Henry Williams

Tho. Poll

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ESSAYS

ON

RHE TORIC.
ESSAYS ON RHE TORIC:
ABRIDGED CHIEFLY FROM
DR. BLAIR'S LECTURES
ON THAT SCIENCE.

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The want of a system of Rhetoric upon a concise plan, and at an easy price, will, it is presumed, render this little Volume not unacceptable to the Public. To collect knowledge which is scattered over a wide extent, into a small compass; if it has not the merit of originality, has at least the advantage of being useful. Many who are terrified at the idea of travelling over a ponderous volume in search of information, will yet set out on
A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

a short journey in pursuit of science with alacrity and profit. Those for whom the following Essays are principally intended, will derive a peculiar benefit from the brevity with which they are conveyed. To youth who are engaged in the rudiments of learning, and whose time and attention must be occupied with a variety of subjects, every branch of science should be rendered as concise as possible. Hence the attention is not fatigued, nor the memory overloaded.

That a knowledge of Rhetoric forms a very material part of the education of a polite scholar, must be universally allowed. Any at-
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tempt, therefore, however imperfect,
to make so useful a science more ge-
nerally known, has a claim to that
praise which is the reward of a
good intention. With this the Edi-
tor will be sufficiently satisfied;
since being serviceable to others, is
the most agreeable mean of becom-
ing contented with ourselves,
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INTRODUCTION.

A proper acquaintance with the circle of Liberal Arts is requisite to the study of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. To extend their knowledge must be the first care of those who wish either to write with reputation, or to express themselves in public so as to command attention. Among the ancients it was an essential principle, that the orator ought to be conversant in every department of learning. No art, indeed, can be contrived, which A could
could stamp merit on a composition for splendour or expression, when it possesses barren or erroneous sentiments. Oratory, it is true, has often been disgraced by attempts to establish a false criterion of its merit. Writers have endeavoured to supply the want of matter by the graces of composition; and to court the temporary applause of the ignorant, instead of the lasting approbation of the discerning. But the prevalence of such imposture must be short and transitory. The body and substance of any valuable composition must be formed by knowledge and science. Rhetoric com-
INTRODUCTION.

to completes the structure, and adds the polish; but firm and solid bodies alone are able to receive it.

Among the learned it has long been a contested, and remains still an undecided question, whether Nature or Art contribute most towards excellence in writing and discourse. Various may be the opinions, with respect to the manner in which Art can most effectually furnish assistance for such a purpose. It were presumption to advance, that mere rhetorical rules, how just soever, are sufficient to form an orator. Private application and study, supposing natural genius to be favourable,
able, is certainly superior to any system of public instruction. But, though rules and instructions cannot comprehend every thing which is requisite, they may afford considerable use and advantage. If they cannot inspire genius, they can give it direction and assistance. If they cannot make barrenness fruitful, they can correct redundancy. They discover the proper models for imitation: they point out the principal beauties which ought to be studied, and the chief faults which ought to be avoided; and consequently tend to enlighten Taste, and to conduct Genius from unnatural deviation.
deviations, into its proper channel. Though they are incapable, perhaps, of producing great excellencies, they may at least be subservient, to prevent the commission of considerable mistakes.

In the education of youth, no object has appeared more important to wise men, in every age, than to furnish them early with a relish for the entertainments of Taste. From these, to the discharge of the higher and more important duties of life, the transition is natural and easy. Of those minds which have this elegant and liberal turn, the most pleasing hopes may be entertained:

A 3
INTRODUCTION.

...whereas, an entire insensibility of eloquence, poetry, or any of the fine arts, is justly considered as an unpromising symptom of youth; and supposes them inclined to inferior gratifications, or capable of being engaged only in the more common and illiberal pursuits of life.

The improvement of Taste seems to be more or less connected with every good and virtuous disposition. By giving frequent exercise to all the tender and humane passions, a cultivated taste increases sensibility; yet, at the same time, it tends to weaken the more violent and fierce emotions.

Ingenuas
INTRODUCTION.

Ingenias didicisse fideliter artes,
Emoluit mores nec finit esse feros.

