies were started toward France, with the Duke of Brunswick in command. However, the mutual jealousies of Prussia and Austria kept them from adopting the active policy which would have defeated France, and gave her a little respite in which to improve her defense.

The only movement in this direction was a decree on the part of the Assembly to establish a camp of fédérés near Paris. At the same time it decreed the deportation of the non-juring priests and the sacrifice of the King's guard. Louis accepted the last named decree but vetoed the other two, thereby arousing an opposition which resulted in the dismissal of the Girondin ministry (June, 1792). Only Dumouriez was retained in the new position of Minister of
War. The latter, always with the war before his eyes, urged upon Louis the acceptance of the decrees, but without success. Convinced now that he could no longer serve the war in Paris, he resigned and joined Lafayette's army of the North. The storm aroused by Louis' stubbornness waxed, and finally found expression through a mob which invaded the Tuileries on June 20th, and imperiled the life of both the King and Queen. Still Louis remained obdurate, and meanwhile the armies of Prussia were slowly approaching.

Expressions of sympathy for the King began to be heard from all over France, among them being one which had a direct bearing on the war. Lafayette, liberal though he was, still had hope of reconciling the monarchy and the Revolution. Accordingly, he came to Paris, thinking to make use of the enormous popularity which had been his in the early days of the Revolution. His time had passed, however, and he returned to his command under suspicion from both parties—from one for having tried to control the Revolution, from the other for having failed. This suspicion grew, and his trial as a traitor was discussed in the Assembly, so that upon receipt of the news of the Insurrection of August 10 (see below), Lafayette saw that his usefulness was past. On August 19, he crossed the frontier and surrendered himself to the Austrians, choosing imprisonment rather than an abandonment of his principles. He was succeeded in command of the Army of the North by Dumouriez.

On July 25th, the Duke of Brunswick started his march from Coblenz, and the same day he issued his famous manifesto to the people of France. In it he declared that the allied sovereigns, without hope or intention of territorial aggrandizement, had taken up arms for the purpose of putting down the anarchy which now prevailed in France, and restoring to the throne its rightful occupant. He ended by warning the Assembly and the people of Paris that
if they did not liberate the King, and "return to their allegiance, they should answer with their heads for their disobedience; and that if the palace were forced, or the slightest insult offered to the royal family, an exemplary and memorable punishment should be inflicted, by the total destruction of the city of Paris."

In justice to the Duke of Brunswick it must be said that he was far-seeing enough to consider the manifesto ill-timed. The allied sovereigns, however, insisted upon its publication. Curiously enough, the document is largely the work of Calonne, former Minister of Finance for Louis XVI. Its effect upon France was electric. Immediate indignation was aroused at the arrogance of the foreign kings, and everywhere were seen signs that France now appreciated the task before her and was earnestly preparing for it.

C. INSURRECTION OF THE PARIS COMMUNE

The threat of invasion had produced the greatest tumult in France, centering, naturally, at the seat of government. The Legislative Assembly decreed La Patrie en danger July 11, and on July 22 and 23 the tocsin was sounded, recruiting bureaux were established at the chief corners in the towns, and the people called to arms. The general fear led to an outburst of indignation against the King. He was believed to be — as indeed he was — in correspondence with the allied governments; and the Queen was suspected of furnishing the French plan of campaign to the commander of the hostile army. From Marseilles came a deputation July 12 demanding the deposition of the King, and from the same city marched into Paris July 30 a force of volunteers singing Rouget de Lisle’s new stirring revolutionary anthem, now universally known as La Marseillaise. In Paris, the Jacobins favored deposition, and plotted insurrection to accomplish this result. Under cover of the ferment in Paris, they planned to gain control of the gov-
ernment of the commune (i.e., the regular municipal government of the capital) and with the support of the mob to coerce the Assembly. The presence of the Marseillaise troops, the constant marching and counter-marching in the streets, and finally the publication on August 3d of the ill-advised proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick worked the people up to a fever of excitement and prepared the way for the success of the plans of the conspirators.

The royal family were aware of the danger of insurrection. Although they took measures to strengthen the guard at the Tuileries, their hope lay in the advance of the allied armies. The King was in correspondence with his brother sovereigns. The Queen was furnishing copies of the French plans to the allied generals. Both hoped for relief if they could hold out for a month.

Insurrection broke out in the early morning of August 10, 1792. A council of commissioners elected in primaries at the dictation of the conspirators deposed the regular communal assembly and established itself in the Hôtel de Ville as the Provisional Commune of Paris. At the Tuileries, the Swiss guard at first repelled the mob, but the King and the royal family, little understanding the true situation, decided to throw themselves on the mercy of the Legislative Assembly. They therefore made their way to the hall of the Assembly, where they presented themselves, the King saying simply: "I am come here to save the nation from the commission of a great crime; I shall always consider myself, with my family, safe in your hands." He then sent written orders to his guard to withdraw — orders which resulted in the extermination of the guard by the mob. He and his family were given seats in a gallery of the Assembly, where they remained from 10 a.m., August 10th, until 3 a.m., August 11th, passive witnesses of the debate which determined their fate.

The Provisional Commune, or the Revolutionary Commune, as it is often called, assumed direction of the revolt.
It preferred to have the Legislative Assembly remain in session, thus keeping in existence a body which was nominally representative of all France, and which retained the allegiance of the provinces. The Assembly, however, was helpless before the Commune, supported by the Paris mob — indeed, only 284 of the 745 deputies dared to appear in their seats August 10. Before this subservient Assembly deputations from the Commune just after the fall of the Tuileries on the morning of the 10th urged the deposition of the King and the dismissal of the ministry. The Assembly obediently followed the dictates of its masters, decreed the deposition of the King, the dismissal of the ministry, and the convocation of a "Convention" to frame a new constitution. Three days later, the Commune demanded the custody of the King and the royal family: again the Assembly perforce yielded.

Between the success of the insurrection and the meeting of the Convention, August 10 to September 20, 1792, the Provisional Commune of Paris governed France. Robespierre, Danton, and Marat then first became conspicuous as leaders of the radicals. Maximilien Robespierre, born 1758, was a successful lawyer in Arras when the Revolution began. Elected to the Estates General, he became an important figure there and a leading member of the Jacobin club. Fanatically sincere in his belief in the principles of the Revolution, he found an audience in the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of the Club, and was soon idolized by these elements as their natural and inspired leader. The power he exercised over the Jacobins is difficult to explain, for he had no gift of eloquence, no commanding presence, and no breadth of vision. He was, however, strictly honest and moral, gaining the surname of "The 'Incorruptible,'" and preached the popular doctrines of Rousseau time without end. He knew the Jacobin plans for the insurrection of August 10, but took no active part in their execution. He sat in the Provisional Commune and, as the most in-
fluential man of the Jacobin organization, wielded an immense power.

A more direct, practical, and forceful leader was George Jacques Danton. Born 1759, Danton was practicing law in Paris in 1789. Although President of the Cordeliers Club in the early days of the Revolution, Danton did not emerge from political obscurity until the August 10, 1792, insurrection. He is given credit today for the success of that revolt. In the reconstitution of government following it, he was appointed to the prominent post of minister of justice. Huge in body, endowed with a loud and vibrant voice and great natural eloquence, brave, honest, and practical, Danton from this time until his execution less than two years later had an important part in shaping events in France. History today, however much it condemns certain errors in judgment, gives him unreserved praise for the sincere patriotic motives which underlay his every act.

We can admire much in Robespierre and Danton, but almost nothing in Marat. Yet Marat's character is one of the enigmas of history. Jean Paul Marat, born 1743, was a Paris physician of great reputation when the Revolution began. He had published a dozen notable books, had been honored by election to learned societies, had been a favored doctor among the autocracy, holding a privileged position in the household of the King's younger brother, the Comte d'Artois, and was a recognized leader in scientific circles. At the Revolution, he laid aside completely his professional life and threw himself into the popular cause. During the first years he edited a paper (L'Ami du Peuple, Friend of the People), notable for its scurrilous violence. His attacks on persons in power placed him in jeopardy again and again, so that he was forced to hide or flee from time to time. He won, however, the confidence of the basest elements of the Paris proletariat. In the insurrection of August 10, 1792, he took a seat in the Provisional Com-
mune, where he was in a position to give full scope to his suspicious zeal.

The Provisional, or Revolutionary, Commune undertook energetically the task of carrying on the government (under the shadow of the Legislative Assembly) until the Convention should be elected. They dictated the appointment of a ministry, Danton being the most prominent figure. They approved the Assembly's decree ordering the confiscation and sale of the land of the émigré nobles, hoping thus to bolster up the depreciated assignats. They ordered the non-juring clergy to leave the country under penalty of transportation to Guiana. They were especially interested, however, in measures to discover and punish traitors to the Revolution, those suspected of desiring the restoration of monarchy and the old régime. For such purpose they demanded from the Assembly the creation of an extraordinary tribunal, with judges and jurors chosen by the people, empowered to try conspirators: and the cowed Assembly consented August 27, 1792. Thus began the Revolutionary Tribunal, later so conspicuous during The Terror.

The Provisional Commune felt the need of a demonstration to terrorize the disloyal. Lafayette had deserted August 19; the fortress of Longwy had fallen August 27; the enemy were before Verdun August 30. On the pretext of a search for concealed weapons, agents of the ministry conducted a house to house canvas of Paris the last days of August, 1792, filling the prisons with suspected reactionaries. With the fall of Verdun momentarily expected and the allied armies then within a few weeks' march of Paris, the Commune saw no opportunity of trying judicially all the cases. To some desperate minds the remedy suggested itself. In the afternoon of September 2, 1792, while crowds in the Champs de Mars were being roused by speeches to patriotic fervor, assassins started the round of the prisons. During the next few days more than 1400 of the suspected
reactionaries were murdered. The authorities, indifferent or helpless, took no measures to check the slaughter. The excuse for the massacre was the oft-repeated question: "How can we go to war and leave three thousand prisoners who may break out and slay our wives and children?"

The remaining fortnight after the massacre was chiefly taken up with the elections to the Convention. In Paris, the acts of terrorism contributed directly, as was partly intended, to the success of the most radical of the Jacobin elements. Robespierre led the list; Danton and Marat were colleagues. Throughout France as a whole, the radical Jacobins had a strong representation. At the meeting of the Convention September 21, 1792, they formed the most important group.

D. THE WAR — TO THE CLOSE OF 1792

With the advance of Brunswick’s forces, 42,000 strong, the French army on the frontier underwent all the terror and panic which marked the restless days in Paris. Following the flight of Lafayette, Dumouriez had succeeded to the command of the Army of the North, and a few days later, Kellermann became commander of the Army of the Center. Both changes were for the betterment of the army, but the latter change, at least, came late. Kellermann’s inert predecessor had, either stupidly or willfully, neglected to keep the border fortresses in a state of preparation to resist attack. When Brunswick appeared before Longwy, August 27, that important fortification was so ill-armed and ill-garrisoned that it surrendered without making even a show of resistance. It was the same at Verdun. What should have been France’s sturdiest stronghold on her eastern frontier went through only a mockery of defense, and then, both her military garrison and her civilian population, terrified by the shells of the allies, demanded that the fort be surrendered. Against their frenzied clamor, the Commandant was helpless, and in despair he
committed suicide. The gates of the town were opened to the invader, September 2. Brunswick was free to march on Paris.

Had the Prussian commander taken advantage of the situation which stupidity and inertia had created for him, a few days more would have made him master of the French capital. But the lethargy of the French seems to have been contagious, for now the same inertness marked their opponent as had previously characterized French movements. Day after day of allied inaction gave Dumouriez one last chance to save France. By a rapid and daring flank march he moved his forces along the front of Brunswick’s army, part of the time in contact with the enemy outposts, and took up a strong position in the Argonne hills which lay across the road to Paris. At the same time, he gave orders for Kellermann to move north from Metz with his troops, and join the main army at once. In position in the hills he awaited the attack which he knew was certain.

The Duke was halted eleven days by the detachments holding the passes of the Argonne Hills. Then, he pushed through the northern pass and forced Dumouriez to fall back to the southern end of the hills, with the Prussians on the direct road to Paris, between the French and their base, Châlons. Once more a vigorous move would have brought success to the Duke, but he delayed until the tardy Kellermann had joined Dumouriez and brought the French strength to 50,000.

On September 20 was fought the battle of Valmy. It was insignificant as a battle between large armies, but it was of the greatest moment to France. Against an accurate and vigorous artillery fire, Brunswick was unable to force forward his infantry columns, and at nightfall abandoned the attack. His losses in numbers were trifling, as were also those of the French, but the influence on the morale of the two armies was remarkable. The allies, already weakened by hardships, hunger, and disease, were ready
to retire, whereas the French were inspirted out of all proportion to the size of the engagement.

Dumouriez, who had long been intriguing to detach Prussia from the alliance, continued his secret negotiations with Brunswick, and failed to harass his beaten enemies until their retreat was well organized. Thereupon, a half-hearted pursuit drove across the frontier the 10,000 effectives which remained of the allied army, October 22.

Meanwhile, in late September and early October, 1792, the French Army of the Vosges, under General Custine, had captured Speier, Worms, Mainz, and Frankfort in Brunswick's rear. The expedition, as carried out, had neither strategical nor permanent political value but the occupation of the cities proved a thorn in the flesh which the allies were unable to remove for months. At least three attacks were launched against Custine before he abandoned all his gains and fell back once more to the line of the Vosges (April 1, 1793).

In November, 1792, Dumouriez found leisure to carry out his interrupted plan of the invasion of the Netherlands. Against an opponent who had seriously weakened his strength by extending his lines, the French commander led superior forces which struck the Austrians at the little town of Jemappes, near Mons. He discovered his enemy in a strong position on the hills near Jemappes. Making use of his superior numbers, Dumouriez launched an enveloping attack against the Austrian left flank. He was at first successful on the right but was forced to halt because of disastrous cavalry attacks against his center. When this danger had been averted, another became imminent on the right flank, which had halted. The situation was relieved by the extreme right column of the French. These troops found boats wherewith to cross the Haine, and thus were enabled to get completely around the Austrian left. When they appeared, in rear of the enemy lines, the Austrians broke and fled.
This fortunate and rather showy victory roused both France and Belgium to the wildest excitement. Thereafter the invasion became almost a triumphal entry. Mons, Brussels, Liège, Ypres, Antwerp, and Namur fell one after another, and by the end of the year the armies of France occupied all of the Austrian Low Countries.

It was time to call a halt. The army was in a sad shape, supplies were scarce and uncertain, the soldiers took to plundering, and the indiscipline in the new levies proved a serious defect in the military organization. By the end of December, the invading army which had numbered 100,000 before Jemappes, had been reduced to 45,000. They no longer had the Austrians to fear, but, by the new year, the Belgians had begun to foresee their fate at the hands of the new republic, and outbreaks were frequent between them and the invading soldiers.

E. THE CONVENTION

The Convention met September 21, 1792, under the best auspices. Its first legislative measure was to decree, September 22, 1792, the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. News of the retirement of the allied armies at Valmy the day before, magnified by report into a great French victory, reached Paris on the 22d and heartened the nation. Followed as it was by the withdrawal of the Prussians in the middle of October, the spectacular raid of Custine in the Rhine countries and his seizure of Mainz October 21, the success at Jemappes November 6, and the occupation of Brussels November 14, it removed for the time all menace of effective foreign intervention.

Although the occupation of Nice on September 28, 1792, had added Sardinia to France's enemies, the successes of their armies determined the enthusiastic deputies, inspired by Danton, to constitute their new republic an apostle of liberty to Europe. The occupation of Brussels November 14 had been largely aided by an influential group of
Belgian liberals, who expressed desire to be forever freed from Austrian tyranny. In accordance with these desires, the Convention in a paroxysm of fervor for the principles of the new-found liberty, decreed November 19, 1792, its protection of all nations struggling for freedom. Appeals from another direction two days later determined the deputies to extend their decree. Delegations from the people of Savoy requested annexation to France. A committee quickly reported that the Convention would not "repulse from their bosom men brought near to them by an identity of principles and interests," and November 27 the deputies voted the annexation. The next month, December 15, 1792, the Convention, under the leadership of Danton, decreed a definite policy of revolutionary propaganda in neighboring countries, providing that the institutions of the new Republic should be transplanted to them, and declaring that any people which should refuse the offered liberty would be treated as enemies and considered as slaves.

These decrees of November 19 and December 15, 1792, mark a definite phase in the passage of the Revolution from an issue of French internal politics to a question of international relations. The French were justified in carrying through a Revolution in France, and few governments in Europe cared to intervene. They were not justified, however, under any of the conventions of international relations in attempting to spread their revolutionary propaganda and system beyond their borders, especially when annexation of territory belonging to other governments followed. The Republic was creating against itself an implacable league of European governments.

In the meanwhile a bitter factional fight developed in the Convention between the extreme Jacobins and the Gironde Jacobins—i.e., the Jacobins from the Gironde district in southern France. Up to the meeting of the Convention the Gironde Jacobins had been in power. They had furnished the ministry of Louis XVI following the fall
of the Feuillants (March, 1792), and were indeed the ministers of the government at the opening of the Convention. They had been instrumental in forcing France into foreign war. Their leaders, gathering frequently in the salon of the brilliant Mme. Roland in Paris, had become the most conspicuous persons in France. After the suspension of the King, however, their policy differed sharply from that advocated by the extremists (the enragés, as they came to be called). They were not whole-heartedly in favor of a Republic. They did not sincerely desire the trial and punishment of the King. They leaned toward moderation, involving the retention of their own position as the head of the government.

The opposing group, headed by Robespierre, was compactly organized and could rely upon the support of the Paris proletariat. The proletariat had so terrorized the bourgeoisie of the capital that in the municipal elections for the new commune to replace the Provisional, or Revolutionary, Commune, only about ten per cent of the voters dared to appear at the polls. This proletariat was ready at Robespierre's call to overawe the Convention. In contrast to the enragés, the Gironde Jacobins were not well organized and had no popular support in Paris, and relatively little throughout the country. The leaders, Brissot, Roland (husband of Mme. Roland), Vergniaud, were not men of force and political vision, and were not unjustly suspected of personal ambition. They had no direct common policy to suggest, but wasted critical hours in rhetorical fulminations against the opposing group. The Girondins lacked the capacity for leadership and the definite policy which might have carried a majority of the independent deputies with them.

As the Robespierre group, the enragés, or the Mountain (so called from their seats in the top benches of the Convention), saw that the disposition of the King was the key to the situation, they pressed the issue to a decision. Novem-
ber 3, 1792, a committee brought in its report on the charges against Louis, recommending that he be tried before the Convention for treason. Late in the same month the discovery in a secret safe of the Tuileries of the correspondence Louis had carried on with his brother sovereigns revealed how he had intrigued against the Revolution. December 3, 1792, the Convention formally decreed that the recommendation of its committee be followed and that "Louis Capet" be tried for treason. December 26, 1792, Louis appeared for trial at the bar of the Convention. The Girondists were placed in a difficult dilemma. To vote guilty was to betray their convictions: to vote not guilty was to arouse the populace, invite accusations of disloyalty, and endanger their lives. They had not the courage to take the second course and to attempt to carry the independent deputies of the Center, or the Plain, with them. On the decisive vote, they yielded before danger and voted the King's guilt. January 19, 1793, the Convention, with the Girondins still fearing the dangers of opposition, decreed the immediate execution of the King. Two days later, January 21, 1793, Louis bravely mounted the scaffold and was guillotined.

The execution of the King, together with the Convention's decrees of November 19 and December 15, 1792, was a gauntlet thrown down by republican France to the governments of Europe, and the challenge was straightway accepted. The English government expelled the French diplomatic agent from its country, and cemented its alliance with the United Provinces of Holland. The Convention thereupon waited no longer, but declared war against England and Holland February 1, 1793. War against Spain, whose ambassador had vainly attempted to save the life of Louis XVI, and with the Holy Roman Empire, followed a month later. By early spring, 1793, France was at war with the First Coalition, comprising Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, England, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Tuscany, Naples, and the Holy Roman Empire.
CHAPTER V

FOREIGN WAR: THE TERROR, AND THE REACTION IN FRANCE. MARCH, 1793—OCTOBER, 1793 ¹

Had the coalition energetically pressed the war, its troops would soon have forced their way to Paris and there dictated the terms of peace. The governments, however, were either impotent or interested in other enterprises. Prussia considered the dissolution of Poland more important than war against France, and had, by treaty with Russia in January, 1793, gained liberally in the Second Partition. Spain, Holland, and Sardinia had not sufficient forces to attempt invasion. England had no foothold from which to launch an army, and was reduced to the exercise of her sea power and to the offer of subsidies to the continental governments. The burden of the land offensive, therefore, fell upon Austria — and even Austria did not contemplate a decisive invasion of France.

To the French, however, the war was of vital interest. The decree of La Patrie en danger awakened every loyal instinct. From their government they asked measures, organization, and leaders to insure success. Hence, every military movement found its direct reflection in internal politics; and every faction argued for its policies on the ground that they were best fitted to save the country.

In the confused events of the next few years, therefore, we shall gain a proper perspective by making the ebb and flow of the military campaigns the background of our narrative of the course of politics in France.

¹The Convention had introduced a new republican calendar, with months named from the seasons. It has been thought simpler, however, to date events by the commonly known method.
A. MILITARY OPERATIONS

FEBRUARY 16, 1793–AUGUST 14, 1793

The success of the fall and winter of 1792 — the advances of Dumouriez in the Netherlands, and those of Custine on the Rhine — had given the French an estimate of their military prowess which was not upheld by their actual condition. Their political ambitions knew no bounds and they determined to make their army the handmaid of their ambitions. England and Holland, protesting against the destruction of a treaty which had closed the Scheldt River to commerce, were offered their 'freedom' at the hands of the Revolutionists, who proposed an invasion to assist Republicans in the two countries. On February 1, 1793, France declared war on England and Holland, and a few weeks later, served a similar declaration on Spain. Before the close of the year, the gauntlet flung down by France had been taken up by the Kings of Portugal and Naples, by the Duke of Tuscany, and by the Holy Roman Empire. Against this First Coalition, France light-heartedly sent an army, unorganized, undisciplined, and untrained, with only the record of two chance-won battles, Valmy and Jemappes, to justify its existence.

Undaunted by the news that large allied armies were concentrating against him, Dumouriez boldly started his advance into Holland. A few cities fell to his arms, but he soon found himself compelled to lay siege to a Prussian force which had occupied Maestricht. As he was making his preparations, news came that the Austrian army under Coburg was beginning to advance into Belgium coincident with a similar movement by Brunswick directed against Custine's forces on the Rhine. The French commander ordered a retreat, and himself hastened back to Belgium to forestall disaster. He found his troops in a panic, and all his efforts toward reorganization enabled him only to make a reasonably well-ordered retreat before his adversary.
At the end of ten days, he determined to risk battle. On March 18th, he drew up his line in front of Neerwinden. The favorable position of Valmy, the overwhelming numbers of Jemappes were absent. On the level ground before Neerwinden, the well-handled Austrian battalions were everywhere successful and created havoc among the disordered Republicans. It was not a great battle, but it appeared to the French in the light of an overwhelming disaster. Dumouriez withdrew his disheartened troops to the border fortresses.

The Prussian advance on the Rhine had met with similar success, and ended with Custine forced back to the fortified town of Landau, his left resting on the Vosges Mountains, his right on the Rhine. There was this difference with Custine's army, however,—it had been forced to retire but it had not been shaken by any such reverse as Neerwinden.

It would look, then, as though nothing remained in the path of the advancing armies. It must be remembered, however, that Custine was undefeated, and his army, though pushed off the direct road to Paris, still menaced the communications of an advancing foe. And on the northeast, Coburg had to contend with the ghosts of Louis XIV and his famous military engineer, Vauban. For there, directly on his road to the French capital, lay Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge, masterpieces of Vauban's skill, constructed in the days of the fighting Louis, and considered well-nigh impregnable. Behind them lay Dumouriez, his army battered but still capable of resistance. Should Coburg go on to the destruction of the French army, he must leave in his rear the unconquered fortresses from which the garrisons would continually harass him. And his army, though considered by all the military experts of Europe of sufficient strength to crush the makeshift organizations of the Republic, was nevertheless not strong enough to mask these fortresses and still permit of the
continued advance on Paris by a force powerful enough to cope with Dumouriez. Coburg, therefore, wisely determined to reduce the fortresses, and accordingly, early in April, settled down to the siege of Condé.

Attention now centers on Dumouriez. A constitutionalist at heart, he had long since expressed his regret at the destruction of the monarchy. His dislike of the Republican commissioners in Belgium had broken out into open quarrels which had aroused the suspicions of the leaders in Paris. His defeat at Neerwinden, handled by the skillful orators in the Convention, began to take on the look of treason, and Dumouriez saw his life in danger. In the black days of late March, 1793, therefore, he opened negotiations with Coburg in which he agreed to turn over the border fortresses and the army to the Austrian commander, the latter in his turn pledging himself to the restoration of the Bourbons, with proper compensation, supposedly, for Dumouriez. The army proved the stumbling block. It was devoted to Dumouriez, but more to the Republic, and when its commander attempted the transfer to the Austrian command, it revolted. The disgraced leader fled to his country's enemies with a mere handful of followers, mostly mercenaries. We may condone the defection of Lafayette, who maintained his principles and left his army prepared to defend his country; but Dumouriez, who repudiated the government which he himself had helped construct and who bent every effort to steal from France her safeguard, we can only condemn.

Evil times now fell upon the army of the North. Leader followed leader through the slough of defeats. Dampierre, attempting to relieve Condé, was killed at the head of his columns; Custine, called from the Rhine, and Kilmaine fell under the displeasure of the Convention, to whom blunders and treason were now equivalent, and the former was guillotined. Meanwhile, Coburg had continued his sieges. Condé was starved out and surrendered July 10,
1793; Valenciennes capitulated two weeks later. There remained now Maubeuge, and to the commander of the beleaguered city the Convention sent the curt information that the price of the surrender of the fortress would be its commandant's head.

But the defeats had convinced the French government that a greater national effort was necessary, and the victories had persuaded the allies that nothing was now left but to divide their plunder. These two states of mind brought about circumstances which inaugurated brighter days for France. The Convention appointed to the Committee of Public Safety, with full power over the personnel of the army, Carnot, the "Organizer of Victory." The allied attitude, manifesting itself in an open declaration by Austria that she meant to hold Condé and Valenciennes and extend her conquests even further, enabled England to make a similar claim which she planned to substantiate by seizing and holding Dunkirk. Accordingly the allied army was divided, and there was dispatched toward the coast the Duke of York's unlucky expedition which was to incur the first of that long line of defeats which were not to be checked until Leipsic.

B. THE CONVENTION: MARCH–SEPTEMBER, 1793

Within the Convention, the factional fight between the Robespierre Jacobins (the Mountain, or the enragés) and the Gironde Jacobins (the Girondins) was brought to a crisis by the successive reverses in the war and the revolts within France. News of the advance of Coburg reached Paris the same day as a report of a formidable insurrection in La Vendée, a district in the west just south of the Loire River. Following this came still more alarming news,—the French defeat at Neerwinden March 18, the evacuation of Brussels March 24, the withdrawal from Belgium March 30, the treason of Dumouriez April 5, the investment of Mainz April 14, and a long series of failures by the repub-
lican forces in their attempts to suppress the Vendéan uprising in the month of May. Though the Girondin ministers endeavored to meet the danger, each disaster weakened their position and strengthened that of their opponents. The Convention again decreed *La Patrie en danger* (March 8, 1793) and appointed “Representatives on Mission” to go to each of the Départements in France to stimulate recruiting. After the bad news from Belgium and the treason of Dumouriez, the ministry, under pressure from the Robespierre Jacobins, re-established the Tribunal Criminel Extraordinaire (soon known as the Revolutionary Tribunal) March 29, 1793, and created a Committee of Public Safety of nine members empowered to deliberate in secret and to override the ministers. In this Committee, Danton was the most prominent and efficient member. Supported by the Robespierre Jacobins, he was virtually dictator in France for the next two months.

These several measures, however, failed to save the Girondin ministry. The Robespierre Jacobins, when in May the Vendéan peasants continued their successes, began to plot actively to overthrow the Girondists. Once more the Jacobins called the Paris Commune to their aid. Similar procedure to that of August 10, 1792, was adopted. Commissioners from the Sections (*i.e.*, the electoral divisions) of Paris deposed the Commune, though for appearances’ sake afterwards uniting its members to their own number, and demanded of the Convention (May 31, 1793) the arrest of the Girondin members. Two days later (June 2, 1793) the Paris proletariat surrounded the Convention, placed artillery in readiness, and again demanded the immediate arrest of the Girondin deputies. The few members who dared to be in their seats were overawed by the mob and helplessly decreed the arrest of nine leading Girondin deputies and of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The coup d’état of May 31–June 2 was a success in that
it overthrew the Girondin government and eliminated the important Girondins from the Assembly. The three factions which had cooperated in the insurrection, however, the Danton and Committee of Public Safety faction, the Robespierre faction, and the Commune faction, were not united upon their subsequent policy. Danton favored moderation and the conciliation of parties. The Robespierre group wished the utter destruction of the Girondists, with the elevation of themselves to power. The Commune, led by such unscrupulous men as Marat and Hébert, advocated the supremacy of the Commune and such socialist measures as the extinction of the bourgeoisie and the distribution of property among the proletariat. The destruction of the Girondists served to bring the opposing interests of the three factions (which had temporarily acted together) in sharp opposition.

All the advantage lay with the Robespierre group. Danton had never gained more than a personal following. His counsels of moderation, too commonly interpreted as weakness, met with little favor. The Hébertists had, and could have, no following outside of the proletariat. The Robespierre Jacobins were well organized, and in the name of the unity and safety of France rallied to themselves the conservative-revolutionary mass of the people.

The terrible condition in which the French people found themselves in the summer of 1793 demanded a strong government. Foreign invasion was combined with acute economic distress and civil war. The fortress of Condé was captured July 10; Mainz capitulated July 23; Valenciennes was occupied July 28; and Toulon surrendered to an English fleet August 23. The assignats had depreciated to a small fraction of their value. Domestic industry was at a standstill. Foreign commerce was throttled by the English navy. The need of the starving urban population had led to a Law of the Maximum by which dealers were forced to sell their grain at a fixed price. On top of these
FOREIGN WAR

troubles, important cities of the south and west, Marselles, Lyons, Nimes, and Bordeaux, refused to acknowledge the authority of the Convention, and put anti-republican forces in the field. In the face of such conditions the Robespierre group took over the power. Their main agent was to be, not the Convention, but the Committee of Public Safety, legally endowed with powers superior even to the ministry. Hence when the term of the first Committee expired July 10, Danton and his friends were replaced by out-and-out Jacobins, and Danton's policy of conciliation was discarded for ruthless suppression of domestic revolt and energetic prosecution of the foreign war. Robespierre and his group were determined to give France a strong government in the great national emergency, a government which would search out and punish treason at the same time that it repulsed the armies of the invader. Their measures to meet the domestic and foreign emergency resulted in The Terror.

C. MILITARY OPERATIONS. AUGUST 14, 1793, TO THE END OF THE YEAR

There remain one or two more defeats to be recorded for the French. In Flanders, Coburg, preparing for the siege of Maubeuge, fell upon the French and pushed them back beyond the Scarpe River in order that he might be free from interference with his siege operations. The Republicans, now commanded by Houchard, took up an entrenched position between Arras and Douai. This was the moment which England chose to demand that an expedition be sent to the Channel to capture and secure for her the port of Dunkirk. If we turn for a moment to glance at conditions on the Rhine we shall have completed the picture of France in her darkest hour.

Custine's old Army of the Rhine had been reinforced by an Army of the Moselle, each army numbering close to 50,000. These armies were holding the situation near
Landau described above,—their left on the Vosges, their right on the Rhine,—known as the lines of Weissemburg. Opposed to them were superior Prussian and Austrian armies under Brunswick, Hohenlohe, and Wurmser. A concerted movement would doubtless have crushed the Armies of the Rhine and the Moselle, but the clashing political aims of Prussia and Austria prevented coöperation. Austria's evident plan to add Alsace to her conquests was not agreeable for Prussia to contemplate. Brunswick might at any time have annihilated the Army of the Moselle, but such an action appeared to the Prussian foreign secretary as a play directly into her greedy ally's hands. Consequently, it was not until mid-October, 1793, that a combined movement could be agreed upon. When the advance began, it broke the French lines, and completely separated the two French armies, but even then the mutual jealousies of the allies prevented them from taking the fullest advantage of their successes. Here for the moment, we will leave the situation—the Army of the Rhine, badly shaken, at Strassburg, the Army of the Moselle in like condition to the west of the Saar—and return to the campaign in Flanders.

In the north, the lowest ebb of the military tide came a little earlier than in the Rhine valley. The retirement behind the Scarpe in August was the last of the movements dictated by the force of the allied arms. To the governments of the coalition, the time seemed ripe to secure their individual advantages, and Coburg, since his own government had announced its intention with regard to Condé and the surrounding country, could scarcely protest when the Duke of York insisted that he lead a force against Dunkirk, or when the commander of the Prussian detachment made a similar demand with regard to the cities of Luxemburg. The plan of an expedition to the Channel was acquiesced in, and in late August a force of English, Austrians, and Hanoverians numbering 35,000 set out for Dunkirk. Carnot was fully cognizant of the movement
and managed by the first week in September to get together an opposing force of 40,000 for the relief of the city.

Two roads lead out of Dunkirk, one to the east and one to the south, with an impassable marsh in the angle between them. Along the road from the east, the Duke of York marched with the main army, his intention being to advance directly to the siege of the town. A portion of his force, 10,000 in number, he dispatched to the south of the marsh, to seize and hold a point on the south road, covering his operations at Dunkirk, at the same time preventing the advance of a relieving French force along the southern route. The two armies were in position several days before Houchard was ready to begin the operations for relieving Dunkirk, but the siege had progressed but little owing to the fact that the inhabitants of the city had opened the dikes and flooded the fields.

Once again the force of superior numbers rather than the skill of the commander brought success to the French. Of his 40,000 men, Houchard brought a bare half against the Hanoverians, and those were advanced with trepidation. Fortunately there was present one of the Convention’s commissioners who assumed command of the right wing and led it forward with such spirit that the remainder caught the enthusiasm. They dashed against the allied left at Hondschoote and drove out their foe with heavy loss (September 8, 1793). Houchard proved a most reluctant victor, for at a time when he might have pursued vigorously, and cut off the entire expeditionary army, he delayed inexcusably until the Duke had retreated eastward, and saved himself. Houchard had won a victory and saved Dunkirk, but his actions were not to the liking of the pitiless Committee of Public Safety. They wanted "audace, toujours l’audace," and plainly Houchard was not the man to supply it. He was recalled to Paris, and before the year was out had been "sent to Heaven through the Little Door."
Still, the victory was loudly acclaimed in France, and had proved the worth of Carnot's idea of concentrating his troops for results. He was to demonstrate still more ably the correctness of his methods. Immediately after Hondschoote, Coburg had brought his whole strength to bear on Maubeuge, the last of the strongholds. If Paris were to be saved, the siege of Maubeuge must be raised and the Austrians forced to retire. To this end Carnot bent every effort. He put in command of the army a young general named Jourdan, who had seen service in the American revolution. The two working together, planned and executed a speedy concentration near Guise of 60,000 men drawn from both ends of their line, and without giving their enemy time to surmise their subsequent actions, without even giving their own men a much needed rest after their marches, they advanced to the attack.

The allied army numbered about 65,000, but of these 35,000 were engaged in the siege of the fortress, and the remainder spread out in a long covering line, east, south, and west—a line so extended that when Jourdan made his attack he was able to mass very superior numbers against that position which he chose to strike. This was an entrenched sector, lying along a low wooded crest, with its right resting on the valley of the Sambre, and its left on a hill near the village of Wattignies. Against the position, Jourdan feinted on the afternoon of October 14, meanwhile reconnoitering his ground thoroughly.

The battle proper began the following day with a general attack all along the line. But although the assault was sharply pressed, the well-trained Austrian troops again asserted their superiority and repulsed their opponents. At nightfall, an observer walking among the exhausted Republicans would have said that the battle was lost. But Jourdan knew better than to spare his men at this juncture, exhausted though they were, so under cover of darkness he moved reinforcements from the left and center to the
extreme right of his line. A heavy mist enabled him to mass his artillery and infantry without their positions being known. When at noon on October 16, the weather cleared, Jourdan hurled his columns full at the plateau of Wattignies, and captured it. The little hill was the key to Coburg's position, for it enfiladed his lines, and although his troops were everywhere else successful, he deemed a withdrawal necessary. The siege of Maubeuge was abandoned, and the allies withdrew behind the Sambre.

The success was not an isolated one. With the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle, the representatives from the Convention had employed to the fullest extent their arbitrary power. The armies had been reorganized and increased, and two new commanders, Hoche and Pichegru, had been placed at their heads. In November they began a forward movement which by the end of the year had not only recaptured the Weissemburg lines but had retaken the important fortress of Landau as well.

In the Pyrenees, in the Maritime Alps, and on the Var, France had waged a desultory warfare during these same months. There had been no notable successes, but there had been only minor defeats which were more than compensated for by the achievements in Flanders and on the Rhine.

Thus the year closed. France was still hemmed about by enemies and vexed by internal disorders, but the period of her despondency was past. The end of '93 is notable in her military history, not so much for actual battles won, or territory taken, as it is for the birth of that great military enthusiasm which was to keep the whole world aflame for twenty years. Carnot was its father. Under his leadership the whole country thrilled to the martial spirit. The raw levies which he had hurried into the ranks were proving themselves excellent soldiers, fit to take the place of the regular army which had saved the day in the beginning. The cities hummed with the business of preparation for
war. Huge foundries were recasting church bells into cannon; factories were turning out a thousand muskets a day; new methods of steel working produced great quantities of swords and bayonets; and a new process of powder making was increasing the supply by 30,000 pounds daily. France had risen to meet the great issue. The country was out of danger.

D. THE REIGN OF TERROR

These successes, however, were not sufficient to allay the fears and suspicions engendered by the misfortunes of the preceding spring and summer. The new Jacobin government was determined that never again should France be weakened by internal treachery and revolt. The policy this government pursued to suppress the existing insurrections, to punish rebels, and to destroy the seeds of future uprisings brought about The Reign of Terror.

The Terror lasted from September, 1793, to July, 1794. Its origins were psychological; its motives, both political and patriotic; its agencies, the Revolutionary Tribunal and the guillotine; its victims, those who by word or act had raised a suspicion of their loyalty to the principles of the Revolution.

Defenders of the policy of terrorism consciously adopted by the Jacobin leaders have been few. If we can, however, imagine ourselves for a moment in the France of September, 1793, and regard ourselves as fanatically faithful to the democratic principles to which our one-year-old Republic has been dedicated, we shall discover, if not a defense, at least an explanation of the Terror. At the beginning of September we have suffered the shocks of a series of national disasters. Our general-in-chief has deserted to the enemy; and a great section of the west has flamed into insurrection. City after city,—Lyons, Marseilles, Nimes, Bordeaux,—has revolted and in some cases openly advocated restoration of the monarchy. Danton has attempted conciliation and
failed. Economic life is stagnant. Our friends are in dire need. Our nerves are shaken. We have perforce become suspicious of everyone, even of our colleagues; but our determination to save the Republic and the Revolution is stronger than ever. A weak Girondist government has failed. Danton’s conciliation has failed. We propose to try force. Controlling the new Committee of Public Safety, we add to it Carnot, noted for his organizing abilities. We leave to him and to his generals the question of repelling the invaders. We turn to the task of stamping out the fires of disloyalty within the Republic. Such might have been our temper in the France of September, 1793: such certainly was the temper of Robespierre and the Jacobins at that crisis.

The signal for the beginning of the Terror was the treason of Toulon, which admitted the English fleet August 23, 1793. As soon as the news reached Paris, the Jacobins acted. September 5, 1793, they proposed a decree dividing the Revolutionary Tribunal into four sections to expedite its work. September 17, 1793, they passed the terrible Law of the Suspects. This law defined suspects as “all who had befriended tyranny, not paid taxes, or who were not furnished with cartes de civisme (cards of citizenship) from their Sections,” and provided that such suspects might be accused and haled before the Revolutionary Tribunal for trial. October 10, 1793, the Convention put aside for a time its constitutional function (for which it had been chosen) and decreed that “the government be revolutionary until the peace.” December 4, 1793, the Committee of Public Safety was made supreme throughout all France by a law permitting it to send out “National Agents” to supervise act of local authorities. These several measures of September 5, September 17, October 10, and December 4 gave to the Jacobins the extraordinary powers they needed.

Their punishment of the revolted cities showed early the
merciless use they intended to make of their powers. In July, Marseilles was captured: the guillotine soon took toll to the number of 400. September 19, Bordeaux was captured: 500 prisoners were summarily shot, and over 1500 guillotined. December 19 the English fleet was forced from Toulon, and the city captured: 800 prisoners were shot, and 1800 guillotined. December 23, the last organized band of Vendéan insurrectionists was cut to pieces: an inhuman monster, Carrier by name, took terrible vengeance upon his prisoners, having 2000 shot under the walls of Nantes, and drowning as many more by scuttling shipfuls in the Loire. And in towns which had not rebelled the guillotine was busy during these months of the Terror. Cambrai, Arras, Orange, Brest, Toulouse—each had its long roll of victims. Probably more than 20,000 suspects were executed in accordance with the Jacobins' political policy.

Paris suffered heavily. Marie Antoinette went bravely to the guillotine October 16. Twenty Girondists were executed October 31. As factional fights developed, the Robespierre group resorted to the guillotine: thus several leaders of the Paris Commune, including Hébert, were executed March 24, 1794; and Danton and a few of his friends April 5, 1794. Persons of less prominence daily mounted the guillotine and suffered the extreme penalty. Eighty per cent of the cases tried before the Revolutionary Tribunal resulted in sentence of death. The record in Paris shows that between September 1, 1793, and July 29, 1794, 2625 people were guillotined.

A curious accompaniment of these excesses was the spirit of irreligion. Here the Commune of Paris took the lead. November 10, 1793, the great cathedral of Notre Dame was consecrated to the worship of Reason. In the month following—November 25—December 25—some 2500 churches in France were converted into Temples of Reason. Robespierre, however, felt the futility of attempting to destroy
the evidences of the religious instinct, and, after Hébert's fall, procured from the Convention a decree solemnly affirming the existence of a Supreme Being and the Immortality of the Soul. June 8, 1794, he officiated in person at a great festival to the "Supreme Being" in the garden of the Tuileries.

Yet France was not gloomy and horror-stricken during the Terror. The usual run of executions touched the interests and emotions of relatively few. The ordinary citizen lived without fear of the guillotine. Many of the victims were really guilty of disloyalty, in spirit if not in act. Twenty thousand executions constitute a very small proportion of a population of 25,000,000 — less than 1 out of every 1000. Even in Paris, the loss of 2600 was hardly noticeable from a population of 500,000. Shops were open, fête days celebrated, and theaters crowded as usual.

In the meanwhile, the continuation of French victories brought renewed confidence to the people and rendered any further extension of the Reign of Terror unnecessary.

E. MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1794

Spring of 1794 found the allied armies, in spite of their defeats of the preceding autumn, still ensconced firmly in the fortified cities of Flanders, and entrenched along the Belgian frontier. From Ypres to Longwy their detachments were posted 145,000 strong, their greatest strength centered near Tournai. Opposite them were ranged under the hand of Carnot the armies of the Republic — Pichegru's Army of the North and the Army of the Ardennes (combined, 18,000) were in a position to menace Brussels and Charleroi; Jourdan's Army of the Moselle (45,000) was south of Longwy, but not actually threatening any portion of the enemy's lines. Strategically, neither force could be said to have the advantage of the other, but morally the balance inclined heavily to the side of the French. The "spirit of '93" was everywhere, and the tide of Republican enthusiasm ran full
and strong. With the allies, however, the political differences of the governments caused dissensions in their armies. For Prussia, in particular, the Oder watered a ground more fertile for gain than did the Meuse, and only England’s monthly subsidy of £150,000 kept Frederick William’s soldiers in the Netherlands.

Notwithstanding the moral superiority of the Republicans, Coburg struck the first decisive blow of the year by capturing Landrecies. In May, Souham, commanding a French column, retaliated by defeating Clerfayt and thrust his division well in between Clerfayt and Coburg’s main army. His position was an isolated one, and, to Coburg, seemed to invite annihilation. Accordingly, he issued orders for an attack which would cut off Souham from the remainder of Pichegru’s army and crush him completely. Three columns from the allied center near Tournai were to march on Turcoing and gain control of Souham’s road to Lille. A fourth from farther south was to march due west, unite with the Archduke Charles’ column arriving from a point two days’ march south, drive off the nearest supporting French troops, and join the first-named columns near Turcoing. Finally, Clerfayt from the north was to cross the Lys River and march upon the same spot, whereupon all six detachments were to fall upon Souham’s helpless division and shatter it.

It was an excellent plan,—needing only synchrony to make it a brilliant success. But from the first the scheme went awry. Archduke Charles, marching his tired men from the south, fell further and further behind the schedule. The fourth column delayed for the Archduke. Clerfayt from the north dawdled in a fashion which, had he been commanding a Republican army, would have cost him his head. The supporting French who were to have been beaten off, marched in to assist Souham, together they repelled the three assaulting columns from Tournai, and then turned and pushed Clerfayt back across the Lys
before the battalions of the Archduke Charles could come within striking distance. The English and Hanoverians in the center fought stubbornly, hoping that the Archduke and Clerfayt would retrieve their original blunders and save the day.

The allied losses were inconsiderable, but the defeat told heavily none the less. The Duke of York commented openly and unfavorably on the Archduke Charles’ defection. The allied commander, fearing further activities where this calamitous beginning had been made, reinforced his right wing heavily to forestall a French march on Brussels.

But it was on the Sambre instead of the Scheldt that disaster finally overtook the enemies of France. By the end of May, Carnot had matured a plan calculated to make the most of the conditions resulting from his previous successes. Up from the south came 45,000 self-sacrificing ragamuffins from the Army of the Moselle, the competent Jourdan at their head, to combine them with the Army of the Ardennes, and form the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, 120,000 strong. His orders, sent from Paris, directed him against Liège and Namur — unwise orders when it is remembered that a strong undefeated enemy lay to the northwest on the Sambre. But fortune was fighting for the Republic. The Austrians themselves recalled Jourdan to his proper task — the destruction of the opposing army — by attacking one of the French garrisons on his left flank. Immediately, Jourdan changed his plan, and pushed back the Austrians by indecisive fighting until his army found itself on the left bank of the Meuse. Here new orders from Paris awaited it — to move at once on Charleroi and essay its capture. Jourdan found his new command, the Army of the Ardennes, in a depressed state after its third attempt to cross the Sambre in the face of the guns of Charleroi. Together the two armies (now to be known as the Army of the Sambre and Meuse) ventured the crossing, and on the second endeavor extended their jubilant lines
around the city. Within a week, the 3000 exhausted Imperialists of the garrison, unacquainted with that buoyant spirit impelling the French, gave up the struggle and surrendered (June 25, 1794).

Too late, Coburg realized that the disjunctive activities in Flanders did not constitute the real danger, and hastened to repair the fault which had incapacitated his left. Hurriedly, he assembled about 60,000 men and marched toward the ill-defended stronghold of Charleroi. He found Jourdan’s army (now 75,000 strong) near Fleurus, occupying the arc of a circle, three miles in radius, with Charleroi as its center. Ignorant of the fact that the city had surrendered, Coburg, on the early morning of June 26, precipitated the battle of Fleurus.

His plan called for a converging attack by five columns, impinging on the French lines from the west, northwest, north, northeast, and east. Such was the dissemination of his troops that Coburg could do no more than give the order which initiated the assault. Thereafter his subordinates did each what he could in his separate field. As a result, Fleurus may be considered as made up of five component battles waged with mutual disregard. On the west and northwest, the French in the late afternoon gained the day and beat off their assailants; on the north and northeast, an undetermined struggle raged. But the eastern flank was the most hotly contended of all. Here the allies came in contact with the old Army of the Ardennes, inferior in training and discipline to the other portions of Jourdan’s army, and worn out by weeks of effort. After six hours the defense broke and fled, and the victors pressed forward until they were checked by the reserve under Lefebvre. Urged on by this fiery commander, and by Marceau, another of the same stamp, the Republicans withstood four attacks of the foe. Then, just as Coburg had ordered the retreat, they launched a counter-attack which swept their remaining opponents from before them.
FOREIGN WAR

The allies were beaten, but the exultant French were too exhausted to pursue. Unmolested, the defeated army withdrew from the field.

The battle of Fleurus changed the whole tenor of the war and, indeed, of the Revolution. In Paris, men saw that the need of The Terror as a form of government had passed. Fleurus made possible the overthrow of Robespierre. As for the war itself, it ceased to be a war of defense and became thereafter one of offense. The cities of Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge fell to the Republicans, who at once began preparations for war on foreign territory. With the allies, the disintegration of the First Coalition was already in sight. The Imperialists fell back toward the Rhine, abandoning the Netherlands, Prussia frankly withdrew, and the English and Dutch retreated into Holland.

F. THE END OF THE TERROR

The close of The Terror came with the overthrow of Robespierre. He had been, even before the death of Danton, practical dictator. His consent to the use of the guillotine to rid himself of political enemies aroused his colleagues in the Convention and on the Committee of Public Safety. These men could not conscientiously always approve every measure Robespierre introduced; yet open opposition might take them to the steps of the guillotine. From their fears, therefore, was born the plot to overthrow him. The military successes of the government, culminating at Fleurus June 25, 1794, gave the plotters the chance to rely for support upon the more moderate elements in the Convention. The necessity for a policy of Terrorism once removed, these elements would favor the overthrow of him who was held responsible for it.

The plot came to a head July 27, 1794. In a tumultuous session, Robespierre was denounced on the floor of the Convention. His efforts to procure a hearing were futile. After hours of turmoil, the Convention decreed his arrest
on the charge of dominating the government. The Jacobin mob rose, delivered him from prison, and took him in triumph to the Hôtel de Ville. The Convention, however, saw the necessity, now that it had gone so far, of carrying out its full purpose. It declared him an outlaw, rallied troops to its aid, and, July 28, attacked the Hôtel de Ville. Forcing an entry, the soldiers found Robespierre stretched out on the floor, his jaw broken by a bullet. The same evening he was guillotined. Within the next few days 108 of his partisans in the Convention and the Jacobin Club followed him to the block. The Jacobin power was definitely broken.

Since Robespierre had become the personification of The Terror, his execution was hailed with rejoicing by those who looked forward to internal peace and conciliation and the resumption of normal conditions. Though the leaders of the movement for Robespierre's overthrow had themselves been Terrorists, they recognized the political wisdom of moderation. In the weeks following July 28, 1794, therefore, they made no attempt to combat the various measures introduced to stamp out the remains of the Terrorist system. Not until too late did they recognize that their power was gone forever and that the moderates were establishing themselves firmly in control.

Since the Committee of Public Safety, the Revolutionary Tribunal, and the Paris Commune had been the chief means by which The Terror had been maintained, the moderates attacked these first in a series of reform measures in August, 1794. The Paris Commune was abolished, and commissioners from the Convention designated to govern the capital. The Revolutionary Tribunal was reorganized, its procedure changed, and ample means of defense allowed to prisoners. The Committee of Public Safety was limited to the province of War and Foreign affairs, fifteen additional committees created to exercise the other powers formerly intrusted to it, and provision made that one
fourth of its members should retire each month and be replaced by appointees of the Convention. These changes were fundamental: they undermined the Jacobin power in the government.

As the moderates became surer of their position, they acted with greater force and directness. In November, 1794, they abolished the Jacobin Club. In the following month they decreed amnesty to the remaining bands of rebels in the west (Vendée and Bretagne), repealed the Law of the Maximum, and ordered the stoppage of the sale of confiscated lands. Finally, March 2, 1795, their committee recommended that the old Terrorist leaders be arrested and sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal for trial.

The dismay of the Jacobins at these measures, and their justified fears for their own safety, led them to have recourse to the familiar expedient of insurrection. The misery of the proletariat in Paris aided them in their designs. The conspiracy came to head April 1, 1795. A disorderly rabble broke into the hall of the Convention and for hours interrupted proceedings. The moderates, however, had learned their power. Loyal troops from the National Guard cleared the hall. The Convention decreed the deportation of the Jacobin prisoners arrested March 2, voted to seize sixteen other leaders, to disarm the Terrorists in Paris, and to purge the National Guard of members of the proletariat. Not only was the insurrection a failure, but the penalties imposed by the moderates in the Convention weakened the Jacobins greatly. Six weeks later (May 20, 1795) a second Jacobin uprising met a similar fate, and the subsequent arrest of 62 Jacobins for complicity wholly destroyed that faction. The "Mountain" ceased to exist.

In the meanwhile the popular reaction had taken a Royalist tone. Though these moderates had checked the Terror, they had no intention of restoring the monarchy. Economic distress, however, had embittered many against the republican experiment. The assignats had fallen to less than twenty-
five per cent of their nominal value, yet the Convention continued to issue them at the rate of forty or fifty million francs a day until there were in circulation nineteen billion francs of this depreciated currency. Industry was stagnant; foreign, and even coastwise, trade was choked by the English fleets. Though the Law of the Maximum had been repealed, grain had not been marketed and the people in the cities were starving. The feeling grew that the Republic was a failure, and that a monarchy such as that accepted by Louis XVI under the constitution of 1791 would again bring prosperity.

Events of the early summer of 1794, however, blasted the hopes of the Royalists. The Dauphin, a boy of ten, who had been in prison since the arrest of the King, sickened under the hard and unusual conditions, and died (June 10, 1794). At his decease, his uncle, the émigré Comte de Provence, younger brother of Louis XVI, issued a proclamation announcing himself as legitimate King of France with the title of Louis XVIII, and declaring his adherence to the rights of the ancient Bourbon house, and his contempt and hatred for constitutional principles. He thus effectually removed himself from the field, for few persons who desired restoration wished for a return of the old régime. A fortnight later a little band of émigrés, borne in English ships, landed on the peninsula of Quiberon, in Brittany, to rally Royalists and fight for the restoration of the monarchy. Fatal division of councils and military incapacity made the expedition futile. Republican troops under Hoche defeated it July 20, 1794, and 690 of its members were shot after a summary court-martial.

The Convention seized the moment of the collapse of the Royalist movement as opportune for the formation of the republican constitution — the task for which it had originally been chosen. June 23, 1794, its committee presented its draft. Debates continued for about seven weeks. The constitution was definitely accepted by the
Convention in the middle of August, 1794. In accordance with precedent, it was submitted to the primary assemblies of the people, and ratified. The Convention thereupon proclaimed it (September 23, 1795) and set the first meeting of the new legislature for November 6, 1795.

The new constitution was framed in an attempt to avoid some of the palpable errors of the old, and was decidedly more conservative. Universal suffrage was abolished; residence and taxation were made necessary qualifications for the franchise. Further, a property qualification was established for membership in the legislature—a provision tending to throw the legislature under the control of the bourgeois class. The legislature was bi-cameral, consisting of the Council of the Five Hundred and the Council of the Ancients, initiation of legislation being solely in the power of the Council of the Five Hundred. The duration of the legislature was three years, one third being renewed each year. The executive consisted of a commission of five members, known as the Directory and chosen by the legislature. One member of the Directory retired each year.

Its work done, the Convention prepared to dissolve. But it had one more crisis to meet. A decree supplementary to the constitution had been passed providing that two thirds of the members of the Convention should be admitted to the new legislature. Its purpose was to insure a majority of experienced men in the new legislature, but the bourgeoisie, especially in Paris, took great offense, believing it intended to prevent the election of members of their class. The proletariat was, of course, willing to side temporarily with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Convention, feeling a grievance in the property qualifications for membership in the legislature. Plans were hastily laid for insurrection. With the bourgeoisie taking part, such an uprising was certain to prove formidable.

The Convention was informed of the disaffection in Paris
and of the intended insurrection. It intrusted measures for its own protection to a committee of its members, headed by one Barras, who was head of the Army of the Interior. Barras called to his aid a young artillery officer by the name of Napoleon Bonaparte, who chanced to be in Paris at the time seeking reinstatement to the army. On the night of October 4, 1795, Bonaparte concentrated artillery against the approaches to the Tuileries and disposed his troops to await attack. The insurgents advanced to the attack the afternoon of the 5th. Bonaparte with his artillery repulsed them without difficulty. Before dark the mob had dispersed, and on the following day loyal troops policed the disaffected quarters of the city. Bonaparte himself received his reward in the shape of appointment as second in command to the Army of the Interior, his friend Barras being his immediate superior. A few weeks later, when Barras was chosen a member of the Directory, Napoleon Bonaparte succeeded to his command.

Its work now completely finished and all danger of a coup d'état having been removed, the Convention dissolved October 26, 1795, and was succeeded by the Directory.
CHAPTER VI

CONTEMPORARY EUROPE. 1789-1795

Since our outline in Chapter I of general conditions in Europe, we have concentrated our attention upon events in France. We are justified in devoting proportionately so much space to these events, not merely because of their immediate and lasting importance in French history, but because of their ultimate effect upon the destinies of all Europe. We must not, however, in stressing the course of the Revolution in France neglect the other states of Europe, for we thus run the risk of losing that just perspective which is the basis of true comprehension of history. Before we go further with our narrative of the Revolution in France, therefore, we shall outline conditions in France’s great neighbors, and indicate briefly the reaction of the Revolution upon them.

A. AUSTRIA

Joseph II of Austria, Holy Roman Emperor, died February 20, 1790. His next brother and successor, the Archduke Leopold, who had already made a reputation for wisdom and judgment in his twenty-five years of enlightened rule in Tuscany, faced a most difficult situation. Joseph’s hasty reforms had brought rebellion in the Austrian Netherlands and created strong disaffection in Hungary and throughout Austria proper. Further, Joseph’s desire for territorial aggrandizement had led him to ally himself with Catherine the Great of Russia in a war upon the Turks, and the Russian-Austrian successes, which by the end of 1789 had gained the allies all of the frontier Turkish fortresses, had aroused Prussia and England to active measures
of hostility. Such, then, was the situation Leopold inherited: internal discontent; one great province in revolt; a war with Turkey; and the imminent formation of a great hostile alliance against him.

Leopold II, a man of forty-three at the time of his accession to the Austrian and Holy Roman Imperial throne, lived only two years thereafter, but accomplished much in that short time to reestablish stable conditions in his country. As soon as he reached Vienna, he decreed the abolition of the new hated land-tax and the return to the ancient and familiar taxation system. He restored to each section of the monarchy the form of government existing under Maria Theresa, thus wiping out the arbitrary territorial divisions formed by Joseph II. He removed the irritating regulations which had fettered foreign commerce. These measures were received with joy by the important and substantial elements in Austria proper, and were responsible for a revulsion of extreme loyalty at the ceremony of Leopold's coronation. His concessions to the Hungarians, consisting of the restoration of all their ancient privileges, were at first less warmly received. His appearance in person at his inauguration, however, and his gracious address finally won from the Hungarian leaders expressions of loyalty as warm as those he received in Austria proper.

In the meantime he had not been idle in his endeavors to compose Austria's foreign relations. Realizing the impossibility of standing against allied Prussia and England — especially since his natural ally, France, was becoming more and more a prey to revolutionary activity — he at once made a direct personal appeal to Frederick William of Prussia in a most conciliatory spirit, and also got in touch with the English cabinet. By most delicate and adroit diplomacy he avoided the imminent war with Prussia. In the Convention of Reichenbach, August 5, 1790, he agreed to enter into an armistice with the Turks, and to open negotiations for peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum. He
then, to be sure, relinquished all the high hopes with which Joseph II had inaugurated the war in February, 1788 — hopes of gaining Bosnia, Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, and expelling the Turks from Europe — but he secured the safety of his dominions and freed his forces for the subjugation of the rebels in Flanders. In accordance with the terms of the Convention of Reichenbach, the armistice with Turkey was concluded in September, 1790, and final terms of peace between Austria and Turkey signed at Sistova August 4, 1791.

Leopold was less successful in his treatment of the Austrian Netherlands. He made a few efforts to conciliate the disaffected elements, but when these efforts were unavailing, prepared to use force. In September, 1790, his armies freed by the Convention of Reichenbach and the armistice with the Turks, he began to reinforce his troops in Luxemburg. At the same time he issued an ultimatum promising the restoration of the government as it existed under Maria Theresa and a general amnesty, fixing the date for acceptance of these terms at November 21, 1790. When no formal acceptance reached him, he ordered his troops to advance. The factional fights among the Belgian revolutionaries prevented them from making any effective resistance. December 3 Brussels was captured; and by the end of the year the entire country was again under Austrian power. His use of force, however, though outwardly successful, had intensified the bitterness of the opposition. It was responsible in succeeding months for the constant turmoil, intrigue, petty insurrections, and spread of sympathy with the principles of the French Revolutionists. Leopold's policy of force actually paved the way for the later French successes in winning the Austrian Netherlands.

With all these internal and foreign difficulties, Leopold kept an anxious eye upon the progress of the Revolution in France. Although from general political considerations
he could hardly regret the loss of French power and prestige, he felt keen sympathy for the predicament of his sister, Marie Antoinette, and his fellow sovereign. The obvious policy to follow would have been to intervene forcibly and restore the sovereign to his former power. Such a policy was dictated by his feelings, urged by the body of the émigrés, headed by the Comte d’Artois, and would have received the approval of the other states of Europe and the active assistance of Prussia. He was deterred by two factors in the situation: 1st, his doubt as to the efficacy of armed intervention as a real cure for Louis XVI’s difficulties; and 2d, his fear of the aggressive designs of Catherine of Russia. It required no great political astuteness to see that foreign intervention would unite revolutionary France against the invader and would actually imperil the position of Louis XVI. He hesitated, therefore, to commit his country to what might be a long and costly war with no assurance that at the end the position of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette would be any better established than before. And in the east, Catherine of Russia was obviously anxious to have both Prussia and Austria embroiled in a war with France in order that she might take advantage of their preoccupation to seize Poland.

Not until the indignities suffered by the French King and Queen after their capture at Varennes in June, 1791, did Leopold act. He then reluctantly issued a general appeal to his fellow sovereigns in Europe to unite in common measures in view of events which “immediately compromised the honor of all sovereigns, and the security of all governments.” A few weeks later, at Pillnitz, near Dresden, he met Frederick William of Prussia and issued (August 27, 1791) the famous Declaration. He still continued to hope that intervention would not be required, however, and after Louis XVI formally accepted the Constitution of September, 1791, professed to believe that a settled government had again been established in France.
His hope, as we know, proved futile. When he attempted to negotiate with the new government concerning the grievances of the German princes along the Rhine, whose hereditary rights had been infringed by the measures passed in the National Assembly, he was sharply rebuffed. He did everything possible to avoid war, incurring among his own people a reputation for weakness and vacillation, but the political leaders in France actually desired hostilities to further their own immediate ends. In the face of continued insults and provocations, Leopold concluded an alliance with Frederick William of Prussia, and moved troops toward the west. In the midst of the final negotiations and preparations, Leopold suddenly died, March 1, 1792.

Leopold's eldest son succeeded him on the throne as Francis I of Austria. Francis was at this time a young man of twenty-four. The negotiations with France had at the time of Leopold's death reached a point where war was inevitable, so this situation was of course the most important one confronting the new Emperor. He straightway issued an ultimatum demanding the restoration of the monarchy in accordance with Louis XVI's concessions to the Estates General in 1789, and satisfaction for the grievances of the German states along the Rhine. The French leaders answered this by forcing their King to a declaration of war April 20, 1792.

The outbreak of the war was the signal for rapid and important action in a new quarter, an action which had been foreseen by Leopold II. The Polish patriots had taken advantage of Russia's preoccupation with the Turkish War of 1787 to shake off temporarily the grip which Catherine had obtained on their country. A Polish Diet, now known as The Four Years' Diet, met at Warsaw October 6, 1787; abolished the Russian Council; demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops; and arranged a defensive treaty with Prussia (March 29, 1790). Then for over a year the
deputies debated the provisions of the new constitution, finally adopting one by acclamation May 3, 1791. Catherine of Russia had been too busily engaged in the Turkish War to interfere. With the coming of peace with Turkey January 9, 1792, and the preoccupation of Austria and Prussia with war against France April 20, 1792, her hands were freed. She ordered her armies across the Polish border May 19, 1792. Within six weeks Russian troops had overrun all of Poland and the short-lived constitution was a memory.

The negotiations of the following months paralyzed Austro-Prussian activities against France. A new partition of Poland was known to be imminent, and both Austria and Prussia were far more interested in territorial advantages to be gained therefrom than in barren victories against France. In the unedifying bickering of the autumn and winter of 1792 Prussia had one great advantage over Austria: Prussia could withdraw from the war against France without loss, whereas Austria could not withdraw without yielding the Austrian Netherlands. By threats, Prussia induced Austria to agree to a separate Russian-Prussian treaty on Polish affairs. This treaty, signed January 23, 1793, and known as the Treaty of the Second Partition of Poland, secured to Prussia the strongholds of Dantzig and Thorn and the district of Posen, with one and one half million inhabitants, and secured to Russia a large slice of territory in the east with nearly three million people.

Francis I of Austria and his advisers were amazed at the amount of territory Russia and Prussia had taken from Poland. Their anger was especially directed against Prussia, and the diplomats of the two countries indulged in bitter mutual recriminations during the spring and summer of 1793. The military campaign against France was neglected while Prussia poured troops into her new Polish acquisitions and Austria sought in some way to gain satisfaction. So intense was the feeling aroused that at the end of September, 1798,
Frederick William left the Prussian camp in the west, ordered his troops to remain inactive, and hurried eastward to be sure that none of the Polish booty should be taken away from him.

A Polish uprising the following spring (March 24, 1794), led by Kosciuszko, opened up the possibility of a final partition of the country in which Austria should regain her proper allotment. Kosciuszko's cause was hopeless from the start. Prussian, Russian, and Austrian armies were in motion against him by the end of the summer. His army was defeated and he himself wounded and captured October 10, 1794. Warsaw fell before the Russian assaults November 8, 1794. Russia calmly claimed the country up to the Bug River, leaving the remainder to be partitioned between Austria and Prussia. Austria, having received no territory in the partition of 1793, now sought Russian aid for extensive gains in the coming treaty. Catherine understood well the wisdom of the policy of dividing her favors: she had supported Prussia before; she leaned to the aid of Austria now. By secret treaty January 3, 1795, Russia and Austria agreed upon the line of division, Austria being assigned the districts of Cracow and Sandomir and a considerable addition to Galicia. In August, 1795, terms of this treaty were divulged to Prussia. With a few slight modifications, these terms were accepted in the final agreement between the three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, signed January 26, 1797, and known as the Treaty of the Third Partition of Poland.

Francis I had thus avenged his diplomatic defeat by Prussia in the partition of 1793, but the negotiations and the bickering had cost him his alliance with Prussia (for Prussia signed the Treaty of Basle with France April 5, 1795), the whole of the Austrian Netherlands (which the French had overrun and annexed), and defeat after defeat in the campaigns of 1793, 1794, and 1795. During the critical years of the French Revolution, years when the
raw French levies might have been crushed and the objects of the allies gained, Francis and his colleague Frederick William II had been deeply interested in plans for selfish aggrandizement at the expense of helpless Poland to push their advantage. And now, in 1796, it was too late, for the French levies were no longer raw and untrained, and a new military genius was ready to take the lead in French operations.

B. PRUSSIA

In the sketch we have given of Austria’s course during the early years of the French Revolution, we have had occasion to refer continually to the diplomacy of Prussia. We have seen how Frederick William II vacillated during these fateful years between his interests in the east and his opposition to the French Revolution in the west and how finally he deserted entirely the allied cause against France and left Austria to bear the burden of the war alone. It is easy now with the fullness of our knowledge of subsequent events to criticize Prussian policy, to point out how energetic coöperation by Prussia and Austria would have captured Paris, restored the ancient monarchy, and prevented the vast evils to the European system which accompanied the rise of Napoleon; but no one at that time, least of all Frederick William II with his limited political vision, could have foreseen the disasters of the next fifteen years. The Prussian King and his advisers were playing the game of international politics according to the conventional standards of their age. They stand condemned today by the ultimate results of their policy, results which they could not foresee. In their own time, up to the debacle at Auerstadt-Jena, they considered themselves — and were considered by many of their contemporaries — astute and successful.

From the outbreak of the French Revolution, Frederick William II showed the keenest interest in the course of
events and deep sympathy with his fellow sovereign Louis XVI. The Prussian King was among the first to urge intervention to save Louis. He was largely responsible for inducing Leopold of Austria, in the little town of Pillnitz, to issue the famous Declaration August 27, 1791, that the two monarchs stood ready to join other European rulers in endeavoring to place Louis XVI in a position to establish in France a government "that shall once more be in accord with the rights of sovereigns, and shall promote the welfare of the French Nation." At the same time, he was also acutely concerned with affairs in Poland. He had long been jealous of Russian influence there. He took advantage of Catherine the Great's preoccupation with her war against Turkey to encourage the movement for independence in Poland in 1789–1790. He viewed with sympathy the acts of the Polish Diet in abolishing the Russian Council and in demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops. He signed an offensive and defensive alliance with Poland May 29, 1790, and ratified the Polish constitution of May 3, 1791. Frederick William's interests, then, were involved in the events both upon his eastern border and in France. He was probably sincere in what he had done up to this point, willing on the one hand to make the sacrifices required by intervention in order to save Louis and to restore the position of the French monarchy, and glad to have a strong independent Poland as a buffer state between Prussia and Russia. The incidents of the next few years, however, introduced so strong a temptation to Prussian self-interest that Frederick William II was unable to resist.

The temptation was presented by Catherine the Great of Russia. Having made a hasty peace with Turkey (January 9, 1792), she prepared her forces to redeem Russian power in Poland. She waited until Austria and Prussia were both committed to war against France (April 20, 1792); then straightway marched her army across the border. Poland, of course, under the terms of her treaty
with Prussia, called upon Frederick William for aid: at the same time Catherine offered him the prospect of liberal increase of territory in Poland if he gave no aid. Frederick William's position was not easy. He had already set his army in motion toward the French frontier. He could not raise, equip, and put in the field against Russia on his east another army with any prospect of success. Yet not to aid Poland was to break his pledged word. He chose to repudiate the treaty, to denounce the constitution which he had ratified a year before, and to dispatch a small force himself to the Polish border to insure the possession of the territory he might be assigned in the coming partition.

As the French War progressed, the chances for glory and profit in the west diminished and the opportunities in the east increased. His army was checked at Valmy in the autumn of 1792. His Austrian ally was checked at Jemappes in November of the same year. The Austro-Prussian successes of the spring and summer of 1793 were offset by the failures in the fall. In the east, on the other hand, Catherine had granted him liberal accessions of territory with one and one half million inhabitants by what is known as the Treaty of the Second Partition of Poland, and the Polish Diet was assembled in deliberation upon ratification of the territorial concessions. Fearful lest Austrian intrigue or Russian cupidity might rob him of part of his Polish spoils, he finally left the Prussian camp, giving his generals directions to remain absolutely inactive, and hastened eastward.

An influential body of his counselors, who from the beginning had disapproved the alliance with Austria, now praised his policy. Self-interest was the guiding principle of their doctrine, and self-interest was immediately promoted, apparently, by the extension of territory in Poland. Through the year 1794 the army in the west remained practically inactive, while Frederick William, now thoroughly committed to and in sympathy with the policy of territorial
aggrandizement, concentrated all his efforts upon Poland. When Kosciuszko led the Polish revolt in the spring of 1794, Prussian troops were the first to march against him. Frederick William now saw the extinction of Poland as an immediate probability, and devoted all his energies to establishing himself in a position where he could again claim a liberal extension of territory. He defeated Kosciuszko in the battle of Rawka June 6, 1794, occupied Cracow June 15, and gathered his troops for the siege of Warsaw July 2, 1794. Kosciuszko's cause was hopeless. Russian and Austrian armies aided the Prussian. By November the unequal contest was decided, and Poland was again garrisoned by its enemies.

Frederick William II had now lost all interest in the French War. Knowing that he would have to meet Austrian opposition in his attempt to gain what he wanted in Poland, he decided to make peace as soon as possible with France. Hence, in January, 1795, his emissary began negotiations in Switzerland with the French representative, and the treaty of peace was signed at Basle April 5, 1795. The treaty was, of course, an outright betrayal of Austria, England, Holland, and other members of the First Coalition against France, but Frederick William and his counselors justified it by the additional forces it placed at their disposal to strengthen their demands for Polish territory.

As we have seen, Austria this time outwitted Prussia by means of secret intrigue with Russia. In January, 1795, even before Prussia had signed the peace with France, Austria and Russia had come to an agreement on the terms of partition. All through 1795 and 1796 the unedifying squabble over the spoils continued. Before the prospect of war against united Russia and Austria, Frederick William II was finally obliged to yield his ground, and accept territory much less than he had hoped. The Treaty of the Third Partition of Poland was signed January 26, 1797.

Though the Prussian court was disappointed at Prussia's
share in the final partition, it was inclined in 1797 to look upon the international situation with pride and confidence. The King had, on the whole, fished with good success in the troubled waters of European politics. Prussian territories had been extensively increased by additions from Poland. One of the chief rivals of Prussia—France—was so weakened by the Revolution that she ceased to be a factor in international considerations. Another—Austria—had been continuously since 1792 engaged in war with ever-mounting sacrifices in men and wealth. No Prussian counselor evinced any remorse for his country’s broken engagements. The King and his advisers were proud of their policy. For the King himself his success was the last as well as the crowning glory of his life, for he died in this very year (1797) undoubtedly believing that he had served his country well. The Prussian awakening did not come for a decade.

C. SPAIN

Across the Pyrenees the French revolutionary movement met with no favor. The Spanish peasantry groaned under burdens as excessive as those laid upon the same class in France, and the idle nobility inherited a caste prejudice against labor or business; but two important factors prevented the spread of revolutionary doctrines. First, the ignorance and the strong racial and religious prejudices of the masses of the people prevented them from being interested in or aroused by the literature of contemporary French political philosophy. The antipathy to French literature because it was foreign, and the knowledge that Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and others were condemned by the Roman Catholic church, united to bar these enlightening influences from such part of Spanish circles as might have profited from them. And second, the bourgeoisie class, which as we have seen played so important a part in the Revolution in France, was weak, small in num-
bers, and not energetic or liberal-minded in Spain. The keen, aggressive shopkeeper, business or professional man, trader, was a type which had not become prominent under Spanish conditions. Intensely loyal to the monarchy, then, uninfluenced by advanced political doctrines and uninspired by the leadership of an active bourgeoisie, the Spanish people in 1789 showed no sign of revolutionary contamination.

Charles III, King of Spain, died in December, 1788, and his son and successor, Charles IV, was duly proclaimed in Madrid in January, 1789. Charles IV was at this time a man of forty who, though simple in his habits and honest in his principles, lacked conspicuous force or mental gifts. His wife, Maria Louisa of Parma, a woman of decided character, exercised a strong influence over him. His immediate problem was difficult. His father and predecessor had committed Spain to long and expensive wars against England and to costly improvements in naval armament, with the result that the Spanish treasury was empty. A harvest failure in 1788 and intense cold in the winter of 1788–1789 increased the general suffering throughout the country.

Charles IV's efforts to alleviate the misery in Spain during 1789 bore witness to the generosity of his temper more than to his good judgment. He remitted taxes, forcibly cheapened the price of grain, and borrowed large sums at exorbitant terms in order to tide over the treasury. At the same time, he cut expenses on the navy to the minimum, and reduced the standing army until it numbered less than forty thousand men. The temporary relief was soon followed by national bankruptcy, for the government was wholly unable to pay its new obligations, and the weakening of the national armaments proved fatal when war came.

In the midst of these distressing internal conditions, he took the keenest interest in the course of events in France.
Himself a Bourbon, he looked up to Louis XVI as the head of the Bourbon house and sympathized deeply with the difficulties of the French King. As the Revolution progressed, he took arbitrary and unnecessary measures to prevent its spread in Spain. For example: in April, 1791, he decreed the suppression of all newspapers in Spain except the *Official Gazette*; he endeavored to keep from his country all French news or propaganda; and in July, 1791, he required every foreigner in Spain, whether resident or mere traveler, to swear allegiance to the King of Spain and to the Catholic religion, and publicly to renounce all claim or right of appeal for protection to his own country.

With the imprisonment of Louis (August, 1792) Charles IV bent all his energies to saving the French King’s life. Charles was willing, indeed, to accept diplomatic rebuffs and even insults from the ministers of the Convention if only he might succeed in saving Louis XVI. At the crisis of the negotiations he summarily dismissed (November 15, 1792) his old and tried minister, Floridablanca, and appointed to his place General Don Manuel de Godoy, Duke of Alcudia.

All the opprobrium due to the Spanish humiliations of the following twenty years has become attached by history to the person of Godoy. Godoy had come to the Spanish court in 1784 at the age of seventeen to be admitted to the King’s bodyguard. His handsome figure and his pleasing personality captivated the Queen, though she was old enough to be his mother. By the Queen’s influence he was rapidly advanced from honor to honor until, as recorded above, he was appointed in 1792, at the age of twenty-five, Prime Minister. He was not equipped by training or by natural genius to cope successfully with the difficult internal and foreign problems of the government.

Godoy’s first failure was in his dealings with France. It was essential that he should avoid war, for the Spanish finances and the Spanish army were, as has been indicated,
in no condition for war. Yet it was the King’s desire that Godoy should make every effort to save the head of the Bourbon house. The Spanish ministers at Paris at Godoy’s direction intervened again and again during the course of Louis XVI’s imprisonment and trial, and used immense sums in the attempt to bribe the leaders in the Convention, but their efforts were without avail. Indeed, Spanish intervention really served to concentrate the hostility of the Convention upon Spain. After Louis XVI’s death, the French leaders declared war upon Spain March 7, 1793.

Although the Spanish people accepted the war loyally and enthusiastically, the deficiencies in size, organization, equipment, training, and leadership of the army prevented any success. The series of disasters in 1793 and 1794 aroused strong discontent with the government. The initial enthusiasm died down and the people clamored for peace. Both the King and Godoy were genuinely anxious to arrange terms, so in the spring of 1795 the representatives of the two nations got in touch. By the final treaty, signed in July, 1795, France agreed to evacuate Spanish territory, and Spain ceded the Spanish part of the island of Santo Domingo. This peace was generally popular. The Spanish court considered that it had come out of the war with honor and with its continental boundaries and its national institutions unimpaired. The loss of part of Santo Domingo was trifling. Godoy, still the object of the Queen’s infatuation, retained his position as Prime Minister and received from the King the title of Prince of Peace.

D. ENGLAND

The fate of England was intrusted during this dangerous period to one of the most remarkable men who has ever risen to the fore in English politics. William Pitt, a younger son of a former Prime Minister, the Earl of Chatham, was called by King George III to the premiership in December,
1783. Pitt was at this time a man of twenty-four. He had been the favorite of his gifted father and from his youth had been trained and designed for political life. His precocity gained him an unusual reputation even as a child; and when he came of age, he had the great advantage of his father's reputation to give him the necessary start. He entered the House of Commons in January, 1781, and at once established his position as a great orator and a natural leader. A year later, 1782, he accepted the place of Chancellor of the Exchequer in a weak cabinet, and became the acknowledged government leader in the House of Commons. And in December of 1783, the King called upon him to form a ministry.

The difficulties before him were very great. His extreme youth and his relatively limited experience at accession to power made it so improbable in the eyes of his contemporaries that his ministry would last that he had the utmost difficulty in gaining the consent of men to enter the Cabinet. The political opposition in the Commons, a coalition comprising such men as Burke, Fox, and Sheridan, was exceptionally strong. And the prestige of the country was at the moment very low, for England had just lost her American colonies and had been humiliated by the treaty of peace with France and Spain. Indeed, on the continent and in some English circles, England was regarded as having gone into a decline, as having descended to the position of a second or third rate power. At the same time, the burden of the great war had greatly embarrassed the national treasury, and the Irish were in a defiant mood. In the face of such complex problems, it is scarcely to be wondered that the English political world hailed the appointment of the twenty-four-year-old Prime Minister with derision.

Pitt conceived it to be his first duty to re-establish the material prosperity of England. His policy, therefore, from 1783 to 1793 was chiefly concerned with fiscal affairs;
his chief interest lay in the preparation of the annual budgets. Thoroughly familiar with the doctrines of Adam Smith, he brought his enlightened intelligence to bear upon methods for reducing the national debt and raising the credit of the country. At the same time he advocated, though without practical success, parliamentary reform and measures for the alleviation of conditions in Ireland. His concentration upon domestic concerns was rewarded by a steady rise in public credit and increase in volume of trade. England recovered rapidly from the depths into which she had apparently descended at the time of the conclusion of the American-French-Spanish peace.

This concentration upon domestic concerns did not prevent the youthful premier from keeping a watchful eye upon foreign affairs. His purpose was to threaten English intervention at any time that the balance of power was disturbed and to uphold English rights wherever and whenever threatened. Thus in 1787, when France was on the point of interfering in Holland, Pitt's government took a firm stand against her, and concluded an alliance (the Triple Alliance of that day) with Prussia and Holland to uphold Dutch rights. Two years later, 1789, when Spain in an endeavor to establish her rights to the northwestern coast of North America seized an English merchant vessel in Nootka Sound near Vancouver Island, Pitt promptly demanded redress and prepared for war. His firm stand forced the Spanish government to come to terms (1790) and the Nootka Sound incident was concluded with honor to England. Again, in 1791, he endeavored with his allies Prussia and Holland to check the Russian aggressions upon Turkish territory, basing his protest especially upon the Russian seizure of the fortress of Ochakoff at the mouth of the Dnieper River. In his endeavor, however, he was foiled by the unwillingness of his Parliament to offer a threat of war over territory so remote from English interests. He had, then, as these examples indicate, not neglected inter-
national politics in his concentration upon the reestablishment of domestic prosperity.

The outbreak of the French Revolution did not divert Pitt from his policy. From international considerations, naturally, he could feel no regret at witnessing the apparent break-up of England’s greatest rival, but he was not tempted to take advantage of her weakness. He refused to commit England to any action in answer to the Austro-Prussian Declaration of Pillnitz, and determined to remain neutral after the declaration of war. In England, his course was, on the whole, approved. The beginning of the Revolution had excited the sincere sympathy of English liberals, but the excesses of the Convention and the reports of The Terror had quickly alienated the great body of sound and conservative public opinion. Even with the general hostility to the leaders and methods of the Revolution, however, the English people were disposed to accept Pitt’s view that it was not a matter for English concern so long as it did not infringe upon English interests. So remote seemed the prospect of departure from his peaceful policy that Pitt, in surveying the national finances in February, 1792, made proposals for repealing certain taxes, adding to the Sinking Fund for the reduction of the debt, and reducing the number of seamen in the English navy from 18,000 to 16,000; and declared that “unquestionably there never was a time in the history of the country when from the situation of Europe we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace than at the present moment.” And as late as November 13, 1792, he wrote to a political friend: “Perhaps some opening may arise which will enable us to contribute to the termination of the war between different powers in Europe, leaving France (which I believe is the best way) to arrange its own internal affairs as it can.”

In spite of Pitt’s policy and desires, the French leaders forced the war. The extreme decrees of November 19, and December 15, 1792, the one promising assistance to
revolutionary peoples in all countries, and the second forcing French institutions upon territories occupied by the French, showed that the revolutionary leaders were not only prepared to foment rebellion in other countries, but that they had adopted a policy of territorial aggrandize-
ment in defiance of the rights of their neighbors. At the same time, these leaders injected an intensely practical issue into the situation by demanding from Holland the freedom of navigation of the Scheldt River. This issue, taken in conjunction with the revolutionary decrees, brought a sharp protest from England, for by treaty in 1788 (the treaty of the Triple Alliance between England, Holland, and Prussia) England had solemnly guaranteed to Holland the navigation on the Scheldt River. To allow Holland to be forced to yield to French demands would be a gross violation of good faith. Pitt was compelled to stand by the provisions of the treaty to assist Holland. War then became inevitable. Popular feeling, aroused to a high pitch, became even more intense after the execution of Louis XVI. The nation went into mourning: crowds surrounded the King and demanded an immediate declara-
tion of war. The French themselves finally put an end to the hesitation by a declaration of war February 1, 1793, following this by a similar declaration against Spain in March.

This First Coalition of France's enemies comprised, after its additions during 1793, all the chief powers of Europe except Russia, Turkey, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden. In nearly every case, France had been the aggressor and had actually issued the declaration of war. We have already spoken of England, Austria, Prussia, Holland, and Spain. Rome, which was the Papacy, had been alienated in the early days of the Revolution by the law of the Civil Consti-
tution of the Clergy, to which the Pope had never agreed. In 1791, the French annexed the Papal city of Avignon, by this aggression showing that they considered themselves
as enemies of Rome. In September, 1792, the Convention declared war upon Sardinia and poured troops into the provinces of Savoy and Nice. The decree of December 15, 1792, was the justification for the actual annexation of these rich provinces to France. Portugal followed Spain into the war in March, 1793, signing an alliance with Spain and contributing 5000 troops for an invasion of France. When Francis I of Austria became Holy Roman Emperor (with the title of Francis II), he naturally committed the empire to the war (1798), finding sufficient reasons in the infringement of France upon the rights of the German princes in Alsace and along the Rhine. Tuscany and Naples joined the coalition in the summer of 1798, the Grand Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany because of his Hapsburg origin, and King Ferdinand IV of Naples because of his Bourbon relationship and his antipathy to liberal doctrines. Thus France faced a coalition including England, Holland, Prussia, Austria, the Holy Roman Empire, Sardinia, Naples, Rome, Tuscany, Portugal, and Spain.

The coalition, however, was stronger in appearance than in reality. Austria and Prussia could not work in harmony because of their jealous rivalry in other directions. Holland was not prepared to meet an attack in force. The Holy Roman Empire was a poorly organized and inefficient confederation whose military strength was negligible. Tuscany, Naples, and Rome added no armies of importance. And Spain was on the verge of bankruptcy. Pitt himself could contribute nothing but liberal subsidies to help the land warfare: the English navy, however, swept the seas of French ships.

The campaign was, as we have already seen in part, a series of disasters. By the close of 1795, Austria by land and England by sea were the chief remaining members of the great coalition. In 1797, Austria retired. The first popular enthusiasm for the war in England had long before died away. The hardships accruing from the interruption
of commerce and a series of harvest failures caused general misery and depression. The National Debt had increased by £135,000,000. Public credit was so undermined that government loan securities, issued below par, in a few months were quoted at a loss of fifteen per cent. Ireland was in revolt and Scotland apparently on the verge of an outbreak. And the navy was paralyzed in the spring of 1797 by general mutinies. Pitt was insulted and his life threatened. Cries for bread and for peace were raised. Yet there was nothing for the prime minister to do but continue the war. He endeavored both in 1796 and 1797 to make peace, but the French would not meet the English representatives in a conciliatory spirit. In the dark days of 1797 and 1798, therefore, Pitt struggled to raise a new coalition against France.
CHAPTER VII

THE RISE OF NAPOLEON

When the directorate took office October 27, 1795, the outlook for the country was brighter than it had been for years. In France, the people were weary of the turmoil of Revolution. They longed for order and peace, that they might enjoy the blessings the Revolution had promised. Though it was then generally recognized that reorganization was a most difficult task, France accepted the new government, hoping that the combined wisdom of its members would find the means to success. The Directory, then, was on trial before a people inclined to be prejudiced in its favor.

Abroad, a series of successful operations for a year previous to their assumption of the government seemed to promise a speedy general peace. After the victory of Fleurus, Jourdan drove the Austrians from Namur and Liège, forced them from their position behind the Roer, and finally (October, 1794) pursued them across the Rhine and captured Cologne and Coblenz. Simultaneously, the Army of the Rhine and Moselle advanced from position to position on the upper river, occupied Mannheim, and connected on their left flank with Jourdan. Austria pretended that the unfavorable situation in Poland demanded the withdrawal of her armies, but it was believed by the triumphant Republicans that the retreat was dictated by France's armies.

Meanwhile, in Holland, Pichegru’s Army of the North had given the English and Dutch no rest. In October, 1794, he began an impetuous advance before which the allies evacuated city after city until they had abandoned Old Holland. Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague fell one
after another; and then, crowning triumph of all, Moreau's cavalry charged across the ice of the Zee at Texel Island and captured a Dutch fleet! In disgust, England embarked her troops for home. It was a terrible campaign for the French, carried on by ill-fed, badly-clothed men in the dead of winter, but in the end Holland paid for it. Clothing, provisions, military stores, and money were requisitioned and the entire state passed under the military domination of the Republic, and became, virtually, a part of France. Early in 1795, France began to reap her reward. Prussia had asked for peace, and in April signed the treaty of Basle, by which she withdrew from the coalition and engaged to exist on friendly terms with the Republic, the Rhine being the boundary between them.

By late July, another enemy capitulated. The Spaniards who had invaded France from both ends of the Pyrenees, had barely been checked at the close of '93. The next year brought more success. In a well-conducted campaign, the French reconquered what they had lost, cleared the passes of the east, and advanced into Spanish territory. The fortresses throughout Catalonia were in French hands by the end of 1794. In the west they were no less successful. The new commander, Moncey, focused his attention on the western passes, where he soon outgeneraled the foe. Once across the mountains, his troops fought skillfully into possession of Tolosa, Vittoria, and Bilbao. In July, 1795, the treaty of peace ended the campaign and necessitated the evacuation of the conquests when the French armies were at the height of their successes.

But the work was not yet ended. Austria and Sardinia still had armies in the field, and Holland and Belgium required an army for garrison purposes. Moreau's Army of the North undertook this latter task, while Jourdan's Army of the Sambre and Meuse and Pichegru's Army of the Rhine and Moselle faced two Austrian armies in the Rhine valley, one under Clerfayt and the other under Wurmser.
The plan of campaign called first for the reduction of Luxemburg, and then for an advance across the Rhine, which should drive the enemy back on the Danube. Luxemburg fell June 25, 1795. Within a few weeks, Jourdan's army was across the Rhine at Düsseldorf, and Clerfayt had withdrawn to the line of the Main. Pichegru had taken Mannheim and could assist Jourdan by pushing his army in between Clerfayt and Wurmser and preventing their cooperation. The campaign would have been short and decisive, but it was destined never to be executed. Pichegru, a prey to his ambitions, thought that the Austrians and the Bourbons would give a more generous recognition of his worth than did the Republic. In return for the promise of the bâton of a Marshal of France, titles, political advancement, and enormous sums in money, he agreed to use his army to overthrow the Directory and establish the Count of Provence on the throne of Louis. Instead, therefore, of giving Jourdan his assistance, he sent forward two divisions without supports which he knew would be powerless before Wurmser. Jourdan, attempting to save the day from the disaster he could not understand, was defeated, and driven back across the Rhine. All France stood incredulous and aghast before another great treachery — this time one which had throttled her at the moment of victory.

There remains to be outlined the situation in Italy. The revolt in the Midi ended, the Committee of Public Safety turned in good earnest to the Sardinian problem. Two armies — that of the Alps, and that of Italy — were in the field, the former operating on the frontiers of Savoy, the latter, based on Nice, along the Riviera. The presence of the English fleet in the Ligurian gulf made the Corniche road, which runs from Nice toward Genoa, an unsafe line of communication for the Army of Italy, and made necessary the establishing of a route free from attack by naval raiding parties. In April of 1794, therefore, an attack was directed against the Sardinian left which resulted in the
capture of the Col di Tenda, the most important pass in the Maritime Alps. Simultaneous operations on the part of the Army of the Alps secured the Mont Cenis and Saint Bernard passes, the principal passes to the west and north of Piedmont.

Here, however, activities ceased. The fall of Robespierre removed for a time the actuating spirits of the Army of Italy, and the year 1794 ended with the passes in the hands of the French but with no advantage accruing from their possession. Not until the peace with Spain in July, 1795, did forces become available with which to conduct a determined offensive.

In June, 1795, the Austro-Sardinian forces conducted a series of attacks on the coast towns in the hands of the French, and on the passes of the Maritime Alps. The passes held firm, but the towns fell, and the whole right wing of Kellermann's Army of Italy fell back. The Allies failed to take advantage of their success, and Kellermann was about to recoup his disaster when he was relieved by an order from Paris, and Schérer was appointed in his stead.