These polish'd arts have humaniz'd mankind,
Soften'd the rude, and calm'd the boist'rous mind.

Poetry, Eloquence, and History,
are continually suggesting those elevated sentiments and high examples
to our view, which tend to nourish in our minds public spirit, the love of glory, contempt of external fortune, and the admiration of every thing which is truly great, noble, and illustrious.
ON TASTE.

TASTE is "the power of receiving pleasure and pain from the beauties and deformities of Nature and of Art." It is a faculty common in some degree to all mankind. Throughout the circle of human nature nothing is more universal than the relish of Beauty, of one kind or other; of what is orderly, proportioned, grand, harmonious, new, or sprightly. In children the rudiments of Taste appear very early, in a thousand instances; in their partiality for regular bodies, their fondness for pictures and statues, and their warm attachment to whatever is new or astonishing. The most uninformed peasants receive pleasure from tales and ballads, and are delighted
Lighted with the beautiful appearances of nature, in the earth and heavens. Even in the wild deserts of America, where human nature appears in its most uncultivated state, the Savages have their ornaments of dress, their war and their death songs, their harangues and their orators. The principles of Taste must, therefore, be deeply founded in the human mind. To have some discernment of Beauty, is no less essential to man, than to possess the attributes of speech and of reason.

Though no human being can be entirely devoid of this faculty; yet it is possessed in very different degrees. In some men only the faint glimmerings of Taste are visible; the beauties which they relish are of the coarsest kind; and of these they have only a weakness combined confused impression; while in others Taste rises to an acute discernment, and lively enjoyment of the most refined beauties.

This
This inequality of Taste amongst mankind is owing, undoubtedly, in some degree, to the different frame of their natures; to nicer organs, and more delicate internal powers, with which some are endowed beyond others; yet it is owing still more to culture and education. Taste is certainly one of the most improvable faculties which adorns our nature. We may easily be convinced of the truth of this assertion, by only reflecting on that immense superiority which education and improvement give to civilized, above barbarous nations, in refinement of Taste; and on the advantage which they give, in the same nation, to those who have studied the liberal arts, above the rude and untaught vulgar.

Reason and good sense have so extensive an influence on all the operations and decisions of Taste, that a completely good Taste may well be considered as a power
power compounded of natural sensibility to beauty, and of improved understanding. To be satisfied of this, we may observe, that the greater part of the productions of Genius are no other than imitations of nature; representations of the characters, actions, or manners of men. The pleasure we experience from such imitations, or representations, is founded on mere Taste: but to judge whether they be properly executed, belongs to the understanding, which compares the copy with the original.

In reading, for instance, the Aeneid of Virgil, a great part of our pleasure arises from the plan or story being well conducted, and all the parts joined together with probability and due connection; from the characters being taken from nature, the sentiments being suited to the characters, and the style to the sentiments. The pleasure which is derived from a poem so conducted,
ducted, is felt or enjoyed by Taste as an internal sense; but the discovery of this conduct in the poem is owing to reason; and the more that reason enables us to discover such propriety in the conduct, the greater will be our pleasure.

The characters of Taste, when brought to its most perfect state, may be reduced to two; Delicacy and Correctness.

Delicacy of Taste regards principally the perfection of that natural sensibility on which Taste is founded. It implies those finer organs or powers which enable us to discover beauties that are concealed from a vulgar eye. It is judged of by the same marks that we use in judging of the delicacy of an external sense. As the goodness of the palate is not tried by strong flavours, but by a mixture of ingredients, where, notwithstanding the confusion, we remain
main sensible of each; in like manner, delicacy of internal Taste is visible, by a quick and lively sensibility to its finest, most compounded, or most latent objects.

Correctness of Taste respects the improvement which that faculty receives through its connection with the understanding. A man of correct Taste is one who is never imposed on by counterfeit beauties; who carries always in his own mind that standard of good sense which he employs in judging of every thing. He estimates with propriety the relative merit of the several beauties which he meets with in any work of genius; refers them to their proper classes; assigns the principles, as far as they can be traced, whence their power of pleasing us is derived; and is pleased himself precisely in that degree in which he ought, and no more.