Schérer took up his predecessor's plan in November, 1795. He proposed to capture the passes of the Apennines, move down the valley of the Tanaro, and thus into the Piedmont plains. Accordingly, he instituted a surprise attack which routed the Austro-Sardinians from Loano, November 23. On the next day, Masséna's forces drove the hostile left off the Corniche road, and Augereau pushed through the passes of Loano and San Giacomo in the center. These two successes compelled the retreat of the allied right which was making a bold stand against Sérrurier. Schérer was now in absolute control of the coast, the Apeninnes crest, and the Tanaro valley as far as Ceva. He had inflicted serious losses on his enemy and had opened the road to Turin, the Piedmontese capital. A continued offensive would have carried him into Turin, but Schérer was of the old type of general who fought by rule. Winter was upon him and it was
time to go into winter quarters. Piedmont was saved for the moment, and the allies were given opportunity to rehabilitate their broken armies. But Schérer had played his part in making way for a greater general than he. The Italian stage was set for the entrance of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Just as the end of 1793 marks a definite period of France’s military career, so does 1795. The days when the state was in danger from her enemies were past. Wattignies and Fleurus had ended the menace of invading troops and had guaranteed the right of France to choose what form of government she would. Nor can the claim be made that the wars which follow 1795 were waged to carry the doctrine of the Revolution. The greed for conquest, for loot, for annexation, had entered into the scheme of things, and makes its mark in all the subsequent campaigns. But one great step had been made. At the end of 1795, France had an army. Her battalions had served as laborious an apprenticeship as any since the days of Hannibal, and from the ruck of indifferent commanders there were emerging those names — Vandamme, Lefébvre, Sérrurier, Masséna, Augereau, Kléber, Soult, and many more — which were to make France glorious in military history for all time.

Thus with the favor of France and the auguries of a series of military successes, the Directory assumed power in November, 1795.

A. THE DIRECTORY — FROM ITS ORGANIZATION TO THE COUP D'ÉTAT OF SEPTEMBER, 1797

Under the constitution of 1795, the power of the Directory was great. Its members appointed the commanding officers in the army, foreign ministers, and diplomatic agents. They signed treaties and submitted to the legislature declarations of war. They could by messages propose legislation, though they could not initiate laws. Their commissioners resided in each Département of France with power to
approve or disapprove the acts of local authorities. Their ministers, instead of forming an advisory council, were subordinates or clerks. The Directors thus formed a strongly concentrated executive power, controlling directly both domestic and foreign policies.

The peace treaties of the spring and summer of 1795 had been favorable to France. Moreover, there was little prospect of further trouble in these quarters provided France herself did not provoke it. Spain was on the verge of bankruptcy. A strong liberal party in Holland was willing to support the French alliance. And Prussia had its armies mobilized to guarantee its own share in the third and final partition of Poland.

The first problem of the Directory was, of course, to bring the war to a successful conclusion. In offering a solution to this problem, Napoleon grasped his second great opportunity. He had gained the favor of the political leaders by serving the Convention the preceding autumn; he was at the moment in command of the Army of the Interior with headquarters in Paris; and he had a plan to present for consideration. His friendship with Barras, a Director, and his previous service with the Army of Italy, gained him a hearing. His plan so impressed the Directors that they adopted it, and made him Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy (March 2, 1796), and authorized him to carry out his part of the campaign along his own lines.

None could have foreseen that the future of France was bound up with the career of this twenty-seven-year-old general. Born in Corsica in 1769, Napoleon Bonaparte graduated from the French military academy at Brienne at fifteen (1784) and entered the artillery. His poverty and Corsican birth offered him no chance of advancement under the old régime. For nine years he took long leaves of absence to mingle in the political intrigues of his native island until the failure of an uprising led by him in 1793 caused a decree of banishment to be issued against him and
his family. Upon rejoining his command, he shared in the operations against Toulon, his skill exciting the commendation of the commissioners of the Convention and winning for him a commission as General of Brigade in the Army of Italy. Early in 1795 he was transferred to the Army of the West, then engaged in suppressing the last traces of the Vendéan revolt. Considering his new assignment undesirable, he went to Paris to protest. His petition was disregarded, and September 15, 1795, his name was officially stricken from the list of generals on duty because of his failure to report as directed. He waited in Paris, his hope of reinstatement lying in the favor of a few prominent men. He was still there in October, when Barras summoned him to help save the Convention. His success brought its immediate reward in his appointment to the Army of the Interior, from which position he was able to urge his plans.

Napoleon's plan called for two simultaneous campaigns, one in Germany and one in Italy. The one in Germany, aimed at the heart of Austria, was expected by the Directory to be the more important; but the one in Italy, led by Napoleon himself, proved decisive.

i. Military Operations, Germany, 1796

The armies of France gave at Fleurus their very best for the Republic and the ideals of the Revolution. In the 1796 campaign in Italy and from then on they gave their very best to a man who was a wonderful leader. But in the campaign of 1796 in Germany, the first ideal had died and the second had not been born. We find the armies going forth in obedience to the Directory, to fight and subsist on foreign soil, to plunder and conquer. However acceptable to the leaders in France such a war might have been, to her people it has always been a business which they set about with reluctance. Throughout all that lamentable campaign of Jourdan and Moreau, there was lacking that enthusiasm, either for a cause or for a man, which makes for
victory. For once, Carnot's schemes took wings and passed beyond his control. He planned a march down the Danube valley which should unite the victorious armies before the walls of Vienna with those of Napoleon from the plains of Italy. The impracticability of such a plan killed it, but there was left the possibility of a campaign in the Danube valley.

Facing Jourdan and Moreau on the Rhine, the former near Düsseldorf, the latter near Strassburg, were two Austrian armies under the Archduke Charles and Wurmser. From Italy came a cry for help on account of Napoleon's successes there, and Wurmser with 20,000 men set out over the mountains. Immediately, Jourdan crossed the Rhine and advanced southward to the Lahn where he was engaged by Charles with the bulk of the Austrian armies, and forced to retire. His advance was a ruse, however, to enable Moreau to cross with ease at Strassburg (April, 1796). Unfortunately, here cooperation between Moreau and Jourdan ceased, and though Charles made the mistake of dividing his army perilously to oppose both his adversaries, the French continued to operate as separate armies and came to grief. Charles himself opposed Moreau, leaving Wartensleben to confront Jourdan. Both armies were inferior to the French and before them retreated rapidly, Wartensleben up the Main, Charles into the Danube valley, unable to unite.

But at last when Jourdan at Amberg was preparing to attack Wartensleben on the Naab River, the Archduke marched rapidly across from Neuburg and struck the French flank at the moment of Wartensleben's frontal attack. Jourdan was outnumbered and retired down the Main in great haste, nor did his retreat end until with heavy loss he had been forced across the Rhine (September 21, 1796).

Meanwhile, Moreau had advanced against the small Austrian force left in the valley of the Danube as far as the
line of the Lech, but there hearing of Jourdan’s disaster, he turned again to the Rhine. He was none too soon, for Charles having finished with Jourdan, marched rapidly up the Rhine valley, and but for Moreau’s brilliant generalship would have cut him off and destroyed his army. Moreau closed the whole disastrous episode by recrossing the Rhine October 25, 1796.

ii. Napoleon’s Campaign in Italy, 1796–1797

The territory in which Napoleon was to operate in 1796 was not new to him—he had served with the Army of Italy in 1794 and had even outlined a plan for the subjection of Piedmont. But the army with which he was called to carry out his project must have struck dismay to his heart. It was one of those bodies of tatterdemalions to which the greedy Directory had said, “You must from now on subsist on the enemy.” Nevertheless, Napoleon knew his material, and from the moment when he first addressed them as “Soldats” instead of “Citoyens,” it became evident that the new hand on the reins was a dexterous one.

He found an army of 38,000 occupying the principal passes of the Maritime Alps and towns along the coast as far as Voltri. In command of them were men of ability and experience—Sérrurier, Augereau, Masséna, Laharpe. Opposed to him was the Austro-Sardinian army occupying positions from Coni to Voltaggio—the Sardinians 20,000 strong under Colli holding the line Coni-Millesimo, the Austrians 30,000 strong under Beaulieu strung out from Sassello to Voltaggio.

Napoleon’s plan contemplated a thrust at the allied center from Savona, an attack which was to fall on the Austrian right wing near Sassello. By great good fortune, the Austrian commander assisted him by moving forward on both flanks on the day of Napoleon’s contemplated operation. The brigade at Voltri resisted Beaulieu’s left, while Napoleon opposed the advancing right by Laharpe’s forces in the
pass at Savona. Meanwhile he ordered Masséna over the mountains from Cadibona to fall upon the rear of the Austrian wing in the Savona pass, and there, as between milestones, the Austrian battalions were crushed. The remaining Austrians fell back on both flanks and endeavored to collect their shattered forces (April 12, 1796).

With the wedge thus skilfully inserted between the portions of his opponent’s army, Napoleon left one division to watch the disconcerted Austrians and then turned with his remaining force on the Sardinians. In the next few days, by repeated attacks near Millesimo, Ceva, and Mondovi, he drove the demoralized Sardinians back on their communications, until on April 28, Colli, in the name of the terrified King, asked for an armistice. Bonaparte, while treating with the envoys, pushed on, almost to Turin. By the armistice of Cherasco (which he signed April 27, 1796) the Sardinians definitely withdrew from the war, surrendered the fortresses of Alessandria, Tortona, Mondovi, and Ceva, and guaranteed to the French a line of communications through the Mont Cenis pass.

Within a few days, Napoleon renewed his attack on the Austrians who had meanwhile accomplished nothing except a withdrawal to the Po at Valenza, on the road to Milan. The French general feinted against their position, but planned his real crossing at Piacenza, fifty miles downstream. His ruse succeeded, but before he could mass his troops on his opponent’s communications, Beaulieu learned of the French stratagem, and retreated precipitately to the line of the Adda. By doing so, he definitely gave up Milan, and after being forced by the battle of Lodi from the Adda, retired on his base, Mantua. Napoleon entered Milan in triumph (May 15, 1796).

The Directory, meanwhile, had confirmed the terms of the Armistice of Cherasco, and Bonaparte, his communications secure, once more took up the pursuit of the Austrians. He found them occupying the line of the Mincio
River, their left protected by the fortress of Mantua. Here, too, Beaulieu was dislodged and withdrew through Venetian territory, leaving Napoleon to invest Mantua.

The subsequent episodes of the first Italian campaign all center in attempts to relieve the beleaguered fortress. There were four of these, all of which were conducted in the vicinity of the Italian Quadrilateral (Verona, Peschiera, Mantua, Legnano), and all of which came to grief.

The first was conducted by Wurmser, who, with 55,000 men advanced on both sides of Lake Garda, and down the Brenta. Opposed to them with about 45,000 men, of whom 10,000 were conducting the siege of Mantua, Napoleon found himself in a serious predicament. He proved equal to the emergency by raising the siege, uniting his troops, striking first the western column and defeating it, and then repeating the blow against the combined eastern columns at Castiglione (August 3, 1796). Wurmser was able in the early successes of his advance to re-victual and re-garrison Mantua, but Castiglione forced him into the Tyrol, leaving the French still in possession of the Quadrilateral and sitting doggedly before the fortress.

In early September, 1796, just as Wurmser was beginning an advance down the valley of the Brenta, Napoleon pushed north as far as Trent, defeated the holding force left there, and then turning to the southeast, deliberately pursued Wurmser, overtook him near Bassano, and inflicted a sharp defeat. He pursued the remnants of the army down the Brenta, across the Adige, and finally forced them to take refuge in the very fortress they had set out to relieve.

The third attempt, in November, 1796, nearly succeeded. Two columns totaling 47,000 under the command of Alvinzi advanced on Verona by way of the Adige and the Brenta valleys. Napoleon, near Verona with 30,000, was confronted with the problem of meeting attacks from two directions. On the north his brigades were pushed in, and he himself was roughly handled at Caldiero. Under cover of night,
he crossed the Adige, moved downstream, recrossed and came up on the Austrian flank near the little town of Arcole. Here for three days (November 13, 14, and 15, 1796) in the marshes and fens raged a most confusing battle. The French were outnumbered and in a disadvantageous position, but they fought with a desperation which was reflected from their commander. On the third day, at a moment when the battle hung in the balance, Napoleon sent a number of cavalry trumpeters around in rear of the Austrians with instructions to blow the charge. The ridiculous trick succeeded, and Alvinzi’s warriors fled in confusion. Meanwhile, the northern Austrian force had remained unaccountably idle, and as a result both columns futilely retreated.

In January, 1797, the fourth and final relief expedition, 48,000 strong, again under the command of Alvinzi, started in three columns, one down the Adige (28,000), a second (6000) from the east on Verona, and a third (9000) on Legnano. Napoleon soon learned what the nature of the advance was to be, and massed his command to meet the main column. At Rivoli the two armies met for what proved to be the decisive battle of the campaign. Alvinzi, underestimating the troops which were to meet him, undertook an enveloping attack on both flanks. That on the lake side succeeded in getting behind the French left, but was there caught by Masséna and annihilated. The general retreat which now began became a rout when the Austrians found in their path a French regiment which had crossed the lake in boats. Fifteen thousand prisoners remained in the hands of the Republicans.

The remaining operations were short lived. Mantua surrendered February 2, 1797, and Napoleon turned his attention to the Archduke Charles now commanding the Austrians, forced him through the Carnic Alps, and at Leoben, within a hundred miles of Vienna, signed, on April 18, 1797, the armistice which ended the campaign.
(a) Political reconstruction in Italy

When the French entered the peninsula, what is now Italy was cut up into a dozen or more independent units, large and small. The term “Italy” was, as called later, a mere geographical expression. The number of separate units was greatest in the north, the very section which Napoleon invaded. The Kingdom of Sardinia (also called Piedmont), the Duchies of Milan, Parma, Modena, Mantua, Lucca, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and the Republics of Genoa and Venice occupied the territory north of the Papal states: the Kingdom of Naples stretched south from the Papal states to the tip, and included the island of Sicily. Most of the sovereigns were foreign in blood to their subjects, being princes of the Austrian Hapsburg or of the Spanish Bourbon house. The governments were of the old régime. Most notable was the absence of any general desire for unity or independence.

The first change came in the little Duchy of Modena. After a revolt against their Duke, the people with the approval of Napoleon organized (October, 1796) a republic along the lines of the French Republic. A few weeks later delegates from Reggio, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara met at Bologna and established a federation. In December of the same year, 1796, a regular congress met and founded the Cispadane (this side, south, of the Po River) Republic. In the spring of the following year, 1797, delegates encouraged by Napoleon met and united territories north of the Po between the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Republic of Venice into the Cisalpine Republic. At the formal inauguration of this new state (July 9, 1797), deputies from the Cispadane Republic appeared to request a greater federation. The young conqueror approved, and the Cispadane and Cisalpine Republics were united under the name of the latter, including territory extending from the Alps beyond Lake Como to the Adriatic Sea at Rimini. During the same
period, Napoleon took advantage of a local disturbance in Genoa to force a reorganization of its government along French lines. Genoa then became (June, 1797) the Ligu-
rian Republic.

The precise boundary lines and the constitutions of these new creations are not important, for they were all destroyed by Austrian victories a few years later. What was impor-
tant, however, was the birth of a widespread popular de-
mand for unity and independence. In the delegations, conventions, and congresses, prominent Italian leaders from different states for the first time in the modern era became convinced of the essential unity of their interests and of the desirability of throwing off the yoke of foreign princes. Once born, this demand never died, though the ideal was not realized for more than half a century.

iii. Government in France

The successes of Napoleon's campaign left the members of the Directory free to concentrate their attention upon do-
mestic concerns. The most pressing problem was financial. The thousands of millions of assignats had depreciated until it took 3400 francs' worth of them to buy one gold louis (normally valued at 24 francs). The poor suffered terribly. Bread sold at 60 francs a pound, and beans for 1400 francs a pint. The Directors resorted to a forced loan exacted from the more wealthy classes, but this expedient failed, yielding barely 20,000,000 francs. The Directors then issued a new paper money, a kind of preferred assignat, but the only re-
sult was to make the original assignats wholly worthless while the new money quickly depreciated to thirty-five per cent of its face value. The only income which saved the state was that received from Napoleon's invasion, and that levied upon the conquered territories of the Austrian Netherlands. According to instructions, Napoleon went upon the principle that the liberated peoples must expect to reimburse their liberators. He forwarded great sums to the hard-pressed
Directors. Milan was forced to pay 20,000,000 francs; Modena, 10,000,000. The Duke of Parma paid 2,000,000 and the Duke of Piacenza 10,000,000 for immunity. The Pope submitted to the conqueror and gave 20,000,000. Murat, one of Napoleon's generals, in a raid upon Leghorn, seized English goods which were subsequently sold for 12,000,000 francs.

In the field of religion, the Directory faced an anomalous condition. The new constitution provided freedom of worship, but the Convention had decreed (October 25, 1795) that the laws against the non-juring priests should be strictly enforced. Priests of the orthodox religion were, therefore, liable to arrest and transportation, yet people were permitted by the constitution to have freedom of worship. In actual fact, the Directory enjoined their commissioners to watch the non-juring priests, "never to lose sight of these instruments of murder, royalism, and anarchy," but it took no active measures against them.

Throughout all its term, the Directory was constantly threatened by conspiracy. The uprisings were sternly suppressed. The only one which deserves special mention here was a communistic plot under the leadership of one Babeuf. Babeuf was chief of the members of a society known as Société des Égaux (Society of Equals), whose principles were, briefly, that all land should belong to the state, all production should be common property, all people should contribute their labor to the general good, and all the social and economic differences due to relative wealth and poverty should be forever destroyed. Curiously enough, this Utopian scheme gained thousands of followers, including even members of the legislature. Attempts were made to undermine the soldiery. On the eve of a revolt, the Directory, May 10, 1796, seized the leaders and sent them before a special High Court of Justice to be tried for treason. A few months later, September 7, 1796, a remnant of the "Equals" again tried to foment insurrection, but the army
remained loyal. The High Court of Justice and a Military Commission (for the September cases) acted expeditiously. Thirty-four were executed; thirty-three sentenced to transportation; and the remainder acquitted. The last case was disposed of by the end of April, 1797.

The Directory suffered, too, from schism among its own members. Three of the five Directors represented the Conventionists, or Revolutionists. Their intention was to continue the Revolution by progressive legislation in internal affairs, and by aggressive war upon foreign powers. Their policy was influenced by self-interest, for any decided reaction throughout the country would imperil their positions and even their lives. The Constitutionalists, on the other hand, comprising two members of the Directory, Carnot and Barthélemy, believed that the Revolution should be regarded as having ended with the Constitution of 1795. Their policy was to establish a well-organized government acceptable to the people, to remedy revolutionary mistakes, and above all to bring the foreign war to an honorable close as soon as possible.

The division in the Directory was reflected in the legislature. Owing to the decree of the Convention that two thirds of its members should be elected to the new legislature, the Conventionist, or Revolutionist, group had a strong majority at first. With the successive elections by thirds, as provided by the constitution, the Conventionists lost their majority, for the country as a whole was heartily in favor of an end of the Revolution and of foreign war. The crisis came with the elections of the spring of 1797. The 216 Conventionists due to retire stood for reelection, but only 11 gained seats. The legislature, therefore, had a majority of Constitutionalists, and the Constitutionalists planned to gain control of the Directory.

The Conventionalist Directors decided to take forcible steps to perpetuate the power of their faction. Gathering on the night of September 3, 1797, they prepared a proclama-
tion announcing that a great Royalist conspiracy had been unearthed. Early September 4 they arrested Barthélemy and attempted to arrest Carnot, but Carnot escaped to Switzerland. Troops under one of Napoleon’s generals, Augereau, who was released by Napoleon for the purpose, marched to the legislature and arrested a number of the constitutionalist deputies. The remaining members of the legislature passed a decree September 8, 1797, annulling the elections of over 150 constitutional deputies and summarily punishing by order for transportation 50 more. The country at large, surprised and unprepared, made no resistance. The trumped-up charge of a Royalist conspiracy deceived many, for none desired the restoration of the monarchy. The Conventionalist Directors established for themselves a dictatorship as absolute as any in history. They quickly replaced Carnot and Barthélemy by Conventionalis; appointed new local agents in districts too pronouncedly Constitutional; and by wholesale deportations lessened the number of their enemies. September 4–5, 1797, marks the real end of the government under the Constitution of 1795, although the Directors remained in power for two years longer.

B. THE DIRECTORY, 1797–1799

Misgovernment of France during these two years prepared the way as nothing else could have done for the overthrow of the Directory. With all power in their hands — for the legislature became a mere puppet — the Directors failed to relieve domestic conditions and brought on a new foreign war. We can find few parallels in history to the criminal inefficiency and corruption of the Directors during the two years from 1797 to 1799.

Since they failed to extricate the country from its financial difficulties, they accepted the odium of repudiation. In February, 1797, before the coup d'état, they repudiated assignats of a nominal value of forty billion francs. Three weeks after the coup d'état they paid off two thirds of the
huge remaining debt by the issuance of a new paper money, called "bons," but the "bons" straightway fell to thirty per cent of their face value, and later to three per cent. The government continued to roll up deficits at the rate of twenty-five million francs a month. Metallic currency had been forced out of the country by the cheap paper money. In many sections, the poor people had to resort to primitive methods of barter and exchange to obtain the necessities of life.

Suspicion was aroused, too, of the honesty of the Directors and of their agents — suspicion justified by subsequent researches. The Directors, especially Barras and Rewbell, were the centers of a dissolute group. Just how much of the spoils turned in by Napoleon went into the Directors' pockets we shall never know, for the agents of corruption kept no books. One or two instances, however, indicate that the total amount was great. Information leaked out that the Portuguese minister had paid to Barras and Rewbell $2,000,000 in 1797 to hasten the treaty of peace. Lord Malmesbury, negotiating for peace, was invited to pay $2,500,000 to assist the negotiations. As rumors of such corrupt bargains spread, the Directors, of course, were more and more discredited.

Their incapacity in foreign affairs, however, was more directly the cause of their overthrow. After the peace of Campo Formio (October 17, 1797) Napoleon returned to Paris (December 5, 1797). He was appointed commander-in-chief of the army against England, and laid plans secretly to strike at the English power in the far east by an expedition through Egypt. In May, 1798, he set sail with the pick of the French army. The peace he had made, however, stopped at once the flow of treasure which had for two years maintained the government. Though the Directors were glad for political reasons to see him go, they had to find a means of replenishing the empty treasury. Their sole scheme was to continue the creation of republics in the
name of liberty, and then to mulct these republics. Hence, through 1798, the Directory used its armies to overthrow existing governments, create nominal republics, and extract huge sums from these helpless states. In January, 1798, they intervened in Holland, established the Batavian Republic, and forced the helpless Dutch to pledge the support of 25,000 French troops and the payment of 1,200,000 guilders (c. $500,000). In the spring of the same year, they compelled the Cisalpine Republic to sign a treaty agreeing to support a French army of occupation of 25,000 and to keep mobilized an Italian army of 22,000. A factional quarrel in Switzerland gave excuse for French intervention (January—September, 1798), after which the Directors formed the Helvetic Republic, forced it to enter an alliance with France, seized 5,000,000 francs in specie in the treasury, and dispatched a commissioner to levy further contributions. A riot in Rome caused the dispatch of a French army, the capture of Rome, the imprisonment of the Pope, the establishment of a Roman Republic with the payment of 15,000,000 francs in specie, large indemnities, and millions of francs' worth of supplies. Agents of the Directors fomented rebellion in Piedmont and the King was forced to flee to Sardinia and abandon Piedmont to the French: the booty there reached more than 10,000,000 francs. And at the end of the year, Naples, opposing the French in the Roman territories, was quickly subdued, its King forced to flee to Sicily, its name changed to the Parthenopean Republic, its country looted by French soldiers, and its treasury assessed sixty million francs. Thus in one short year the Directors had used French armies to establish the Batavian, Helvetic, Roman, and Parthenopean Republics, with huge levies in each case, and to extract great assessments from the Cisalpine Republic and from Piedmont.

Such policy, however, aroused again the resistance of Austria and enabled her to gain a powerful ally in Russia. The Congress of Rastadt, opened in December, 1797, to
arrange terms of peace between France and the Holy Roman Empire, was making little progress. Austria was disappointed, for she hoped to use the Congress to revise in her favor the terms of the Treaty of Campo Formio and to gain additional territory in Italy. The determined tone of the French delegates, and the aggressions of the French armies, balked Austria in her plans. The Austrian government made representations to the Russians, already hostile to France because of the French seizure of Malta June, 1798, by Napoleon on his way to Egypt, and received an immediate favorable reply. Russian troops, subsidized by England, began to move through Galicia to Austria’s aid in July, 1798. The information of this movement was carried to the Directors and brought from them immediate inquiries and threats. Negotiations dragged through the fall of 1798. January 31, 1799, the Directors issued an ultimatum to the Austrian government, demanding the withdrawal of the Russian troops. A month later, when no answer was returned, the French armies were thrown across the Rhine and the War of the Second Coalition was begun (March 1, 1799). April 8, 1799, the Emperor of Austria summarily dissolved the Congress of Rastadt and annulled its acts.

The immediate disasters to French arms following the outbreak of war fatally undermined the already tottering Directory. The Archduke Charles of Austria defeated Jourdan at Stockach (March 25, 1799) and forced the withdrawal of the French invaders to the Rhine; the Russians and Austrians in Italy quickly cleared Italy in a series of battles (April–August, 1799); the Cisalpine, Roman, and Parthenopean Republics ceased to exist, and the French troops were everywhere on the defensive.

i. The Campaign in Egypt and Syria, 1798–1799

In the meanwhile, the one successful French general, Napoleon, had been conducting a remarkable campaign in Egypt. The purposes of the Egyptian expedition as out-
lined in the decrees which Napoleon wrote for the Directory to sign are sufficiently startling to satisfy the most romantic. To destroy the English power in the Mediterranean, to acquire control of the Red Sea, to investigate the antiquities, arts, and natural resources of Egypt, to construct a Suez canal — here was a list of objectives to fill many months of toil.

The fleet which was to carry Napoleon's army of 35,000 set sail from Toulon, May 19, 1798. Thirteen ships-of-the-line, fourteen frigates, and numerous smaller war craft safely convoyed the three hundred transports to Malta, the first stopping place. Here, a sham assault completed what French gold had begun, and the first of the important strongholds in the Mediterranean fell to the Republic (June, 1798). Two weeks later the fleet came to anchor off Alexandria and disembarkation of the troops began. Napoleon must have believed himself favored by fortune, for twice his fleet had narrowly escaped the English squadron under the redoubtable Nelson, sent into the Mediterranean for the very purpose of destroying this menace to England's power.

Within a few hours of his landing, Napoleon had seized Alexandria, and had dispatched Desaix toward Cairo, a hundred and twenty-five miles distant. The following day (July 3) Bonaparte followed with the main army after having dispatched a flotilla up the Nile. Only once on the march did the army encounter the Mamelukes, but the sufferings from heat and thirst were terrible to the men accustomed to the temperate climate of France.

Within sight of Cairo, Napoleon encountered the armies of Ibrahim and Murad, drawn up on both banks of the Nile, the former on the right, the latter on the left. Since the French army was entirely on the left bank, it had only the army of Murad to contend with. Against this the French divisions marched in great squares in echelon, the right leading. The Mamelukes launched a furious charge against this leading wing but were halted by the devastat-
ing fire of the Europeans and were forced back in disorder into the waters of the Nile. A little hand-to-hand fighting in the streets of the city left Napoleon unquestioned victor in this battle of the Pyramids. Murad retreated up the Nile; Ibrahim withdrew toward Syria (July 21).

Desaix immediately began his pursuit of Murad, while Napoleon advanced eastward on Ibrahim's track as far as Salalieh. These operations were barely begun, however, when news came from the coast that Nelson had completely destroyed the French fleet in the battle of the Nile (August 1, 1798). To heighten the gloom came the information that Turkey had come to an understanding with England, and was preparing two armies to drive the French out of Egypt, one at Rhodes, the other in Syria. To the soldiers, the army seemed doomed, but their indomitable commander was still far from defeat. He saw that he must proceed at once to destroy Turkey's armies before they could unite against him. Without a fleet, he could do nothing against Rhodes, but Syria was open to him. At once he began preparations and within a few months started into the desert (January 31, 1799).

His army of Syria numbered only 10,000, but it was ably commanded. On February 20, it captured the fortress of El Arish, and paroled about 1500 prisoners. On March 7, it successfully stormed Jaffa, taking some 2000 prisoners, among whom they found many who had been paroled at El Arish. Unable to guard them, feed them, or send them back to Egypt, Napoleon ordered the entire 2000 to be shot. The sentence was carried out, and the imperturbable general continued his advance.

Acre proved the stumbling block of the campaign. Here the Turks and English, commanded by Sir Sidney Smith, an English naval commodore, had mounted the guns of two frigates on the walls of the old mud fort. Bitterly they defended it while waiting for the Turkish army in the field to come to their rescue. The French, short of artillery, at-
tackled with their accustomed fury, but were always at a disadvantage. Once Napoleon raised the siege while he proceeded against the army of the Pasha of Damascus. At Mount Tabor he destroyed the hope of the beleaguered garrison (April 16, 1799) and turned once more to the siege of Acre. Two of the towers fell, and in the assaults which followed the French took and held a part of the works. The remainder held firm, however, and Napoleon, seeing the enormous loss in men and time, gave up the struggle. He had had news of the entrance of Naples into the war, and a return to Egypt seemed inevitable.

On May 20 he began the weary 300 mile march back to Egypt, and twenty-six days later entered Cairo with perhaps half of his army left. He was just in time to learn of the landing at Aboukir of the second Turkish army. Desaix was ordered to evacuate upper Egypt, and the other troops were concentrated before the defenses of Aboukir. In a furious assault which lasted two days, the fort was taken at enormous cost to the defenders, only 2000 of the original 10,000 surviving.

This was Napoleon’s last exploit in Egypt. He had long since determined to return to Europe, and accordingly, early in August, with many of his leading officers, he set sail for France.

C. THE FALL OF THE DIRECTORY

As a result of the Austrian successes and the proved incompetency of the government both in foreign and domestic affairs, the political turmoil in Paris was great. May 16, 1799, the Abbé Sieyès was elected a Director. Sieyès had long been one of the most conspicuous men in French public life. He had been in the Estates General, had helped to draft the Tennis Court oath and the first Revolutionary constitution, had voted for the execution of the King, and had been a member of the great Committee of Public Safety during the Convention. Yet he was vain, self-confident,
and lacked force, succeeding in concealing his deficiencies by
an air of reserve and an appearance of wisdom. At the
moment, however, he was considered by the people as the
one man capable of saving the situation; and he assumed
the leadership at once in the Directory. Largely through
his influence, the most unpopular Directors were induced
to resign (June 18, 1799) and their places filled by his
friends.

To save France, however, he recognized the need of a
competent general. He therefore, with the other Directors,
prepared to negotiate (September 10, 1799) with the Turk-
ish government for the return of Napoleon and the French
army, and sent word to Napoleon to this effect. Napoleon,
however, never received the message, for he had already,
as we have said, set sail for France. He landed on the south
coast October 9, 1799.

Napoleon’s appearance in Paris October 16, 1799, was the
signal for a great popular ovation. Yet people did not
dream of a dictatorship: they welcomed Napoleon as a
Republican general returned in time to save the country.
Napoleon himself prepared to familiarize himself with the
political situation before taking any decisive step.

Napoleon could not have had any well-defined plan of
action when he first reached Paris. His brother, Lucien,
was therefore of the greatest assistance to him, for Lucien
was President of the Council of the Five Hundred and in
touch with the political intrigues. Napoleon’s most direct
course was to ally himself with the leading faction and ride
with it to success in a coup d’état. This course he followed.
He found a colleague in Sieyès, who, himself a Director,
was actually engaged in an intrigue against the Directory
and the constitution, hoping to replace the existing system
with one evolved from his own fertile brain. The alliance
between the two men was cemented in late October. The
date for the coup d’état was set for November 9, 1799. The
position of Lucien Bonaparte as President of the Council of
Five Hundred, and the prestige of Sieyès and Napoleon, apparently guaranteed success.

The plan went through with scarcely a hitch. November 8, 1799, the necessary decrees, proclamations, pamphlets, and other literature were ready for distribution. Early November 9, the Council of the Ancients, influenced by men in the plot, passed a decree that the meeting place of the legislature should be transferred to Saint Cloud (a suburb of Paris) because of the danger from a popular uprising in Paris, and that General Bonaparte should be given command of troops in and about Paris to insure the safety of the deputies. This decree was read to the Council of the Five Hundred, and that Council was immediately adjourned by Lucien Bonaparte before any question could be raised. Sieyès, Barras, and one other Director resigned, and the remaining two were kept under close guard at the Tuileries. The following day Napoleon appeared in person before the Council of the Ancients and made a confused speech announcing the resignation of the Directors and hinting at his own purpose to save the country. The Ancients were astounded, but did nothing. A few minutes later Napoleon entered the hall of the Council of the Five Hundred, but met with furious opposition. The deputies rose in a tumult and rushed at him, crying "Down with the Dictator! Outlaw him!" Napoleon was forced to retire in momentary discomfiture. Lucien Bonaparte then saved the situation. He refused to put to vote motions to outlaw his brother, held the floor himself with a long speech to gain time, and finally left the chamber and addressed the troops outside in ringing tones. His speech and the appearance of Napoleon carried the day. The grenadiers advanced and in a few minutes cleared the hall. Shortly afterwards the obsequious Ancients decreed the appointment of Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Ducos as provisional Consuls pending the preparation of a new constitution. In the late evening a "rump" council, composed of a group of the former Council of the Five
Hundred, gathered under the leadership of Lucien and indorsed the decree of the Ancients, thus giving it a certain constitutional authority which otherwise it would not have had. With this act the coup d'état was complete. No lives had been lost; the plans of the conspirators had succeeded. At 3:00 A.M., November 11, Lucien Bonaparte, the Abbé Sieyès, and Napoleon drove back to Paris, Napoleon “silent and wrapped in thought.”

Unsuspected as the coup d'état had been, it excited nothing but approval in Paris and throughout France. The unpopularity of the Directory, the renown of Sieyès and Napoleon, the hope that now indeed the evil days of the Revolution were over, inspired everyone to accept the change with enthusiasm.
CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSULATE, NOVEMBER 1799–DECEMBER 1804

Forty-four days elapsed between the coup d'État of November 9, 1799, and the organization of a new government. During this interval the three provisional consuls, Napoleon, Sieyès, and Ducos, were intrusted with the powers of the defunct Directory, and were theoretically assisted by two committees chosen by the former Council of the Five Hundred and the Council of the Ancients. In pursuance of their proclaimed purpose "to organize order in all parts of the administration, to restore tranquillity at home, and to procure an enduring and honorable peace," these provisional consuls undertook a few urgent administrative reforms and hastened their work on the new constitution.

Of the three provisional consuls Sieyès was preëminent in civil fame, Napoleon in military, and Ducos in political. At the beginning of the Provisional Consulate, the reputation of Sieyès overshadowed that of his colleagues, for Ducos was not considered more than a politician, and the administrative genius of Napoleon was as yet unknown. Sieyès had good reason to expect that in the new government he would be the logical chief executive, able to rely upon the military ability of Napoleon to contribute to the success of his government. The few weeks of the Provisional government's existence, however, changed the situation rapidly. By mutual consent, Sieyès took up the task of framing the new constitution, and Napoleon of administering the government. Napoleon's duties brought him prominently into the public eye. He gained the credit for the wise and conciliatory measures decreed by the
government. His appointments to office of men of recognized ability, irrespective of previous factional affiliations, revealed his broad-minded political views. His suppression of the hated Law of Hostages, whereby relatives of persons implicated in royalist uprisings had been seized and held by the government, raised his reputation for justice. His substitution of a fixed war-tax for the obnoxious forced loans gained him the confidence of the banking and financial interests. His prompt measures for the revision of the tax lists and for the collection of arrears gave proof of his sound national policy. Rumor magnified his wisdom. In the popular mind, he supplanted Sieyès as the logical candidate for chief executive in the new government.

Within the Provisional Consulate a similar transformation took place. Invited informally at the beginning of its meetings to take the chairman’s seat, Napoleon soon established his ascendancy over the older and (in civil affairs) more experienced Sieyès. When it became evident in the later stages of the discussion of the proposed constitution that he rather than Sieyès was to be the chief executive, he wielded a determining influence in molding the most important part of the document. Sieyès had planned a chief executive, to be known as Grand Elector, whose actual powers were small, and whose prerogatives were carefully limited on every side: Napoleon ridiculed the idea, refusing, as he said, to be kept as a "fatted hog." Napoleon planned instead a strong executive, who should have the power of appointment to the chief legislative council, to all offices in the army, navy, and diplomatic branch, who should designate ministers responsible individually to him, who should have the right with the advice of his picked legislative to conduct foreign affairs. The theorist Sieyès was forced to yield before the practical Napoleon. In its essential feature, i.e., the nature and powers of the chief executive, the new constitution was Napoleon’s work: in the remaining features, the power of
the electorate and the formation of the legislative branch, the document was the creation of Sieyès.

Realizing the restlessness in political circles pending the production of the new constitution, Napoleon hurried it through the final stages, once he had gained his point with respect to the chief executive. As finally drafted, the document gave universal suffrage, but limited the voters in their elective powers. It provided (1) that the 5,000,000 voters in France should have merely the right to choose one tenth of their number (500,000) as candidates for office in the communes, final appointment from these 500,000 to be made by the chief executive; then (2) that these 500,000 should in turn elect one tenth of their number (50,000) as candidates for office in the Départements, final appointment likewise to be made by the chief executive; and lastly, (3) that these 50,000 should choose one tenth of their number (5000) as candidates for the national legislative bodies (except the Council of State and the Senate), final appointment to the lower houses to be made from these 5000 by the Senate. For the formation of the legislative branch, the proposed constitution provided four houses, or chambers: (1) The Council of State, whose members were designated by the Chief Executive, having the power to initiate legislation; (2) The Tribunate, having the power to discuss legislation; (3) The Legislative body, having the power to vote upon legislation; and (4) The Senate, whose members were appointed for life by the chief executive, having the power to confirm or annul legislation. For the executive, the constitution provided a First Consul and two Associate Consuls with a ten-year term, the First Consul to have the large powers demanded by Napoleon as outlined above, and the Associate Consuls to have merely advisory functions. It is easy to understand that from his extensive powers of appointment as well as his independent prerogatives, the First Consul was, in the organization outlined above, the actual head and
soul of the entire government. Indeed, he held more authority than Louis XVI under the Constitution of 1791. He was the legitimate successor of the Committee of Public Safety with its autocratic powers of the Reign of Terror.

The constitution was promulgated December 15, 1799, and the people invited to register their approval or disapproval by vote. Popular enthusiasm for Napoleon, who was named as First Consul, swept the country. Over 3,000,000 votes were recorded in favor of the new constitution, and a beggarly 1500 against it. By decree Christmas Day was set for the inauguration of the new government, and Napoleon as First Consul, and Cambacérès and Lebrun as Associate Consuls, were then inducted into office.

A. THE CONSULATE AND ITS PROBLEMS

Napoleon intended to have the date of the inauguration of the new government, — Christmas Day, “Peace on earth, good will toward men,” — accepted as significant. He appreciated the fact that the success of his rule over France depended upon bringing the war to a speedy and honorable conclusion. However favorable the first effect of his conciliatory political measures and his wise financial and economic reforms, he knew that the French people desired peace. His failure to bring peace would loose all the hostility of opposing factions, and his reforms and his government would quickly be dissolved. He therefore signalized his accession to power by addressing personal letters, December 26, 1799, to King George III of England and Emperor Francis I of Austria, in which he deplored the miseries of war and expressed his own earnest desire to enter upon negotiations for peace. These letters constituted an adroit political move: if they resulted in a favorable peace, France would applaud; if his enemies rejected his overtures, France would lay the blame for the continuation of the war upon England and Austria, and not upon his government.
Napoleon's letter was not received well by Pitt and his ministry. The English government had no assurance of the enduring power of the newly-instituted consulship in France; the military situation, with the French forced out of northern Italy, besieged at Malta, and hopelessly isolated in Egypt, promised substantial gains in the near future. Hence, though the war had become unpopular and a strong group in Parliament favored meeting halfway Napoleon's proffer, Pitt and his ministers determined upon a resolute refusal to treat. Their reply, however, was needlessly impolitic. After reciting the cause of the war and laying all the blame upon France, the note went on to state: "His Majesty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general professions of pacific dispositions. . . . The best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence would be the restoration of that line of princes, which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home and in consideration and respect abroad." This mention of the restoration of the Bourbons deeply incensed the French people and enormously strengthened the position of Napoleon. He could henceforth not only blame England for the continuance of the war, but picture her as fighting for a Bourbon restoration.

The Austrian reply to Napoleon's note was more moderate in tone, but still was non-committal in substance. Although Francis would have welcomed peace, his armies had pushed through Italy to the very boundaries of France, and he was in no mood to make concessions. When, therefore, Napoleon definitely offered to discuss peace on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio, the Austrian government refused to pursue the subject without agreement with its allies—a courteous method of breaking off negotiations.

Napoleon had at no time deceived himself as to the prospects of the acceptance of his peace moves. He had, however, accomplished his purposes. All the negotiations had been conducted on his part with ostentatious publicity, so
that France as a whole might be convinced of his pacific intentions. The blame for the continuance of the war he could now logically lay upon his enemies. He proceeded, therefore, coincident with his reforms in internal administration, to lay his plans and make his dispositions for a decisive campaign against Austria.

B. MARENGO AND HOHENLINDEN

When the First Consul turned from throwing the diplomatic burden of proof on his enemies to the armies which had now to take up the discussion, he found in the field about 190,000 men. Brune commanded an army of occupation 25,000 strong in the Netherlands; Moreau with 120,000 was arrayed against the Austrians along the upper Rhine from Schaffhausen to Strassburg; and Masséna with 45,000 confronted a greatly superior Austrian force in Piedmont. His opponents, commanded by Melas, numbered 90,000 men distributed at various points throughout North Italy, Tuscany, and the Romagna. On the Rhine, Kray opposed equal forces to those of Moreau.

The Rhenish frontier was the keynote to the Austrian situation, for here on the most direct road to Vienna lay the bulk of the Emperor’s forces. Napoleon’s first plan contemplated the formation of an army of the Reserve which he should unite with Moreau’s, advance on the Austrian left wing from Schaffhausen, cut off the army from its communications, and end the war by a single campaign. Unfortunately, he had in Moreau a general whose quality differed greatly from his own. Jealousy of Bonaparte and caution for his own safety caused the lesser general to oppose the greater so consistently that the plan of a decisive campaign in Germany had to be abandoned. The resistance to his plans irked Napoleon, but his position as yet was too insecure to warrant a summary dismissal of a general so influential as Moreau. Accordingly, Italy was chosen
as the field of operations. Here the consul knew he would have a free hand.

Slowly but surely, the situation in Piedmont was becoming impossible for the French. Masséna's army, now divided, had been forced back toward the Gulf of Genoa, until on April 19, 1800, Masséna with about 28,000 men was blockaded in the city of Genoa, while Suchet, in command of the left wing, 10,000 strong, had been forced back to the line of the Var. Superior forces opposed them both, and it became apparent to everyone that if they were to be saved, help must come, and come quickly.

Napoleon's original intention had been to debouch on to the plains of Lombardy from the Splügen pass north of Lake Como and to cut the Austrian communications with Mantua well to the east, but as Masséna's need became more and more urgent, he shifted his point of crossing westward until he had chosen the great St. Bernard as his principal route. Toward this point he began moving his Army of the Reserve (40,000 strong) early in May. To augment this force he ordered Moncey's corps of 15,000 to be detached from Moreau, and to join the Army of the Reserve in Lombardy by a march over the St. Gothard pass. The First Consul, forbidden by the constitution from commanding an army in the field, left Paris secretly to take charge of the expedition which he felt could succeed only under his personal direction. Under him were Berthier as Chief-of-Staff, Lannes as advance guard commander, Murat with the cavalry reserve, and Victor and Duhesme commanding corps.

With great toil his advance guard crossed the snow and ice of the great Saint Bernard on May 15, and immediately began the descent to the plains of Piedmont. Halfway down the valley, the little fortress of Bard, perched high on the cliffs, threatened to halt the entire army. But at the end of the second day, a tortuous path across the mountain had been discovered, and over this precipitous route went
cavalry and infantry alike, leaving a division to reduce the troublesome fortress. This latter task was not accomplished for two weeks, and as a consequence only such artillery as could be slipped through Bard at night joined Napoleon for immediate use.

Meanwhile, Lannes had arrived at the fork of the way, from which led the road to Turin and that to Milan. To persuade Melas that an immediate advance on Turin was to be looked for, Napoleon ordered Lannes forward on the Turin road, while his main army pushed on rapidly to Milan. This latter move appears as a direct abandonment of the beleaguered garrison in Genoa, but it was not made without cogent reasons. At Milan, the Consul knew he would capture arms and supplies, he would unite Moncey's corps from Germany with his army, and he would secure for himself a new line of retreat by way of the St. Gothard pass. Moreover, he did not mean only to save Masséna; he meant to destroy Melas. On June 2, the French army entered Milan, pushed the Austrians in Lombardy across the Adda, on the 6th united with Moncey, and at once pressed southward to secure the crossings of the Po.

The Austrian commander awakened but slowly to the true situation. He was incredulous when told that an entire army had crossed the Saint Bernard, and began a rather leisurely concentration of his forces. He was loath to withdraw the troops from before Masséna and Suchet at the moment when success was in sight. His opposition to Lannes' feint toward Turin was not spirited, for he felt that if the French did come over the Alps, the crossing must necessarily be by way of the more accessible Mt. Cenis pass. And he was encouraged in this belief by the timely arrival at Mt. Cenis of Thurreau whom Napoleon had dispatched with about 4000 men to create that very idea in his opponent's mind.

Even when the true situation was no longer hidden from him, Melas might have saved himself by vigorous measures.
But his orders for a concentration near Alessandria were delayed in arriving at their destinations; Ott, besieging Genoa, delayed two days to receive Masséna's surrender; and Elsnitz, retiring from before Suchet, was so harassed by that enterprising soldier that less than half of his army reached the rendezvous. Only when Masséna had been allowed to march out with the honors of war en route for Nice, did Ott move northward to seize the points of importance on the Po (June 6, 1800).

He was too late. Already Lannes and Victor had crossed near Stradella to the right bank of the river and were marching rapidly toward Alessandria, followed by Murat who had crossed at points farther east. At Montebello, the two forces came into contact and the Austrians fell back in all haste to Alessandria (June 9, 1800). Napoleon's generals, reinforced by the arrival of Desaix from Egypt, pushed on to Casteggio. On the right bank of the Po, Moncey kept Melas from attempting a dash around the right flank. In eastern Lombardy, Duhesme was forcing the foe toward the Mincio. The Austrian communications were completely severed; they must now either fight or retire on Genoa. To prevent this latter contingency, Napoleon, who had pushed forward to the Bormida River, on June 13, dispatched Desaix with one division towards Rivolta in search of information. In Desaix's absence the blow fell.

Melas, made desperate by his situation, had determined on battle, and on the morning of June 14 crossed the Bormida to meet Bonaparte's leading units on the plains of Marengo. The advantage was all with Melas, for he numbered 40,000 to Napoleon's 21,000. The brunt of the battle was borne by Victor and Lannes, whose lines were steadily pushed back by the superior numbers attacking them. Napoleon was soon convinced that Melas' entire army was opposing him and threw in the single division he had held as a reserve. Hastily he sent couriers to Desaix, but with little hope of
BATTLE OF MARENGO
Situation at 5:00 P.M.
SCALE OF MILES

ALESSANDRIA
Castel Carlotto
Pedragna
Villanova
o Barbotta
MARENGO
o La Spinetta
Te Tortona

Laon
Kellerman
Desaix
Y von
San Giuliano

Wav, Eng. Co., N.Y.
his general’s arrival. By mid-afternoon, the Austrians conceived of the battle as won. Their solid columns were pushing steadily forward against the disordered French, and their general returned to Alessandria to write the dispatches telling of his victory.

Then came Desaix. His perfectly formed lines struck the head of the hostile columns, and though they lost their valiant general, they checked the onslaught. At the same moment, Marmont on the right opened a vicious cannonade, and the younger Kellermann launched a cavalry charge which struck the amazed Austrians midway of their left flank. The shock was too great to be sustained. They wavered, broke, and streamed away to Alessandria in hopeless disarray.

The next morning, Melas, dazed by a defeat which he could not understand, signed a truce by which he agreed to retire to the line of the Mincio. The triumphant Napoleon, although he had not destroyed his opponent by his splendid victory at Marengo, had rendered him impotent, and was ready to return to Paris.

Meanwhile, Moreau had assisted Bonaparte’s more brilliant maneuvers by well-conducted operations in the Rhine country. The battle of Mosskirch in May, 1800, and that of Höchstädt in June, had kept Kray fully occupied. But the time of Moreau’s greatest feat of arms was not yet come. A truce was instituted in June which lasted until November. During the cessation of hostilities Kray was replaced by the Archduke John. When the war was renewed, activities began both in Germany and Italy, but this time despite sharp skirmishes on the Mincio, Italy was to be the secondary theater of operations. Interest now centered in the territory about the Inn River.

The Archduke John began a bold offensive, hoping to take the scattered forces of Moreau by surprise. His maneuver of crossing the lower Inn and passing around Moreau’s left in such fashion as to isolate him, came to a
halt in the face of inclement weather and impassable roads. Moreau who was determined to retrieve his mistake of having allowed himself to be caught napping, kept moving in spite of all difficulties and on December 3, encountered the foe in the forest of Hohenlinden.

The blow which the French general delivered was sudden and decisive. While he engaged the head of the Austrian columns in resolute fashion, he dispatched one corps to attack their left flank and rear. This corps, although it was itself cut in two by a chance-met Austrian column, nevertheless kept bravely on and accomplished its mission. First the baggage and artillery trains were captured, and then an attack was begun on the rear of the Austrians, already smartly assailed by Moreau’s frontal attack. There could be but one outcome to such an encounter, and night-fall of the short winter day saw a confused retreat from a field where the Austrians had left ten thousand prisoners and as many dead.

Hohenlinden completed what Marengo began. The second coalition was dead. The armistice of Steyer, on December 25, 1800, terminated the actual fighting and the treaty of Lunéville, five weeks later, brought peace.

C. NAPOLEON IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

With peace negotiations following Marengo and Hohenlinden, Napoleon made his appearance upon the stage of European politics as an actor of the first importance. When he arranged the treaty of Campo Formio (1797), he was merely a general of the French Republic acting as his government’s servant; when he administered northern Italy, his work was in a relatively limited theater; when he governed Egypt, he ruled an inferior population in a distant country; but in the negotiations with Austria in the winter of 1800–1801, he was head of the French state and was negotiating upon affairs affecting the greater part of western Europe. International diplomacy had long been, as we
THE CONSULATE

have said, the game of princes; but from his first appearance this Corsican interloper played the game as if to the purple born.

He was greatly aided by his foreign minister, Talleyrand, another of the remarkable figures of this remarkable epoch. Talleyrand was born in Paris in 1754, the scion of an ancient and powerful family. A childhood fall had so crippled him that the usual line of noble advancement, the army, was closed to him. His family, therefore, directed his studies for the church. At the outbreak of the Revolution he was Bishop of Autun, and was chosen the representative of the clergy of his diocese to the Estates General. The world of politics proved so much more attractive to him than his prospects in the church that two years later (1791) he resigned his Bishop's see and sought employment in diplomacy. After five years of vicissitude, at one time on special mission to London, at another (it is reported) selling buttons on the streets of New York to make a living, he was appointed by the influence of Barras — the same man who so advanced Napoleon's fortunes — minister of foreign affairs. There he remained for three years, gaining valuable experiences and following the prevailing custom of lining his pockets with bribes. When he realized the depth of unpopularity into which the Directory had sunk, he resigned his post (1799) and associated himself, though in a minor capacity, with the conspiracy of Sieyès and Napoleon. He was not at once appointed minister of foreign affairs during the provisional consulate, for the taint of his reputation for official corruption and private immorality made him undesirable. In December, however, the new government, needing badly the benefit of his experience, reinstated him in his old office, and Napoleon as First Consul continued him there. For diplomacy under Napoleon, Talleyrand was well suited. He was unemotional and cynical, thoroughly familiar with diplomatic forms and procedure, unscrupulous, and endowed with a
philosophic ability to detach himself from the event of the moment and discern the general trend of affairs. He had, withal, a genuine love of France and sought according to his understanding to advance her interests. The close alliance between him and Napoleon, formed in the winter of 1799–1800, continued until the ambitions of the conqueror passed the bounds of what Talleyrand believed to be expediency: then, 1807, Talleyrand left office and with calm cynicism watched the successive stages of the Emperor’s downfall.

i. Austria

Though Austria’s army in Italy was shattered at Marengo, Francis waited until after the disaster of Hohenlinden (December 3, 1800) before agreeing to treat for peace independently of England. In the negotiations it was understood that the terms of Campo Formio would hold so far as territory in Italy was concerned, so that the discussions turned mainly on the question of Germany. Austria was in no condition to resist Napoleon’s demands. She protracted negotiations, however, until February, 1801, thus living up to the letter of the agreement with England under which she had been receiving heavy money subsidies. The final terms, signed at Lunéville February 9, 1801, provided: (1) the boundaries in Italy to be as determined by the treaty of Campo Formio; (2) the cession to France of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the German districts on the west bank of the Rhine; (3) the compensation of the dispossessed German princes to be made by the Holy Roman Empire subject to the approval of the French government. The Austrian diplomat who signed the treaty referred to its conditions as “terrible”: the French people were elated. Had Napoleon been defeated at Marengo, he and his government would have been overthrown: the indisputable triumph of the Peace of Lunéville secured his hold on power.
ii. Great Britain

One important enemy still remained — Great Britain. At the moment, however, prospects brightened for Napoleon in this contest also. Pitt had left office in February, 1801, because of his failure to obtain concessions which he had pledged to Ireland, and had been succeeded by the acknowledgedly weak Addington Ministry. Furthermore, British aggressive measures in seizing contraband in neutral bottoms had caused the formation of a Northern Maritime League (December 16, 1800), comprising Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, pledged to resist by force such seizures. It looked, therefore, as though Great Britain, under a weak government, would be forced into war against France, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark — truly a formidable coalition.

At the critical time, however, Great Britain was saved by two events: the assassination of the Russian Czar; and Nelson’s naval victory at Copenhagen. The Czar Paul, who succeeded Catherine the Great upon her death in 1796, quickly alienated by his mad conduct the most important elements in his empire. In March, 1801, a group of nobles brutally assassinated him, and the throne passed to his son Alexander. One of Alexander’s first steps was to reverse his father’s anti-British policy, especially for the sake of the much-needed British trade. Russia and Great Britain quickly agreed, Great Britain yielding her most exorbitant demands; and Russia thereupon resumed her former attitude of neutrality. In April, 1801, the British government, treating the declarations of the Northern Maritime League as equivalent to war, sent Nelson against the Danes. In a most daring and spectacular battle, Nelson sailed into the harbor of Copenhagen and destroyed the entire Danish fleet (April 2, 1801). The defection of Russia and the loss of Denmark’s navy broke up the Maritime League. France was again left alone to struggle against Great Britain.
During the summer the British pushed operations against the only French force they could reach — that in Egypt. Landing an army of 17,000 in March, the British profited by French errors in dispositions, captured the bulk of the French army in Cairo June 27, 1801, and the remainder in Alexandria August 30, 1801. Inasmuch as Malta had surrendered the preceding September, all the French colonies and those of France’s allies had been captured, French commerce had long been swept from the seas, and the people of Great Britain were sincerely desirous of peace, the Addington government saw no reason for continuing the war.

Preliminaries of peace, providing for the cession of Ceylon and Trinidad to Great Britain but not touching upon the continental situation, were signed in London October 1, 1802. After long delay the final peace, the Treaty of Amiens, was concluded March 27, 1802.

iii. Holland, Italy, and Switzerland

In the meanwhile, during the months following the Treaty of Lunéville, Napoleon was busy with readjustments in the minor republics dependent upon France. He had, it is true, guaranteed their independence at Lunéville, but he did not choose to interpret such a guarantee as preventing him from intervention to change their forms of government.

The Batavian Republic (as Holland was called) had been in continual political and financial difficulties since its formation. By 1800 its government — a Directory modeled on the French system — was thoroughly discredited. Napoleon thereupon framed a new constitution creating an Executive Council of twelve members with broad powers, and a unicameral legislature whose functions were limited to the right to vote “aye” or “no” upon propositions laid before it. With callous contempt for the open or sullen opposition of the Dutch people, he dissolved the existing chambers, disregarded the hostile vote of the plebiscite,
and imposed the constitution upon the "free" republic (October, 1801).

Plans for the reorganization of the Cisalpine Republic were perfected in Paris during the summer and autumn of 1801. The new constitution provided for a Republic headed by a President and Vice-President, with a legislature of four chambers, and a very limited electorate. The name of the state was changed from Cisalpine Republic to the Italian Republic (later the Kingdom of Italy), and the presidency was offered on the suggestion of Talleyrand to Napoleon himself. By January 2, 1802, these arrangements were completed. Napoleon accepted the presidency and the "independent" state began its career.

At the same time, Napoleon revised the constitution of the Ligurian Republic, changing the name to the Republic of Genoa and replacing the Directory and the two legislative chambers with a Doge and a single chamber (Senate). At the end of June, 1802, this new government took office without open opposition.

One other important part of northern Italy, Piedmont, remained. Since Marengo, Piedmont had been occupied by French troops. By decree of April 21, 1801, it was constituted a French military province. In September, 1802, French civil administration replaced the military, the country was divided into six departments according to the French system, and Piedmont became to all intents and purposes a part of France.

In Switzerland, republican agitation following the successes of the French Revolution had resulted in a succession of coups d'état, one faction following another in its few months of supremacy. Napoleon was ready to fish to advantage in these troubled waters. His secret agents instigated political demands, and engineered popular uprisings. In the midst of civil war Napoleon directly intervened (October, 1802). Summoning the leading Swiss representatives to Paris, he laid before them an Act of Mediation providing
for a Helvetic Republic, a confederation of nineteen sovereign cantons, with a chief magistrate known as the Landammann, and a Federal Diet of twenty-five members. The differing factions accepted this Act of Mediation February 19, 1803, and Switzerland (i.e., The Helvetic Republic) forthwith began its new régime.

iv. Germany

The Treaty of Lunéville, it will be remembered, had provided for the compensation of the dispossessed German princelings by the Holy Roman Empire subject to the approval of France. The lands for their compensation were gained by the arbitrary secularization of the many church territories. A special Imperial Deputation was in session from August, 1802, to February, 1803, to consider the allotment of compensations, but as the terms of the treaty became known, the claimants recognized that the determination of boundaries was going to be made at Paris and not at the session of the Imperial Commission. Hordes of petty nobles moved in person upon Paris, hoping by influence or bribes to add a few square miles to their allotment. Ludicrous stories were current of how these suppliants haunted Talleyrand's anteroom, tendering gifts of jeweled snuff boxes, fondling his poodle, and playing blindman's buff and drop the handkerchief with his favorite little niece.

In the end, as usual, the more powerful states absorbed the greater amount of the spoils. Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden increased and consolidated their territories. In addition to the 97 separate German states on the west bank of the Rhine ceded to France, the final distribution extinguished 112 other states of the Empire. The Principal Decree of the Imperial Deputation, signed February 25, 1803, and ceremonially ratified by the Diet, partitioned some 50,000 square miles of territory containing 3,000,000 people. Though Germany reached the depths of humiliation in such readjustments at the virtual dictation
of a foreign power, the seeds of regeneration were at the same time sown in the increase and consolidation of the territories of the larger and more important states.

**D. NAPOLEON’S DOMESTIC POLICIES**

At the same time that he was winning diplomatic successes, Napoleon was initiating and supervising a series of domestic reforms. He found conditions in chaos. The decade of disturbance which had preceded him had profoundly affected matters political, financial, economic, religious, legal, and educational. It was his problem to re-establish order. Complete insurance of his position would follow the double triumph of diplomacy abroad and wisdom at home.

From the beginning of his consulate, Napoleon occupied a favorable position for conciliating the political factions in France. Reputed to belong to no faction himself, he was free to draw the ablest men from all parties and to compose their differences by employing them in the great work of reorganizing and administering the government. This policy he followed. His appointments gratified the sound elements of French society, for distinguished men were drawn from all ranks of life to prominent positions in the government. His mercy toward the émigrés relieved people of the fear of another reign of terror, such as accompanied the previous strong revolutionary government. His friendly negotiations with the remaining rebels in Brittany and La Vendée (Chouans, as they were called) speedily brought an internal peace such as had not been known since the days of Louis XVI. With the greatest success, Napoleon emphasized in these early days his desire to conciliate all the factions in the distracted country.

With political conciliation came a plan for the reorganization of local government throughout France. The Revolution had gone further than the average education of the mass of the people warranted in placing the burden of
local government in the hands of local authorities. The result was inefficiency and confusion. The authorities elected in the communes and départements were lax in purpose and slipshod in method. By a comprehensive law, passed February 17, 1800, a centralized system based on the new revolutionary divisions of France (i.e., Départements, Arrondissements, Communes) was established. At the head of each division was an administrative official appointed by and responsible to the central government of France — the Prefect for the Département, the Sub-Prefect for the Arrondissement, and the Mayor for the Commune. In each division was also an elected council with merely advisory functions — the General Council for the Département, the District Council for the Arrondissement, and the Municipal Council for the Commune. Realizing the urgency of re-organization, Napoleon appointed the Prefects under the new system March 2, 1800. As was his custom, he chose men of ability and reputation, whose energy soon brought order from the universal chaos. The people, thankful for the resumption of normal conditions, actually welcomed the re-establishment of centralized government, though it meant the end of their direct elective power over the administration.

Equally urgent was the need for financial measures. The decade of civil disorder and foreign war had broken down utterly the financial system of the country. At Napoleon's accession to power, the government officials had not received their salaries for months. The army was starving. The administration was trying to pay its debts with paper money which had no value except that it was legal tender in payment of taxes. The tax-arrears for the years 1796, 1797, and 1798 were huge, and so distracted was the country that a third of the tax lists for 1798 had not been made out, and the lists for 1799 had scarcely been considered. For some years the Directory had existed merely on the money exacted from the countries dependent
on France. Napoleon thus faced small cash receipts, great difficulty of collection, and abnormal expenditures due to war. His finance minister, M. Gaudin, was of the greatest assistance to him in reforming the finances. He had been a thorough conscientious upper clerk in the Treasury Department up to the time he was elevated by Napoleon. He and Napoleon worked together in the early days of the consulate several times a week over their problems. After securing an advance of 12,000,000 francs for the immediate necessities of the government, they proceeded to formulate legislation for a sound financial system. By this legislation it was provided that a Director-General of Taxes and an Inspector of Taxes should supervise the collection of taxes in each Département, and that 840 Controllers of Taxes should be scattered through the Arrondissements to see to the details of assessment and payment. At the same time (January, 1800) the Bank of France was organized with a capital stock of 30,000,000 francs of which the government and the First Consul subscribed a part, to be the central authorized financial agency in France. With incredible energy and ability these measures were carried through. The Directors-General, the Inspectors, and the Controllers were appointed, the arrears of taxes collected, the new tax lists made up. The budget was mercilessly cut, economy promised, and order guaranteed. The confidence of the sound elements of French society rapidly rose. In the autumn of 1800, the government began the payment of its annuity obligations in specie; in 1802–1803, for the first time in a score of years, the financial statement actually showed a surplus instead of a deficit.

The final indication of the success of his financial measures led Napoleon to order certain public works of importance, works which had been much needed, but which could not be forwarded during the civil disorders of the preceding decade. Thus the repair of roads, the construction of canals, the building of bridges, were financed by the govern-
ment. At the same time, M. Chaptal, the broad-minded and energetic Minister of the Interior, took steps to improve and encourage French industry. Through his foresight, French manufacturers were made acquainted with the latest improvements in machinery, as in weaving cloth. French industries started on a new career of progress and prosperity. The moral effect of this resumption of the normal activities of the government and economic life was excellent; men welcomed the end of political agitation and the return of regular conditions.

In his desire to prove himself the conciliator of factions, friend of peace, and restorer of order and regularity, Napoleon bent his best efforts toward a settlement of the religious problem. From the time when the National Assembly had passed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790), religious conditions had been in a turmoil. For a decade, the French people had not had the opportunity to worship after the manner of their innermost desires. Napoleon recognized the force and sincerity of the people's faith, and therefore sought to make a pact with the Pope by which the familiar ceremonies could again be celebrated throughout France. Negotiations were extraordinarily difficult, for the Pope began by demanding the restitution of all rights and properties the church had possessed prior to the Revolution. By threats of establishing a new church (as Henry VIII did in England), and by making it evident after his victory of Marengo how completely the Pope and Rome were in his power, Napoleon quickly induced a more conciliatory spirit. In the end, Napoleon, realizing the complete helplessness of the Pontiff, practically dictated his own terms. These terms provided: (1) that the Roman Catholic religion should be acknowledged that of the great majority of French citizens; (2) that its rites might be freely celebrated in France; (3) that after the division of the country into new bishoprics, the First Consul should appoint the Bishops, the Bishops should be confirmed by
the Pope, and the Bishops should choose the priests; and (4) that the government should pay the clergy, provided that the clergy should swear to support the constitution of the Republic. This Concordat, as it was known, concluded September, 1801, gave to Napoleon the power he desired over the church in France. At the same time, it satisfied the people by permitting them again to enjoy the exercise of their religion as sanctified by the Pope. As time passed, both the church and the government grew satisfied with the provisions of the Concordat.

It fell to Napoleon, too, to complete the codification of the laws of the country. Every government in France during the Revolution had recognized the need of such codification, but none had been able amid the political strife and confusion to carry it through. Napoleon infused the committee which had it under consideration with something of his own energy and efficiency. Of the 87 general sessions of the committee, he personally presided at 35, and often assisted in discussion by his insight and his practical suggestions. The final code, completed in 1804 and later called the Code Napoléon, proved one of the greatest and most enduring of the works of the Revolution. In France, the Code gave a unity to legal practice which had never before been known. In the various countries which at one time or another became subject to or merged with France, the Code was adopted and became the foundation of later systems.

Thus in these momentous years of his consulate, Napoleon steadily increased his fame and strengthened his position. He began with a purely military reputation — this he enhanced at Marengo. He pledged himself to a policy of peace — he redeemed his pledge at Lunéville and Amiens. He promised the restoration of order in France — he fulfilled his promise by his settlement of factional quarrels, by his reforms in the finances, by his stimulation of industry and public works, by the Concordat and the Code Napoléon.
By each achievement he made himself more indispensable to France, for he and he alone was responsible for the great and beneficent change which had come over the country.

His successes inspired his ambition. With the same clear insight with which he solved military, political, and economic problems, he perceived the strength of his position in the country and the opportunity for a rise to greater heights of personal glory. Just after the Peace of Amiens (May, 1802) one of the legislative houses proposed to accord to "General Bonaparte" a "signal pledge of national gratitude." By the clever maneuvers of Napoleon's friends, this "pledge" was made to consist of an offer to make Napoleon consul for life. With affected modesty, Napoleon replied that he could not consider such a burden unless the people should impose the sacrifice. Thereupon the Council of State arranged a national referendum upon the question: "Shall Napoleon Bonaparte become Consul for life?" The grateful people recorded their approval of the new government by voting 3,577,259 "Yes" to 8374 "No." Shortly afterwards, a decree of the Senate bestowed upon him the right to name his successor.

Napoleon's power was at this time imperial, but he desired the name as well as the substance. He had become obsessed with the idea of gaining from a grateful people the dignity of Emperor. The title would, he may have thought, raise him to equal dignity with the hereditary monarchs of Europe, and the establishment of a dynasty would assure the continuation of his reforms to France. A great plot concocted by his royalist enemies against his life so stimulated the enthusiasm of the people that the way to the title was made easy. During the late summer and autumn of 1803 this conspiracy was ripening. George Cadoudal, one of the irreconcilable Breton royalists, crossed the channel from England in August with drafts for a million francs, and went direct to Paris. General Pichegru fol-
lowed Cadoudal in January, hoping to win over his comrade in arms, General Moreau. In the meanwhile, Fouché, Napoleon's Minister of Police, had the strings of the plot in his hands and merely waited to close the net upon all those implicated. The first arrest was made at the end of January, 1804; others followed rapidly, including Moreau (February 15), Pichegru (February 29), Cadoudal himself (March 9), and the remainder within the next few days. Still the government was disappointed, for it was understood that one of the royal princes was implicated and no prince had been arrested — indeed, the identity of the prince was not certain. On the night of March 14, however, French troops crossed the boundary of Baden territory and arrested the Duc d'Enghien, grandson of the Prince de Condé, who had been living quietly near Strassburg. A week later, after a hasty court-martial, the Duke was convicted of treason and shot (March 21, 1804). The sensation created by the arrest of the conspirators and the execution of the Duc d'Enghien brought in its wake a wave of popular sympathy for Napoleon. People believed that Great Britain and the royalists supported the conspiracy in order to assassinate Napoleon, ruin France, and restore the old régime. Napoleon's friends cleverly worked upon the enthusiasm for political ends. April 23, 1804, a member of the Tribunate moved that Napoleon "should be declared Emperor" and "that the Imperial dignity should be declared hereditary in his family." Carnot was the only man to speak and vote against the motion. May 4, 1804, the Senate acting upon the Tribunate's resolution, decreed: "Glory, gratitude, devotion, reason, the interests of the State, all unite to proclaim Napoleon hereditary Emperor." A new constitution embodying these changes was approved May 18, 1804. A plebiscite, ordered to give national sanction to the changes, was held during the summer and autumn, the results as announced November 26 being 3,572,239 "Ayes" against 2569 "Noes." December 4, 1804, the
coronation ceremonies were held in the cathedral of Nôtre Dame. At Napoleon's request the Pope was present, but Napoleon himself took the crown from the Pope's hands and placed it upon his own head, thus symbolizing the fact that he owed his crown to no superior power.
CHAPTER IX

NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION

More than a year before Napoleon assumed the imperial dignity, the relations between France and Great Britain had been strained and broken. Though both countries had welcomed the peace, it proved after all merely a truce. To the series of pin pricks, as those caused by attack and counter-attack in the public press of the two countries, and by British hospitality shown to French royalist émigrés and conspirators, were added some substantial causes of dispute. Napoleon continued to enforce French statutes against the importation of British goods, and showed no disposition to advance negotiations for a commercial treaty. As French control extended in adjacent countries — as by the annexation of Piedmont, intervention in Switzerland, and change of government in Holland and northern Italy — British exports lost more and more markets, until peace seemed as costly and ruinous as war. Again, Napoleon sent (September, 1802) a trusted agent, Colonel Sebastiani, to report upon conditions in Egypt. His report, printed in the official Moniteur January 13, 1803, stated the number of Turks and British garrisoned in Egypt, commented upon the suffering and discontent among the natives, and hinted at the possibility of a resumption of Napoleon’s eastern ambitions in the words “6000 French would be sufficient to conquer Egypt.” Napoleon on his part dwelt particularly upon British delay in evacuating Malta according to the terms of the treaty. Repeated demands upon Great Britain for the fulfillment of the treaty provisions were met by excuses — indeed, the Addington Ministry, foreseeing war, had determined not to leave Malta. In the formal reception to the
diplomatic body March 13, 1803, at the Tuileries, Napoleon created a "scene" by striding in anger to the British ambassador, Lord Whitworth, and indulging in a tirade against Great Britain, using such phrases as: "You want war, do you! We have already fought for ten years: do you want to fight for another ten? . . . Treaties must be respected! Woe to those who do not respect them!" War was, of course, inevitable after such an episode. Though two months of futile recriminations passed before the declaration, Napoleon began preparations at once. He sold the vast territory of Louisiana (which he had acquired from Spain two years before) to the United States for 75,000,000 francs ($15,000,000). He ordered an inspection and report upon the harbors and ships of Flanders and Holland. He directed the purchase of vast quantities of timber. He caused plans to be drawn of a light draft flatboat suitable for the transport of troops. He began the concentration of troops at strategic points for initial operations against Hanover and Otranto. When Lord Whitworth finally demanded his passports May 11, 1803, Napoleon's plans were well advanced.

Napoleon did not mean to fight his adversary without assistance, or to limit his operations to France alone. Hanover presented itself as the point demanding most immediate attention, for the King of Great Britain was still the elector of Hanover, and it seemed to Napoleon that here Great Britain was most vulnerable. Within two weeks of the outbreak of hostilities, an army of 20,000 under General Mortier was on the banks of the Weser, summoning the Hanoverians to surrender. The British government protested loudly against the violation of neutrality of the German states which had to be crossed in order that Hanover might be invaded. As she was in no position to land an army on the continent, however, her protest was unheeded and Hanover fell under the sway of the French. The Weser was closed to British commerce.
To offset the naval stronghold, Malta, which the British persistently refused to evacuate, Napoleon felt that he must occupy adjacent points of vantage. At the same moment that troops were occupying Hanover, St. Cyr was marching south with 15,000 men to take advantage of the ports of Brindisi, Otranto, and Taranto, in the southernmost part of Italy. Their occupation was, of course, a violation of the neutrality of Naples, but Napoleon was ever distrustful of the neutrality of Ferdinand and Caroline, and it is quite probable that he reasoned that an army of occupation now would make unnecessary an army of invasion later.

As for assistance, he looked to those states which had already felt the weight of his hand. Holland held ready at the First Consul's disposal an army of about 15,000; she furnished funds to equip a French force of the same size; and she supplied small channel boats in quantity. Switzerland and the Cisalpine states both furnished similar contingents. But the greatest aid was to come from Spain and Portugal. By humiliating treaties in October and December of 1803, these two countries opened their ports to French goods, and agreed to pay France a yearly contribution of nearly a hundred million of francs, the greatest share of the burden falling, of course, upon Spain. Such a course was bound to provoke Great Britain to retaliatory measures — retaliations which took the form of attacks on Spanish and Portuguese ships from the new world. In a few months, Napoleon had the satisfaction of enrolling the Peninsular countries not only as financial assistants, but as active operating allies.

However welcome were the gold and men from outsiders, the real strength of France was as always in her armies. Along the channel, principally in the neighborhood of Boulogne, huge camps sprang up, and to them Napoleon daily forwarded new levies to be shaped by his generals into the Grand Army of France. Long hours of daily training taught them the business of the soldier on land, and con-
stant drills with the flatboats and ships so familiarized them with this form of transportation that they were said to be able to embark a hundred thousand in half an hour. Nothing was wanting save command of the channel for thirty-six hours to place this army on English soil.

Since the day of the French menace, Englishmen have scoffed openly at the idea of the invasion from Boulogne. Napoleon, however, was the man in Europe best able to judge of the feasibility of any military scheme, and the mere fact that he contemplated such an invasion, removes it from the category of absurdities. It must be remembered that he did not intend to occupy England, but merely to destroy her shipyards, arsenals, and manufactures. With only such an army as Britain could have put into the field at the moment, surely this plan could have been possible.

It was a scheme destined never to be carried into effect, however. Great Britain’s strength lay on the sea, and she guarded the channel jealously. France’s navy was inferior in ships and personnel and in training. Outside of every port where lay the fleets of the First Consul, or of his allies, a British squadron hung in the offing, ready to strike. And although France had an admirable sailor in Latouche-Tréville, he was no match for the redoubtable Nelson. When upon the death of the former, Villeneuve succeeded to the command of the navies of France, the balance inclined still more toward the side of Great Britain.

Throughout the closing months of 1803 and for the first half of 1804, Napoleon tried in vain to concentrate in the channel the French and Spanish fleets which lay at Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest. A simple plan of direct concentration was just about to be executed when Latouche-Tréville died and left Villeneuve to cope with the situation. A new and more intricate plan called for a concentration in the West Indies, and thither, in April, 1804, sailed the Toulon and Cadiz fleets, hoping to be joined by
the Brest fleet. These three, united, were then to make for the channel before the British knew of their whereabouts.

The expedition failed dismally. The Brest fleet never left French waters, and Villeneuve, sharply pursued by Nelson, returned to Europe only to encounter a second British fleet in the Bay of Biscay and be forced again into Cadiz. Cornwallis now blockaded Brest, and Nelson, Cadiz (August, 1805).

Thus, the French navy was made useless to Napoleon, who now turned toward a new enemy on the Danube. He was determined, however, that his fleets should be of some value to him, and in consequence gave sharp orders to Villeneuve to leave Cadiz and sail to Naples at the first opportunity. Villeneuve, stung by the knowledge that he was to be relieved of his command, determined to force his way out of Cadiz and into the Mediterranean. Accordingly, on October 20, 1805, he weighed anchor and left the harbor. Off Trafalgar, the blockading squadron attacked in two long columns under Collingwood and Nelson, and for five hours fought furiously against the allies. Only a remnant of Villeneuve's fleet was left to take refuge again in Cadiz. The Emperor offset this defeat by a brilliant land victory at Ulm, but many a time thereafter he longed bitterly for the naval strength which Nelson dissipated at Trafalgar. As for Nelson himself, Trafalgar was his last battle. The French, in his own words, "had done for him at last." Great Britain mourned genuinely the admiral who had done more than all the rest to make her mistress of the seas.

A. FORMATION OF THE THIRD COALITION

In May, 1804, the lingering agonies of the Addington Ministry were terminated by its dissolution, and Pitt again became Prime Minister. One and only one great task lay before him, the defeat of Napoleon, and to that task he bent all his strength. Though already broken in health — he
died in January of 1806 — he at once set in motion intricate negotiations to create a new all-European coalition to oppose Napoleon.

The situation in Europe rendered his task extraordinarily difficult. Alexander I of Russia, who became Czar after the assassination of his father, Paul, was a curious mixture of the visionary and the practical man. He had at first welcomed Napoleon and had actually sought alliance with the new France, especially as Napoleon had tempted him with the offer of the honorary chief of the Knights of St. John of Malta; but the aggressions of the French conqueror upon the continent and the execution of the Duc d'Enghien had turned him to the opposing camp. He sounded the British government on the terms of a possible alliance, declaring that the new coalition must adopt principles of liberalism to offset the French doctrines, but at the same time stipulating that Russia must be given Constantinople and the grand-duchy of Poland. Austria had not yet recovered from the previous wars. She had a huge debt and a small income; her army was poorly organized and equipped; the Archduke Charles, then at the head of the war office and busy with the problems of reorganization, advised peace upon almost any terms, even an alliance with France. Prussia's fortunes were guided by a vacillating king and his group of short-sighted counselors, all jealous of Austria and bent upon the prospect of immediate gain. Though Sweden, an implacable enemy of Napoleon, would surely join the coalition, her aid could be only trifling. As Napoleon frankly told her ambassador at Paris, Sweden had descended to the rank of a third-class power. From such difficult materials, Pitt sought to build a strong coalition.

Negotiations with Russia dragged from after the death of the Duc d'Enghien (March, 1804) until April, 1805. In June, 1804, Alexander signified his willingness to consider an alliance. In September, 1804, he sent an envoy to London to sug-
gest that the declared objects of the proposed coalition should be "to deliver from Napoleon's yoke the peoples whom he oppressed," and "to free France from the despotism under which she groaned, to leave her the free choice of a government," and to bring about "the greatest welfare of their subjects." In November of the same year he sent another envoy with the more practical proposal that Russia should be guaranteed Moldavia, Constantinople, and the island of Malta, with a protectorship over the other Balkan territories and over Poland. In the final convention, signed at St. Petersburg April 11, 1805, Alexander was forced to recede from practically all of his demands. The terms provided that a league should be formed for the restoration of peace and the balance of power; that Holland, Switzerland, and Italy should be freed from French control, and Piedmont returned to the King of Sardinia; that Great Britain should furnish an annual subsidy of $6,250,000 for each 100,000 men under arms against France, provided the total forces should be kept at more than 400,000; and that Russia should furnish an army of 115,000 men. With this convention signed, the diplomats approached Austria, Sweden, and Prussia.

For the reasons previously stated, Austria was at first averse to a renewal of the war. While she was still hesitating, however, a new step by Napoleon strongly incensed her government. Napoleon changed the Italian Republic (formerly the Cisalpine Republic) into a monarchy and assumed the crown himself (at Milan, May 26, 1805) as King of Italy; and a month later he annexed the Republic of Genoa outright to France. Fearing further encroachments against Venice, threatened by Russia, and bribed by the offer of four months' advance subsidy from Great Britain, the Austrian government consented to join the coalition in July, 1805, and formally signed the convention at St. Petersburg August 9, 1805. She agreed to furnish 315,000 troops, though in actual fact her armies never reached that number.
Sweden joined as a matter of course, promising to furnish a contingent of 12,000 men. Later, Queen Caroline of Naples, though she had signed a treaty of neutrality with France, adhered to the coalition and admitted (November, 1805) 13,000 Russians and 7000 British troops to her territory.

The agents of the coalition, however, made little headway with the Prussian government. In Frederick William III's court, the traditional jealousy of Austria, and the belief that diplomacy might win Prussia a greater prize than war, influenced the councilors to advise neutrality. Napoleon, too, had a bait in the shape of Hanover by which at the proper moment he might tempt Prussia into an actual alliance. Hence, Frederick William III rejected the offers of alliance and help from Great Britain, Russia, and Austria, acknowledged Napoleon's title as Emperor of the French and as King of Italy, and prepared as a neutral to gain all he could from the impending war.

Secret as the negotiations had been, the increase in the Austrian armies and the delay of the Austrian government in recognizing Napoleon's new dignities gave ample intimation of what was going on. In June, 1804, he warned the Austrian government that he was alive to the continental situation. Early in 1805 he demanded from the court at Vienna an assurance of peaceful intentions, and received it. In August, 1805, he informed his foreign minister, Talleyrand, that he must know within two weeks whether Austria meant war. At the end of the same month (August, 1805) he ordered Talleyrand to prepare an announcement showing how Austria had driven him to war, and (on August 26) directed the march of his troops from the Boulogne camps toward the Danube. The border German states, helpless and exposed to the first onset of the French army in its march against Austria, declared openly for France. As allies, they were at this time useless for Napoleon, however, except as they afforded a free highway to the Danube.
September 3, the Austrian government rejected Napoleon's ultimatum, and five days later its armies under General Mack crossed the Inn River.

**B. ULM AND AUSTERLITZ**

It must not be thought that the months spent on the channel waiting vainly for the chance to invade England were profitless. When the Grand Army turned toward the Rhine, it was as fine a fighting unit as the world had ever seen. It was composed of thoroughly trained men, a large percentage of whom had seen active service, officered by generals, young, able, and ambitious, and commanded by the greatest soldier of them all — a man who had no knowledge of the word defeat. The quality of the army is shown by the fact that Soult's Corps, 41,000 in number, made the march from Boulogne to Spino (over 400 miles) in twenty-nine days, without losing a single man either by sickness or by desertion.

The Grand Army numbered 180,000. At its head, the Emperor was seconded by Berthier as Chief-of-Staff, and under him commanding his several corps were Bessières, Bernadotte, Marmont, Davout, Soult, Lannes, Ney, Augereau, and Murat — men whose greatest misfortune it was that their splendid military achievements were destined to take place in the white light which surrounded their great leader. Their part was to lead the Grand Army from Boulogne and from Hanover into the valley of the Danube and there strike at whatever point would prove the key to Austria. To second their efforts, Masséna commanded an army of 50,000 on the Adige, and in Naples, St. Cyr with 20,000 watched the Bourbons.

Opposed to them, Austria had about equal numbers of her own, and she was relying upon two armies which Russia had promised. Twice had Napoleon struck at Austria so successfully through Italy, that the Aulic War Council was persuaded that the Adige rather than the Danube called
for the more steadfast defense. Accordingly, the Archduke Charles commanded in Venezia an army of 120,000 waiting for a blow which never fell. Mack, with 80,000, pushed far forward to the Iller in the vain hope that Bavaria might be induced to join the allies, and there, with his flank resting on the fortress of Ulm, he awaited the arrival of his Russian reinforcements. Between Charles and Mack, the Archduke John held in the Tyrol an army of 40,000, designed as a supporting unit for either of the others who might need him more. Far to the rear—not yet out of Russia—Buxhöwden and Kutusoff each commanded a force of about 45,000. This, then, was the situation when the Grand Army began crossing the Rhine, September 21, 1805.

When his corps moved forward from the Rhine on September 28, Napoleon's plan of attack was completely formed. His advance cavalry under Murat, pushing forward through the defiles of the Black Forest, gave Mack the idea that a frontal attack against his position was contemplated. Meanwhile, from Spire, Mannheim, Mayence, and Wurtzburg, the divisions moved swiftly forward, crossing the Danube at Donauworth and Ingolstadt on October 7–8, before Mack was aware of their presence. By the time he realized the true situation, Napoleon was already in his rear and had cut his communications with Vienna. In vain he faced his line to the right and then as the French pushed on, again to the right, until now he faced his bases. No escape remained but successful battle.

Napoleon, in possession of his adversary's communications, hurried to secure his own position and to hasten the battle which he knew must follow. Two corps marched on Munich to guard against the possible arrival of the Russians; one corps moved southward to prevent the Archduke John from sending reinforcements from the Tyrol. With the remaining corps, the Emperor moved up the Danube from Donauworth, marching on both banks of the river, drawing his lines tighter and tighter about his foe.
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On October 12, Mack attempted to cut the net closing on him by a march northward from Ulm which would have crossed the French communications. A whole-hearted attempt might have effected his escape, for an error on the part of one of the French generals had left the situation at his mercy, had he but known it. Murat, in command of the three corps on the right, knowing that the Emperor meant to prevent at any cost Mack’s possible flight to the Tyrol, had ordered Ney to leave the left bank of the Danube and join Lannes on the right. Ney, fortunately, carried out the order in part only, leaving one division on the left bank. This division was all that stood between Mack and freedom, had he but brought his entire force against it. Unfortunately for him, he sent forward less than half his army, and against this, Ney’s one division fought gallantly until Napoleon had retrieved his marshal’s error.

Next day, when his chance had gone, Mack made a second attempt, but this time was roughly handled by Ney at Elchingen and again withdrew to Ulm. News of a defeat to the Archduke John’s reinforcements from the Tyrol convinced him that his situation was hopeless, and on October 19, hemmed in on all sides by his opponents, he capitulated. He had made vain attempts to get terms, but Napoleon was obdurate. The Emperor demanded and received the unconditional surrender of Mack’s 60,000 remaining.

Ulm taken, Napoleon lost no time in marching on Vienna. One Russian army was already in the Danube valley, but it had turned back upon hearing of the disaster at Ulm. To capture and destroy this army before it could unite with the second Russian force was now Napoleon’s object. In three columns he started swiftly down the Danube valley, leaving Augereau and Ney to drive the Austrians out of the Tyrol and keep them from endangering his communications. He received news of a defeat which Masséna suffered at the hands of the Archduke Charles October 29, but he was not disturbed
for he knew that with the road to Vienna wide open, Charles must of necessity fall back into Austria if he were to be of the slightest use.

The march to Vienna was accomplished in an incredibly short time. What little resistance was encountered at the fortified cities or the rivers, was brushed aside, and the Grand Army swept speedily on. At Linz the Emperor formed a new corps which crossed to and occupied the left bank of the river, so that from Linz on the French controlled the entire valley. This isolated corps was the one weakness of the advance and received the only check suffered in the entire campaign. Pushing forward too hastily, it encountered the Russians who had crossed the river without Napoleon’s knowledge and experienced a severe defeat. The reverse was not disastrous, however, and the force on the right bank continued its advance.

The court in Vienna was in consternation. In vain it issued orders for its handful of troops to take up a stand before the city. Kutusoff, the Russian commander, was unconcerned for the fate of the Austrian capital. He knew that the only hope of a successful outcome of the campaign lay in his junction with Buxhöwden’s army, now in Moravia. Accordingly, on November 9, he crossed the river at Krems, paused only to administer the defeat to the French on the left bank as described above, and then hurried northward into Moravia, leaving Vienna to its fate. On the morning of November 13, Murat seized the bridge at Vienna by a stratagem, and his corps occupied the city without opposition.

The bulk of the Grand Army crossed at Krems in hot pursuit of Kutusoff. The Austrian Emperor had made timid overtures for peace, but Napoleon, who saw a great victory in sight, offered him terms which seemed impossible. In despair, Francis waited for the disaster which he saw preparing for him. His armies under the Archdukes Charles and John, pushed through the mountains by Masséna, Augereau,
and Ney, had effected a union at Laibach, only to find Napoleon’s armies between themselves and Vienna. The Archdukes could only begin a long march through Hungary in the hope of being able to unite with the Russians in Moravia before Napoleon could join battle.

The two Russian armies united at Wischau on November 19. Napoleon had been valiantly delayed by Kutusoff’s rear guard and was in no condition to force immediate issue. Before the end of the month, however, he had drawn in his various detachments, had several times tested the temper of his adversary in small preliminary skirmishes, and was ready for the combat which was to make or break his campaign. His army was inferior in numbers, but in every other way seemed more than a match for its opponent. On the last of November, he carefully reconnoitered the ground which promised to be the battle field.

The field of Austerlitz slopes to the south, the little Goldbach brook cutting it midway. At the northern end, the Brunn-Olmütitz road runs east and west; to the south, the Satschan lakes, fed by the Litawa River from the northeast, form the boundary. The west bank of the Goldbach is rolling, but the east bank rises to the Pratzen plateau, the dominating feature of the landscape. For reasons which follow, Napoleon avoided the plateau and massed his forces on the west bank of the stream.

The Grand Army having advanced by way of Vienna, its communications naturally lay through that city. Napoleon, occupying the line of the Goldbach, lay almost parallel to the road to Vienna. “Could his right flank be turned,” argued the allied strategists, “his communications would be lost and his army at our mercy.” Accordingly, they planned to throw their weight against the Emperor’s right wing. This was quite to Napoleon’s liking, for he had arranged a new line of retreat westward through Prague, and was, therefore, not troubled by an attempt to cut him off from Vienna. On the contrary, he had an enormous advantage in knowing
where the allies would strike. With this knowledge in mind, he concentrated his troops on his left, and held thinly the end of the line toward Satschan lake.

A thick mist hid the field on the morning of December 2. Under cover of this the allies moved forward to the line of the Pratzen plateau, and when the “sun of Austerlitz” dispelled the fog, Buxhöwden’s masses could be seen marching toward the lower ground to attack the weakly held end of Napoleon’s line. By nine o’clock, Davout’s corps and part of Soult’s were sharply engaged by the Russian columns which crowded together on the lower reaches of the Goldbach. Sure of success, the allied commander had practically denuded the Pratzen plateau. Here was the moment for which Napoleon waited. Ordering forward his extreme left to hold in check the allied right, he launched the great mass in his center full on the Pratzen plateau. The troops remaining there were helpless. After an hour of vain resistance, they were forced back toward Austerlitz, and left the plateau in possession of the French. Soult, who commanded this assault, instantly turned to attack the flank and rear of the Russians who were engaged with Davout. The result was immediate. The Russians caught between the two bodies of the French fought bravely but hopelessly. Their line was shattered and by nightfall the remnants of the allied army were fleeing in so many directions that an effective pursuit was impossible.

But there was no need. The victory was complete and of such a nature that Napoleon could dictate what terms he would. The Archdukes with all of Austria’s remaining forces were far away in Hungary, and further resistance was out of the question. On December 4, 1805, the two Emperors met in Napoleon’s tent to discuss the preliminaries of the treaty which should end the war.
C. THE TREATY OF PRESSBURG

The helpless Austrian Sovereign was forced to accept the terms at Napoleon’s dictation. His army was scattered, his ally defeated and retreating, his resources exhausted. By the provisions of the final treaty, signed at Pressburg December 26, 1805, and duly ratified on New Year’s Day, 1806, Austria ceded to the new Kingdom of Italy all of Venetia, including Istria and Dalmatia (but not Trieste); gave up her territories in the Tyrol and Swabia for the aggrandizement of Napoleon’s German allies Bavaria, Baden, and Württemburg; and recognized the elevation of the electors of Bavaria and Württemburg to the dignity of Kings. In signing and ratifying this treaty, the Austrian ruler and his government descended far into the valley of humiliation. He lost about 3,000,000 subjects and the source of about one sixth of the national revenue.

One aftermath of Austerlitz and Pressburg deserves mention at this point. Pitt, Great Britain’s great Prime Minister, sank under the shock and died January 23, 1806. All his plans had gone for naught. One ally had signed a disastrous peace; the shattered remains of the other’s army were hastily retiring from the conflict. Pitt’s last thoughts were of his country, from whom he was taken at what seemed its darkest hour.

D. CHANGES IN ITALY AND CENTRAL EUROPE

Prussian diplomacy during the war had been of the most selfish kind. Unable to divine what the result might be, Frederick William III had sought to assure the safety of his territories by advances to both sides. Thus, even while he had assured Napoleon of Prussia’s neutrality, he was in constant communication with agents of the Czar Alexander, and actually signed a convention with him (November 3, 1805) agreeing to assist in enforcing the terms of the Anglo-Russian coalition. His envoy was in Vienna awaiting the
issue of Austerlitz to determine whether to go further with the Russian relations or to renounce them for an alliance with Napoleon. The battle of Austerlitz settled the question. Haugwitz (Prussian envoy) sought Napoleon at his headquarters in order to conclude an alliance.