Taste is certainly not an arbitrary
principle, which is subject to the fancy of every individual, and which admits of no criterion for determining whether it be false or true. Its foundation is the same in every human mind. It is built upon sentiments and perceptions which are inseparable from our nature; and which generally operate with the same uniformity as our other intellectual principles. When these sentiments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, they may be rectified by reason. Their found and natural state is finally determined, by comparing them with the general Taste of mankind. Let men declaim, as much as they please, concerning the caprice and the uncertainty of Taste; it is found by experience, that there are beauties, which, if displayed in a proper light, have power to command lasting and universal admiration. In every composition, what interests the imagination, and touches the heart, gives
gives pleasure to all ages and to all nations. There is a certain string, which being properly struck, the human heart is so made as to accord to it.

Hence the general testimony which the most improved nations of the earth have conspired, throughout a long series of ages, to give to some few works of genius; such as the Iliad of Homer, and the Aeneid of Virgil. Hence the authority which such works have obtained, as standards in some degree of poetical composition; since from them we are enabled to collect what the sense of mankind is, with respect to those beauties which give them the highest pleasure, and which therefore poetry ought to exhibit. Authority or prejudice may, in one age or country, give a short-lived reputation to an indifferent poet, or a bad artist; but when foreigners, or when posterity examine his works, his faults are discovered, and
and the genuine Taste of human nature is seen. Time overthrows the illusions of opinion, but confirms the decisions of nature.
TRUE CRITICISM is the application of Taste and of good sense to the several fine arts. Its design is to distinguish what is beautiful and what is faulty in every performance; from particular instances to ascend to general principles; and thus to form rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of Beauty in works of Genius.

Criticisn is an art founded entirely on experience; on the observation of such beauties as have been found to please mankind most generally. For example; Aristotle's rules concerning the unity of action in dramatic and epic composition, were not first discovered by logical reasoning, and then applied
to poetry; but they were deduced from the practice of Homer and Sophocles: they were founded upon observing the superior pleasure which we derive from the relation of an action which is one and entire, beyond what we receive from the relation of scattered and unconnected facts.

A superior Genius, indeed, will of himself, uninstructed, compose in such a manner as shall be agreeable to the most important rules of Criticism; for since these rules are founded in nature, nature will frequently suggest them in practice. Homer, it appears certain, was acquainted with no systems of the art of poetry: Guided by Genius alone, he composed in verse a regular story, which all succeeding ages have admired. But this is no argument against the usefulness of Criticism: for, since no human genius is perfect, there is no writer who may not receive assistance from
from critical observations upon the beauties and defects of those who have gone before him. No rules can, indeed, supply the defect of genius, or inspire it where it is wanting; but they may often guide it into its proper channel; they may correct its extravagances; and teach it the most just and proper imitation of nature. Critical rules are intended chiefly to point out the faults which ought to be avoided. We must be indebted to nature for the production of eminent beauties.

Genius is a word which, in common acceptation, extends much farther than to the objects of Taste. It signifies that talent or aptitude which we receive from nature, in order to excel in any one thing whatever. A man is said to have a genius for mathematics, as well as a genius for poetry; a genius for war, for politics, or for any mechanical employment.
Genius may be greatly improved by art and study; but by them alone it cannot be acquired. As it is a higher faculty than Taste, it is ever, according to the common frugality of nature, more limited in the sphere of its operations. There are persons, not unfrequently to be met with, who have an excellent Taste in several of the polite arts; such as music, poetry, painting, and eloquence, altogether; but an excellent performance in all these arts is very seldom found; or rather, indeed, such an one is not to be looked for. An universal Genius, or one who is equally and indifferently inclined towards several different professions and arts, is not likely to excel in any. Although there may be some few exceptions, yet in general it is true, that when the bent of the mind is wholly directed towards some one object, exclusive, as it were, of others, there is
PLEASURES OF TASTE.

The fairest prospect of eminence in that, whatever it may be. Extreme heat can be produced only when the rays converge to a single point. Young people are highly interested in this remark; since it may teach them to examine with care, and to pursue with ardour, that path which nature has marked out for their peculiar exertions.