Napoleon's secret service had kept him informed of Prussia's duplicity, and the Emperor reproached Haugwitz bitterly for it. The practical advantages of alliance, however, were great, so that Napoleon did not let his feeling prevent the treaty. Using Hanover as a bait, and his victorious and mobilized armies as a menace, he enforced very advantageous terms upon Haugwitz. Prussia was to cede the duchies of Cleves, Neuchâtel, and Anspach, and to guarantee all contemplated changes in Italy or in Germany; and was to bind herself in a close offensive and defensive alliance with France. In return, Prussia received Hanover. The preliminary treaty containing these terms was signed December 15, 1805 — eleven days before the treaty of Pressburg. The final treaty, containing a revised provision by which Prussia was to annex Hanover at once and to close the ports on the Elbe, Weser, and Ems Rivers to British commerce, was concluded February 15, 1806, at Paris.

By his victory at Austerlitz and his treaty with Prussia, Napoleon became absolute arbiter of matters affecting Italy and Central Europe. Austria was prostrate; Russia was defeated and distant; Great Britain was impotent on land; and Prussia had become an accomplice.

His first move was against Naples. Upon the very date of the treaty of Pressburg, he announced his intention of "hurling that guilty woman" (Queen Caroline of Naples) from her throne. The small expeditionary forces of Russians and British in Naples were no match for the troops Napoleon could direct against them. In the face of Napoleon's threat, they embarked about the middle of January, 1806, the Russians for Corfu and the British for Messina (Sicily). The King and Queen of Naples fled to Palermo (Sicily) and estab-
lished their court there. French troops entered Naples February 15, 1806, after slight resistance, and soon occupied the remainder of the peninsula. At the end of March, Joseph, Napoleon's brother, was proclaimed King of the Two Sicilies.

During the same months, Napoleon was working upon the details of another cherished plan—to organize the states of western Germany into a new confederation from which the influence of Prussia and Austria would be wholly excluded. The task was not difficult, for, as has already been indicated, the chief great powers concerned were helpless, and the Rhine countries were bound to Napoleon by ties of fear and self-interest. Talleyrand, who was intrusted with the drawing up of the necessary articles and treaties worked rapidly under Napoleon's dictation. By the final treaty, signed at Saint-Cloud July 19, 1806, the Confederation of the Rhine was organized to consist of Bavaria, Baden, Württemburg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and several small states, with a central Diet of two chambers, or "Colleges," at Frankfort. The new Confederation acknowledged Napoleon as its "Protector," and at once signed a close offensive and defensive alliance with France. August 1, 1806, the representatives of the several states individually and collectively announced to the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire at Ratisbon their withdrawal from the Empire. At the same time, Napoleon's envoy announced that Napoleon henceforth refused to acknowledge the existence of the Empire. August 6, 1806, Francis of Austria accepted the inevitable, relinquished his many inherited titles, and assumed the simple dignity of Emperor of Austria. Thus the old Germanic system, the Holy Roman Empire, came to an unlamented end.

One other change Napoleon made during this same period. He again altered the constitution of Holland, making of it a kingdom and naming his brother Louis as King (June 5, 1806). The Hollanders accepted the change with resigna-
tion, as they had helplessly accepted previous arbitrary changes. Indeed, they had so long suffered from the ex-
actions of the French that they in general cherished a hope that a royal government of their own might make their burdens lighter.

Napoleon's successes and supremacy on the continent led him to hope that he might at last gain a favorable peace with his remaining enemies — Great Britain and Russia. To that end, he encouraged Talleyrand to open negotiations in the spring and summer of 1806.

In Great Britain, Pitt's death had been followed by a coalition ministry, the "ministry of all the talents," with Grenville as Prime Minister, and Fox as Foreign Secretary. The desire for peace was real, but Fox had no intention of committing his country to a treaty on unfavorable terms. Curiously enough, the discussion turned chiefly upon the disposition of the island of Sicily, Napoleon demanding it as a part of Joseph's new kingdom, and Fox refusing to yield it. Before any compromise could be effected, Fox died (September, 1806), and war with Prussia interrupted negotiations.

Alexander of Russia, learning of the Anglo-French negotiations, feared a separate peace which would leave Russia without an ally. He therefore dispatched a special envoy to Paris, July 6, 1806, ostensibly to arrange for the transfer of prisoners; but really to look after Russian interests. Within a fortnight Talleyrand persuaded him of the advisability of peace, and packed him back to St. Petersburg with the draft of a treaty. Alexander, however, in close communion with Prussia and again inclined to rely upon Great Britain, repudiated his envoy's treaty, and these negotiations came to naught.

Thus, in spite of his successes, Napoleon could not bring peace to his people. The reason lay, not in the obstinacy of his enemies, but in his own widening ambitions. This young Corsican, whose field had expanded successively from Toulon, from northern Italy, from Egypt, to France, now had visions
of vaster projects. He saw all Europe brought to heel, himself an Emperor over Kings. His past successes were but the preliminary scenes to a far greater drama. He had saved France; he had restored order and advanced prosperity in France; he had increased the territories of France beyond the wildest dreams of his Bourbon predecessors; he had surrounded France with a barrier of obsequious and independent states. Now his ideals passed far beyond the bounds of France. He would prove himself, not the mere successor of the Bourbon Kings in France, but the inheritor of Charlemagne's empire in Europe. Had he been content with France, he might have lived and died an Emperor, famous and beloved by his people and honored by contemporary sovereigns — but such a man would not have been Napoleon.
CHAPTER X

NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA

The vacillating Frederick William III of Prussia continued his policy of double-dealing in the effort to secure himself and his territories by diplomacy. His occupation of Hanover and closing of the Weser, Elbe, and Ems river-ports to British commerce had resulted in the seizure of some 400 Prussian vessels in British waters and in a declaration of war by Great Britain (April, 1806). Furthermore, an increasingly strong patriotic party in Prussia, led by Prince Louis Ferdinand (nephew of Frederick the Great) and the beloved Queen Louisa was resenting the policy which made Prussia the mere tail to the French kite. Still under the influence of Haugwitz and Hardenberg, however, Frederick William was more worried about the effect of the French treaty upon Alexander of Russia than its effect upon Great Britain or the patriots at home. He had a wholesome fear of Russia, as he had of Napoleon.

Shortly after the Paris treaty of February 15, 1806, therefore, Frederick William sent word to Russia that he had no idea of attacking her; that, in fact, he would not interpret his French alliance as binding him to offensive measures against Alexander. The Prussian overtures fell in with the Czar's plans. Alexander needed the assurance of Prussian neutrality. He therefore proposed a secret treaty to offset the Paris treaty. Frederick William, glad of the opportunity thus to secure himself against both his powerful neighbors, gladly welcomed negotiations. In the late spring of 1806 a convention was signed, pledging Prussia not to take part in any attack upon Russia, and to force French
 evacuation of Germany within three months, and pledging
Russia to go to the aid of Prussia if Prussia were attacked.

With the assurance of Russian support, Frederick William
III was prepared to lean more to an independent Prussian
policy and to resist French encroachments. At the same
time, he hoped that the terms of his treaty with Napoleon
were such as to prevent any such encroachments. His
great awakening came suddenly when he learned (August 6,
1806) that Napoleon in his negotiations with Fox had agreed
to return Hanover to England. August 9, he appealed
to the Czar for aid, and a few days later strove even to get
in touch with the British ministry. At the same time he
ordered the mobilization of part of the Prussian army. His
change of attitude aroused the highest enthusiasm among
the patriotic circles of the country. The thinking men who
had felt the humiliation of Prussian diplomacy rejoiced
at the opportunity to take an independent course and to
revenge themselves for a long series of insults.

When Napoleon first heard of the popular excitement in
Berlin, he paid little attention to it. He knew that Austria
could do nothing to help Prussia; his agent in Turkey,
Colonel Sebastiani (the same man who had rendered the
Egyptian report the preceding year) had adroitly con-
trived to involve Russia in a dispute with the Porte; and
Great Britain was, as always, impotent on land. Early
in September, however, the gravity of the situation became
apparent. September 12, 1806, he dispatched a note to
Berlin concerning Prussian military preparations, implying
that unless these were at once stopped the French armies
would be put in motion. Frederick William III answered
this note with an ultimatum September 26, 1806, demanding
the immediate withdrawal of French troops from Germany
and Napoleon's consent to the formation of a Confedera-
tion of the North comprising the German states outside of the
Confederation of the Rhine. Napoleon had already slipped
out of Paris to join his armies, so that the ultimatum did
not reach him until October 7. His only answer was his appearance with his troops at the Prussian frontier.

A. THE CAMPAIGN IN PRUSSIA

The Prussian officers who fought the Republican armies in the wars of the First Coalition against France were aware of a change in the spirit of warfare. They knew that their adversaries had devised new rules for an old game, but they had retired from the war without having learned to adjust themselves to those rules. Now, in 1806, the successor to that Republican army in Flanders, the Grand Army of France, hardened by years of campaigning and led by adepts at the new warfare was advancing to contend with the army of Prussia, grown old in the traditions of Frederick the Great. But the methods which under Frederick had served to make Prussia’s army invincible, now served only to make it inflexible.

Military historians unite in praising the excellence of discipline which existed in Frederick William’s forces, but there commendation ceases. The tactics which prescribed the rigid line formations of fifty years before could not but spell disaster to troops which marched against the French skirmishers with the columns behind. And although the French had still to fight Friedland before they learned the full value of artillery in masses, they were nevertheless far more skillful in the use of this important arm than were the Prussians. Napoleon saw fit to warn his marshals especially against the Prussian cavalry, for he thought it excellent, but at the same time he knew that it considered its existence justified if it resisted hostile cavalry charges. Its leaders knew nothing of handling it in the face of the new infantry tactics. In the matter of supply, the Prussians clung to a method, which if more certain in a long campaign, nevertheless limited their movements to the speed of the ration trains. They were not familiar with Napoleon’s systems of requisitioning which enabled him to subsist on
the invaded country, but depended entirely upon supply magazines. One of their own writers remarks that often the Prussian troops went hungry in villages where subsequently the French found food in abundance. Even with their magazines, transportation often failed, so that equipment and clothing as well as food were often lacking.

The deficiencies noted above did not exist in the Grand Army. The organization had been so perfected through experience in war, that Napoleon was able by the simplest orders to direct his forces as he wished. Perhaps the greatest point of difference in favor of the French lay in their superior officers. It was not only that the Prussian generals were old: they were often infirm. Opposed to them were a dozen or more brilliant young men between thirty and forty years of age. No greater contrast can appear than in a comparison of the commanders-in-chief. Brunswick was seventy-one and exhausted by a life of activity; Napoleon was thirty-eight and at the very height of his vigor.

When Frederick William's ultimatum reached Napoleon, the French army was being thriftily subsisted at the expense of the new ally — the Confederation of the Rhine. The various corps were distributed at points along the Main River, facing the Thuringian Forest, beyond which lay the plains of Prussia. The army numbered about 190,000, was in excellent condition, and ready to move at a moment's notice. To oppose them, Brunswick could not muster more than 145,000, of which 20,000 belonged to Prussia's ally, Saxony. His army consisted of two parts, one under his own command and one under Prince Hohenlohe, both stationed in the country along the upper Saal River, east of the Thuringian Forest. The troops promised by the Czar had not yet left Russia. Indeed, they did not appear until after the campaign was finished.

The logical line of defense for the Russians was the Elbe River. Here were their three fortresses of Magdeburg,
Torgau, and Wittenberg, and here they might have waited in a position of strength the arrival of their allies from across the Vistula. But the fact that Dresden, the capital of their Saxon ally, would thus have been exposed to the direct attacks of Napoleon was a potent factor in determining a stand farther to the west. Moreover, the Prussian generals cherished the idea that Napoleon's successes were due to the fact that he had always fought an offensive campaign. They reasoned that an aggressive enemy who would take the initiative would by that act alone bid fair to defeat the formidable Napoleon. Accordingly they dispersed their troops in the region surrounding Jena, and devised a plan which should throw the French at once on the defensive. The contemplated scheme proposed an advance through the defiles of the northern end of the Thuringian Forest, a concentration at a point on its western edge, and thence a determined push against the left wing of the French which should cut off from Mainz all of the Emperor's troops along the Main. This advance was actually begun, and the advance guard of Brunswick's army entered the passes of the hills October 10, 1806.

Meanwhile, Napoleon had entered upon the execution of a similar attack against the Prussian left, his plan being to pass the defiles of the southern end of the forest and if possible cut off his enemy from Dresden and the Elbe fortresses. His plan stood the better chance of success for the distance from the French right to the Prussian left was less than that from the Prussian right to the French left. In addition, the Emperor's units marched more rapidly than did Brunswick's and were consequently enabled to strike their blow more quickly.

On October 9 and 10, 1806, while Brunswick's advance guard was entering the northern passes, the bulk of Napoleon's army passed the southern defiles and crossed the Saal River. The left and center of his advance encountered portions of Hohenlohe's command and drove them back,
while at the same time the right gained control of the road to Dresden. In the two or three days following, the French lost contact with their enemy, but continued their advance until on the night of October 13, at which time the Emperor gained definite information as to the location of his adversary, two corps were close to Jena, three about fifteen miles east of that point, and two down the river near Naumburg. The cavalry had pushed ahead and on October 13, when it was called in, its leading elements had entered Leipsic.

The Prussian commander was slow in arriving at the correct estimate of the situation. The defeat of Hohenlohe’s men warned him, however, that his own plan of attack against the French left was now no longer possible, and that he must look to his own communications. By the time he had ordered a concentration near Jena on October 12, a great share of the damage was already done. The French controlled the road to Dresden and were closer to the routes to Torgau and Wittenberg than were the Prussians. There remained the road to Magdeburg, and this Brunswick felt he must retain at any cost. He planned, therefore, to hold the crossings of the Upper Saal at Jena and Naumburg while his army began its march to Magdeburg. Such a plan would keep Napoleon on the right bank of the Saal until the river was of sufficient size to be a protection in itself. Accordingly he ordered Hohenlohe to Jena to hold the crossing there while he with the main army began the march down the Saal, intending himself to hold the crossing at Naumburg until the retreat was well under way.

This, then, was the situation on the evening of October 13. Hohenlohe lay west of Jena, the river crossing itself being in the hands of the French. Near Jena lay the corps of Lannes and Augereau, while en route were the Guard, the corps of Soult and Ney, and Murat’s cavalry. At Naumburg were Davout and Bernadotte, the former under orders to march on Jena on the morning of October 14 by the left
bank of the Saal, the latter to march by way of a less important crossing at Dornburg, midway between Naumburg and Jena. Napoleon, thinking he had before him at Jena the entire Prussian army, planned a strong frontal attack which should presently be reinforced by Davout and Bernadotte, attacking the flank and rear of the foe. In truth, only Hohenlohe lay at Jena, and, meanwhile, Brunswick was marching with the bulk of the Prussians on Naumburg and Davout, who with one corps was destined to meet the onslaught of twice his own numbers.

In the night of October 13–14, the three corps from the east moved westward while Lannes occupied the heights of Jena on the left bank. Napoleon expected momentarily an attack while this one corps was isolated from the remainder of the army, but Hohenlohe lay quiet until morning. The French began the attack early, pushing eagerly forward to make room on the heights for their approaching reinforcements. Hohenlohe launched a counter-attack and for several hours his lines held. Then the preponderance of force on the French side told, and at two o'clock the Prussians fell back in complete rout. The timely arrival of General Rüchel with reinforcements, allowed them a breathing space, but the French did not stop. At four o'clock a confused retreat became general.

Meanwhile, Bernadotte and Davout moved out in the early morning, the former on Dornburg, the latter on Jena by way of Auerstädt. One division of Davout's corps had barely mounted the heights west of the stream, when it encountered the leading columns of Brunswick's main army. At once it deployed, and under the severest fire, fought determinedly until the remaining two divisions should come up and extend the line. In the early moments of the battle, Brunswick himself was fatally wounded and the command passed into incompetent hands. The Prussians came blindly on in close columns—a procedure which alone allowed Davout to hold his position. By mid-after-
noon, the Prussian situation was hopeless, and Frederick William, who was present, ignorant of Hohenlohe’s disaster, ordered a retreat toward Jena. The fragments of the two defeated armies came together midway of the two battle fields and streamed away into the darkness with no semblance of order or command.

Swiftly Napoleon followed up the advantage gained by Jena and Auerstädt. The two small armies which remained after the double disaster were pursued ceaselessly, until the one under Hohenlohe was captured at Prentzlaun on October 26, and the other under Blücher surrendered on the Danish frontier, November 7. Meanwhile, Torgau and Wittenberg fell, Berlin was captured October 25, and Magdeburg capitulated November 8. The victors pushed rapidly on to the line of the Oder and before the end of November all Prussia lay at the Emperor’s disposal.

B. THE WINTER OF 1806–1807

A fortnight after his victory at Auerstädt-Jena, Napoleon made his triumphant entry into Berlin (October 27, 1806). Within a month after he had entered the Prussian capital, every Prussian fortress west of the Oder River, except a few strongholds in Silesia, had opened its gates to the French. And Napoleon pushed his advantage by extending his conquests beyond the territories of Prussia. November 4, he deposed the Elector of Hesse-Cassel and occupied his territories. In the following weeks his soldiers took possession of Brunswick, Hanover, and Hamburg. And he forced Saxony, Saxe-Gotha, and Saxe-Weimar to pledge strict observance of neutrality.

Immediately after the Auerstädt-Jena battle, Frederick William had appealed for peace, but Napoleon, who grasped the possibilities of his victory, haughtily replied that he hoped “to end the war sooner in Berlin than in Weimar.” October 18 the Prussian King dispatched Count Lucchesini to Napoleon with full powers to enter upon negotiations.
The terms submitted by Napoleon, comprising no less than the territory west of the Elbe, a guarantee that Prussia should not league herself with other German states against France, and 100,000,000 francs indemnity, were far more severe and humiliating than the Prussians had expected. Even these, however, Frederick William and his ministers were prepared to accept, but before Lucchesini could reach Napoleon, Napoleon had widened his vision of the extent of his victory and refused to do more than grant a suspension of hostilities on condition that the French were to occupy all of the country up to the Bug River, the fortress of Danzig, Kolberg, Thorn, and Graudenzi, and that Frederick William was to order the Russians out of the country. The unhappy Prussian envoys signed terms on these lines November 16, 1806, but the King of Prussia, whose hopes had risen with the approach of the Russian armies, repudiated their act. A few days later at Grodno Frederick William and Alexander signed a solemn covenant of alliance and began preparations to recoup the Prussian losses.

The measure of his success against Prussia encouraged Napoleon at this moment to try severer measures against his arch-enemy, Great Britain. His hatred of Great Britain was intense. He used all the manifold agencies at his command to arouse and keep at flame-heat indignation and hatred among the French for the British. He proclaimed the European coalition against France to have been bought and continued by British gold. He described how the Russian army was subsidized by British subsidies. He pictured Great Britain as the common and eternal enemy of the European continent. Nevertheless, however much he might threaten vengeance, he was impotent against Great Britain. Great Britain had no armies on the continent: Napoleon had no navies on the sea. In the realm in which he was master, therefore, Napoleon was given no opportunity of crushing Great Britain.

He sought, however, to destroy Great Britain by a
different method, by an extension of his continental blockade. Could he ruin British commerce, he plausibly argued, Great Britain would soon be forced to sue for peace. He therefore promulgated, November 21, 1806, the famous Berlin decree, in which, after a preamble, asserting the crimes of Great Britain, he announced the blockade of his enemy, forbidding all commerce or communication with the British islands, and ordering the seizure of all British property in ports under French control. Great Britain, as was natural, retaliated in kind, declaring by Order in Council of January 7, 1807, all the ports of France and of French colonies in a state of blockade and forbidding any ship to trade between French ports, French colonial ports, and the ports of any of the countries within the French system. The rival decrees, of course, bore especially hard upon the neutrals. Among others, the merchant marine of the United States was practically wiped out. Though serious losses were occasioned to Great Britain by Napoleon's decree, these losses were in no way vital, and increased rather than lessened British determination to continue the war. The people of the continent suffered severely, however, from the British blockade, for they had long become accustomed to luxuries imported from the colonies. The sudden stoppage of colonial products was the ground for hardship and complaint.

Napoleon's immediate problem, however, was to meet the military menace from Russia and the remains of the Prussian army along the Vistula. He did not, therefore, remain long in the conquered Prussian cities, but pushed forward into Poland.

i. The Polish Campaign

His goal was Warsaw, for he saw in the territory controlled by the Polish capital men and material in abundance to enable him to hold the new enemy on the Prussian frontier, and, if successful, to destroy the last remaining enemy on
the continent. Accordingly, he dispatched Davout's corps to Warsaw by way of Posen. Behind him, all marching in a general way on Warsaw, came Augereau, Jérôme (Napoleon's brother), and Lannes. These constituted the first line and numbered about 80,000 men. Behind them came the second line, of about equal numbers, composed of the corps of Ney, Soult, Bernadotte, and Murat. Between France and the strategic frontier, the country swarmed with the new levies, French and allied, which Napoleon was hurrying forward. By November 27, the advance guards had encountered and driven back Russian detachments west of Warsaw, and on the following day entered the city without opposition.

The allied armies consisted of one Prussian corps of 15,000 under Lestocq—the last remaining fragment of Frederick the Great's army—and two Russian columns, one 55,000 strong under Bennigsen, the other, 35,000 in number, commanded by Buxhöwden. These three bodies were not as yet capable of cooperation, for when Davout appeared before Warsaw, Lestocq was at Thorn, Bennigsen at Warsaw, and Buxhöwden on the Russian side of the old Polish frontier. Without attempting to dispute the crossing, Bennigsen withdrew from Warsaw and took up a position near Pultusk to await the second Russian army.

The withdrawal was ill advised. He was joined by Buxhöwden in less than three weeks, and, then, as the French still did not advance against him, he began to see that he had abandoned the river crossings too easily. He, therefore, began a forward movement in mid-December only to find Napoleon's troops across the river. The latter had been hampered by bad roads and inclement weather to such an extent that the crossings of the Vistula had occupied nearly a month. But when the Russian advance began, the French were prepared to resist it.

On December 23, the Emperor directed an attack which involved movements from Thorn to Warsaw. Contact
was gained, but the Russians retired after an indecisive and ineffectual struggle. Napoleon was determined that some result should be reached and for this reason continued the forward movement. December 25, sharp engagements occurred at Pultusk and Golymin, but the Russian line withdrew without having been dangerously involved. The exasperated Emperor was forced to content himself with this unsatisfactory solution, and to look upon the campaign as ended. The approach of winter and the exhausted state of the armies urged upon him a choice of winter quarters along the Vistula. He gave orders for the winter rest early in January, 1807. Meanwhile, the Russians remained mobilized near Johannisberg south of the Mazurian lakes.

ii. Diplomacy

Napoleon had taken measures during this Polish campaign to strengthen his position by raising up new enemies for his opponents. He found one ally in Turkey, whose Sultan had already been strongly influenced by the adroit French representative, Sebastiani. November 11, 1806, Napoleon wrote a letter to the Sultan, advising him of the French victory over the Prussians, stating that a French army of 300,000 was relentlessly pursuing its enemies, and recommending that the Turkish army advance to the Dniester River while the French operated from the Vistula. Napoleon’s object, of course, was to force a division of the Russian strength. He was completely successful. The first sign of the Turkish advance was met by the dispatch of 80,000 Russian troops — troops which were sorely needed at Eylau and Friedland.

Napoleon’s other diplomatic opportunity was presented by the situation in what had been Poland. As soon as he reached Berlin, his secret agents were sent into Prussian and Russian Poland to encourage the people with hopes of freedom. November 19, 1806, he received in Berlin a Polish deputation from Posen and treated the members
with marked distinction. After hearing their plea, he dismissed them with the assurance that, as France had never recognized the partition of their country, he himself would be deeply interested in restoring its independence and reconstructing a kingdom along lines which would render it permanent. A week later, November 25, he himself went to Posen, entering the city under a huge arch inscribed "The Liberator of Poland." His arrival awakened the utmost enthusiasm among the Poles, the practical evidence of which was the voluntary enlistment of 60,000 men for a national guard.

iii. Campaign in East Prussia

After he had put his troops in winter quarters, Napoleon himself, with the Imperial Guard, established his headquarters in Warsaw. Though he unbent in the gayeties of the Polish metropolis, he accomplished a prodigious amount of work. He called upon the obsequious Senate in Paris for new French conscripts and provided for their organization, equipment, and drill. He caused the commissary and supply departments of his army to be thoroughly overhauled and improved. On account of the barren country and poor villages, so different from the rich Italian country where his troops could live by pillage, he ordered the establishment of immense provision and munition depots in the rear of his armies. He made detailed arrangements for the organization and training of the Polish contingent. He created and put into operation a government for Poland, surmounting all difficulties by the sureness of his judgment and the prestige of his power. And with all these manifold duties he kept in close touch with affairs in his own capital, ordering and advising in every matter of policy. He was, indeed, at this period at the height of his mental and physical powers, and his capacity for work seemed boundless.

His troops, however, war-weary though they were, could
not be allowed their needed rest in their winter quarters. January 27, 1807, Napoleon was compelled to issue orders for a concentration. The Emperor was unwilling to renew the war so soon, but circumstances forced him to remold his plans. Marshal Ney, who was subsisting his troops in the sector northeast of Thorn, found the country barren of supplies. Pushing farther and farther toward the Alle River without encountering resistance, he conceived the idea of making a flying attack on the temporary Prussian capital, Königsberg. At Bartenstein, he was checked by Lestocq, January 15. Apprised by couriers that the Emperor was infuriated by this unwarranted activity, Ney withdrew to his original station. He was just in time, for Bennigsen, having learned of Ney’s isolated position, had started his entire army to the northwest, intending to cut off the intrepid marshal and destroy him. In this immediate object he failed, since Ney had withdrawn as we have seen, but he continued his advance, encountered Bernadotte in the sector just north of Ney, and forced him to fall back nearly to the Vistula.

It was this last circumstance which had determined Napoleon to renew the campaign in the dead of winter. His marshals formed their corps hastily, and began the laborious march northward. The Emperor hoped to encounter his enemy near Joukendorf, where he knew Bennigsen had concentrated; but when his forces arrived, it was only to find that the Russians had retired northward. He did, however, succeed in forcing Ney’s corps between Bennigsen and Lestocq, and prevented their union until the battle of Eylau. The remainder of his army pursued Bennigsen, always hoping to overtake the foe, arriving at a place only to find that the Russians had vacated it. The pursuit, begun February 4, was short but exhausting. The cold was intense, and the troops suffered incredibly. Only the ingrained Russian discipline kept Bennigsen’s army on the march; only the Emperor’s iron will kept up the pur-
suit. The losses from cold, exhaustion, and disease in that terrible five days' march have never been accurately determined, so that it is not known what numbers faced each other when the Russians turned on their pursuers.

Napoleon's army was not all present when the action began. Bernadotte was far to the rear — so far that he took no part in the battle; Davout was several miles away on the right, having followed a different route; and Ney was well to the left, pursuing Lestocq. The Emperor informed the two latter marshals of his plans, and ordered their support, but at the moment when the engagement was precipitated by the Russians, Davout had only begun his march toward the field, and Ney had not been heard from.

A heavy cannonade in the early morning of February 8 opened the battle. Napoleon planned to advance by his center corps — that of Augereau — which should be sustained by a holding attack on the left, and supported by an envelopment of the enemy's left flank by Davout. The movement was begun in a blinding snowstorm, and Augereau, advancing through the confusion, lost his direction and came full on the massed artillery in the hostile center. The enemy's batteries opened on the battalions at less than a hundred yards, and practically annihilated the whole corps. Indeed, it ceased to exist as a separate unit from that time. The Russian counter-attack was repulsed by Bessières in command of the Imperial Guard, in time to drive the attacking Russians back into Davout's enveloping maneuver which now began to manifest itself. With skillful strokes, Davout advanced from position to position until by four o'clock he was behind the center of the Russian line.

Help was to come to Bennigsen from his other flank. Lestocq, in command of the Prussian corps, had successfully evaded Ney by a brilliant flank march and in the late afternoon appeared in time to check the victorious Davout.
Night fell with the battle undetermined, with the French holding advanced positions, but with the allies complete masters of their lines of retreat. The Emperor had lost heavily, and he contemplated his situation with misgivings. In the night, however, Bennigsen's courage failed him, and he slipped away, leaving the French in possession of the field. Napoleon, greatly relieved, ordered a pursuit, but the weather was such that he soon abandoned it.

iv. Diplomatic Maneuvers

After the bloody and indecisive battle of Eylau February 8, 1807, Napoleon made direct advances to Frederick William of Prussia for peace. Frederick William's spirits had risen, however, at the amount of resistance the Russians had been able to offer, and he rejected Napoleon's overtures. A few weeks later the Prussian and Russian sovereigns renewed their pledges in the Treaty of Bartenstein (April 26, 1807), and bound themselves also to request the adhesion of Great Britain, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark to a great Coalition of Liberation, whose object should be to drive Napoleon out of Germany and Italy.

At the same time Napoleon again approached Austria in the endeavor to involve her with the French in an alliance against Russia and Prussia. In the Austrian court at the same time were envoys from both Russia and Prussia trying to influence Francis for their cause. Though Silesia, the bait offered by Napoleon, was most tempting, and though the reward of success in case an Austro-Prussian-Russian alliance should overthrow Napoleon would be great, the Austrian government had suffered too heavily to take up arms again at once. Francis resisted the appeals from both belligerents. As a matter of fact, this neutrality was of immense value to Napoleon, for an attack by Austria upon his communications and his flank would at this time have been disastrous. He obtained, therefore, all that he had any reason to expect.
In a more distant quarter he had still further success. The Turkish campaign against Russia had languished because of the inefficiency and treacherous intrigues of the Turkish commanders. And still farther east, his negotiations with the Shah of Persia had not been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. With the beginning of the new year, however, conditions took a turn for the better. Napoleon's emissaries infused new life into the Turkish campaign, causing the Czar to send reinforcements to his armies in the Danube region. And the French Emperor concluded a treaty with the Shah by which Napoleon guaranteed to compel the Russians to evacuate the province of Georgia and the Shah pledged himself to take the offensive against the British in India.

v. The Campaign in East Prussia (continued). Friedland

In the few days following the battle of Eylau Napoleon withdrew to the general line of the Passarge River and set about his preparations for the activities which he knew would come with spring. The chief of these was the siege of Dantzig — an operation undertaken in order that a new and shorter line of supply might be established through the productive provinces of north Prussia to replace that through Poland. The siege was brought to a successful conclusion by the surrender of the fortress on May 26, 1807, and the Emperor was left free to turn his attention to his enemy in the field. He had recruited his forces until he was ready to oppose the allied 92,000 men with an army of nearly 150,000. He had behind him 30,000 more in the north German lowlands, and Masséna with 25,000 opposing a single Russian corps in Poland.

Bennigsen forestalled any possible French advance by an attack along the Passarge begun in the early days of June, 1807. A few minor successes speedily faded from view, for Napoleon concentrated for a counter-attack, and the Russian advance became a precipitous retreat. The
allied commander had committed the error of dividing his forces. 20,000 of his scanty numbers under Lestocq were on the lower Passarge where they could be opposed by a single corps under Victor. They began their retirement simultaneously with Bennigsen, but Napoleon’s advance was such that he pushed the two forces farther and farther apart. In this advance, the French encountered one severe check at Heilsberg where Bennigsen had constructed an entrenched camp. A full 10,000 was the price they paid for the Russian evacuation, but in the end they saw their foe in full retreat down the right bank of the Alle.

Napoleon’s plan contemplated an attack on the allied right wing which would cut off his opponent from Königsberg and force him across the Niemen. Accordingly, when he learned of Bennigsen’s retreat from Heilsberg, he hurried across country through Eylau to prevent the allied armies from entering the Prussian capital. He was too late to prevent Lestocq’s corps from entering the city, but he put his army across Bennigsen’s shortest route to Königsberg. The latter, who had meanwhile lost touch with the French, determined to cross the Alle at Friedland, and make at once for Lestocq and the city. Napoleon, learning of this on the night of June 13, was enabled so to move his troops that the following day they won for him the great victory of Friedland.

In the early morning of June 14, Bennigsen was opposed at Friedland by a single French corps, but his crossing was slow, and before he was prepared to advance, other French divisions had arrived, and he was forced to take up a defensive line. A scattering fight was waged all day, during which the French were continually being enforced, until by late afternoon the Emperor was able to put into execution his real attack. This provided for an assault on the Russian left wing by Ney, while the remainder of the line engaged in a strong holding attack. The Russians rallied bravely to the shock of Ney’s assault, repulsed it sharply,
and caused the Emperor to send heavy reinforcements. The second attempt forced the Russian left into the very streets of Friedland where the havoc wrought by the French massed artillery was frightful. The bridges, crowded by the Russian infantry, were set afire and became impassable. Meanwhile, the Russian right had become demoralized before the sturdy French holding attack and was being sharply pressed back to the river bank. The French cavalry under Grouchy, which might have made the victory complete, was inexcusably inactive, and the Russian artillery gallantly held the stream's edge while great masses of the infantry swam and forded the Alle below Friedland.

But though a large portion of the Russians escaped, it was not as organized units, for the right bank of the Alle was crowded with fugitives fleeing to cross the Niemen. Lestocq, when he learned of the disaster, abandoned Königsberg and did his best to rally the fragments of Bennigsen's command, but the attempt was vain. The Russian army had been too roughly handled, and Lestocq was forced, when Napoleon appeared on the Niemen, to give up the struggle, and with it, Prussia's last hope of freedom.

C. THE TREATY OF TILSIT

The victory of the French at Friedland disheartened the Czar. The Russian generals urged him to treat with the French conqueror. Alexander was forced to yield to their entreaties. June 22, 1807, he arranged an armistice, advising the Prussians to follow his example. The next day Frederick William acted in accordance with this advice. June 25, 1807, a personal interview between Napoleon and Alexander was held on a huge raft, moored in the middle of the Niemen River.

What took place in this first meeting of the sovereigns is unknown. Alexander, however, was in a mood to come to terms of peace. He had been bitterly disappointed by the lack of assistance from Great Britain. He was face to
face with a strong mutinous element among the officers of the Russian army, who condemned this war "for foreign interests." It has been said that Alexander's first remark was: "I hate the English as much as you do, and I will second you in all your actions against them;" and that Napoleon at once responded: "In that case all can be arranged and peace is made." Certain it is that Napoleon's personal fascination was exercised to good effect upon the young Russian Czar. "I never had more prejudices against any one than against him," said Alexander afterwards, "but after three quarters of an hour of conversation, they all disappeared like a dream."

After two meetings on the raft, the monarchs met thereafter in the town of Tilsit, a section of which had been temporarily neutralized for the purpose. Frederick William met them, but Napoleon treated him coldly and discourteously, accusing him of being responsible for the war and paying little attention to his interests. Indeed, Napoleon accepted his presence, not in the character of sovereign, but in that of a protégé of the Czar. In the midst of the negotiations, word came that the Sultan of Turkey, with whom Napoleon had been allied, had been deposed. No event could have suited Napoleon's purposes better. He realized well the ambitions of Alexander for Constantinople. He had no scruples against arranging for a partition of the country which had been his ally. He is said to have exclaimed to Alexander upon receipt of the news: "It is a decree of Providence which tells me that the Turkish Empire can no longer exist." Certainly, Napoleon now had something definite to offer the Czar in return for what he desired for France and his own ends.

In the negotiations that followed, Prussia suffered severely. Neither the arguments of the Czar nor the entreaties of the beautiful Prussian Queen Louisa could move Napoleon to spare Prussia. In the final treaty, the Treaty of Tilsit, signed July 7, 1807, Prussia was given back Silesia out of
deference to the wishes of the Czar, but her territories were restricted to those former territories between the Elbe and the Niemen Rivers. The Polish lands seized by Prussia in the second and third partitions were constituted into a new state, the Duchy of Warsaw, of which the King of Saxony was made sovereign. Dantzig was made a free city under the joint protection of the King of Prussia and the Czar of Russia. Prussia was thus dismembered and weakened.

By the terms of the treaty, Alexander recognized the changes made in Naples, Holland, and Germany, including the creation of the Kingdom of Westphalia for Napoleon's brother, Jérôme, out of the Prussian territories west of the Rhine. He further agreed to accept Napoleon's mediation between Russia and Turkey, and to withdraw Russian troops from the Danubian provinces as soon as a Russo-Turkish peace was reached.

Added to the above public terms of treaty was provision for a close offensive and defensive alliance in a convention signed the same day. By the terms of this alliance, both sovereigns pledged themselves to make common cause in any war either might undertake against any European power. The Czar agreed to make war upon Great Britain if she did not accept his mediation between France and Great Britain. Napoleon agreed to help Russia drive the Turks from Europe, if the Porte did not accept his mediation between Russia and Turkey.

Two days later, July 9, 1807, a treaty of peace was signed with Prussia, its terms being the same as those outlined in the treaty with Russia. In addition, Prussia was forced to join the continental blockade against Great Britain and, in case Great Britain failed to come to terms, to join France and Russia in war.

Shortly after the Peace of Tilsit was signed, Napoleon returned to Paris, stopping en route at Dresden to visit his ally the King of Saxony. He arrived in Paris, July 27,
1807, after an absence from his capital of ten months. His troops were gradually withdrawn from Prussia and disposed among the states of the Confederation of the Rhine. His diplomacy was now directed solely to injuring his one implacable enemy, Great Britain.
CHAPTER XI

THE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN

After his successive victories over Austria, Prussia, and Russia, Napoleon was encouraged to believe that he could subdue his last important enemy, Great Britain. He was unable, it is true, to meet the British naval power or to break the strict blockade it maintained on French ports: but, on the other hand, Great Britain was equally unable to meet his troops on land, and accurate reports represented her industry and commerce as suffering intensely from his limitation of her continental markets. Indeed, as he estimated the situation, France was, after the Treaty of Tilsit, in the more favorable position. Great Britain had put forth her full effort in the blockade: she could injure France no further. The conquest of Prussia and the alliance with Russia gave to France new weapons. Napoleon could look forward with confidence to barring the British from access to any part of the continent. His plans, then, from this moment onward depended wholly upon the single end of the defeat of Great Britain. His decrees, his annexations, his wars and campaigns were all executed with the single object of stopping up every gap on the continent. Success in his duel with Great Britain became the key to all his policies.

A. THE CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE

The first measure in his plan for a continental blockade against British commerce was taken in the issuance of the Berlin Decree (November 21, 1806). By this, as we have mentioned, he forbade all commerce or communication with the British islands, and ordered the seizure of British goods in ports under French control. He forwarded this Decree
to the governments of Spain, Naples, Holland, and Etruria (Tuscany), and expected them in loyalty to the close bonds between them and France to comply with its provisions. He looked forward to forcing the observance of this decree upon every state with which he preserved amicable relations.

Great Britain, of course, could not supinely disregard such a sweeping decree as that Napoleon issued from Berlin. Her answer was in an Order in Council of January 7, 1807, proclaiming that any ship trading between two ports from which British ships were excluded should after due warning be regarded as lawful prize. This stroke was intended to prevent neutral commerce from reaching France. The British government followed this measure at the end of the year by another Order in Council (November 11, 1807) proclaiming that ports whence British ships and goods were excluded should be subject to all the restrictions of actual blockade; that all trade in articles produced by countries excluding British ships and goods was to be prohibited; and that all ships indulging in such trade were to be regarded as lawful prize. These Orders in Council were intended to do two things: (1) to prevent trade with France; and (2) to prevent other states from observing Napoleon's decrees. The deadly efficiency of the British navy made the Orders in Council a frightful menace to neutral shipping.

Napoleon's response to the British measures was by the Warsaw Decree (January 25, 1807) in which he directed the confiscation of all British merchandise in the Hanseatic cities; and by the great Milan Decree December 17, 1807, in which he proclaimed that all ships submitting to the British Orders, and any ship sailing from a British harbor or from a country occupied by British troops, would be regarded as lawful prize subject to capture by the French. Thus, the British navy tried to catch neutral ships at sea, and the French officials seized them when they came to port. Neutral commerce was paralyzed by such sweeping acts of the belligerents.
Napoleon’s decrees were by no means the mere “paper blockade” they might seem, for he accompanied them with an extension of his power until he had actually stopped access to the continent for British goods. His Treaty of Tilsit had secured Russia and Prussia; his alliances guaranteed Holland, Spain, Etruria (Tuscany), and northern Italy. There remained only Denmark, Portugal, Austria, and Sweden. Beginning immediately after the Treaty of Tilsit, he put pressure upon these states until he brought them one by one into his system.

In July, 1807, Napoleon invited the Danish government to make its choice between friendship with Great Britain and friendship with France. Denmark’s position was difficult. War against Great Britain would expose her thriving commerce to destruction: war with France would probably result in her extinction: and neither France nor Great Britain was disposed longer to tolerate her neutrality. The Danish government’s final decision was determined by Great Britain’s action. The British government, learning of Napoleon’s intentions toward Denmark, decided to forestall him. It therefore ordered a fleet and expeditionary force to Copenhagen to offer alliance, and in the event of refusal to cripple the Danish offensive power. This fleet arrived off Copenhagen August 3, 1807. As was expected, its offer of alliance was refused. The expeditionary force was landed and guns placed for the bombardment of the city. September 2, 1807, the bombardment began. Five days later the Danes yielded, surrendering their fleet, and the British seized eighteen ships of the line, ten frigates, and forty-two smaller vessels. Denmark, of course, formally declared war upon Great Britain, and joined whole-heartedly Napoleon’s alliance. Napoleon thus gained his purpose, but keenly regretted the loss of a navy which would have strengthened him offensively.

At the same time he was pressing Denmark, Napoleon was acting against Portugal, another gap in his continental blockade. July 19, 1807, he instructed Talleyrand to warn
the Portuguese ambassador that Portugal must close its harbors to British trade and seize British goods by September 1 on penalty of war. Like Denmark, Portugal, not allowed to maintain neutrality, was sure to lose with whichever belligerent she cast her fortunes. Napoleon expected her refusal and consequently signed a secret convention with Spain at Fontainebleau October 27, 1807, providing for military coöperation and the ultimate partition of Portugal. Even before this convention was signed, a flying column under Junot entered Spain (October 19, 1807) and marched rapidly toward Lisbon. The Portuguese government, recognizing the futility of resistance, prepared to flee. November 29, 1807, the entire court, with the national archives and the state treasure, set sail for Brazil under protection of the British fleet. The following day Junot's advance guard came in sight of Lisbon, almost in time to see the retiring ships. Lisbon fell, and Portugal was closed to British commerce; but Napoleon felt again that one of the chief advantages of his policy had been lost by the escape of the court and the treasure.

Though Austria, with her single port of Trieste, could hardly be called one of the important trading countries, the moral advantage of her adhesion to the continental system was great. Napoleon sought, therefore, to bring his influence to bear upon her government. By a convention signed at Fontainebleau October 11, 1807, all outstanding issues, especially those concerning boundaries in Illyria and Dalmatia, were settled, and Austria undertook to offer her mediation to the British government with a view to Anglo-French peace. When the British refused firmly such mediation, the Austrian ambassador withdrew from London. February 28, 1808, Austria accepted the principles of the continental blockade. This triumph for Napoleon was marred by no disaster. Indeed, he had hopes at the time of a close alliance with Austria to further French ambitions.

The pressure upon Sweden was exerted by Russia. Febru-
ary 10, 1808, Alexander demanded that Sweden withdraw from her alliance with Great Britain. Upon Sweden’s refusal, Russian troops poured into Finland and in a quick campaign subjugated the country. June 17, 1808, Alexander endeavored to make his conquest agreeable to the Finns by promising them the enjoyment of their ancient rights and the convocation of their Diet. In November, 1808, Sweden accepted a truce, acknowledging the Russian occupation of Finland. Not until over a year later, however, after the abdication of the irreconcilable Swedish King Gustavus IV, did Sweden enter the continental system (January 6, 1810).

Two other small possible gaps in the coast line Napoleon closed by outright annexation. The small Kingdom of Etruria (Tuscany, chief city Florence) had not been governed with the efficiency Napoleon expected. He therefore annexed it by decree May 30, 1808. To the south, the Pope had been sullenly hostile to Napoleon, even after the conclusion of the Concordat of 1801. Napoleon dealt with him arbitrarily. After detaching the northeastern papal provinces, known as the Marches, and adding them to the Kingdom of Italy (April, 1808) he annexed Rome and the adjoining provinces, May 17, 1809.

**B. Effect of Napoleon’s Political and Economic Measures**

Upon Great Britain, the closing of commercial opportunities in country after country naturally produced the keenest effect. Gold went to a premium. The price of necessities, especially grain, rose to unprecedented heights. Great merchant houses went into bankruptcy. The poor people suffered intensely. So far as the government was concerned, however, the determination to carry the war through to a successful conclusion remained unshaken. Fox had died in September, 1806, and his “Ministry of all the Talents” had been succeeded in March, 1807, by a Tory ministry under the Duke of Portland. It was this ministry
which projected the attack upon neutral Denmark (August–September, 1807), which refused Austrian mediation for peace (October, 1807–February, 1808), which first saw the light of possible ultimate success in the Spanish uprising and the fighting of British expeditionary troops in Portugal and Spain in 1808 and 1809. The Portland government showed little energy or capacity in domestic affairs, but it remained firm against Napoleon’s system.

Upon the continent, Napoleon’s exactions were at this time rapidly arousing new enemies and putting fresh life into old ones. In his efforts to ruin Great Britain, he overreached himself and awakened national forces whose strength he utterly failed to appreciate. In dealing with the princes and princedoms, he ceased to take into account the inherent patriotism of peoples.

It was in Spain that his arbitrary policies met their first decidedly popular check. The Spanish government had been his ally from the beginning of the war. It had actually in October, 1807, by the Convention of Fontainebleau bound itself more rigidly to alliance in the hope of sharing in the partition of Portugal. The Spanish people had welcomed Junot’s soldiers in their march to Lisbon, and, though surprised, had not at first resisted the later French detachments which established themselves at strategic points throughout northern Spain. Resentment at the presence of these foreign troops on Spanish soil suddenly blazed forth in a demonstration against the King and the Prime Minister, Godoy, March 19, 1808 The King, Charles IV, resigned in fright and his son Ferdinand assumed the crown. A few weeks later the French Emperor induced the whole royal family to meet him at Bayonne (in French territory), and there extracted from Ferdinand the restoration of the crown to his father, and from Charles IV a resignation of all his rights into the hands of Napoleon, as the only person able to restore order (May 6, 1808). Napoleon thereupon designated his brother Joseph as King of Spain, sending Murat to take the
throne of Naples. Joseph went to Spain in June, 1808, to assume his new but dangerous honors.

When information of these political changes was given out in Spain, the country broke into spontaneous revolution. However inefficient their sovereigns had been, they were still of Spanish blood and traditions. The people were enthusiastically loyal. Though they were without organization, without capable leaders, and without adequate equipment, they prepared by guerrilla warfare to harass the French armies. They gave to the world the first example of what could be effected against the French conqueror by a truly national uprising.

To the east, the humiliation of Prussia by Napoleon had engendered a new patriotism which revealed itself, not in a spectacular uprising, but in the laborious reorganization of the country's institutions. Prussia, under the lead of Stein, Scharnhorst, and their colleagues, began to fit herself to put forward her utmost strength when the time came for her to strike. The disasters of the war had shown the need of general reformation. Stein, who entered office as Minister of War October 5, 1807, had the energy and ability to carry through this reformation. The initial measure was the abolition of serfdom in Prussia by edict of October 9, 1807. By thus abolishing all personal servitude and permitting all persons to engage in any calling, Stein at a stroke brought the social structure of Prussia into a line legally with that of her progressive neighbors, and won for the government a new kind of allegiance from the mass of the people. Stein accompanied this social reform by his support of the plan for a reorganization of the army suggested by Scharnhorst. According to this plan, the principle of universal service was to be adopted, a short term of service with the colors required, and a term in the Reserve when a man would be called upon only in the event of war. The standing army of Prussia would be only 40,000, but by means of assigning trained men to the Reserve and continually calling new levies to the colors, a
large number of soldiers were kept ready for military duty at short notice. The system thus suggested by Scharnhorst and adopted remained the practice of Prussia and of modern Germany. A third great reform projected by Stein, but never fully carried out, was the establishment of the foundations of representative liberal government, including a parliament and local elected bodies. The opposition on the part of the old nobility drove Stein from power (December, 1808) before he had been able to do more than introduce the rudiments of local self-government. Such measures as these mentioned encouraged a new spirit among the Prussian people. Once the instinct of patriotism was aroused, its development was fostered under the new institutions.

In Austria, too, the government prepared to rely upon an awakened patriotism to withstand Napoleon. As in the case of Prussia, the severity of Napoleon in his hour of victory actually gave birth to a new spirit in the defeated nation. The Austrian humiliation at the terms of the Treaty of Pressburg and at the enforced entry of the government into the continental system early in 1808 inspired the people to redeem themselves. The Emperor Francis gave them their opportunity by ordering (June 9, 1808) the establishment of a national Landwehr, an army to include all able-bodied men from eighteen to twenty-five years old. The people responded to this law with the greatest enthusiasm, enrolling themselves eagerly in the new Landwehr and looking forward with confidence to the struggle.

The persistence of Great Britain, the signs of awakening national life in Prussia, the formation of the new Landwehr in Austria, and the very embarrassing revolt in Spain led Napoleon to desire a new conference with Alexander of Russia, his one great ally. The shifting political situation made a full understanding between the two sovereigns advisable. The conference was arranged for the end of September, 1808, in the little Thuringian town of Erfurt. There the Czar and the Emperor met September 27 and remained together until
October 12, 1808. The conditions, however, were much changed since Tilsit. At Tilsit Napoleon was supreme. At Erfurt, the Czar held the advantage of position, for Napoleon sorely needed the Czar's guarantee to keep in check the threatening Austria and Prussia while the French armies were engaged in Spain. Of the discussions we know little. Much time was taken up with the eastern question, where the Czar wanted a free hand even so far as the seizure of Constantinople, and by Napoleon's desire to make a joint Franco-Russian demand upon Austria to disarm. The final convention, signed October 12, 1808, was a compromise. Napoleon consented reluctantly to Russian acquisition of the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, acknowledged the Russian control over Finland, and received the Czar's pledge to come to his assistance in case Austria attacked France. Napoleon had to be content with these terms, and hurried from Erfurt to direct his campaign in Spain.

C. THE PENINSULAR WAR

The Peninsular War does not admit of a casual survey as readily as do Napoleon's other campaigns. The definite shock of army against army ending in decisive victory or defeat is missing here. This is partly because the Emperor himself was unable to give his whole attention to Spain, and partly because the war dragged out its unsatisfactory course for five years. There were sharp conflicts between the opponents, but they were not decisive for the reason that the contestants, British and French, were fighting over the territory of a third nation, the Spanish, and there could never be added to the strategic value of any operation that political gravity which so influences the scale when one belligerent is defending its own domain. Nevertheless, the war can be divided into phases sufficiently definite to give an understanding of the military situations. The two phases which concern us now are that of Junot in Portugal and that of the Emperor in Spain.
The situation in Spain was a confused one. To meet the growing national rising the French troops were scattered throughout the Peninsula. In the beginning they were everywhere successful against the ragged nationalists, and by July, 1808, they were occupying the provinces of Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and the Castiles, holding, among others, the cities of Madrid and Toledo. Then disaster fell suddenly upon them. Dupont, marching into Andalusia, was defeated after he had captured Cordova, and was forced to surrender at Baylen his entire force of 20,000. A little earlier, Moncey had been repulsed in an attempt to storm Valencia. The Spanish general, Palafox, had held the French helpless before Saragossa, and on the Mediterranean another force had blockaded 14,000 French in Barcelona. All this the Spanish had accomplished acting alone, and now, early in August, came news of 25,000 English landing at various points in Spain and Portugal. King Joseph, with Marshal Jourdan of Revolutionary army fame as his military adviser, proved incapable of handling so vexed a question, and it became apparent to the Emperor that there were needed in Spain more men and the Imperial presence.

The landing of the British troops calls attention for the moment to Portugal. August 1, 1808, 15,000 men under Sir Arthur Wellesley (later Duke of Wellington) landed on the coast a hundred miles north of Lisbon and at once began an advance on the Portuguese capital. On their march southward they were joined by two brigades which brought their strength up to 20,000. With this force, Wellesley hoped to drive out Junot's weaker army of less than 15,000. The French general, however, determined to make up in activity what he lacked in strength, and accordingly took the offensive before the little town of Vimiera. A failure to reconnoiter properly his enemy's position led to his army's being pushed off the Lisbon road into a most unfavorable situation (August 21, 1808). Learning of the approach of British reinforcements, Junot on the following day asked for
an armistice. By the convention of Cintra, signed on August 30, the French agreed to withdraw from Portugal and in turn the English undertook to transport Junot's army to France.

Affairs in Spain were no more satisfactory. The French forces had retired to the line of the Ebro River, where they held a weak position near Logroño. The Spaniards were confronting them boldly but unintelligently. Their line was divided into three principal parts, stationed from Valmaseda to Saragossa, and between the commanders of these divisions there was little desire for cooperation. Their forces were disposed as follows: Blake (32,000) held the left of the line at Valmaseda; Castaños (25,000) formed the center at Tudela; Palafox (17,000) stood before Saragossa; and a reserve of 13,000 occupied Burgos. Far to the right, another force of 20,000 was blockading the French in Barcelona. This was the situation which Napoleon found when he arrived in Vittoria on November 5, 1808.

The Emperor had prepared for his campaign by greatly augmenting the corps with which he proposed to operate. At the moment of taking command, his army, divided into seven corps, numbered 190,000. Of these, all except one corps of 30,000 under St. Cyr (who was designated to relieve Barcelona) occupied the line of the Ebro. The army was divided into three units: the right composed of Soult and Lefebvre; a center made up of Victor, Bessières, and the Guard; and the left constituted by Ney and Moncey. The plan of campaign was outlined as soon as the situation became apparent. The Emperor decided upon a swift thrust at the hostile center which should completely penetrate the Spanish line, and then a series of blows aimed at the greatly inferior portions of his dismembered foe. It was familiar strategy, for the young General Bonaparte had used it with great effect against the Austrians and Sardinians in that renowned first campaign in Italy.

It was to succeed as markedly in the present campaign.
The initial irruption of the Spanish line brought Soult and Bessières face to face with their opponent's reserve, near Burgos. In the engagement which followed, the irregular Spanish forces were beaten and entirely dispersed. Thus, in a single day the first part of the plan was completed. The line was bisected; it remained only to crush each portion separately. The left half under Blake featured ever so slightly in the operations which followed, and may be dealt with in a few words. Soult, to whom was given the task of pursuit, pressed it back through the mountains of northern Spain. Though it subsequently united with Sir John Moore's army, it did not affect the outcome of the campaign.

The right wing lay at the mercy of Ney and Moncey. A coördinate movement would have crushed it utterly between the two corps, but for no apparent reason Ney lay quiet while Moncey attacked, with the result that though this wing of the foe was again divided, it was not crushed. Palafox's command made for Saragossa, while Castaños retreated to Guadalajara.

Meanwhile, the center with the Emperor in command had marched briskly forward, seized the passes of the Guadarrama Mountains, and on December 2 appeared before Madrid. A few hours of artillery fire so convinced the armed inhabitants of the futility of resistance that on December 4 the city capitulated. Napoleon did not pause in the city but moved south to the Tagus River to meet the British attack which he knew was approaching.

He had miscalculated the direction of this approach, however. Sir John Moore, commanding a British force of 20,000, was marching from Lisbon to the assistance of the Spaniards. He expected to join at Valladolid or Burgos a smaller British force which had landed at Corunna, and from the point of union go on to the assistance of their allies. But by the time his advance guard had entered Salamanca, the French were in sight of Madrid, and his original plan had become impossible. He formulated a second which con-
templated a thrust at Napoleon’s communications, but gave
it up for a purely defensive union at Valderas with the force
from Corunna, and then began his famous retreat to the
coast.

For Napoleon had learned of his advance, and had left
Madrid on December 20 with a force of 50,000 in the hope
of cutting Moore off from Corunna. In twelve days he
marched 214 miles through ice and snow to reach a position
in the rear of Moore, while at the same time, in obedience to
the Emperor’s orders, Soult moved forward from his position
in north Spain. At Astorga, on January 1, 1809, Napoleon
saw that Moore could not be cut off from his port; so leaving
Soult’s corps to carry on the pursuit, he led his own command
to Valladolid. A few days later he was in Paris. Meanwhile,
Soult kept at the heels of the retreating British. At Corunna,
within sight of the transports, he forced a battle which cost
the British their commander, but he was unable to prevent
a safe embarkation. The first phase had ended successfully
for France, but the British still held Lisbon, and dishearten-
ing times were in store for the Emperor in the Peninsula.

D. THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA

Believing that the final stages of the campaign in Spain
could be carried through by his lieutenants, Napoleon hurried
back to Paris in January, 1809. Rumors had reached him of
political intrigues in the French capital, and direct informa-
tion of the extent and progress of Austria’s preparations for
war. His presence in Paris quickly ended the intrigues and
he began to make his dispositions to meet the Austrian
attack.

For her excuse for war, Austria need merely point to the
terms of the Treaty of Pressburg. Such terms could never be
considered permanent by a proud and self-respecting nation.
Furthermore, the Emperor Francis had been deeply moved
by Napoleon’s treatment of the Spanish royal family, and by
the changes in Italy. If the French conqueror could by a
word unseat the ancient Bourbon house in Spain, why should not the whim seize him to demand the abdication of the Hapsburg house in Austria? And if by mere imperial decree Napoleon chose to annex nominally independent states in the Italian peninsula, like Tuscany, and arbitrarily assign parts of the Papal dominions to his Kingdom of Italy, where need this process end? Considerations of self-interest and fear both pointed to a war to destroy this constant menace. The time seemed opportune, for the mass of French troops were engaged in Spain, and the new Austrian levies were inspired with enthusiasm.

By December, 1808, the Austrian court had secretly determined upon war. The final decision was made by the Imperial Council under the presidency of the Emperor Francis February 8, 1809. The concentration of Austrian troops began February 25, 1809; the advance over the Bavarian boundary without a formal declaration of war on April 10, 1809.

In the spring of 1809, for the first time in his career, Napoleon was unable to anticipate his adversary’s preparations for war. His own activities in Spain had kept him out of France until January, and though he immediately set about the task of concentrating an army for the coming war, Austria’s commander, the Archduke Charles, was able to make the initial move. The Emperor Francis was making every effort to avenge Pressburg, and accordingly put into the field an army of 190,000. In the second week of April, 1809, this great army was set in motion. Bellegarde with 50,000 men was in Bohemia, marching toward Ratisbon, while the Archduke Charles with the remainder crossed the River Inn. His objective was, of course, Napoleon’s troops on the upper Danube, and in order to compass their destruction he planned a union with Bellegarde at Ratisbon, from which point he would march to destroy the French. He had behind him, on both sides of the Danube, lines of communication with Vienna, which were guarded by militia.
Napoleon’s plan contemplated the destruction of the Austrian army combined with an occupation of Vienna. This plan, however, was dependent upon the movements of his enemy, because, as we have said, Charles rather than Napoleon was in a position to direct the opening movements of the campaign. By the end of March, the Emperor had east of the Rhine 167,000 troops, which he planned to concentrate in the vicinity of Ratisbon. In command of them he had his two ablest lieutenants, Davout and Masséna, and before the campaign was well under way, he was able to employ the other marshal who is worthy to be ranked with these two — Lannes. In addition, he had Lefébvre, Oudinot, Vandamme, Bessières, and as chief-of-staff, Berthier. In early April the six corps into which the army was divided were stationed along the Danube in the vicinity of Ülm, extending as far east as Ratisbon, and as far south as Augsburg. One corps — the Bavarian — was holding the Isar River at Landshut. The army was based on the Rhine from Mainz to Strassburg.

When Charles crossed the Inn, about April 12, 1809, he made impossible a French concentration at Ratisbon. Berthier, who was in command until the Emperor should arrive, failing to grasp the significance of his advance, instead of concentrating, as Napoleon had directed for this contingency, ordered the Bavarians to retake Landshut, from which they had retired at the approach of the Austrians. In the face of greatly superior forces they were unable to hold the river crossing, and fell back, thus opening a great hole in Berthier’s Augsburg-Ratisbon line, into which the Archduke began pouring his forces. The French position was not unlike that of the allies in the first Italian campaign after Montenotte, or of the Spaniards after Napoleon had made his thrust on Burgos. Fortunately, the Emperor was at hand to repair the damage which Berthier’s blunder had caused. Upon his arrival he ordered Masséna with the right wing to march from Augsburg on Pfaffenhofen, and Davout
with the left wing to march from Ratisbon on Augsburg. Both flanks were thus brought in to support the Bavarians who had fallen back to the Abens River, just east of Neustadt.

But the Archduke failed to take advantage of hisfortunate situation. Instead of marching with his whole force against either wing of Napoleon’s army, he made the mistake of marching north from Landshut in four columns—one each on Mainburg, Abensburg, Rohr, and Langquaid. The next day (April 19, 1809) he made his situation still worse by turning his center and right toward Ratisbon, where he still hoped to unite with Bellegarde. In the march toward Ratisbon his westernmost columns brushed against the columns of Davout marching south to the support of the Bavarians. There was an encounter, but it was limited to the hindermost divisions and did not deter Davout from completing his mission. A half of his corps remained to watch the Archduke himself while the remainder hurried on to carry out an attack against the Archduke’s left wing.

This wing, commanded by Hiller, had been left, when Charles turned toward Ratisbon with his center and right, in an isolated position of which Napoleon was quick to take advantage. Against it he brought the whole force of Masséna, the Bavarians, and half of Davout’s corps under Lannes. With their overwhelming numbers, they had soon defeated it (April 20, 1809) and forced it to retreat across the Isar at Landshut. Sending two cavalry divisions under Bessières in pursuit of this shattered wing, the Emperor turned his attention toward the Archduke’s main force.

Bellegarde, meanwhile, had arrived at Ratisbon after his march through Bohemia, and had quickly overpowered the garrison left there. He had then pushed southward and had soon joined Charles near Eckmühl (April 22, 1809). He had barely arrived when Masséna and Lannes, who had just finished defeating Hiller, attacked at Eckmühl. The Archduke’s right was being engaged at the time by Davout, so the attack on Eckmühl came as a disagreeable surprise; and as a
result of it he was forced to fall back upon Ratisbon. He was pursued thither by Napoleon in the hope of destroying the Austrian army, but Charles' rear guard held the city until his army had safely crossed the river. Nevertheless, Charles was now limited to a line of retreat north of the Danube, while on the south a way lay clear for the French to the Austrian capital.

The march to Vienna was made speedily, the Archduke Charles paralleling it on the north bank of the Danube. On the 9th of May, the French were before the walls, and on the evening of the 12th, Masséna entered the city. The capital surrendered on the following day. But the greatest task was still ahead, for the Archduke's army was still in the field. The two portions had united near Wagram and were expecting to be reinforced by the Archduke John who had been endeavoring to prevent Prince Eugène's advance with an army from Italy. To reach and attack this army Napoleon planned to cross the Danube at the island of Lobau. Such a crossing required the construction of two bridges, one across the wider southern channel and another across the narrow northern one. They were completed within a week, and on the morning of May 21 Masséna crossed and occupied the villages of Aspern and Essling. Charles waited until such numbers had crossed as he thought could be readily handled, and then fell upon them at the two villages. For two days a bloody battle raged, in which the Austrians, perhaps, had the advantage. The villages were taken and retaken, while Napoleon waited for Davout's corps to cross. But the great southern bridge had been destroyed by a sudden rise in the river, and nothing remained but to retire to the island of Lobau. This retreat was carried out in safety but it cost the Emperor the life of Lannes, one of his ablest marshals and closest friends.

The marshals, when consulted, advised a retreat after the defeat at Aspern, but Napoleon determined to try once more. By July 4, on which day he completed his new bridges, he
SKETCH MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLE OF WAGRAM
SCALE OF MILES

French □ Austrians ■

DEUTSCH WAGRAM

VIENNA

LOBAU

W. E. Eng. Co., N.Y.
had raised his army to 150,000, and was ready to attempt again the defeat of Charles. The next morning, his army crossed the Danube in safety and filed out on the level field of Wagram. He found the Archduke, with equal numbers, occupying a great semicircle, his left at Neusiedel, his right at Aspern. He was momentarily expecting the arrival of the Archduke John on his left.

The Emperor’s attack consisted of a simultaneous attack on the Austrian left and center. This was repulsed with such vigor, that Charles himself seized the offensive and massed his forces on the river bank hoping to cut Napoleon off from his bridges. Masséna rushed to the threatened spot, and the Emperor took command in the center. Ordering his right again forward, he massed his artillery in the center, supporting it with the cavalry of the Guard and two infantry divisions under MacDonald. The guns pushed forward almost to the Austrian lines and opened a devastating fire against which nothing could stand. The Austrian center broke, the left fell back, sharply pressed by Davout, and Charles, realizing that the Archduke John was nowhere in sight and that his heavily reinforced right at the river was too far away to assist, gave up the struggle. A well-ordered retreat was conducted, but the French were too exhausted for pursuit.

The battle of Wagram was not decisive in the same way as Austerlitz. Charles had been defeated, but he had handled the situation so skillfully that Napoleon’s gain had been a minimum. However, Austria’s losses had been heavy throughout the campaign, and the week’s desultory fighting which followed Wagram proved that there was no possibility of retrieving the situation. On July 12, 1809, Francis reluctantly agreed to an armistice.

E. THE PEACE OF SCHÖNBRUNN

The armistice concluded on July 12, 1809, and ratified reluctantly by Francis five days later put an end to hostili-
ties. Peace negotiations dragged, for a strong party among the councilors of the Emperor and in the court actually favored the resumption of hostilities. Indeed, Napoleon's terms in the beginning, comprising the cession of much territory and the abdication of the Emperor, were such as to inspire further resistance. Prussia, too, offered prospects of immediate aid in case the war were continued. The disorganization of the army, the difficulty in finding money and supplies, and the certainty that Napoleon would strike long before the Prussian contingent could aid, finally turned the scales toward peace. Napoleon receded from his most extreme demands, and the treaty of Schönbrunn was signed October 15, 1809.

The terms of the treaty marked the extent of Austria's failure. Austria ceded territory in the west to Bavaria; agreed to the division of the greater part of Galicia between Russia and the grand-duchy of Warsaw; and surrendered Trieste, Croatia, and adjoining districts to form Napoleon's new Illyrian provinces. These terms were hard enough, reducing Austrian territories by 50,000 square miles and nearly 4,000,000 souls; but in addition Napoleon was to receive an indemnity of 85,000,000 francs, and Austria was to pledge herself to reduce her active army to 150,000 men. Thus cut off from the sea, weakened and humiliated, Austria descended to the rank of a second class power.

For Napoleon's future plans, the victory at Wagram was of the utmost importance. He looked forward to a general tightening of the continental blockade and a sure victory over Great Britain. His policy in this respect became more determined than ever before.
CHAPTER XII

NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER

A. CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

The crushing of Austria at Wagram left Napoleon absolute master of the continent. No state therein dared to oppose his will. His territories, including his Kingdom of Italy, extended from the boundaries of Holland on the north to Naples and to Turkey on the Adriatic. Russia and Denmark were his allies. Holland, Spain, and Westphalia were ruled by his brothers. Naples was in the hands of one of his marshals (Murat). The Grand Duchy of Warsaw (Poland) and the Confederation of the Rhine were his protectorates. And Switzerland acknowledged him as mediator. He had indeed proved himself a worthy successor of Charlemagne. He now took advantage of his position to consolidate his power by bringing within his influence the few remaining independent units of western Europe.

i. Portugal and Spain

The hold which the little British force maintained upon Portugal broke the blockade at that point, but in the vast extent of his influence Napoleon was inclined to disregard this break and to underestimate the importance of the British operations and the coincident Spanish revolt. As his general policy was dictated by the necessity of maintaining the continental blockade, he was content to keep a cordon of French troops around the British force and satisfied that no British commerce could penetrate the continent through these lines.
But this conclusion had not been reached without serious efforts to dislodge the British. When Napoleon left Spain, to give his attention to the Austrian War, he turned over the command to Marshal Soult, who, as we have seen, was pursuing Sir John Moore in Galicia (January, 1809). Within a few weeks, opposition on the part of Spanish mobile forces had practically ceased, although resistance was still kept up in a few besieged towns. Immediately, the French began a campaign against the most formidable remaining enemy — the British in Portugal. Accordingly, they advanced in two main columns under Soult and Victor in the general direction of Lisbon, the former marching south from the neighborhood of Corunna, the latter advancing down the Tagus valley.

This was the situation which confronted General Wellesley when he arrived in Lisbon in April, 1809. With commendable energy, he determined upon attacking the two armies before they could unite. By a swift march, early in May, he surprised the French before their newly captured town of Oporto, and after sharp fighting drove them out, nor did his activities cease until, with the help of the Portuguese, he had forced Soult over the mountains into Galicia. Without delay, he turned on Victor. The latter had halted at the news of Soult's reverse, and when, a few days later, he learned of Napoleon's check at Aspern, had withdrawn to Talavera. Here, Wellesley encountered him on July 27, 1809, and for two days there raged a battle which ended in Victor's retirement on Madrid. The defeat would have been more serious but that Wellesley's Spanish allies failed him completely at the decisive moment.

In the meantime, the hand of Napoleon had reached out to direct Spanish affairs. Divining what Wellesley would do after he had defeated Soult, he ordered the latter's forces south to strike the British rear and flank. Hardly were the guns of Talavera silenced when Wellesley learned of this new menace to his army. Soult pressed his ad-
vantage, and by late August the British were in a position of great danger. The British commander proved himself equal to the situation, however, and by a skillful retreat to the south of the Tagus he made good his escape from Soult, and was soon in his old position before Lisbon. Here he began the construction of the Torres Vedras lines which were to maintain the British in the Peninsula and ultimately insure their success.

In a half dozen places the Spanish armies had been defeated by the French, until only in Andalusia did resistance continue. Wellesley had learned the true worth of his Spanish allies, however, and had determined for the future to conduct his campaigns by himself.

Hence, the Portuguese break in the continental blockade did not seriously worry Napoleon. Though naturally desirous of defeating the British and driving them from Portugal, and chagrined at the failure of his lieutenants, he still considered that his main object was being achieved by the exclusion of British goods. He was, indeed, justified under the conditions in considering the Iberian peninsula as included in his continental system.

ii. Sweden

In the far north, Sweden, one of Napoleon’s most implacable enemies, was finally induced by expediency to join his system. Her continued opposition had brought her nothing but disaster. The Russian invasion of Finland was the last blow to a discouraged people. When the King, Gustavus IV, planned still further hopeless resistance, an army corps forced his abdication, March 29, 1809. The Estates of Sweden, in sympathy with the popular desire for peace, confirmed this act, and called to the throne a descendant of Adolphus Frederick (King from 1751–1771) as Charles XIII. The new sovereign’s policy was dictated by the circumstances of his accession. He straightway made peace with Russia (September 17, 1809), ceding the remains of
Finland; and followed this with a treaty of peace with France (January 6, 1810) by which he accepted the terms of the continental blockade. Shortly afterwards, when a fatal accident removed the heir apparent, Charles designated, with the general approval of the nation and the consent of a special Diet, one of Napoleon’s marshals, Bernadotte, as his successor (August 18, 1810). For Charles XIII, this designation seemed to guarantee permanent peace with the French conqueror: for Napoleon, of course, it meant the adherence of Sweden — for the time at least — to his system.

iii. Holland

In Holland, King Louis was trying to solve a difficult problem in the best way for his people. Naturally a maritime nation and normally trading largely with Great Britain, Holland suffered severely from the restrictions imposed by the continental blockade. The people, who had no individual quarrel with, or hatred for, Great Britain, resorted to smuggling on a large scale, and the King failed to take strict measures to suppress the practice. His brother, Napoleon, showed no inclination to help Holland, but rather blamed the King for his laxness in enforcing the blockade system.

In the summer of 1809, the British attempt to open the Scheldt River to commerce intensified Napoleon’s antagonism to his brother’s government. Antwerp, the key not only to the river but to all the rich lowland country which the river waters, had been seized upon by Napoleon as the site of proposed enormous docks, arsenals, and shipyards, and already some of his construction was under way. The Emperor was not alone in his appreciation of the importance of Antwerp. Already the British had gone to war at least three times to maintain the neutrality of this city so close to their own shores, and now that the stronghold was in possession of their greatest enemy, they planned
an expedition to capture it. 40,000 men, the largest force ever sent from England until this time, set sail in July, 1809, for the mouth of the Scheldt. The attack was originally planned as a diversion for the Austrians contending with Napoleon along the Danube, but it was so late in being executed that by the time a landing was made on Walcheren Island the Austrians had been defeated and peace was in sight. Troops under Bernadotte were hurried to the defense of Antwerp, and though the British had some successes near the mouth of the river, they never seriously menaced the city. Malaria broke out alarmingly amongst the troops, and the shattered army was recalled in December, 1809, with a lengthy death roll, and with nothing permanent accomplished.

By the autumn of 1809, Napoleon had decided to annex Holland and thus introduce French agents to enforce the provisions of his blockade. In November, 1809, he advised King Louis of his intentions, but gave him the chance to retain his crown by the enforcement of strict measures against British commerce, by the creation of a strong naval force for use against England, and by the maintenance of a standing army of 25,000 men. King Louis struggled on for a few months longer, trying to conciliate Napoleon and at the same time to spare his people. Napoleon's aggressions continued. January 3, 1810, he annexed the Island of Walcheren and his troops forcibly occupied two towns near the mouth of the Scheldt. In May and June, he seized several American trading ships in Holland's harbors and demanded the cession of the territory south of the Rhine River.

Under such continued humiliations King Louis was finally moved to abdicate. On the night of July 1, 1810, after signing his abdication and writing to his counselors, he fled from his Kingdom and took refuge in a little town in Bohemia. Eight days later (July 9, 1810) Napoleon by decree annexed Holland, and straightway dispatched his
agents to confiscate forbidden goods and to enforce the French decrees.

iv. *Annexations*

Two important annexations during this year 1810 completed Napoleon's territorial extension and consolidation. In the north, he feared a leakage of British goods through the ports of the northwest German states including the duchy of Oldenburg, the Hanseatic towns (Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck), and the northern part of Hanover. In the south, he desired full control of the great Simplon Pass, the highway to Italy. With simple audacity, he decreed the annexation, December 10, 1810, to the Empire of all the lands between the lower reaches of the Rhine and the free city of Lübeck; and a fortnight later the annexation to the Empire of the Republic of Valais. There was no one who dared oppose him.

Thus by the middle of December, 1810, Napoleon had completed his system. It would be scarcely inaccurate to state that he had brought the whole of the continent of Europe within the sphere of his direct influence. France itself stretched from the Baltic to the Adriatic, and from the Rhine River to the Atlantic Ocean. France's close allies included Russia, Sweden, Denmark, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Westphalia, the Confederation of the Rhine, Switzerland, and the Kingdom of Italy, Naples, and Spain. Prussia and Austria were impotent. French emissaries were upon a cordial footing in distant Turkey. It cannot be surprising that Napoleon expected confidently that Great Britain would be brought to terms by so formidable a power.

**B. CONDITIONS IN FRANCE**

At the beginning of 1810 Napoleon had been in power, reckoning the consulate, for a full decade. For France, it was a period of order and prosperity in sharp contrast
to the ten years of chaos which had preceded it. The institutions of the Empire seemed on a firmer foundation in 1810 than they had been at any previous time.

Yet Napoleon realized how slender was the thread which bound the various parts of his wide administration together. He in his own life alone controlled the government; he was both executive and administrative authority throughout all parts of France. His energy, his insight, his memory, his capacity for work were the marvel of his contemporaries. He kept in touch simultaneously with all branches of administration, and infused something of his own energy and ability into his servants. He constantly scrutinized the details of the departments, seeking blunders and suggesting improvements. He had presented to him each fortnight full reports of the various activities of the government, so classified that he could at an instant locate any desired bit of information. He kept in touch with the affairs of foreign states through the messages of his secret agents, and often surprised diplomats by the fullness and accuracy of his knowledge. He watched closely the condition of the finances, the price of foodstuffs, the development of public improvements, the system of education, the practice of religion. Above all, he knew intimately his armies down to details of organization, equipment, discipline, and training. Though often absent from his capital for long campaigns in distant countries, he never allowed his vigilance to relax: relays of couriers kept him in constant communication with Paris. He was confident of the loyalty of his people so long as he lived, but he was troubled by his fears of what would happen to the Empire after his death. He longed for some assurance that his system would be perpetuated, for some person after him around whom the people would rally loyally and preserve the existing institutions.

This desire to guarantee the continuation of the Empire led him in 1809–1810 to seek a marriage alliance with one
of the ancient royal houses of the continent, whereby his
dynasty might find sure support in Europe, and from
which an heir might come who would give a new cohesion
to his empire. He first approached the Czar of Russia,
asking for the hand of his sister, the Archduchess Anna.
When the Czar pleaded her extreme youth — she was but
fifteen at the time — Napoleon turned to the Emperor
Francis of Austria and negotiated for the hand of his daugh-
ter, the Archduchess Maria Louisa. Though the marriage
was repugnant to Francis’ ideas and at first thought hateful
to the young archduchess, the prime minister, Metternich,
urged it for reasons of state. Francis yielded and the
archduchess assented to the sacrifice. Napoleon divorced
Josephine, settled her with a comfortable pension at the
chateau of Malmaison, and married Maria Louisa (April 2,
1810). The following year Napoleon’s hopes were ful-
filled by the birth of a son (March 20, 1811). Upon the
child he conferred the title of the King of Rome. He
looked forward confidently to a new loyalty from France
which should center about the child.

With the birth of his son, Napoleon’s happiness seemed
complete and the future of France assured. He had ex-
panded the boundaries of the Empire until they contained
45,000,000 people. He had brought order and security
out of chaos and danger. He had seen industry flourish.
He had carried through vast public improvements. Now
he saw the prospect of his work being continued by his
son amid the enthusiastic loyalty of a devoted people.

Indeed, the France which had revolted against a monarchy
and had established a Republic in the decade from 1789 to
1799 had once more under Napoleon seen the introduction
of monarchical forms. The power of the legislative body
(the Corps Legislatif) was severely restricted. One of its
chambers, the Tribunate, had been abolished after its
debating functions had been taken over (decrees of August
19, 1807) by commissions empowered to discuss legislative
proposals before the full session of the Corps Legislatif. The Senate and the Council of State were the chief bodies in the government, and their members, appointed by Napoleon, were subservient to his wishes. The Council of State considered legislation and formulated decrees for Napoleon; Napoleon sent these decrees to the Senate for ratification. Napoleon thus kept autocratic control over all legislation of major importance.

Again, the Emperor had reintroduced the ceremonies, dignities, and titles that go with monarchical government. At his elevation in 1804 he created the Legion of Honor, membership in which he awarded to soldiers or civilians who had deserved well of their country. As he conquered foreign territories, he raised his brothers and sisters to sovereign rank, and bound his ministers and marshals to his interests by bestowing upon them principalities and dukedoms. He established a court of the usual continental splendor, with its hierarchy of officials about the throne, from the Grand Imperial Dignities down to the Grand Master of Ceremonies, and with its customary retinue of chamberlains, equerries, ladies-in-waiting, aides-de-camp, pages, etc. He created a new nobility by decree (March 1, 1808), with its ranks of Prince, Duke, Count, Baron, and Chevalier (Knight).

He assumed the royal right, too, to restrict the freedom of the press and of speech. Newspapers were carefully censored or were suppressed. The official Moniteur was the only favored sheet. Political discussion was discouraged: political literature did not exist. The schools were obliged to teach loyalty to the Emperor as the first duty of a French citizen. Spies abounded, listening, sounding opinion, opening mail, and reporting to Paris the first signs of trouble.

Yet France forgave the restoration of monarchical forms, the autocratic power, the social distinctions, the loss of freedom, in the general satisfaction at the return of order
and prosperity. For France under the Empire was prosperous. Though she had been continually at war, the campaigns had been fought on foreign soil and had largely been paid for by the indemnities wrung from the conquered nations. Her national finances, honestly and wisely administered, had borne the strain. Her industries had found new continental markets to replace those lost to them by the British blockade. Her improved methods of agriculture, brought about by a campaign of education among the peasants, yielded her more bountiful crops. Her scientists solved some of the difficulties due to the blockade by perfecting the process of extracting sugar from beets, dyes from native roots, and by teaching the substitution of chicory for coffee. Her government began and carried through vast public improvements, such as canals, roads, bridges, and the draining of marsh lands. Under the autocratic and paternalistic government, the people of France were industrious, prosperous, and contented. Government securities reflected the general confidence and prosperity, rising in 1807 to ninety-three per cent and remaining firm thereafter around eighty.

Bright as this broad picture of France under the Empire may be painted, it had its dark sides too. The prosperity of France was not shared in equal degree by newly annexed territories or by France's allies in the continental system. Ominous indications proved that beyond the limits of France proper the French method of administration, even when accompanied by much-desired legal and social reforms, was seriously resented. French dependencies were too often required to be governed in the interests of France rather than for the best good of their own people.

Again, Napoleon had brought on a conflict with the Pope which stirred the religious feeling of his people. Pius VII had resisted Napoleon's attempts at an alliance after the treaty of Tilsit (1807), and had insisted upon his right to maintain his neutrality and his independence of action.
In 1808 Napoleon annexed the northern and eastern Papal states to the Kingdom of Italy; in May, 1809, he seized Rome and removed the Pope, a prisoner, to Savona. Pius VII's only means of protest was a bull of excommunication, and a refusal to confirm bishops to vacant sees in France. The spectacle of this self-styled successor to Charlemagne imprisoning the head of the Roman Catholic church awakened serious criticism in France, and, indeed, throughout Christendom.

But most serious of all was the ever-present war or shadow of war. The annual drain of conscripts, usually a year or more in advance of their legal time, kept the people aware of the cost of empire. Napoleon's wars after 1806–1807 were waged in accordance with his general policy of maintaining the continental blockade against British commerce and not for his personal glory or for French aggrandizement. The French peasant, however, had no such comprehensive conception of imperial strategy. He understood merely that war followed war, and that he was now called upon to fight in distant lands where France had no direct interest. The patriotic ardor with which he had defended France against invasion gave place to a sullen dissatisfaction with these campaigns in distant fields. And the people at home felt intuitively that their happiness and prosperity were being imperiled by the never-ending series of wars.

C. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

In the last days of 1810 Napoleon was confident that his continental blockade policy was at the point of success. The extension of his influence over the entire continent blocked the free entry of British goods at every point. His agents brought him true reports of the depression in Great Britain, of the successive crop failures and the resulting misery and suffering of the British people, of the warehouses stuffed with goods for which no market could be found, of
the commercial failures, and of the depreciation of British credit. He pictured Great Britain as choked with her own manufactured wealth, ready to plead for peace to gain a market for her products. His agents were busily tightening every joint in his vast European system that not a bale of British goods might find access to the continent.

The hardships entailed upon his allies, however, were rapidly causing a suffering as intense in many cases as that in Great Britain, and were breeding a general discontent which was bound in the end — if Great Britain held out long enough — to react against Napoleon. His continental blockade was a two-edged sword: it cut his friends as well as his enemies. The once busy and prosperous Hanseatic towns were idle and the people driven to despair by the cessation of trade and the imposition of heavy taxes. Russia, which had long exported its grain, timber, and furs, and had imported British manufactured goods, especially cloths, found herself facing huge annual deficits with no prospect of relief. Swedish and Danish ships rotted at their idle wharves. In every state of Europe, except in a few isolated cases where smuggling proved profitable or where the blockade operated as a kind of protective wall for special native industries, the continental system was choking all economic life and causing intense distress and dissatisfaction.

One breach in his great system existed, and had existed since 1808, in Portugal, but, as has been explained, this was not regarded as vital. To this was added, however, at the very end of 1810 a second breach which, if permitted, meant the ruin of his whole vast system. On December 31, 1810, the Czar of Russia signalized a change in policy by an ukase permitting colonial trade in neutral bottoms and imposing a prohibitive tariff upon the importation of certain luxuries, as wines and silks. The admission of colonial trade threw Russia's great markets open to Great Britain: the tariff upon imports of wines and silks was a direct blow at France.
i. Russia

Since his convention with the French Emperor at Erfurt, October 12, 1808, the Czar Alexander had gradually been alienated from Napoleon by the course of events. His alliance had not yielded him the results he expected. He had gained Finland, it is true, but he had learned that Napoleon, instead of aiding him to acquire Moldavia and Wallachia and an open way to Constantinople, was secretly encouraging Turkish resistance. Again, at the conclusion of the Peace of Schönbrunn, Napoleon had added large parts of Galicia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and had yielded less than one third as much territory to Russia. Alexander could not but be hostile to the growth of the grand duchy, for its strength was a continual threat against his own Polish provinces. Further, a strong party among his counselors emphasized the financial ruin his pro-Napoleonic policy was bringing upon his country in the loss of trade. He felt keenly the imputation that he was but a tool in Napoleon's hands, and that his country's policy was being subordinated to the ambitions of Napoleon. Two other incidents added a tinge of personal bitterness to Alexander's change of attitude. When Napoleon had first planned a divorce and remarriage, he had asked the hand of Alexander's sister, the Archduchess Anna; and before the alliance had been definitely refused, he had betrothed himself to Maria Louisa of Austria. The indecent haste with which Napoleon had transferred his negotiations — we can scarcely speak of affections — deeply offended the Czar. Then again, when the French Emperor annexed the states of northwest Germany, he absorbed the duchy of Oldenburg, whose sovereign was the Czar's uncle. Alexander took offense at this wanton disregard of the rights of a member of his family.

Napoleon regarded the ukase of December 31, 1810, as a direct challenge to France. He bitterly reproached the
Czar for his rupture of the alliance, but his words were without effect other than to reveal to the world that a new war was impending. Through the summer of 1811 and the early months of 1812 both states hastened their preparations.

ii. Portugal and Spain

With a Russian war in sight, the continuation of operations in Portugal and Spain proved most embarrassing. Wellesley, now Viscount Wellington, was determined to fight the war not for his personal glory but for victory. When, therefore, in the early summer of 1810, he first encountered the forces of Masséna, he began the long months of defensive warfare which broke down the French with the minimum of loss for his own command.

Napoleon had returned victorious from Wagram resolved to throw into Spain forces sufficient to subdue once and for all this troublesome peninsula. Because of the press of affairs in France he was unable to take charge in person, but in command of troops numbering over 300,000 he dispatched his lieutenants, among whom were the lustrous names of Masséna, Soult, Victor, Bessières, Ney, Reynier, Junot, and Mortier. Unfortunately, because the warfare was partly guerrilla in character, these vast numbers could not operate as one powerful unit, and to this disadvantage Napoleon himself added a second by leaving Soult (70,000) independent of Masséna. It was planned that the latter should have 120,000, but it is doubtful if the number under his immediate command was ever more than 80,000.

Of these huge armies, many thousands were necessary to reduce the fortified cities and to overcome the resistance of the hordes of Spanish nationalists. But two enterprises of some magnitude were projected. Soult was ordered south to undertake the subjugation of Andalusia, and Masséna was directed against the British in Portugal. This last operation was considered the most important,
and so that it might be completely successful, Masséna was cautioned to spare no effort in preparation.

From Burgos two roads lead into Portugal, one by way of Salamanca, the other through Madrid and Talavera. The first crosses the mountain barrier at the frontier by a pass protected by the cities of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, the second by a pass guarded in the same way by Badajoz and Elvas. This latter route is circuitous and arrives, finally, not at Lisbon itself, but at the ferry on the east bank of the Tagus. This point was, of course, in 1810, menaced by the British fleet. There is no practicable road down the Tagus valley, so Wellington felt sure that he might expect Masséna by the northern route. He knew that Soult was in Andalusia, and might menace him through Badajoz, but he felt certain that the strongholds of southern Spain, particularly Cadiz, would keep the French marshal fully occupied. Accordingly, he placed his 50,000 men, English and Portuguese, in position on the Salamanca road.

Masséna began his advance in early June, 1810. His supplies were scanty and reached him so irregularly that it was not until mid-August that the mountain pass was in his possession. He was not alarmed at this, for the Emperor had told him that he might take all summer reducing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. The towns taken, however, he pushed rapidly in pursuit of Wellington’s army. The British general occupied a position at Busaco with the idea of damaging his opponent’s forces, and did succeed in checking him with heavy loss. Masséna, however, out-flanked him to the north, and Wellington was obliged to fall back.

The victor of Rivoli now felt that the worst of the campaign was over, for he was assured that Wellington was withdrawing to his transports. In hot haste, then, he followed closely behind the retiring allies. But on the evening of October 10 his advance cavalry came upon fortifications, and Masséna riding forward the next morn-
ing to investigate, found himself facing the famous lines of Torres Vedras. It is said that in response to a shot from a British battery, he lifted his hat and bowed in acknowledgment of his defeat.

For defeat it was. Two sturdy lines of fortifications, five miles apart, prepared with all the skill which the British Engineers could bring to bear upon them, stretched across the Lisbon peninsula from the Atlantic to the Tagus. Thousands of Portuguese laborers had worked on them for months, and now when Masséna appeared before them, they were complete, thirty miles long and manned by thirty thousand Portuguese militia under British officers, while behind, Wellington with his regular army stood ready to receive whatever attacks the French might make. There the British fleet supported his troops in comfort while outside the French were starving in an impoverished country.

Masséna, hoping for the reinforcements which alone could enable him to force the Tagus below the Torres Vedras lines, remained on the river for four months and then in March, 1811, began the retreat to the mountain passes. Soult meanwhile had taken Badajoz, but this of itself could bring no relief to Masséna's starved and frozen army. There is no room here for the details of that wretched retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo. The brave Ney in command of the rear guard performed the most brilliant exploits of his career, but a bare half of the army crossed the mountain passes. Cold, sickness, hunger, and the implacable hatred of the inhabitants had cost Masséna 25,000 men.

The remaining months of the year mark the beginning of Wellington's offensive. He directed his attacks first on the northern pass, then against the southern, now against Marmont (who had succeeded Masséna), now against Soult. The battles of Fuente d'Oñoro and of Albuera in July took a heavy toll of the French, but they held doggedly to the strongholds of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. They had, however, by the close of 1811, lost
NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER

every foot of ground in Portugal, whereas, on the western side of the mountains, Wellington was each day becoming stronger and more active.

D. PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA

Embarrassing as these Portuguese and Spanish operations were, Napoleon naturally concentrated his main attention during 1811 and the early months of 1812 upon his preparations for his campaign against Russia.

He had already begun to feel in France a slackening in that military fervor which had supplied him his earlier armies, but he turned to the task with vigor. The armies that fought at Wagram had been maintained in the form of so-called "corps of observation" on the Elbe, the Rhine, and in Italy, and in their augmented form numbered 200,000. These constituted the backbone of the great army of Russia, and about them Napoleon gathered the legions from his allies, willing and coerced alike. Austrian, Prussian, Illyrian, Polish, Rhenish, Saxon, and Italian contingents swelled his army to a strength that has been variously estimated at from 450,000 to 600,000 men. The variations lie in the uncertainty of determining what troops protected his frontiers and lines of communications, but it is probable that he crossed to Russian soil with a full 400,000.

To the formation of this enormous army, the Emperor had paid the closest personal attention. Details of ordnance, transportation, uniform, commissariat, routes of march, — everything had passed under his eye. Indeed, it may fairly be said that Napoleon commenced this campaign as Emperor, Commander-in-Chief, Minister-of-War, and Chief-of-Staff — a burden which might well bow even his capable shoulders.