The nature of Taste, the nature and importance of Criticism, and the distinction between Taste and Genius, being thus explained; the sources of the Pleasures of Taste shall next be considered. Here a very extensive field is opened; no less than all the Pleasures of the Imagination, as they are generally called, whether afforded us by natural objects, or by the imitations and descriptions of them. It is not, however, necessary to the purpose of the present Work, that all of them should be examined
examined fully; the pleasure which we receive from discourse, or writing, being the principal object of them. Our design is, to give some openings into the Pleasures of Taste in general; and to insist, more particularly, upon Sublimity and Beauty.

As yet, we are far from having attained to any system concerning this subject. A regular enquiry into it was first attempted by Mr. Addison, in his Essay on the Pleasures of the Imagination. By him these Pleasures are reduced under three heads: Beauty, Grandeur, and Novelty. His speculations on this subject, if not remarkably profound, are, however, very beautiful and entertaining; and he has the merit of having discovered a tract which was before untrod. Since his time, the advances which have been made in this part of philosophical criticism are not considerable; which is owing, doubtless, to that
that thinness and subtilty, which are discovered to be properties of all the feelings of Taste, It is difficult to enumerate the several objects which give pleasure to Taste; it is more difficult to define all those which have been discovered, and to range them under proper classes; and when we would proceed farther, and investigate the efficient causes of the pleasure which we receive from such objects, here we find ourselves at the greatest loss. For example; we all learn by experience, that some figures of bodies appear to us more beautiful than others; on farther enquiry, we discover that the regularity of some figures, and the graceful variety of others, are the foundation of the beauty which we discern in them; but when we endeavour to go a step beyond this, and enquire what is the cause of regularity and variety producing in our minds the sensation of beauty,
pleasures of taste.

beauty, any reason we can produce is extremely imperfect. Those first principles of internal sensation, nature appears to have studiously concealed.

It is some consolation, however, that although the efficient cause be obscure, the final cause of those sensations lies commonly more open; and here we must observe, the strong impression which the powers of Taste and Imagination are calculated to give us of the benevolence of our Creator. By these endowments, he hath widely enlarged the sphere of the pleasures of human life; and those, too, of a kind the most pure and innocent. The necessary pursuits of life might have been amply answered, though our senses of seeing and hearing had only served to distinguish external objects, without giving us any of those refined and delicate sensations of beauty and grandeur, with which we are now so much delighted.

The
The pleasure which arises from sublimity or grandeur deserves to be fully considered; because it has a character more precise and distinctly marked, than any other of the pleasures of the imagination; and also, it coincides more directly with our main subject. The simplest form of external grandeur is seen in the vast and boundless prospects presented to us by nature; such as wide extended plains, to which the eye can find no limits; the firmament of heaven; or the boundless expanse of the ocean. All vastness produces an idea of sublimity. Space, however extended in length, makes not so strong an impression as height or depth. Though a boundless plain be a grand object, yet a lofty mountain, to which we look up, or an awful precipice or tower, whence we look down on the objects below, is still more so. The excessive grandeur of the firmament arises from its height, added
added to its boundless extent; and that of the ocean, not from its extent alone, but from the continual motion and irresistible impetuosity of that mass of waters. Wherever space is concerned, it is evident, that amplitude or greatness of extent, in one dimension or other, is inseparable from grandeur. Take away all bounds from any object, and you immediately render it sublime. Hence infinite space, endless numbers, and everlasting duration, fill the mind with great ideas.

The most copious source of sublime ideas seems to be derived from the exertion of great power and force. Hence the grandeur of earthquakes and burning mountains; of great conflagrations; of the boisterous ocean; of the tempestuous storm; of thunder and lightning; and of all the unusual violence of the elements. A stream which glides along gently within its banks is a beautiful
riful object; but when it precipitates itself with the impetuosity and noise of a torrent, it immediately becomes a sublime one. A race-horse is beheld with pleasure; but it is the war-horse, "whose neck is cloth'd with thunder," that conveys grandeur in its idea. The engagement of two powerful armies, as it is the highest exertion of human strength, combines a variety of sources of the sublime; and has consequently been ever considered as one of the most striking and magnificent spectacles which can be either presented to the eye, or exhibited to the imagination in description.