Coincident with these strictly military preparations were diplomatic attempts to secure the greatest possible assistance from his allies. His marriage alliance with Austria, the overwhelming force he could bring at short notice against her, and his knowledge of her weak financial condition made
him certain that she would not accept the Czar's overtures. He knew, too, that Austria did not desire to see Russia established upon the lower reaches of the Danube in Moldavia and Wallachia. He did not feel so sure of Prussia. His agents kept him informed of the progress of the national movement in that state. He had, however, great forces cantoned in fortresses within easy reach of the Prussian border, and determined to use those as a threat to force Prussia into active alliance with him. He realized that he could not leave a possible enemy in force upon his line of communications. Frederick William, in view of his probable annihilation if he made common cause with the Czar, yielded to Napoleon's terms, agreed to furnish a Prussian contingent to the Grand Army, and so to distribute the troops remaining in Prussia that they would be under the constant surveillance of French officers. In Poland, too, Napoleon's diplomacy was successful. Though the Czar offered the Poles an independent Kingdom with himself as King, the Poles remained faithful to Napoleon, who had created their Grand Duchy of Warsaw and had so liberally enlarged their territory by the Peace of Schönbrunn (1809). Napoleon, however, was disappointed in his dealings with Turkey and Sweden. Though his agents tried to put new life into the Turkish campaign against Russia, the Sultan, obtaining liberal terms from the Czar, made peace with Russia in the Treaty of Bucharest (May 28, 1812). The Czar gave up his immediate hope of gaining Moldavia and Wallachia, but acquired Bessarabia and freed his army on the Danube for the defense of the Ukraine region. Napoleon's overtures to his former marshal, Bernadotte, prince regent of Sweden during the dotage of Charles XIII, were met by the demand that France should agree to the Swedish acquisition of Norway. Since Norway belonged to France's loyal ally, Denmark, Napoleon refused to yield. Bernadotte thereupon threw in his fortunes with Russia, and signed a treaty of alliance with the Czar
March 24, 1812. Great Britain, of course, welcomed friendship with any country willing to oppose Napoleon. Russia and Sweden, therefore, quickly composed their differences with Great Britain and signed an alliance July, 1812, after the French invasion had already begun.

France and Russia had for so long actively and openly prepared for hostilities that a declaration of war was hardly necessary; and, in fact, none was issued. The last week of June, 1812, Napoleon's Grand Army crossed the Niemen River. Without other notification, the war began.
CHAPTER XIII

THE CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA AND THE CAMPAIGN OF LEIPZIG

Just as in the latter days of the Revolution the military exigencies strike the dominant note in the government, so, beginning with 1812, we find the thunder of guns, constantly increasing, drowning out matters of domestic import which had hitherto engaged the Emperor. From 1812 to 1815 history was made only on battle fields. The periods of quiet were mere armistices and lulls during which the opponents were preparing themselves for further struggle. Four great campaigns — the Russian in 1812, the Leipzig in 1813, the defense of France in 1814, and the Waterloo in 1815 — hurried the Napoleonic drama on to its tragic close.

A. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, 1812

The disastrous campaign which opened in June, 1812, was conducted on so vast a scale that a brief sketch can provide only the slightest conception of the magnitude of the operations. The Emperor’s forces were divided into three armies. The first, 220,000 strong, which he himself commanded, with Berthier as his Chief-of-Staff, was composed of the Guards, three infantry corps under Davout, Oudinot, and Ney, and two cavalry divisions. The second army, 80,000 strong, was commanded by Prince Eugène, and was composed of Eugène’s own corps, that of St. Cyr, and one cavalry division. The third army, numbering 80,000 also, was under the command of the Emperor’s brother, Jérôme, and was made up of three infantry corps under Poniatowski, Vandamme, and Reynier, and one
cavalry division. On the extreme left was MacDonald in command of 38,000 men of which the Prussian Auxiliary Corps was a part, and on the extreme right, Schwarzenberg led the Austrian Auxiliary Corps, 30,000 strong. On June 23, 1812, the Emperor’s army crossed the Niemen at Kovno and set out for Vilna. One week later, Jérôme crossed the river at Grodno, and on the following day Eugène crossed at a point between the other two armies, and followed the Emperor toward Vilna.

To oppose the French, the Czar Alexander had in his first line two armies ready for service, one under Barclay de Tolly numbering about 120,000, with its headquarters at Vilna, the other 50,000 strong under Bagration, stationed near Volkovisk. A third army, some 40,000 in number, was in process of formation, while on the frontier of Turkey, a fourth of 50,000 waited the cessation of Turkish hostilities. The Czar had placed his forces in the belief that Napoleon would proceed against him in one large column, directed probably toward Vilna. This would be met by his larger force under Barclay, while Bagration’s army coming from the south harassed its flank and rear. The existence of Napoleon’s second and third columns, of course, made such a procedure impossible, and the Czar from the very beginning found himself acting on the defensive. In addition to his ignorance as to Napoleon’s method of advance, Alexander was still working on the supposition that Austria and Prussia would remain neutral.

On June 28, the Emperor’s forces captured Vilna. His plan of campaign contemplated a piercing of his enemy’s right wing, and then a continuation of operations against the communications of the hostile center and left. The advance to Vilna practically completed the first step of the scheme, for Barclay fell back, in accordance with a previously arranged plan, to the entrenched town of Drissa, there to wait his reinforcement by Bagration. Such a junction was, of course, impossible, and within a few days
the absurdity of the position at Drissa, while the left wing was all but surrounded, became apparent, and Barclay began a withdrawal to Vitebsk. Unfortunately, the Emperor had delayed at Vilna until he should hear of success against the army of Bagration, and did not, therefore, begin further activities until July 16, the very day on which Barclay set out for Vitebsk.

And meanwhile, the operations against Bagration had gone sadly awry. Davout had been sent from Vilna in the direction of Minsk, there to crush Bagration's army when Jérome should have driven it against him. But the latter had been most dilatory, and had remained unaccountably immobile for four days in spite of Napoleon's urgent commands to move forward. As a result, Bagration was enabled by a detour through Bobruisk to avoid serious encounter with Davout and to reach Smolensk on August 1, where on the following day, his army was united with that of Barclay.

After a two weeks' rest, Napoleon on August 14, 1812, continued his operations. The indecisiveness of the campaign thus far was most vexatious to him at a time when he considered some conspicuous achievement essential, and urged him to advance farther into Russia, at a season when prudence advised taking a defensive position (though, perhaps, strategically, an undesirable one), and preparing for the winter. His initial move involved an attack against Smolensk, on the left bank of the Dnieper, which should cut off the Russian retreat to Moscow; but before the operation could be completed, the Russians learned of his plan. Accordingly, they held the city only until they were sure of their communications, and then retired.

The Emperor pushed hotly forward on the three hundred mile pursuit to Moscow. One great battle broke the continuity of the march. Barclay, unwilling to risk his army in a pitched battle, was summarily removed and his place filled by Kutusov. The latter, knowing that his appoint-
ment had been made that he might fight a battle in defense of "holy Moscow," turned at Borodino, on September 4, 1812, to meet the army of the Emperor. The French forces were so strung out along the Smolensk road that it was not until September 7, after he had made a careful reconnaissance of the field, that Napoleon was ready to attack.

Kutusov's army of 110,000 occupied an excellent position, increased in value by the addition of redoubts and other works. At 6 A.M. the action began—an attack full on the center supported by a turning movement against the hostile left flank by Poniatowski's corps. The great center redoubt was taken again and again, but Kutusov handled his forces skillfully and brought troops where they were most needed. Eugène, Ney, and Davout, late in the afternoon, united their commands and launched a great blow at the Russian left center. The attack was a success and shattered the hostile line, but exhausted the assailants. Hurriedly, the marshals sent a request to the Emperor to throw in the Guard and complete with fresh troops what had been so ably begun. But the Emperor, 1500 miles from Paris and in a hostile country, in an unusual mood of prudence refused the request, and Kutusov made his way unpursued from the bloody field. He had lost 40,000 men and he had caused the French a loss of 30,000. The battle had served Napoleon only to open the road to Moscow.

The occupation of the city, which took place September 14, was a short-lived triumph. On the morning following, fires broke out all over the city, probably set by the hands of Russian patriots, and for two days Moscow was a sea of flames. Napoleon's position was a serious one. His army was in the heart of a hostile country, the supplies he had expected to find in the vicinity of Moscow were insufficient to support him, and he had of necessity left portions of his command behind on his communications, so that now, MacDonald (left), Schwarzenberg (right), and himself formed the apices of a huge triangle, five hundred miles to a side.
On October 4, he attempted to open negotiations for peace, but Alexander was keenly alive to the situation and declined resolutely to treat. Winter in Moscow was impossible, and after three precious weeks of further delay in the hope of a possible peace, Napoleon moved out for Smolensk. He planned to go by a southern route which had not been touched by the advance, but a rough handling at Maloyaroslavetz forced him back to the main road to Smolensk.

News had already come that both to the north at Polotsk and to the south near Minsk, the enemy were approaching his communications. But now came the advance guards of a sterner and more powerful foe—winter. By the time the Emperor reached Smolensk, the Russians all the time at his heels, the thermometer was registering zero weather, and his loss in horses and men had been frightful. Not over 50,000 actives of the 110,000 who had left Moscow remained to him at Smolensk. The weather had ruined discipline, and a whole army of stragglers followed as best they could.

November 14, 1812, the French left Smolensk in four bodies, the Guard first, followed in turn by Eugène, Davout, and Ney. At Krasnoi the Emperor and his stepson were attacked by a superior force, but fought valiantly until they were reinforced by Davout. Ney had been lost sight of, and Napoleon was reluctantly obliged to leave him. But at Orcha, Ney rejoined the main army with less than half his corps, after a series of exploits that more than justified his sobriquet of "bravest of the brave." The shattered army pushed on with what speed it could to Borisov.

Then came the terrible crossing of the Beresina. At Borisov, the corps of Oudinot and Victor joined, bringing the army up to 40,000 effectives. Fully as many stragglers were in the vicinity. Oudinot's men with great difficulty constructed bridges over the Beresina on November 26,
and late in the afternoon, the infantry of that corps crossed. The foe had troops close at hand which attempted to impede the crossing, but Victor’s corps by gallant efforts protected the miserable army. The military crossing was completed November 27, although great numbers of stragglers still remained on the east bank. Napoleon, sacrificing the chances of his army, allowed the bridges to remain a day longer, to permit these stragglers to cross, but on November 29 he burned the bridges and left the remaining wretches on the other bank to their fate at the hands of the enemy.

From the Beresina the retreat became a confused flight. Napoleon, seeing new and greater labors ahead, left for Paris on December 5. Ney with a valiant rear guard protected the dwindling army. Finally, on December 8, the wreck of the Grand Army crossed the Niemen at Vilna and the exhausted Russians were forced to let the pursuit drop. To the south, Schwarzenberg’s Austrians were withdrawing to their own frontiers, and to the north, Yorck was already negotiating with the Russians for the treasonable surrender of the Prussian corps. Huge numbers of sick and stragglers had filtered back into Germany during the previous months, but of the Grand Army which had crossed the Niemen in the heat of June, a single organized body of less than 40,000 recrossed its ice-bound surface in December.

B. THE AFTERMATH OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Napoleon left his retreating army at Smorgon December 5, 1812, and traveled at top speed via Vilna, Warsaw, Dresden, and Mainz to Paris, reaching his capital at midnight December 18–19. He knew that his presence was sorely needed in France. Vague rumors of disaster had alarmed the people. A conspiracy at the end of October, 1812, after Napoleon had not been heard from for a fortnight, had nearly succeeded in overthrowing his government by announcing his death. He in person had to reassert his
authority, calm the fears of his people, and above all initiate measures to recoup his losses and defend his empire.

To his councilors he painted his situation in the most favorable light possible. He had been defeated, he said, not by the Russians, but by the exceptionally early and severe winter weather. He had beaten the Russians in every battle. He had not lost a gun until he was forced to abandon artillery because of the lack of horses. His army, when he turned it over to Murat at Smorgon, was, he said, still in good condition, and could serve as a nucleus for a new force to save the empire. By such statements and by the force of his personality he reassured his advisers and, in some measure at least, allayed the excited fears of the people.

Indeed, his position was by no means desperate so long as he could maintain his empire and its alliances intact. He had the resources of all western Europe, except Spain and Portugal, at his disposal. He could levy for troops and supplies upon all the countries from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. He could, by withdrawing his armies in Spain to the natural defensive line of the Pyrenees, divert a great force of trained and seasoned troops to meet the Russians. He still had the promise of alliance of Denmark, the Confederation of the Rhine, Saxony and Poland, Prussia, Austria, the Kingdom of Italy, and Naples. And above all, France itself was loyal to him. The Russian Czar, Alexander, would be bold if he attempted to defy the power of such a league.

Napoleon, however, realized that his league had fatally weak links in Prussia and Austria. These states had so suffered at his hands that they could hardly be expected to maintain their loyalty to the French alliance when once the Emperor's power was broken. All depended upon their attitude.

In Prussia, the news of the French disaster was as the dawn of a new day. When the ragged, starving remains of
Napoleon’s Grand Army streamed across the Prussian border, they sent a thrill of hope throughout the Prussian people. The tale of the extent of the distress of the French spread rapidly from mouth to mouth. A few days later, news of the convention of Tauroggen (December 30, 1812), by which the Prussian general Yorck had betrayed Napoleon and saved the Prussian contingent by agreement with the Russians, increased the popular excitement. Yorck, by his treachery to the French, raised himself to the position of a national hero in the thoughts of the Prussians. The secret leagues, like the Tugendbund (League of Virtue), which had flourished in Prussia and throughout Germany since the débâcle of 1806 with the desire of inspiring the people to work for the regeneration of the German fatherland, now openly proclaimed that the moment for an uprising against the tyrant was at hand. In only one quarter was there hesitation—in the government. Frederick William III was still in fear of the power of Napoleon. He vacillated when the whole nation was aroused. In Berlin, where the French garrison was still in control, he disavowed the act of Yorck in signing the convention of Tauroggen and sent repeated messages of assurance to Napoleon. All through the month of January, 1813, he was subject to the greatest of pressure, on the one hand from his fears that a fatal war would end in the extinction of his Kingdom, and on the other hand from the loyal enthusiasm of his aroused people. In February he moved from his capital to Breslau, where he was less subject to the watch of the French.

In Austria, the disaster to the French army failed to arouse any such national enthusiasm as in Prussia, but resulted in a marked independence of policy by the government. The chancellor, Metternich, had been responsible for the original alliance with Napoleon after Wagram, and had persuaded his Emperor, Francis, to cement this alliance by permitting the marriage of the Archduchess Maria Louisa to Napoleon. The advantages of the alliance so
long as Napoleon remained powerful were obvious: a new condition was created, however, by the prospect of Napoleon's fall. Metternich exerted himself, therefore, to pursue a policy which should guarantee the safety of Austria, maintain the dignity of Francis, and insure his own reputation. He first concluded a secret agreement with Russia (January, 1813) to cease hostilities. He did not, however, venture at first to repudiate the French alliance, but he initiated a policy of independence by putting Austria forward as a mediator for a general peace. He was, indeed, feeling his way. By proposing mediation, he was taking no step inconsistent with his alliance with France, and yet he was moving definitely toward the independent position he desired Austria to assume in European affairs.

In the meanwhile, Napoleon was exerting himself to prepare his country and his armies to resist whatever forces should be brought against them. At no time in his career were his energy and his genius more conspicuously displayed than during the early months of 1813. He provided for the drafting of new levies of soldiers, and for their equipment and training. He raised funds by taking over the communal lands and disposing of them. He framed a new concordat with the Pope, induced him to sign it (January 25, 1813), and reaped the advantage of it, even though two months later the Pope repudiated it. He kept in constant touch with the courts of Prussia and Austria, endeavoring to keep them within his alliance. He was working under high pressure, but was accomplishing wonders.

The danger-spot was Prussia. When Frederick William III removed to Breslau, he went outside the direct range of French influence as typified by the French garrison in Berlin. The unanimity of public opinion in favor of a war of liberation became evident to him. He recalled Schernhorst and Gneisenau to assist in the organization, equipment, and training of the masses of enthusiastic volunteers, and Hardenberg as chancellor to be his chief councilor in
conducting the government at the crisis. He approached the government of Austria, seeking alliance, but received no encouragement from Metternich. He at last, upon the advice of Hardenberg, turned to Alexander of Russia.

When Alexander of Russia had reached the Prussian border, he had been temporarily halted by a division among his councilors. Kutusov, his commanding general, favored the abandonment of the pursuit at that point. Stein urged the grander plan of advancing to liberate Europe from the oppression of Napoleonic tyranny, and prophesied the uprising of the Prussian people. Alexander's hatred of Napoleon, his desire to play a great part in the history of his time, and his belief that his success would win him Poland, inclined him to follow the counsel of Stein. He moved his troops across the Niemen River, and (February, 1813) welcomed negotiations with Frederick William III.

With both sovereigns agreed upon the main object, the negotiations proceeded rapidly. By the Treaty of Kalisch, signed February 26, 1813, Russia and Prussia bound themselves to an offensive and defensive alliance. Prussia agreed to furnish 80,000 troops; Russia, 150,000. Alexander pledged himself to continue the war until Prussia was restored to her boundaries of 1805. Russia was to receive extensive acquisitions in Poland. Prussia was to receive compensation for her Polish losses by annexations in northern Germany. A fortnight later, Prussia made public the treaty and declared war on France (March 13, 1813).

At the same time that this declaration was made, a new country in the north turned actively against Napoleon. Bernadotte, the crown prince of Sweden, when the news of the French disaster reached him, demanded the cession of Norway as the price of Swedish support. To accede to this demand would have been a base betrayal of Denmark, which had remained consistently faithful to the French alliance. Napoleon therefore refused. Bernadotte there-
upon further cemented his alliance of 1812 with Great
Britain by a new treaty of March 13, 1813, and landed
12,000 troops in Swedish Pomerania, ready to operate
against the French when the opportunity offered.

Thus in the spring of 1813, Napoleon faced a coalition
in the east of Russia and Prussia, had a Swedish force in
the north prepared to strike at his communications, and
was heavily engaged against the Spanish, Portuguese, and
British in Spain. Though Austria was not at the moment
against him, she had made evident her new independent
policy. April 16, 1813, Napoleon left Paris to join his
armies in the east.

C. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN — TO THE ARMISTICE

Although the Grand Army had retreated into Poland
little better than a band of fugitives, there were troops in
the Polish and Prussian fortresses which had not felt the
burden of war. To Napoleon it seemed imperative that
the line of the Vistula should be held. Accordingly he
admonished Eugène, whom he had placed in supreme com-
mand, of the necessity of presenting a bold front to the
Russians. But the defection of Yorck, and the lukewarm
attitude of the Austrians in withdrawing to their own
frontiers, combined with evidences of such strong antipathy
to the French as threatened actual uprising, persuaded
Eugène to withdraw from Posen, and ultimately to take
up a position at Magdeburg on the Elbe. Here reinforce-
ments were gradually collected about him until he had an
army of 60,000 guarding the line of the river. To his right
rear, the Emperor had collected another force of 105,000
on the lower Main; a third force of 40,000 was hurrying
from Italy.

The allied army at the opening of the campaign num-
bered about 130,000. The right wing, 50,000 strong, under
Wittgenstein, was marching on Magdeburg; the left wing,
a force of 40,000 under Blücher, was directed on Dresden;
while the center reserve of 40,000, under Kutusov, was following a center route but was still far to the rear when activities commenced. More units were being formed, and great hope was placed in the prospect of reinforcement by Austria. The allied commanders feared an attack on Berlin, but they nevertheless determined to assume the offensive, devising a plan which involved a march down the Elbe, rolling up the French line as they went.

The Emperor had hoped that his foe would march so far south that he would be able to cut him off from Prussia by an advance from Magdeburg, but when on April 25, 1813, he joined the army at Erfurt, he found that the enemy was in two main bodies, one to the south and one to the north of Leipzig. He therefore abandoned his first plan and determined on a concentration near Merseburg, followed by a frontal advance which should push the allies across the Elbe. Eugène's army, composed of the corps of MacDonald, Lauriston, and Reynier, was ordered on Merseburg, while the main army — the Guard, Ney, Marmont, Oudinot, and Bertrand — were advanced from near Erfurt. His advance guard arrived before Leipzig May 1, 1813, and there gained contact with the enemy. The main body was at this time some distance to the rear, and, since the Elbe protected them on the left, well to the right of the advance guard.

The allied armies, meanwhile, had united, and learning of the arrival of troops before Leipzig, determined to strike. Mistaking Napoleon's strong advance guard for his main army, they devised the plan of attacking fiercely at Lützen (to the west of Leipzig) with about 5000, while with their main body they endeavored to turn his right flank. The effect of this was, of course, to bring their main body full front to the Emperor's army marching to the right and rear of his advance guard. The attack at Lützen began about 9 A.M., May 2, and was proceeding spiritedly under the Emperor's personal direction, when suddenly there was
heard the roar of cannon to the rear. Comprehending instantly its full import, Napoleon set out for the scene of action, where he at once prepared a battle-reserve. When the allies' attack began to slacken from exhaustion, he rushed forward a hundred guns which tore the hostile line to shreds, and through the holes he marched his reserve. The victory was complete, and had the Emperor possessed an adequate cavalry, annihilation of the beaten army would have followed. As it was, the allies retreated under cover of night from a field which should have been as decisive as Austerlitz.

The retreat lay through Dresden, and thither Napoleon followed with five corps, while Ney with his own corps, Reynier's, Lauriston's, and a new corps under Victor, was sent to cross at Torgau in the hope of turning the enemy's position in the Saxon capital. At first the allies seemed disposed to dispute the crossing, for they established artillery on the bank in the vicinity of the bridges. A superior massing of artillery drove them out, however, and under cover of its fire, the bridges were built, and the army was pushed across. There was no further attempt to defend the city, and a reconnaissance to the east showed that the foe was rapidly retiring. Contact was not again effected until the line of the Spree was reached.

Here, near the little village of Bautzen, the allies had decided once more to risk an encounter. Their first line of defense was that of the river itself, but behind that on the heights was a second line of considerable strength to which they proposed to fall back. The Emperor's army as we have seen was marching in two bodies, one from Dresden (Napoleon), and one from Torgau (Ney), the second one about a day's march behind the first. When Napoleon had reconnoitered the hostile line, he determined upon a frontal attack which should drive it back from the river, whereupon he would strike it in the right flank with Ney's army and crush it. His plan worked almost mechanically. On May 20, the river line was everywhere pushed back,
after hot fighting, and the French advanced to the right bank of the stream. Early next morning the attack began again, and in some places the French were repulsed. But Napoleon was not alarmed, for he had assured himself of the presence of Ney and was only waiting for the latter to attack in flank. When the assault came, the allied line was crumpled, and Napoleon, hastily throwing in his frontal reserve, was able within a few hours to congratulate himself on the second great victory of the campaign.

Again the lack of cavalry had left him powerless to prevent the enemy from making an orderly retreat, and again the pursuit had to begin, this time directed toward Silesia. But by the middle of May, the behavior of Austria alarmed the Emperor, and he opened negotiations with a view to peace. On June 1, 1813, a thirty-six-hour armistice was agreed to, a lull in operations which was gradually lengthened to a six weeks' suspension of war.

D. THE ARMISTICE

Historians, knowing the disorganization and weakness of the allied armies following their successive defeats, have marveled at Napoleon's short-sighted policy in concluding the armistice of Pläswitz, June 1, 1813. Napoleon's own losses, however, had been exceptionally heavy, and he sorely needed time to procure the additional cavalry to drive his victories home. Also, he feared the policy of Austria, and hoped by bringing up troops from Italy to overawe her government and force it to remain neutral. Possibly had he realized the extent of demoralization among his enemies, he would have waived these advantages of an armistice and continued the campaign to a decision.

During the armistice both belligerents worked furiously to strengthen their position for the ensuing struggle. Fresh troops were brought up; supply lines established and improved; and all possible done to equip the armies for the reopening of the war after the armistice.
Austria was recognized as the critical state now, however, as Prussia had been in the first months of the year. Prussia, Russia, and Sweden, after some preliminary difficulties over the question of Hanover, reached an agreement with Great Britain by which British subsidies were allowed, but they found Metternich of Austria hard to deal with. Metternich had, indeed, now fully resumed for Austria full independence of policy. He was guided by a purely Austrian policy. He purposed to reestablish the old continental equilibrium of power between Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France. He was unwilling to encourage Russia's aggrandizement. He distrusted the popular movement in Prussia. He did not desire to weaken unduly the French Empire. He saw the opportunity of advancing Austrian interests by dictating to Napoleon the terms of peace. Metternich's proposals as mediator were laid before Napoleon June 7, 1813, and involved the abolition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and the Confederation of the Rhine; the restoration of the Illyrian provinces to Austria; the surrender of the Hanseatic towns and of the northern German states; and the reestablishment of Prussia in her boundaries of 1805. Shortly afterwards, while Napoleon was deliberating on these terms, Metternich signed the Treaty of Reichenbach with the Russian-Prussian allies (June 27, 1813), agreeing to join them in the war if the terms were not accepted.

Napoleon might well have agreed to these terms. They left him a huge empire, far greater than the France of the Bourbon Kings. It was, however, galling to his pride to think of returning to Paris with diminished empire. He consented to a congress to discuss the terms and dispatched a representative thereto, but continued to push feverishly his preparations for a renewal of the campaign.

The Congress of Prague was in session from July 15 to August 10, 1813. After agreeing upon an extension of the armistice from July 20 to August 20, the delegates entered
upon a discussion of possible terms of peace along the lines laid down by Metternich. The French representative, Caulaincourt, could not, however, obtain from Napoleon the authority to accept these terms. Finally, as negotiations continued to drag, Metternich put forth Austria as armed mediator and delivered to Napoleon an ultimatum that the terms must be accepted by August 10 or Austria would enter the war on the side of the allies. When August 10th arrived and Napoleon had failed to answer the ultimatum to the satisfaction of Austria, the Congress declared itself dissolved. Two days later, August 12, 1813, Austria declared war against France.

E. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN—TO THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

The Emperor had during the armistice greatly increased his armies by the addition of levies from France so that at the resumption of hostilities his army numbered nearly 420,000 effectives. The allies had augmented their forces by recruiting as well as by the addition of the Austrian contingent, and must have had in the field 435,000 men. These figures had been placed as high as 700,000 and 860,000 respectively, but the lesser figures are certainly more accurate as a comparison of the power of the two combatants. Of the Emperor’s enemies, Bernadotte with the Swedes and Prussians (135,000) lay near Berlin; Blücher, 95,000 Russians and Prussians, about Breslau; and Schwarzenberg, 180,000 Austrians and Russians, in Bohemia.

The Emperor’s position called for the exercise of all his talents, but was far from being an unsatisfactory one at the opening of this phase of the campaign. He was determined to strike a blow at his old lieutenant, Bernadotte, while waiting to see what the main body of his enemy should propose. With the Austrians on the move behind the Bohemian mountains, he knew that his position in Silesia was too advanced, and accordingly withdrew the bulk of his army to Bautzen. From here he directed Oudinot against
Berlin, supporting him by troops from the lower Elbe. Such an advance if successful would not only capture the Prussian capital, but could continue and relieve the French garrisons in Danzig and the Oder fortresses.

While waiting for the consummation of this scheme, Napoleon made an experimental move toward Blücher, hoping to draw him into an exposure of his real intentions, but the wily old Prussian simply retreated before the advancing French, drawing them farther and farther into Silesia. At this juncture, the Emperor learned that the Austrians were advancing in force down the Elbe, threatening to take Dresden and to cut his communications with France. Leaving MacDonald to watch Blücher, Napoleon hurried his army to Bautzen, planning meanwhile a march across the mountains to Königstein which should result in a battle bound to be decisive. But at Bautzen he received word from St. Cyr, garrisoning Dresden, that Schwarzenberg was already through the defiles, and that if the fortress were to be saved, help must come at once. Refusing to give up entirely his proposed march into Bohemia, the Emperor ordered Vandamme's corps to effect the crossing to Königstein, while with the main army he himself set out for Dresden. He was only just in time, for Schwarzenberg's six columns were close to the city, and the battle was already under way when the French from Bautzen began to arrive.

The battle began late in the afternoon of August 26, 1813. The superior numbers of the Austrians soon told on the defenders, and St. Cyr had begun a slow withdrawal when the Emperor arrived. Night gave an opportunity to put the new arrivals in position, and to formulate a plan. A severe rain storm which occurred during the night placed the Austrians with their heavy artillery at a disadvantage, of which the French were soon aware. In the morning, the Emperor began an operation unusual for him—an attack on both flanks of his opponent. The cannon
of the Dresden redoubts were, he thought, able to hold off the attacks from the Austrian center while a spirited assault on the hostile right would leave him free to carry out the portion of his scheme to which he looked to bring success—the assault on the hostile left. A ravine just to the south of the city ran between the allied center and left, and upon the wing thus isolated, the blow was launched. So effective was this that the isolated portion of Schwarzenberg’s line was completely crushed, less than one fourth of it escaping. The success of Ney’s assaults on the other flank made necessary a withdrawal of the center and by late afternoon the allies were in full flight. For the third time, the lack of cavalry rendered sterile what was the last great victory of the Empire.

Success did not lie wholly with the French, however. When Napoleon withdrew to Bautzen, preparatory to Dresden, Blücher seized his opportunity and administered a telling defeat to MacDonald. The Austrians, retreating into Bohemia, came upon Vandamme at Kulm, his corps across their road, and by sheer force of numbers overpowered him. Within a few days came word that Oudinot had been repulsed at Grossbeeren, south of Berlin, and Ney at Dennewitz.

But when the Emperor hastened eastward to repair the damage done to MacDonald, Blücher retreated before him, and Schwarzenberg again advanced down the Elbe. Back came the Emperor to overwhelm the Austrians only to find that the latter had retired. Time was working for the allies, and they did not mean to risk another defeat. Napoleon’s activities of this period of the campaign do not show him at his best. Indeed, his numerous marches back and forth from Bautzen earned from the sneering peasants the title of “The Bautzen Messenger.” When, finally, he reviewed his situation, he decided upon a stand somewhere behind the Elbe which would enable him to start anew in the spring.

The determination to execute this plan brought him on
October 13 to Düben. His enemies lay as follows: Bernadotte at Halle, Blücher at Wittenberg, Schwarzenberg to the south of Leipzig. Plainly the only way to overcome them was to turn first on one, and then on the other. Blücher was the first objective. But by now the Prussian had moved westward from Wittenberg and at the moment of Napoleon's operation, Bernadotte was between the Prussians and the French. The attack, therefore, came upon the timid Bernadotte who at once withdrew, leaving Napoleon, as he thought, free to deal with Schwarzenberg. But though the Emperor was acting on interior lines, he had not left himself room to operate to advantage, and he had lost sight of Blücher — the real danger to his success. When, therefore, he turned to meet the Austrians, although he was in no danger from Bernadotte, Blücher was within a day's march.

On October 16 began the Battle of the Nations. Napoleon had massed his troops to the east of Leipzig, prepared to meet Schwarzenberg's Austrians who were approaching in converging columns down the valleys of the Elster and Pleisse, with the heaviest column on the right hand of the latter. Farther to the west, a third column under Ginlay was pressing northward in the double hope of destroying the bridge on the road to Erfurt, and of uniting with Blücher when the latter should arrive from the north. The French positions were undisturbed by the Austrian onslaughts, and Ginlay's column completely failed in its mission. In the afternoon, however, there came disturbing news from northwest of the city, that Blücher was closing in on the city and had already reached the suburb of Möckern. Detachments of French troops were sent to oppose him, and in the early evening, before the little village, there occurred some of the most furious fighting of the Napoleonic wars. Nightfall brought success to the Prussians, and left Napoleon occupying a space far too restricted for successful handling of his forces.
He had hoped, as we have seen, to defeat Schwarzenberg before Blücher could arrive, but he had allowed himself neither time nor space in which to complete such a plan. On the second day of the battle, therefore, he could only resist the attacks of his enemies, directed against him from the same quarters, and in much the same fashion as on the day previous. Again Ginlay’s column was driven in upon the main Austrian column, a success which enabled Napoleon to make sure of the bridge across the Elster on the Erfurt road.

It was a fortunate gain for the French, for on the third day, Bernadotte’s army came in on the northeast and filled the gap between Blücher and Schwarzenberg. The Emperor’s situation was now hopeless. Pressed on three sides by the savage attacks of his enemies, he gave the orders to retreat from the disastrous field. Bravely the French kept open their single line of retreat to the west, and by daybreak a full half of the army was across the Elster. Defeat was certain, but the Emperor’s troops were well handled, the enemy was in the utmost confusion, and the sturdy French battalions still on the right bank of the Elster were covering the crossing skillfully.

The Emperor had ordered that bridges be constructed across the Elster at Lindenau, but for some reason his commands were not carried out, and the whole army found itself struggling to cross by a single bridge. When morning dawned, the allies, seeing the battle field abandoned, pressed rapidly into the city and beat against the defenders of the bridge. Already the Russians were close upon it when a sudden explosion (accidental, it has always been supposed) blew the bridge into bits. Immediately the Italian and Rhine troops, still on the Leipzig side, surrendered, or turned against their French allies, who after maintaining the attack against overwhelming odds, plunged into the river, where many were drowned.

Napoleon’s retreat lay across the front part of Schwar-
zenberg's army, and it would seem that energetic measures would have completed the ruin begun at Leipzig. Nothing was done, however, and the beaten army, now reformed, began its march to the Rhine by way of Erfurt, without serious interference. Near Hanau, 50,000 men under Wrede, marching north from Bavaria, placed themselves across the way and attempted to halt the retreating army. For three days they contested the French retreat obstinately, but were at last forced aside. Two days later (November 2), the fleeing army crossed the Rhine at Mainz, its numbers now reduced to about 70,000.
CHAPTER XIV

THE FIRST ABDICATION

A. THE FRANKFORT NEGOTIATIONS

With the advance of his army after the shattered French, Alexander of Russia reached Frankfort November 7, 1813. The question then arose: Should the allies push their forces across the Rhine for the invasion of France proper?

At the beginning of the discussion, only the Prussian generals Blücher and Gneisenau favored invasion. The Prussian people, burning with resentment at their past humiliations, looked forward to the joy of revenge. The representatives of the other powers, however, paused before the probable difficulties of invasion and the problems which would result. Alexander's generals had wished to stop at the Niemen; all the more did they urge the cessation of hostilities at the Rhine. The allied armies had suffered severely in the defeats at Lutzen, Bautzen, and Dresden, and even in the victories at Katzbach, Grossbeeren, Kulm, Dennewitz, and Leipzig. The Russian advisers could see no advantage which would accrue to Russia from further operations. The risk of defeat at the hands of a martial French people, aroused by the disgrace of invasion and led by the genius of Napoleon, was too great. Political considerations influenced Metternich of Austria to be of the same opinion. The allied successes had avenged Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram, had freed Austrian territories, and cleared the French from Germany. The Austrian purposes were thus achieved. Further successes would merely strengthen Russia and Prussia, who under normal conditions were Austria's traditional foes. Even England hesitated
momentarily at the prospect of invading France. Wellington had taken no significant forward movement after his victory at Vittoria, and the British representatives at Frankfort were willing to negotiate.

Hence from Frankfort the allies sent a message to Napoleon, November 9, 1813, offering peace on the condition that the French surrender all the conquests and claims of France beyond the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine. France was thus to be confined within what were regarded as her natural boundaries. The allies insisted upon the acceptance of these terms before further negotiations, and announced that they expected an answer before December 1. Their messenger reached Paris with the proposals November 14, 1813.

Napoleon had arrived at his capital upon his return from his retreating army November 4, 1813. He understood his position thoroughly, and again bent his energies toward raising the men and supplies necessary to defend France. He had not had time to make great progress before the allied offer reached him.

Napoleon realized that the terms proposed from Frankfort were liberal under the circumstances, yet he could not bring himself to an outright and definite acceptance of them. His memory of the extent of his empire, his dreams of pan-European dominion, his claim to be inheritor from Charlemagne, his sense of humiliation at the prospect of acknowledging before France that he had grasped for more than he could hold — these very human influences led him to temporize. He did not reject the offer; but he did not accept the terms as the bases of negotiation: he answered (November 16, 1813) by suggesting that a congress be held at Mannheim for the consideration of peace.

If Napoleon really desired peace on the terms offered by the allies, his answer was ill considered, for by neglecting to accept the provisions named it gave his enemies the opportunity to withdraw them. And in the few days which elapsed between the dispatch of the allies’ offer and the
receipt of Napoleon's answer, the attitude of the representatives of the great powers changed radically. Information reached them of the pitiable condition of the wreck of Napoleon's army, of the universal war-weariness in France, of the great difficulty Napoleon was meeting in his attempts to raise men and supplies. In addition, the official British attitude changed as a result of a burst of popular indignation when it became known that the terms offered Napoleon had not comprised the surrender of Holland and the Netherlands. The feeling that no strong continental power could be suffered to maintain a foothold across the English Channel had long inspired the popular conception of what should be British policy. Thus when Napoleon's answer reached the representatives of the great powers, they united in regarding it as unsatisfactory, and proceeded to draw up their plans for crossing the Rhine for the invasion of France. A few more futile notes followed, Napoleon even going so far as to accept the terms as a basis of negotiation, but the allies were no longer disposed to treat with him. When November closed, the allies considered that their ultimatum had not been met. On the last day of December, 1813, they began to move troops across the Rhine.

B. THE PENINSULAR WAR

Before proceeding to this campaign in France, however, we may well outline the military operations in the Spanish peninsula and bring them into such perspective that the general military situation in the last few fatal months will be clear.

The account of the campaign in the Peninsula was dropped at the moment when Wellington had been repulsed before the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in the autumn of 1811. The French still held the gates on the Portuguese frontier while Wellington was master in Portugal; and though, if the French wished to complete the subjugation of Andalusia, they would have Wellington on their flank, the
latter in his turn would be harassed in precisely the same way should he attempt to operate in the valley of the Douro. When operations began in the spring of 1812, the pocketbook of Britain began to assert its superiority, for Wellington subsisted his armies from well-filled magazines supplied by British transports, whereas the French were obliged to scatter in order that they might forage in a reluctant country.

The guerrillas were becoming each day more powerful, and were a constant menace to the French communications. The French armies, some 175,000 strong, still greatly outnumbered Wellington’s forces, but for the reasons just given this superiority was more apparent than real.

The campaign of 1812 began with two swift attacks by Wellington on the border fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz (January and March, 1812). The element of surprise contributed largely to Wellington’s success, but there were days of very bloody fighting at both places before that success was complete. With the gates to Portugal in his hands, he no longer feared an attack in his rear when he moved into the Douro valley. Accordingly, in June, he moved on Marmont’s forces there. An attempt on the part of the latter to interpose his army between that of Wellington and the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo brought on the battle of Salamanca, where the British won a decisive victory (July 22, 1812). Marmont fell back on Burgos, and Wellington, after routing Joseph, occupied Madrid. Soult now raised the siege of Cadiz and, abandoning Andalusia, hurried over the mountains into Valencia, where he joined Suchet.

In September, Wellington marched against the French army of the north now concentrated at Burgos. For over a month he laid siege to the citadel without effect. Then, learning that Soult was approaching from Valencia, he directed the evacuation of Madrid and withdrew his army to Ciudad Rodrigo. The French pressed the pursuit warmly. The close of the campaign had, it was true, been unfavorable to the British, but they had won a notable victory at Sala-
manca, they had occupied the Spanish capital, and their operations had forced the French to abandon Andalusia.

In the spring of 1813, Wellington, now commander-in-chief of the British, Spanish, and Portuguese forces, found himself in command of troops totaling 200,000, of which 75,000 were his own British regulars and seasoned Portuguese. These were massed near Ciudad Rodrigo, and the Spanish nationalists were scattered about Spain, there being one army of 40,000 in Leon, on Wellington's left flank. To oppose them, the French had 165,000, of which number Suchet's 55,000 were in Valencia and Catalonia, and the remainder in the Tagus and Douro valleys on the Burgos line of invasion under the command of King Joseph. Marmont and Soult had both been recalled to France, leaving Joseph with only second-rate generals under his command.

When Wellington began his advance in May, 1813, there was no one on the opposing side skillful enough to divine his purpose. A divided attack was proposed, a junction on the battle field being part of the scheme. It was very daring, for at one time the two portions of the army (under Graham and the Duke) were fifty miles apart. But Wellington knew his junior, and the scheme worked. The French, their right flank on the Douro turned, fell back in haste. The Spaniards on Graham's left joined the allies and the advance continued, through Burgos, to the Ebro, to Vittoria. Santander on the north coast was taken and a new base established, the long lines to Lisbon being abandoned. At Vittoria, Joseph made his last stand in Spain. Another converging attack by the allies met on the battle field from which the weak King fled in dismay, leaving his troops, his treasure, and his kingdom behind (June 21, 1813).

Vittoria is the high tide of British success in the Peninsula. There was severe fighting in the Pyrenees following that battle, but before winter stopped the campaign, the British held the line of the Nive, and the French had withdrawn from Catalonia on the east flank of the mountains.
In February, 1814, Soult was recalled from his splendid achievements in the Leipzig campaign to repair the damage caused at Vittoria. But his army of recruits was helpless before the Duke's veterans. Though Soult never displayed more ably his qualities as a general, he was driven away from Bayonne and forced back to Toulouse. Here, on April 10, 1814, he attempted to stem the British advance and made a brave stand, but again the superiority of the seasoned soldier displayed itself. In the night he retreated, leaving the Duke in possession of the city. Before hostilities could be renewed, the news of Fontainebleau and of Napoleon's abdication reached the opposing forces. They thereupon terminated operations by a convention.

The five years of varying fortunes had been completed favorably to Britain. Her success there had by no means been the smallest contribution to the downfall of Napoleon.

C. THE DEFENSE OF FRANCE

We turn now back to Napoleon's defense of France. The Emperor hoped to be left in peace until the spring, by which time his new levies might have been whipped partly into shape for the campaign. Long before then, however, the allies were agreed as to the urgency for an invasion of France. Consequently, Napoleon was forced to fight with an army never greater than 90,000. These figures do not represent France's total strength in the field: Eugène with 50,000 was in Italy; Soult and Suchet had fully 100,000 in the Pyrenees and southern France; and the German fortresses, which Napoleon was determined to hold, absorbed 50,000 more. These last were entirely lost to him, because the fortresses were at once invested. Such, then, were the armies, pitifully small by comparison, which were to endeavor in vain to stem the great tide of allied invasion—five armies advancing through Belgium, on the upper and lower Rhine, in Italy, and from Spain.

The first of the allied armies was that of Bernadotte, which
for the moment consumed a great part of its strength in besieging the Netherlands and the German fortresses, but which, nevertheless, was able to detach two corps (40,000) under Bülow for service in the field. The second army was Blücher’s Army of Silesia, 70,000, advancing through Coblenz and Mainz. The third was Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia, 200,000, which planned to enter France near Basle. The fourth was Bellegarde’s Army of Northern Italy, 50,000. And the fifth was Wellington’s combined British, Spanish, and Portuguese army, 100,000, operating at the moment in the Pyrenees and southern France. It will be seen at a glance that Blücher and Schwarzenberg were the most immediate and dangerous of the enemies Napoleon had to face. It was by them that the issue was decided.

At the very outset of the campaign, difficulties developed between Blücher and Schwarzenberg as to the proper method of procedure. Blücher, a courageous officer and a thorough fighter, wished to push straight through the Rhine fortresses, take them, or, failing that, mask them, and march on Paris: Schwarzenberg, timid and awed by the prospect of fighting the terrible Emperor in his own country, wished to turn the line of fortresses by entering from Switzerland. As a result of the difference of opinion, the invasion was made in two columns, each general following his own plan, so that Napoleon was able to make the very most out of the situation, and with an army much weaker than the combination of his enemies would have presented, to hold up their advance for many weeks.

The theater of operations was east of Paris, in the valleys of the confluent rivers, the Aisne, the Ourcq, the Marne, the Aube, the Seine, and the Yonne, but chiefly in that portion between the Marne and the Seine. The main roads to Paris, which the allies were obliged to use follow these rivers, so that it was necessary for the allies to force these streams at the points of crossing. None of them is very wide, but all are so deep that the bridges are points of supreme importance.
The country about them is all open cultivated land, suitable for the passage of armies; but in the winter and early spring much of the country next to the rivers becomes impassable and movements of troops are therefore confined to the highways.

It was a field admirably adapted for a defensive campaign. In it, the Emperor disposed his meager forces to oppose his advancing foes. He divided his army into three parts: a main body, and a right and left wing. By holding the bridges on either side with one wing, he could move his center freely to the support of the other wing, thus striking one opponent with the bulk of his forces while the other was being contained at the river crossings by the smaller part of his command.

Blücher crossed the Rhine January 1, 1814, and within a few days Schwarzenberg pushed through the Belfort gap. Napoleon's army, composed of the corps of MacDonald, Ney, and Victor, and the Imperial Guard under Mortier and Oudinot, was disposed to meet the foe and delay him as much as possible until the Emperor should arrive in person. Blücher pushed back Marmont from Metz. Victor and Ney, falling back through the Vosges, joined Marmont at Nancy and together retired, first upon St. Dizier, and then upon Vitry-le-Francais. Simultaneously, Mortier had retreated before Schwarzenberg through Bar-sur-Aube to Troyes. MacDonald, marching south through Belgium, was approaching Châlons. This was the situation when Napoleon arrived in Châlons January 25, 1814.

He pictured Blücher as marching through St. Dizier to join Schwarzenberg, and decided to strike him in flank. January 26, he began the first of those swings from river to river which were to be so disastrous to his foe. Leaving MacDonald as his left wing to hold the Marne, he attacked the Prussian detachment at St. Dizier, drove it out, and turned southward on the rear of Blücher's troops. At the same time he ordered Mortier (his right wing) in from Troyes
to coöperate with him. The Prussian general was pursued until he came into touch with Schwarzenberg’s army, when, strongly reinforced, he turned and faced the Emperor at La Rothière. Napoleon would gladly have retired in the face of such superior numbers, but conditions were such that he could not cross the Aube without an encounter. In the battle of La Rothière, which followed February 1, 1814, his lines were so badly broken that in the night he slipped away and fell back on Troyes.

Meanwhile, the rear of Blücher’s column, which had not arrived at St. Dizier when Napoleon’s first blow fell, was forcing MacDonald rapidly westward on the Châlons-Château-Thierry road. Blücher who, impatient with Schwarzenberg’s caution, had decided to operate separately in the valley of the Marne, moved northward (February 8) through La Fère-Champenoise to join his two corps who were pursuing MacDonald, now at Meaux. Here was Napoleon’s second chance. Leaving Victor and Oudinot (one half the Guard) as his right wing to hold the crossings of the Seine, he hurried across the valley through Sézanne and struck the flank of the Army of Silesia strung out along the road from Vertus to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. His blow cut Blücher’s army in half. Leaving Marmont to face Blücher himself at Etoges, the Emperor turned full on the two corps to the west, beat them badly at Montmirail (February 11), and finally drove them across the Marne. There, pursued by Mortier, they could rejoin Blücher only by a roundabout march through Reims. Before they could arrive, Napoleon faced squarely about, inflicted with Marmont’s help another defeat on Blücher at Vauchamps (February 14), and drove him well toward Chalons, leaving Marmont to continue the pursuit. Marmont and Mortier thus formed his left wing on the Marne.

In between the battles of La Rothière and Montmirail the allies had again offered peace to the French Emperor. The kaleidoscopic changes in the military situation, hard
and successful strokes by Napoleon with only occasional and indecisive successes by the allied troops, had again induced doubts of the wisdom of the attempt to proceed with the invasion of France. Further, the jealousies, suspicions, and selfishness of the individual members of the allied league, never completely allayed, once more threatened to disrupt the coalition. The situation at the beginning of February diplomatically was critical. Lord Castlereagh, the British foreign minister, when he joined the diplomats in France, found Austria actually on the point of withdrawing from the war because she feared that her interests in central Europe and Poland would not in the final settlement be sufficiently respected by Prussia and Russia. Under the circumstances, Castlereagh thought it most wise to summon another conference and again to offer peace to Napoleon. With the greatest difficulty he finally united the diplomats of the allies in a general policy.

The conference, known as the conference of Châtillon from its meeting place at Châtillon-sur-Seine, was opened February 5, 1814. Caulaincourt represented France. Two days later the allies stated their terms, more onerous to Napoleon than those offered from Frankfort. France was now to surrender all of Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, and Savoy and Nice: to return, in short, to her boundaries of 1791. Caulaincourt’s instructions, which were to accept the terms offered at Frankfort, did not allow him to take independent action on these more humiliating provisions. He had to refer them to the Emperor.

Desperate as Napoleon’s situation seemed at the time he received this offer, the great captain refused the terms. He saw the chance for further blows, those which came at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Montmirail, and Vauchamps. He could, indeed, at this time hardly have hoped for a decisive military stroke, but he undoubtedly expected that the conflicting interests of the allies, of which his secret agents kept him informed, would cause the break-up of the coalition under his
attacks. The military operations were interrupted for scarcely a day by the negotiations at Châlillon. On the 9th of February, the conference was suspended for a week. When it was reopened (February 17, 1814), Napoleon was so encouraged by his recent strokes that he refused to consider any terms more drastic than those offered from Frankfort. He refused even to grant an armistice for further discussion.

Napoleon’s refusal sealed his fate. Though the allies were naturally disheartened at their recent defeats, they recognized the impossibility of treating further with Napoleon and the necessity of knitting themselves more firmly together for the prosecution of the war. They thereupon a few days later concluded the Treaty of Chaumont among themselves, by the provisions of which each signatory power pledged itself not to treat separately with Napoleon, but to continue the war until France should be reduced to the boundaries she had before the Revolution. Great Britain guaranteed further heavy subsidies to her allies. The Treaty of Chaumont, dated March 1, 1814, though not actually signed until March 9, signalized a new unity among the allies, a unity of purpose which kept the individual powers together for the defeat of Napoleon.

The military scene now shifts to Schwarzenberg’s army on the Seine. Taking advantage of the Emperor’s blow at Blücher, the Austrian had advanced down the valley and had driven Victor and Oudinot back to the line of the Yeres, dangerously close to Paris. In this position his flank was exposed to Napoleon’s army, a situation of which the Emperor should have taken advantage. His fears for Paris, however, caused him to make a frontal attack instead. Calling in MacDonald from Meaux, he hurried to the line of the Yeres, struck hard at the Seine crossings, and managed to force that at Monteneau. Reinforcements from southern France now raised this portion of his army to 70,000. Feeling strong enough to pursue the Austrians, he did not desist from his offensive until he had driven his adversary almost to
Chaumont (February 23, 1814). Blücher attempted to help his colleague in this reverse, and to that end moved south to the Seine at Mery. Oudinot’s Guards, however, were able to hold him there and to nullify his attempt at assistance.

The allies now determined to call in two corps from Bernadotte’s Army of the North and unite them with Blücher, a union which they planned to take place in the vicinity of Laon. Blücher, therefore, moved north from Mery, and, as he advanced, drove the French left wing, Marmont and Mortier, across the Marne at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and later forced them into a position near Meaux where they held the bridges of the Marne and the Ourcq. Here was the Emperor’s opportunity for the fourth great swing across the theater of war. Forming MacDonald and Oudinot into a right wing as a containing force against Schwarzenberg, Napoleon marched swiftly on La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, forced a crossing, and made his way to Château-Thierry in the hope of destroying Blücher before the latter could unite with the corps from the north (March 3, 1814).

This gain the Emperor was forced to forego, but his act freed Marmont and Mortier who now joined him near Craonne. The junction was too late, however, to prevent Blücher’s reinforcement by Bülow near Soissons. The Prussian was now far distant from his Austrian colleague, and Napoleon might have contained him on the Aisne as he had formerly contained him on the Marne. Unfortunately, he chose to attempt Blücher’s destruction. With this in view, he crossed the Aisne and drove his opponent out of Craonne. At Laon, however, Blücher made a stand in a position against which the French could accomplish nothing and from which they were repulsed with heavy loss.

Again the scene shifts to the Seine and shows the fifth and last of those swift blows from side to side of the theater of
war. Schwarzenberg had taken advantage of Napoleon’s absence in the north to push down the valley at Nogent and Bray. Napoleon, leaving Marmont to contain Blücher on the Aisne, hurried southward to cope with the new danger. At Reims he encountered and destroyed St. Priest’s Prussian corps; and here, also, he detached Mortier to support Marmont. Thence he pushed on to Arcis-sur-Aube. As soon as the news of his movements came to Schwarzenberg, the Austrian began a retreat up the Seine, the French right wing (MacDonald and Oudinot) close behind. Schwarzenberg’s courage this time did not fail. Turning northward when he reached Troyes, he marched with greatly superior numbers upon the Emperor’s army at Arcis-sur-Aube. The odds were so great that after a day’s hard fighting Napoleon withdrew across the river (March 20, 1814).

The Emperor next determined on a blow against his adversary’s communications at a point far enough east to force them to retreat and to enable him himself to call in much needed troops from the Rhine fortresses. From Arcis, therefore, he moved on Vitry, drove out the Prussian garrison, and sent orders for Marmont and Mortier to join him. But the marshals were no longer in a position to obey. The allies, too, had determined on a new plan which made the occupation of Paris their first concern. They paid no attention to Napoleon’s attack on their communications, but pushed straight on to the city, Schwarzenberg by the Seine, and Blücher by the Marne, driving Marmont and Mortier before him. The two armies established communications between the rivers and left one corps between them to hold off Napoleon until the city should fall. The steady advance of the allies brought them to the capital, where on the heights of Montmartre Mortier and Marmont were making a last attempt to save the city. In the last fight in the hills adjacent to Paris, the overpowering numbers of the allies forced the two marshals to surrender. The city itself capitulated March 31, 1814.
D. THE FIRST ABDICATION

Napoleon would fain have treated the fall of his capital as an event of no military importance, but political conditions in France determined otherwise. The capitulation of Paris marked in the minds of Frenchmen the definite end of effective resistance. The war was over.

The Emperor himself, as he concentrated his army around Fontainebleau with the expectation of maneuvering to strike the enemy on the flank, was made aware of the hopelessness of further resistance. The news of the Senate’s act in decreeing the deposition of the Emperor, thus absolving the French people from their allegiance to him, strengthened the general feeling of desperation. Napoleon endeavored in vain to combat this depression. April 4, 1814, he addressed his Guard in an inspiring harangue:

Soldiers! The enemy, by making three days’ march from our neighborhood, has made himself master of Paris. We must chase him thence. Certain men, émigrés, unworthy of the name of Frenchmen, whom we had the weakness to forgive formerly, have made common cause with the foreigner, and have donned the white cockade. The cowards! They shall receive the reward of this new attempt. Let us swear to conquer or die, to avenge the outrage offered to our native country and the honor of our arms!

Fanatically devoted to Napoleon, the rank and file responded with enthusiastic cheers and cries of “We Swear.” But Napoleon’s marshals, no less loyal but much clearer of vision, recognized that the end had come. Though they dreaded the task of informing the Emperor that they could carry on no further, they felt this was necessary. They therefore confronted him with the facts and urged the impossibility of further action. Lefèbvre, Oudinot, Ney, and MacDonald, marshals whose courage and loyalty had been so many times tested and found true, presented the situation to the Emperor.
Before such facts thus presented Napoleon could no longer stand. He might, it is true, have appealed directly to his troops, but he could not discard the marshals who had been his lieutenants in so many campaigns. After a few hours of thought, therefore, he announced his willingness to abdicate in favor of his wife as regent for his young son. He then designated Marshals Ney and MacDonald to accompany Caulaincourt to Paris with the following communication:

The Allied Powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the reëstablishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares his readiness to descend from the throne, to quit France, to lay down his life even for his country's good, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from the regency in the person of the Empress, and from the maintenance of the laws of the Empire. Given at our palace of Fontainebleau, 4th April, 1814.

A week later, after realizing that only an unconditional abdication would be acceptable to the victors, he drew up and sent by the same messengers the necessary words:

The Allied Powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the reëstablishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oaths, declares that he renounces for himself and his heirs the thrones of France and Italy, because there is no personal sacrifice, not even of life itself, which he is not prepared to make in the interests of France.

April 13th he agreed to the conditions of his exile at Elba, and April 26th, after an affecting farewell to his Guard, he was on his way south.
CHAPTER XV

THE LAST PHASE

When Alexander of Russia and Frederick William of Prussia rode into Paris on the morning of March 31, 1814, their triumph signalized the solution of one problem and at the same time brought into the foreground two others. They had vanquished Napoleon: it remained for them to decide the future government of France, and to determine the readjustment of Europe. The second of these, the readjustment of Europe, in view of the vast and complicated interests at stake, had necessarily to be postponed for the deliberations of a general congress of the powers; but decision with regard to the government of France had to be made at once.

A. THE FIRST RESTORATION

The immediate future of France lay admittedly in the will of Alexander of Russia, for it was generally conceded that his defense against Napoleon's invasion of Russia, his aid in 1813 and 1814, and his policy of a direct drive upon Paris had been the principal factors in bringing about a final victory for the allies. He was nonplussed by his problem. He no longer considered Napoleon possible. He thought of a regency under Maria Louisa for Napoleon's son, the King of Rome; of Prince Eugène; of Bernadotte; of a carefully organized conservative republic; and especially of the Bourbons. Against each plan, however, serious objections existed. The shouts of Vivent les Bourbons raised by a little knot of royalists when he rode through Paris had not impressed him as much as the sullen apathy of the crowds.

One man of political importance remained in Paris when all officialdom had fled by order to Blois. Prince Talley-
rand had had a vision of the end of the Napoleonic régime, had contrived to get himself left behind in Paris, and now frankly offered his services to the Czar in dealing with the French situation. Alexander took up his quarters in Talleyrand's palace and expressed his confidence in Talleyrand's judgment: "You know France, its needs and its desires: say what we ought to do and we will do it." Thus given his opportunity, Talleyrand asserted the principle of legitimacy and pleaded the cause of the Bourbon house. To the Czar's objections, the astute diplomat answered that, once it was certain that no terms were to be made with Napoleon or with any member of his family, the legislative councils would of their own volition recall the Bourbons. It would thus appear that the legal representatives of the people had summoned the ancient monarchy back to France.

Talleyrand's arguments convinced the vacillating Alexander. The Czar proclaimed that the powers would not treat with Napoleon or with any member of his family. Talleyrand hastily gathered together what remained of the Senate, created a provisional government with himself at its head, and published the Senate's decree of the deposition of Napoleon from the throne (April 3, 1814). Two days later the Senate at the instigation of the provisional government adopted a constitution, the second clause of which contained the words: "The French people freely calls to the throne of France Louis Stanislas Xavier, brother of the late King." A week afterwards the Comte d'Artois entered Paris and assumed the position of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom until his older brother, the Comte de Provence, should return.

With the Comte d'Artois the allies discussed the terms of peace. Alexander counseled clemency to France as the surest guarantee of the permanence of Bourbon power, and his fellow sovereigns yielded. By the provisions of the Treaty of Paris (negotiated in April and finally signed and ratified May 30, 1814) the French boundaries were approx-
imately those of 1792. France surrendered Belgium, the
provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, the conquered
territory in Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, and
a few small colonies. Actually, however, she emerged from
her long series of wars with boundaries greater than those
at the beginning. The European powers were astounded at
their own generosity.

In the meanwhile, as we have outlined at the close of the
previous chapter, the Emperor Napoleon bowed to the
inevitable and accepted the terms offered to him by his
conquerors. He was allowed to retain his imperial title, was
given the island of Elba in the Mediterranean Sea off the
coast of Italy for his residence, and was allotted from the
revenues of France an annual income of two million francs
with adequate additional provision for members of his family.
He reached his new home in Elba May 4, 1814.

Just one day earlier, the Comte de Provence had entered
Paris and assumed the crown as Louis XVIII.

**B. THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE**

Louis XVIII was bound by his brother's promise and by his
own pledge to give France a constitution. He redeemed his
word by the issue June 4, 1814, of a Constitutional Charter.
Although after the Revolution many patriots felt that a
constitution should be an instrument, not granted by a
sovereign, but drawn up by the representatives of the people
and subscribed to by the sovereign, the Charter was liberal
in its provisions and the desire for peace was overwhelming.
The Charter, therefore, was peacefully accepted as the funda-
mental law of France, and as such continued, except during
the Hundred Days, until the Revolution of 1848.

The Constitutional Charter was an attempt to graft the
English constitutional system on the French body politic.
It introduced into France the chief recognized English
principles, the inviolate King as executive, the upper chamber
composed of nobles, and the lower chamber chosen by an
THE LAST PHASE

The electorate restricted by high property qualifications. The Chamber of Peers was to be appointed by the King either for life or for hereditary transmission, as he judged best. The Chamber of Deputies was elected for five years, one fifth retiring each year, by an electorate composed of men not less than thirty years old and paying not less than three hundred francs of direct taxes. Candidates for the lower chamber had to be men not less than forty years old paying not less than one thousand francs of direct taxes. By these restrictions the Chamber of Deputies naturally became the representative of the wealthy interests in France. Out of a population of nearly 30,000,000, only 100,000 were eligible for the suffrage and only 12,000 for the election. The two Chambers were given full power over taxation in accordance with the English system, but the King had the sole power of initiating legislation. In the statement that all citizens were equal before the law, and in the guarantees of liberty of worship, liberty of the press, and trial by jury, the Charter revealed how far the restored Bourbon King was willing to accept the lessons of the Revolution.

Louis XVIII himself was not badly qualified by temper and experience to meet the difficulties of the situation. He was wise enough to recognize that he inherited, not the France of Louis XIV but the France of the Revolution and of Napoleon. He had long been an exile and had no desire to “resume his travels.” He had no passion for revenge for his suffering and the suffering of his class. He was sceptical, good-natured, witty, and indolent beyond the generality of men. His personal attitude toward the problems of government was that of an opportunist who met each situation with the sole object of retaining his throne with the least labor and inconvenience to himself.

The restoration, however, brought back to France a host of émigrés inspired with feelings very different from those of the King. These men desired revenge and clamored for the restitution of their lost privileges. They looked confidently
forward to the reestablishment of the old régime. They had been long in exile, usually passing their time amid courts and environments of the old familiar kind, and had learned nothing of the spirit of the new France. Many of them had fought in the allied armies against their own country, and all were completely estranged in sympathy from those who had accomplished and lived through the glories and dangers of the revolutionary and Napoleonic years.

In little ways as well as big the new government quickly alienated the people. Its first act was to establish the white cockade as the badge of loyalty and to adopt the white flag of the Bourbon house as the national standard. The tricolor which had been carried to victory on a hundred battle fields was discarded as being a revolutionary symbol. Honors and high appointments in the army were distributed to the returning nobles. Thousands of the Napoleonic officers were summarily discharged to make room for these nobles. Ribbons of the glorious Legion of Honor were distributed to civilians of little merit. The Order of St. Louis was constituted the sole military order in the kingdom. The influence of the Roman Catholic church at the restored court aroused a suspicion that it might be given back all of its former vast holdings in France.

Thus big things and little combined to make the new régime unpopular. Tens of thousands of Napoleonic soldiers, too, released from the prison camps of the allies and from the fortresses on the Oder and on the Vistula, returned to spread discontent. The whole country became sullenly embittered against the restored régime.

C. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

The second of the two problems confronting the victorious allies, the readjustment of Europe, had by common consent been postponed for the consideration of a general congress of the powers. In the Treaty of Paris, that treaty which had settled the boundaries of France, it was definitely provided
that "within the space of two months all the powers that have been engaged on either side in the present war shall send plenipotentiaries to Vienna to regulate in a general congress the arrangements that are necessary to complete the present treaty."

After the nine days' wonder over the fall of Napoleon and his exile to Elba, all popular interest turned to Vienna. The Congress, originally set for August 1, 1814, was delayed for various reasons until about November 1. By that date most of the powers concerned had their representatives in the Austrian capital. Many monarchs, feeling that the issues at stake were too great to intrust to any plenipotentiary, established themselves in person at Vienna where they might be in immediate touch with the situation. Alexander I of Russia, Frederick William III of Prussia, Frederick VI of Denmark, and of course Francis I of Austria were among the most prominent monarchs present at Vienna during this time. Not only governmental interests, however, but interests of commercial bodies, racial societies, and religious organizations had their representatives at the congress. The publishers and authors had a representative. The Jews of Frankfort, Bremen, and Lübeck had representatives. The Roman Catholic interests of Germany contributed more than thirty representatives. And various districts, towns, corporations, and commissions added their delegates to the throng. Europe was to be reapportioned; political, commercial, racial, and religious interests of great magnitude were at stake. In the matter of mere territories, it was estimated that the congress had at its disposal lands inhabited by thirty-two millions of souls, and each power was determined to use every conceivable resource of diplomatic strategy to secure what advantage it could.

Francis I of Austria was host to the assembled royalties and diplomats. The possibility of vital differences was early foreseen, so Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, with the idea of easing so far as possible the personal relations between
the diplomats, appointed a committee on entertainment whose duty it was to organize and carry on a continual round of social diversion. Military reviews and maneuvers, grand fancy dress balls, formal and informal banquets, excursions, and huge fêtes followed one another with bewildering rapidity. The impoverished Austrian treasury is reported to have spent nearly thirty million florins ($15,000,000) in entertainment.

Naturally enough, the four great powers (Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain) who had accomplished Napoleon's overthrow expected to have the deciding influence in all matters brought before the congress. As early as the middle of September, before the representatives of the other states had assembled in Vienna, the plenipotentiaries of these four powers were meeting, formulating procedure for the coming congress, and agreeing to arrange among themselves the disposition of the Polish, German, and Italian territories.

As a matter of fact, the congress did not "open" November 1, 1814, or at any subsequent date. The work for which it had been summoned was accomplished by a number of special committees. It was a popular fiction that the assembled rulers met daily and discussed familiarly before the social relaxations of the late afternoon and evening the complex problems of international politics with which they were confronted. The truth was that the practical work of the congress was done in these special committees by trained diplomats — men whose names are scarcely remembered today, as Wessenberg, Clancarty, Dalberg, Gentz, and La Besnardièrè — who considered proposals, weighed claims, and drew up articles in accord with diplomatic precedent. The only authoritative act of the congress as a whole was its so-called Final Act, which embodied in its various articles the decisions of the separate special committees on the political and territorial questions at issue — and even this Final Act was but the act of the representatives of the great
powers submitted to the rest of the states of Europe for their acceptance.

The problem of first importance before the congress was the redistribution of European territory. Most important among the lands on the continent of Europe which were at the disposition of the congress were Italy, the Netherlands, the left bank of the Rhine, Saxony (whose King had forfeited his rights, it was thought, by adhering so long to his alliance with Napoleon), and Poland. Each of the great powers had at the beginning of the deliberations in the committees certain well-defined desires. France was excepted, of course, for her boundaries had been fixed at the Treaty of Paris. Great Britain was expected to find her compensation in the retention of many of her colonial conquests. Russia, Austria, and Prussia were to divide Poland. In addition, Russia was to receive Finland, Bessarabia, and distant territories on the Persian border; Austria was to control Italy; and Prussia was to expand in Germany.

No doubt the allied powers, had they been free from outside interferences, could have come to an arrangement satisfactory to themselves along the above general lines without undue friction, but the French representative, Talleyrand, had determined to use the potential international jealousies to break the coalition against France. For Talleyrand realized that, even though the war had ended and his nation was technically again one of the family of European nations, a tacit understanding existed among the allied powers Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain whereby France was outlawed and French influence was minimized.

Talleyrand’s opportunity came with the discussion of the territories to be awarded to Russia and Prussia. Russia desired the greater part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Alexander wishing to restore the ancient kingdom of Poland under Russian supremacy. The Czar could yield to Austria her coveted share of Poland without seriously endangering
his scheme, but he needed that part which in a division would naturally fall to Prussia. The issue resolved itself, then, into an endeavor to persuade Prussia to relinquish her claim on Warsaw in return for compensation elsewhere. Such compensation was offered by Russia in Saxony, whose King had forfeited his rights to his kingdom by remaining faithful to his alliance with Napoleon.

As soon as the disposition of Saxony was injected into the situation, Talleyrand seized his opportunity. The King of Saxony, though an ally of Napoleon, had long been connected with the Bourbon house, and his cause was the cause of legitimacy. The people of Saxony had much loyal sentiment for their King and no enthusiasm for Prussia. Other smaller German states feared that the constrictor swallowing up of Saxony might augur a like process for them upon some future occasion. Talleyrand, therefore, put France forward as the upholder of the rights of the principle of legitimacy and of the rights of the small states. From the beginning he had the support of Austria, who had no wish to see Russia's power so greatly extended. Later he won the support of Great Britain, whose representatives were influenced by popular opinion at home and by the traditional jealousy of Russia. Prussia, attracted by the rich bait of Saxony offered by Russia, had agreed to the exchange and had even taken preliminary measures for the occupation and government of the Saxon kingdom.

At this juncture, Talleyrand on behalf of France offered armed aid to Austria to resist the Russian-Prussian plan, and a close alliance was formed by a secret treaty (January 3, 1815), signed by Talleyrand (France), Metternich (Austria), and Castlereagh (Great Britain), binding these three nations to mutual support if any one of them were attacked because of the proposals upon which they had agreed. The alliance could count confidently upon the aid of the Saxons, Bavarians, Hanoverians, and others of the smaller German states. Talleyrand had succeeded up to his
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highest expectations and could well boast to his master, Louis XVIII, that the coalition against France was forever dissolved. In but a few short months after the humiliation of France, Talleyrand by adroit albeit conscienceless diplomacy had secured for his nation alliance with two of the greatest European states and had thus raised France back to her rightful position among the arbiters of European destinies.

Actual war, however, did not result. The gravity of the situation made the nations pause. Europe had exhausted its war spirit, its men, and its money. Alexander of Russia became more conciliatory, and Frederick William III abated part of his ambitions. Austria, too, receded from her most extreme demands, and France, who had no inherent territorial interest involved, was disposed to agree to a compromise as soon as the dignity of her position in international politics had been redeemed. The delegates began to bargain, and by the end of the first week in February, 1815, after some very stormy sessions, an agreement was reached.

By this agreement Austria recovered her Polish territories; Prussia retained a part of her former Polish possessions, gained about two fifths of Saxony, and some territory along the left bank of the Rhine; and Russia received the greater part of Poland in addition to Finland, Bessarabia, and the Persian frontier provinces. The remainder of Saxony was returned to its King, but it was not until the middle of May that Frederick Augustus, the King, accepted definitely the cession of a part of his land to Prussia.

Other committees of the congress had been busily engaged with other problems during these months occupied by the Polish-Saxon wrangle. The Swiss committee struggled with the difficulties raised by the traditional animosities among the several cantons, each of which had its representative at Vienna. Since no individual interests of any of the great states were involved, the committee was actuated solely by considerations affecting the future of Switzerland. An
unusual degree of success was thereby assured. The perpetual neutrality of Switzerland was guaranteed (November 20, 1815) and the cantons of Switzerland, including three new cantons, Valais, Geneva, and Neuchâtel, were bound together in a loose federal union.

In the settlement of questions affecting the Italian peninsula, Austrian influence predominated. Italian unity was not considered. Lombardy and Venetia went direct to Austria, in addition to Illyria and Dalmatia on the other shore of the Adriatic. Tuscany, Modena, and Parma went to individual members of the Hapsburg house. Naples, including Sicily, was after the defeat of Murat in 1815 restored to Ferdinand. The Papal states were given back to the Pope.

In the northwest of Europe, the Netherlands and the southern provinces (formerly the Austrian Netherlands) were joined into one state. Great Britain favored this plan, for it partially compensated the Netherlands for its great colonial losses, and it placed a "buffer" state north of France. The racial, religious, and economic differences between the two districts were, it was theoretically argued, no objection to their union. Racial mixture was a common phenomenon in European states; religious privileges might be securely guarded by the fundamental law; and the union between the mercantile and maritime Netherlands and the industrial and agricultural southern provinces might actually prove a source of strength.

In the extreme north, Russia was the arbiter of territorial division much as Austria was in the Italian peninsula. Sweden received Norway as a compensation for her part in the coalition against Napoleon, but she was forced to sacrifice Finland and all prospect of an important part in the political life of central Europe.

Although no desire to revive the defunct Holy Roman Empire existed among the diplomats, it was generally acknowledged that some kind of federal system should be
inaugurated among the German states. The difficulties, however, were very great. Austria would not allow Prussia to take leadership in the new federation; Prussia would not submit to Austrian dominion; and neither state would consent to the formation of a new combination of states which might threaten its own position. Of the important matters before the congress, this of the German constitutional system was the chief one undecided when the news of Napoleon’s return from Elba was brought to Vienna (March 4, 1815). Quick action was then taken. One of the many schemes which had been suggested was, with slight modifications, adopted, and a Federal Act adopted. This Federal Act provided for a Federal Diet of seventeen votes, an assembly of sixty-nine votes proportionately distributed among the constituent states, for the prohibition of any alliance on the part of any state with foreign governments against the confederation or against any of its members, for a constitution of estates in each of the German states, and for the placing of the Federal Act itself under the protection of the European powers. This Act was signed and sealed June 8, 1815, by the accredited representatives of thirty-six of the German states, Wurtemburg and Baden not accepting it until months later.

Thus before Napoleon had landed in France the congress was practically through with its labors, and Gentz (Austria), the secretary, was engaged in incorporating into a Final Act the decisions of the separate committees. Before the battle of Waterloo this Final Act was signed (June 9, 1815) by seven out of eight representatives of the great powers, Spain’s representative alone withholding his signature. An effectual seal was put upon the work of the congress by the troops which defeated Napoleon at Waterloo, so that the decisions incorporated in the Final Act were destined to stand for good or for ill.
D. THE HUNDRED DAYS

Napoleon, in exile at Elba, had been kept informed by his agents of events both in the Congress of Vienna and in France. He knew, probably with exaggerated details, of the dissension among the allies aroused by the Polish-Saxon question, and he knew the dissatisfaction and unrest prevalent in France as a result of the ill-considered measures of the new government.

Inspired by reports from these sources, Napoleon laid his plans for an attempt to regain his throne. February 26, 1815, he set sail with his guard of eleven hundred men on seven ships and bent his course directly for the French coast. From a military view, his force was of course insignificant, but it sufficed to guard against any interference from local authorities and would have protected him against a small band under an unsympathetic leader. March 1, 1815, he disembarked in a little bay near Nice, and, instead of striking for Marseilles whose population was royalist in sympathy, at once marched northward through the mountains. He knew his people thoroughly. In these mountain districts the peasants worshiped Napoleon, and so aided him with carts and horses that he was able with his little force to advance from thirty to forty miles a day. The first threat of opposition came at a little village near Grenoble, where a regiment of infantry was drawn up to defend the road. At the sight of Napoleon, however, the soldiers broke ranks and crowded enthusiastically around their former idol with the old cry of "Vive l'Empereur." Similar scenes greeted him all the way. Cities opened their gates to him; troops refused to oppose him; even the commanding officers sent against him, as Colonel Labeledoyere and Marshal Ney, went over to him with all of their detachments.

And Napoleon chose his messages to the nation skillfully. He came, he said, to bring to France peace without and liberty within. He sought to govern as a constitutional sovereign.
He wished to redeem France from the nobles and from the priests. He sought to assure to the people the reforms that had been won in the great Revolution of 1789. Such utterances as these were certain to arouse the most enthusiastic response both from the peasantry and from the bourgeoisie, for the peasantry feared a restoration of the feudal privileges of the nobles and of the power and property of the priesthood, and the bourgeoisie longed for civil liberty and wider suffrage. The Napoleonic success was not a mere military restoration: it was a popular revolution.

In the meanwhile, Louis XVIII in Paris had failed to realize the alienation of his people and the feeling in favor of Napoleon. Only after the fall of Grenoble and Lyons did he begin to understand the extent of the popular movement with which he had to contend. Then by a series of concessions to liberal demands he attempted to rally the nation around him. He recalled many of the discharged officers to active service with full pay. He reconstituted the old Imperial Guard. He professed loyalty to constitutional principles. He summoned the chambers in session March 13th, and three days later appeared before them wearing conspicuously the rosette of the Legion of Honor. With information of the desertion of Marshal Ney to Napoleon, however, he realized at last that his measures had come too late and he made preparations to leave Paris. March 19 he slipped out of the city, and the following day Napoleon drove up to the palace of the Tuileries amid the enthusiastic welcome of thousands. The government of Louis XVIII was temporarily at an end.

With prodigious energy Napoleon labored to construct a government, to issue guarantees which would assure France of his democratic principles and good intentions, and to take the necessary steps to keep France at peace with Europe. Within two days he had the machinery of government in operation and, after a slight resistance in the south of France, had secured its recognition by the French people. To assure
the cordial support of the great liberal element in the French nation, he issued an Acte Additionel, an additional act to the former imperial constitution, by which provision was made for a bicameral parliament, for responsibility of ministers to the parliament, and for freedom of the press. The Acte Additionel was submitted by plebiscite to France, was duly adopted, and was at once put into effect. Outwardly Napoleon seemed to have succeeded in the first of his two problems.

Napoleon’s fate was decided, however, not by his good intentions for internal government or by constitutional guarantees within France, but by the diplomats assembled at Vienna. In the first week of March news reached the congress that the exile had sailed from Elba, and a few days later that he had landed in France. To Metternich (Austria) is due the rapidity of action of the allies. On March 12, 1815, the representatives of the great powers issued the famous proclamation denouncing Napoleon Bonaparte as the common enemy of mankind and declaring him an outlaw. March 25, the plenipotentiaries of the four great powers, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, signed a solemn treaty of alliance and invited the adherence of all the powers of Europe. Napoleon seems to have made genuine efforts to maintain peace — as indeed he well might, knowing the number and disposition of the military forces against him — but his messengers were turned back without being able to deliver their messages and his letter to the Prince Regent of Great Britain was returned unopened. By the middle of April, it was evident that France was to stand again against all Europe. Civil reforms became of subordinate importance and Napoleon was forced to bend every energy to raising and equipping an army for the defense of his throne.

i. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN

The British and Prussians were still in Belgium, and to their forces the allied powers looked to bear the brunt of the
initial activities while Austria and Russia were getting their armies ready to strike. So far as Napoleon was concerned, there was but one question to decide: whether the coming war was to be for him offensive or defensive — whether he should fight it on French soil or beyond the frontier. There were plenty of reasons on both sides, but two finally decided the Emperor in favor of the latter course. The first was the fact that his political situation in France was far from secure and needed the bolstering effect of a military victory; the second was the strategical advantage to be gained by expelling the enemy from the Netherlands and occupying the Rhine from Switzerland to its mouth as the line of defense.

Early in June the Emperor had formed his army. He was to command in person, and had selected Soult as his chief-of-staff. The army was composed of the Guards; five infantry corps under d’Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gerard, and Laban; and four small cavalry corps under Pajal, Excelmans, Kellermann, and Milhaud, the whole cavalry command being under Grouchy. Ney joined the army just before operations began, and was given command of the left wing. It will be seen at a glance that many of the lustrous names of the earlier campaigns are absent. Davout was in command of Paris; Suchet was in the Alps; Mortier was ill — but the others who had made their names under Napoleon were not numbered among the Emperor’s adherents. The army as composed numbered about 125,000.

The immediate opponents were the Anglo-Dutch army and the Prussian, stationed in two groups in the country between Brussels and the Scheldt and Sambre rivers, the former based on Ostend and Antwerp, the latter through Liège on the Rhine cities. Wellington was in command of the Anglo-Dutch force, 90,000 strong; Blücher led the Prussian contingent of 115,000. Wellington’s forces lay to the west and south of the Belgian capital; Blücher’s corps occupied the chief points along the Sambre. Both armies were widely distributed, and not in the best position to cover Brussels,
since the main line of attack from the south, the Charleroi-
Brussels road, ran between the two commands.

Napoleon had the option of operating against either army’s
line of operations, or of attacking between the two forces and
separating them. The preponderance of numbers decided
for him the last-named course. A successful attack, such as
he had made in his first Italian campaign and again in his
Spanish campaign, would mean that he could deal singly
with armies not much larger than his own. Having decided
upon the point of attack, the Emperor was restricted to the
Charleroi-Brussels road as being the line leading to the
junction point of the two adversaries. Nothing could have
suited him better. The road was an excellent one; it was
undefended; and it led him to the very point of assault. On
the night of June 14, 1815, he had his corps in position at
Philippeville, Beaumont, and Leers, all three points within a
few miles of his projected crossing of the Sambre.

Before daylight of June 15, the three columns began their
march to the Sambre; a few hours later they had crossed the
river on a front of six miles in the face of only nominal re-
sistance by one of Blücher’s corps. When night came the
head of the French left on the main road had arrived at
Frasne; the right was approaching Fleurus. On the allied
side, Blücher had prepared to check the French advance by
ordering a concentration near Ligny, where he proposed to
give battle if necessary; Wellington began concentrating at
various points west of Brussels turnpike. The British
general was still afraid of an attack against his communica-
tions, and consequently left the main road but lightly de-
fended. The situation was most favorable for the success of
Napoleon’s plan.

The condition of that success was that the Emperor should
seize the Quatre Bras-Namur road, the main avenue of
communications for the allied commanders. Once in pos-
session of that, he knew that his opponents could reëstablish
contact only through Wavre, or even by the Brussels-Lou-
vain road. Accordingly, therefore, he issued orders for a simultaneous attack on June 16 on the crossroads at Quatre Bras and on those near Ligny.

Let us turn first to the attack against Blücher at Ligny. Three of the Prussian commander's corps (about 90,000) had taken up a strong position at Saint Amand and Ligny. Grouchy was in general charge of the attack by Vandamme, Gerard, and three of the cavalry corps. Blücher, with his usual impetuosity, pushed forward over the hotly contested ground in front of the villages with the evident intention of turning the French left, and in so doing greatly weakened his center in order to give strength to the attacking wing. The Emperor, seeing the denuded line, prepared the Guard for an assault on the weakened center, but before carrying out the projected movement waited the arrival of d'Erlon whom he had ordered from Ney's command. The head of d'Erlon's column was seen approaching, but suddenly, with no apparent cause, it countermarched and disappeared. Without further delay, Napoleon ordered his assault, broke the hostile line, and forced the discomfited Prussians from the field. Both armies bivouacked near the scene of the battle.

Meanwhile, on the left, Ney in command of the remainder of the army had been fighting skillfully near Quatre Bras. Opposed in the beginning of the fray by forces considerably inferior to his own, he found himself confronted by a constantly increasing army as the battle wore on. At the last, he called in d'Erlon's corps as his final reinforcement. But just as this corps was marching to the field, an aide from the Emperor without consulting or informing Ney ordered it to Grouchy's assistance at Ligny. Ney, upon learning of its deflected route, peremptorily ordered its return, but the damage had already been done. D'Erlon had been of use to neither wing. Night fell upon an evenly contested tactical battle, but strategically Ney had won. He had prevented Wellington from reinforcing Blücher.

On the night of the 16th, Wellington retired and took up a
position at Mt. St. Jean, where he felt assured that Blücher would join him. The latter, after his defeat at Ligny, had resolutely abandoned his communications with Liège, and on the morning of June 17th set out to rejoin his ally by way of Wavre. Napoleon, who seems to have been convinced that the Prussians were retiring on Liège, nevertheless left Grouchy with Vandamme, Gerard, and one cavalry corps to pursue. That pursuit was tardily begun at 2 P.M. on the 17th, ten hours after Blücher had marched. It did not determine until late that night what direction the Prussians had taken. And when the information was in Grouchy’s hands, instead of maneuvering to prevent Blücher’s uniting with Wellington, the French marshal stupidly followed the Prussian army to Wavre. The advantage gained by the seizure of the Quatre Bras road was lost.

The Emperor meanwhile had joined Ney, followed the retiring British, and by evening was in sight of their position near Waterloo. He was determined to attack at once, and with this attack in mind carefully reconnoitered the field. A heavy rain on the night of June 17 prevented his moving his artillery early the next morning, so it was not until about 11.30 A.M. that the action commenced.

The British occupied a strong position at the crest of the hill, and, in front, on their right and opposite their left center, they had prepared two stone farmhouses which became centers of resistance—Hougomont and La Haye Sainte. Opposite the allies, on another crest, with a shallow dip between, were the French. Napoleon’s plan was to attack and turn the allied left flank, his idea being always to force the Anglo-Dutch army away from any possible union with Blücher.

The attack was begun with an advance by d’Erlon on the French right, down the hill against the British lines. Murderous infantry volleys checked the forward movement, and while the corps halted a spirited cavalry charge forced them back, broken and disordered, to their original position. No
sooner were their lines reformed than a new danger appeared to their right front in the form of Bülow’s Prussian corps which Grouchy’s inactivity had allowed to cross from Wavre. The Emperor placed a part of one corps at Planchenaiat to meet this menace and turned again to the main issue. The battle now took the form of a series of gallant cavalry charges under the command of Ney. Again and again the horsemen assaulted the British lines, but without effect. Ney, instead of directing his charges against the wing weakened by d’Erlon’s advance, was hurling his squadrons against the unshaken British center. It is true that the British line was weakened by these furious shocks, but the French cavalry was well-nigh exterminated.

By four o’clock in the afternoon, the French had possessed themselves of Hougomont and La Haye Sainte, but the Prussians had become a very grave danger on their flank. Fully 30,000 men were engaged, and Laban’s divisions were hard pressed to hold their own. Another Prussian corps had joined the British left, so that the French were outnumbered by 50,000. As a last resort Napoleon ordered the Guards to assault the plateau and break the British lines. Bravely, the veterans advanced across the valley under a galling fire and pushed their charge halfway up the opposite rise. There, taken in front and flank, the Guards staggered, halted — and broke! The effect was electric. The news spread instantly, and morale vanished. Nothing remained but flight. The Prussians overcame their immediate opponents and pushed their lines across the Brussels road. In the greatest disorder Napoleon’s army was routed from its last battle field.

On the following day, Grouchy fell upon the remaining Prussian corps at Wavre and defeated it badly, but nothing could retrieve the disaster of Waterloo. Although Grouchy managed to get his divisions safely across the frontier, the mass of the main army filtered over the border, fleeing in as abject terror as had ever the Prussians or the Austrians be-
fore the relentless Napoleon. The Emperor himself, after a few desperate attempts to restore order, succumbed to the general despair and hastened dejectedly to Paris. There was with him none of the feeling that followed Leipzig or Fontainebleau. He could not but feel now that his last campaign was completed in defeat and disaster.

E. THE FINAL SURRENDER

Napoleon arrived in Paris, utterly exhausted, June 21, 1815. He had no time for rest, for measures had to be taken at once to defend the capital. He hastily gathered his brothers and ministers about him to consider ways and means. He suggested a temporary dictatorship.

But even while he was in conference with his advisers, the Chamber of Deputies had assumed control of the situation. It passed a motion to continue in permanent session, and to consider any attempt to dissolve it as an act of high treason. This measure was a final blow to Napoleon’s hopes. He might, it is true, have collected some loyal forces and moved against the Deputies, but he shrank with good reason from the civil war which would inevitably follow. The blow at Waterloo had, indeed, temporarily paralyzed his will. For a precious day he allowed matters to drift. When news came that Grouchy had escaped, his chance of again assuming leadership appealed to him, but the Deputies had steeled their minds against further sacrifices and demanded his immediate abdication. He yielded on June 22, 1815; and reached the depths of humiliation a few weeks later when he received orders to leave France.

July 8, a fugitive, he embarked on board the French ship Saale. After a week of agonizing delay, he saw the impossibility of eluding the British ships hovering outside the bay. Hence, July 15, he surrendered to the commander of the British ship Bellerophon, throwing himself on the mercy of the British government. July 31, Napoleon was presented with the decision of that government that his liberty was to
be restricted in the interests of the peace of Europe, and that he would be taken to the isolated island of St. Helena to live. He was landed at St. Helena on the evening of October 17, 1815.

The remaining years of his life were passed as a prisoner on this island. He was assigned residence at a country estate called Longwood near the center of the island. He was allowed to have with him the small group of those who had chosen to share his exile. He was subject, however, to constant surveillance and to a number of restrictions irritating to a man of his energy and previous position. For example: his title was never recognized — he was always addressed as General Bonaparte; beyond certain prescribed limits he was not allowed to go without the company of a British officer; all his mail was intercepted and censored; interviews with him were possible only upon special permit from the British governor — and this permit was seldom issued. In his constant protests against the injustice of these restrictions, and his displays of temper against Sir Hudson Lowe, the British governor, we have an unedifying picture of the nervous irritability of Napoleon and his utter failure to adapt himself to his fall in fortune. Perhaps it would be too much to expect that the greatest military genius of his age should be also a practical philosopher.

Outside of the bickerings with Sir Hudson Lowe and the management of the small court formed by his companions in exile, Napoleon spent his time in dictating his memoirs. He had at hand a fair library (more than 2500 volumes) and took an interest in creating for the imagination of the future a favorable interpretation of his own career. From what he dictated on St. Helena grew the Napoleonic tradition that played an important part in later French history.

Late in 1820 the first serious symptoms of the disease which had carried off his father — cancer of the stomach — manifested themselves in sharp stabbing pains. By the end of the year the disease had so undermined his constitution
that he had lost his energy and become weary and apathetic. He no longer cared for the outdoor exercise he had been taking so vigorously; he lost weight rapidly; his digestion was impaired. May 3, 1821, his mind, which up to that time had remained clear, began to wander. Two days later, May 5, 1821, at 5.50 p.m., he died.

Napoleon's body, after an autopsy according to his own desire, was interred at Longwood with full military honors. Twenty years later, 1840, when the passions excited by his career seemed to have subsided, the British government allowed the removal of the body to Paris. There it received the honors that were its due and gained its final resting place on the banks of the Seine under the magnificent mausoleum of Les Invalides.

F. THE SECOND RESTORATION

When the extent of the allied victory was recognized, Wellington sent word to Louis XVIII that he had better follow the armies into France. So the dethroned Bourbon King again entered French soil June 25, 1815, publishing a proclamation that he had returned to resume his rights and that he would abide by the Constitutional Charter of 1814. The whole north of France speedily accepted him as King, so that debate by the assembled chambers or by the diplomats of the allies was useless.

The situation at the French capital was still, naturally, confused. The chambers continued in session; the wreck of the imperial army retreated within the city; and on June 29 the Prussians took up positions on the heights to the north. Wellington and Blücher refused to grant an armistice and pushed the attack. Confronted with the alternative of fighting or capitulating, the Chambers, in view of the hopelessness of the former course, accepted the latter, at the same time admitting Louis XVIII as the rightful King. On July 7 the allies entered Paris, and the following day Louis XVIII returned to the Tuileries.
Victory had been won so quickly by the allies that the diplomats had not had the opportunity to discuss terms. The restoration of Louis XVIII had to be treated as an accomplished fact, but certain of the diplomats, especially Hardenberg (Prussia) and Metternich (Austria), believed that France should suffer territorially for having again supported Napoleon. Prussia's object was to gain the border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Alexander of Russia strongly opposed any reduction of French territory, recalling the declaration of the allies that they warred, not against France, but against Napoleon. Wellington added to the arguments of Alexander the statement that the position of Louis XVIII in the eyes of the French people would be untenable if his restoration were accompanied by material loss of territory. Hardenberg (Prussia) was forced to abate his demands until Prussia obtained only a few small border strips. The punishment which, all agreed, France deserved was imposed in the shape of a money indemnity amounting to about $200,000,000 and by the location of allied troops to the number of 150,000 in the northern provinces of France for a period not to exceed five years. The Treaty of Paris, embodying the above provisions, was signed November 20, 1815.

With the success of the allies at Waterloo, the Second Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, and the abdication and imprisonment of Napoleon, Europe settled down to the task of readjustment. The terms and conditions under which this readjustment was to begin, and the territorial reapportionments, had been set forth in full by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. The governments in general looked forward to a speedy return to the old familiar conditions. In France alone the restored monarch yielded in the Constitutional Charter something to the forces of the Revolution. Elsewhere, the Revolution was regarded as a great earthquake which had for a time convulsed Europe, torn society from its natural bases, hurled sovereigns from their thrones, and left a wake of general destruction. This
earthquake once stilled, it remained for the old monarchs to restore the former order of existence. To their restricted vision, the period from 1789 to 1815 was no sign of the end of one era and the beginning of a new, of death agonies and birth throes, but merely a temporary and unfortunate disturbance in routine conditions. Hence, their idea of readjustment was to make every effort to forget, and to force their subjects to forget, the causes, nature, and results of the Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath.

The reactionary elements obtained a temporary and deceptive success. Under the domination of Metternich of Austria, true diplomat of the old régime as he was, the great states of the continent were frozen into an ultra-conservative mold. The dreams of political and social equality which had been inspired during the great Revolution were forcibly dissipated. For a full generation, Metternich and his colleagues in the chancellories of continental Europe strove to stifle the new life which had been born in France and spread far and wide by the French armies.

A generation is, however, but a minute time in history. With the passage of the years the living influences created by the Revolution gained explosive force. By spontaneous uprisings from one end of Europe to the other in the middle of the century, men testified to the vitality of these influences. And in contemporary Europe, we recognize that the liberal institutions and popular governments are the direct heritage of the convulsion in France. The political power of the masses of the people; the ideals of civil and social equality and justice; the extinction of absolute monarchy, feudal privileges, and a host of other abuses: — on the continent of Europe these reforms date from the Revolution. Severe as was the suffering caused to individuals by the shock of the Revolution, it is doubtful whether the entrenched system of the old régime could have been carried otherwise.
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