All ideas of the solemn and awful kind, and even bordering on the terrible, tend greatly to assist the sublime; such as darkness, solitude, and silence. The firmament, when filled with stars, scattered in such infinite numbers and with such splendid profusion, strikes the imagination with a more awful grandeur
SUBLIMITY IN OBJECTS.

Deeper than when we behold it enlightened by all the splendour of the sun. The deep sound of a great bell, or the striking of a great clock, are at any time grand and awful; but, when heard amidst the silence and stillness of the night, they become doubly striking. Darkness is very generally applied for adding sublimity to all our ideas of the Deity: "He maketh darkness his pavilion; he dwelleth in the thick cloud." Thus Milton—

How oft, amidst
Thick clouds and dark, does Heaven's all-ruling Sire
Choose to reside, his glory unobscured;
And, with the majesty of darkness, round,
Circles his throne—

Obscurity, we may farther remark, is favourable to the sublime. The descriptions given us of the appearances of supernatural beings carry some sublimity,
limity, though the conceptions which they afford us be confused and indi-
fined. Their sublimity arises from the ideas which they always convey of su-
perior power and might, connected with an awful obscurity. No ideas, it is evident, are so sublime as those de-
derived from the Supreme Being: the most unknown, yet the greatest of all objects; the infinity of whose nature, and the eternity of whose duration, added to the omnipotence of his power, though they surpass our conceptions, yet exalt them to the highest.

Disorder is also very compatible with grandeur; nay, frequently heightens it. Few things which are exactly reg-
gular and methodical, appear sublime. We discover the limits on every side; we perceive ourselves confined; there is no room for any considerable exertion of the mind. Though exact pro-
portion of parts enters often into the beautiful,
beautiful, it is much disregarded in the sublime. An immense mass of rocks, thrown together by the hand of nature with wildness and confusion, strike the mind with more grandeur, than if they had been joined to each other with the most accurate symmetry.

There yet remains one class of Sublime Objects to be mentioned; which may be termed the Moral or Sentimental Sublime; arising from certain exertions of the mind; from certain affections and actions of our fellow-creatures. These will be found to be chiefly of that class which comes under the name of Magnanimity or Heroism; and they produce an effect very similar to what is produced by the view of grand objects in nature; filling the mind with admiration, and raising it above itself. Wherever, in some critical and dangerous situation, we behold a man uncommonly intrepid, and resting solely upon
upon himself; superior to passion and to fear; animated by some great principle to the contempt of popular opinion, of selfish interest, of dangers, or of death; we are there struck with a sense of the sublime. Thus Porus, when taken prisoner by Alexander, after a gallant defence, and asked in what manner he would be treated? answering, "Like a King!" and Caesar chiding the pilot who was afraid to set out with him in a storm, "Quid times? Caæarem vehis;" are good instances of the Sentimental Sublime.

The Sublime, in natural and in moral objects, is presented to us in one view, and compared together, in the following beautiful passage of Aksnside's Pleasures of the Imagination:

Look then abroad through nature; to the range
Of planets, suns, and adamantine spheres,
Wheeling, unshaken, thro' the void immense;
And speak, O Man! does this capacious scene.
With half that kindling majesty, dilate
Thy strong conception, as when Bruin rose;
Refulgent from the stroke of Caesar's fate;
Amid the crowd of Patriots; and his arm
Aloft extending, like eternal Jove,
When guilt brings down the thunder, call'd aloud
On Tully's name, and shook his crimson steel,
And bade the father of his country hail!
For lo! the tyrant prostrate on the dust;
And Rome again is free.

It has been thought by an ingenious Author, that terror is the source of the sublime; and that no objects have this character, but such as produce impressions of pain and danger. Many terrible objects are indeed highly sublime; nor does grandeur refuse an alliance with the idea of danger. But the sublime does not consist wholly in modes of danger, or of pain. In many grand objects there is not the least coincidence with terror; as in the magnificent prospect of wide extended plains, and of the starry firmament; or in the moral
moral dispositions and sentiments which we contemplate with high admiration; and in many painful and terrible objects also, it is evident, there is no sort of grandeur. The amputation of a limb, or the bite of a snake, are, in the highest degree, terrible; but are destitute of all claim whatever to sublimity. It seems just to allow, that mighty force or power, whether attended by terror or not, whether employed in protecting, or in alarming us, has a better title, than any thing which has yet been mentioned, to be the fundamental quality of the sublime. There appears to be no sublime object, into the idea of which, power, strength, and force, either enter not directly, or are not, at least, intimately associated with the idea, by conducting our thoughts to some astonishing power, as concerned in the production of the object.
SUBLIMITY IN WRITING.

THE foundation of the Sublime in Composition must always be laid in the nature of the object described; except it be such an object as, if presented to our sight, if exhibited to us in reality, would excite ideas of that elevating, that awful, and magnificent kind, which we call Sublime: the description, however finely drawn, is not entitled to be placed under this class. This excludes all objects which are merely beautiful, gay, or elegant. Besides, the object must not only in itself be sublime, but it must be placed before us in such a light as is best calculated to give us a clear and full impression of it: it must be described with strength, with conciseness, and
and simplicity. This depends chiefly upon the lively impression which the poet or orator has of the object which he exhibits, and upon his being deeply affected and animated by the sublime ideas which he would convey. If his own feeling be languid, he can never inspire his reader with any strong emotion. Instances, which on this subject are extremely necessary, will clearly show the importance of those requisites which have just been mentioned.

It is chiefly amongst the most ancient authors that we are to look for the most striking instances of the sublime. The early ages of the world, and the rude uncultivated state of society, appear to have been peculiarly favourable to the strong emotions of sublimity. The genius of mankind was then very prone to admiration and astonishment. Meeting continually with new and strange objects, their imagination was kept glow-
glowing, and their passions were often raised to the utmost. They thought, and expressed themselves boldly, and without restraint. In the progress of society, the genius and manners of men have undergone a change more favourable to accuracy than to strength or sublimity.

Of all writings, whether ancient or modern, the Sacred Scriptures afford us the most striking instances of the sublime. The descriptions of the Supreme Being are, in them, wonderfully noble; both from the grandeur of the object, and the manner of representing it. What a collection of awful and sublime ideas is presented to us in that passage of the eighteenth psalm, where an appearance of the Deity is described! "In my distress I called upon the Lord; he heard my voice out of his temple, and my cry came before him. Then the earth shook and trembled; the
"The foundations of the hills were moved; because he was wroth. He bowed the heavens and came down, and darkness was under his feet; and he did ride upon a cherub, and did fly; yea, he did fly upon the wings of the winds. He made darkness his secret place; his pavilion round about him were dark waters, and thick clouds of the sky." The circumstances of darkness and terror are here applied with propriety and success, for heightening the sublime.

The celebrated instance given by Longinus, from Moses, "God said, let there be light; and there was light," belongs to the true sublime; and its sublimity arises from the strong conception it conveys, of an effort of power producing its effect with the utmost speed and facility. A similar thought is magnificently expanded in the following passage of Isaiah (chap.
axiv—v. 24, 27, 28) "Thus faith
" the Lord, thy Redeemer, and he
" that formed thee from the womb:
" I am the Lord that maketh all things;
" that stretcheth forth the heavens
" alone; that spreadeth abroad the
" earth by myself; that faith to the
" deep, be dry, and I will dry up thy
" rivers; that faith of Cyrus, he is my
" shepherd, and shall perform all my
" pleasure; even, saying to Jerusalem,
" thou shalt be built; and to the
" Temple, thy foundation shall be
" laid."

Homer has, in all ages, been uni-
versally admired for sublimity; and he
is indebted for much of his grandeur
to that native and unaffected simplicity
which characterizes his manner. His
descriptions of conflicting armies; the
spirit, the fire, the rapidity which he
throws into his battles, present to every
reader of the Iliad frequent instances of
C 4 sublime
Sublime writing. The majesty of his warlike scenes are often heightened, in a high degree, by the introduction of the Gods. In the twentieth book, where all these superior beings take part in the engagement, according as they severally favour either the Grecians or the Trojans, the poet appears to put forth one of his highest efforts; and the description tises into the most awful magnificence. All nature seems to be in commotion. Jupiter thunders through the sky; Neptune strikes the earth with his trident; the ships, the city, and the mountains tremble; the earth shakes to its centre; Pluto leaps from his throne, fearing lest the secrets of the infernal regions should be laid open to the view of mortals. We shall transcribe Mr. Pope's translation of this passage; which, though perhaps inferior to the original, is yet highly animated and sublime.

But
But when the Powers descending swell'd the fight,
Then tumult rose, fierce rage, and pale affright:
Now thro' the trembling shores Minerva calls,
And now the thunders from the Grecian walls;
Mars, hovering o'er his Troy, his terror shrouds
In gloomy tempests, and a night of clouds;
Now thro' each Trojan heart his fury pours,
With voice divine, from Ilion's topmost towers;
Above, the Sire of Gods his thunder rolls,
And peals on peals redoubled rend the poles;
Beneath, stern Neptune shakes the solid ground,
The forests wave, the mountains nod around;
Thro' all her summits tremble Ida's woods,
And from their sources boil her hundred floods;
Troy's turrets totter on the rocking plain,
And the toils'd navies beat the heaving main;
Deep in the dismal region of the dead,
The infernal Monarch reared his horrid head,
Leapt from his throne, left Neptune's arm should lay
His dark dominions open to the day;
And pour in light on Pluto's drear abodes,
Abhor'd by men, and dreadful e'en to Gods!
Such wars the Immortals wage; such horrors rend
The world's vast concave, when the Gods contend.
Conciseness and simplicity will ever be found essential to sublime writing. Simplicity is properly opposed to studied and profuse ornament; and conciseness to superfluous expression. It will easily appear, why a defect either in conciseness or simplicity is peculiarly hurtful to the sublime. The emotion excited in the mind by some great or noble object, raises it considerably above its common pitch. A species of enthusiasm is produced, extremely pleasing while it lasts; but from which the mind is tending every moment to sink into its ordinary state. When an author, therefore, has brought us, or is endeavouring to bring us into this state, if he multiplies words unnecessarily, if he decks the sublime object, on all sides, with glittering ornaments; may, if he throws in any one decoration which falls in the least below the principal image, that moment he changes the
the key; he relaxes the tension of the mind; the strength of the feeling is emasculated; the Beautiful may remain, but the Sublime is no more.—Homer’s description of the nod of Jupiter, as shaking the heavens, has been admired, in all ages, as excessively sublime. Literally translated, it runs thus: “He spoke, and bending his fable brows, gave the awful nod; while he shook the celestial locks of his immortal head, all Olympus was shaken.”—Mr. Pope translates it thus:

He spoke; and awful bends his fable brows,
Shakes his ambrosial curls, and gives the nod,
The stamp of fate, and sanction of a god:
High heaven with trembling the dread signal took,
And all Olympus to its centre shook.

The image is expanded, and attempted to be beautified; but, in reality, it is weakened. The third line—"The stamp
Stamp of fate, and sanction of a God," is entirely expulsive, and introduced only to fill up the rhyme; for it interrupts the description, and clogs the image. For the same reason, Jupiter is represented as shaking his locks before he gives the nod: "Shakes his ambrosial curls, and gives the nod;" which is trifling and insignificant: whereas, in the original, the hair of his head shaken is the consequence of his nod, and makes a happy picturesque circumstance in the description.

The boldness, freedom, and variety of our blank verse, is infinitely more propitious than rhyme, to all kinds of sublime poetry. The fullest evidence of this is afforded by Milton; an author whose genius led him peculiarly to the sublime. The whole first and second books of Paradise Lost are continued examples of it. Take only, for instance, the following noted description of Satan, after
after his fall, appearing at the head of his infernal hosts:

—He, above the rest,
In shape and gesture proudly eminent,
Stood like a tower: his form had not yet lost
All her original brightness, nor appeared
Less than Archangel ruined; and the excess
Of glory obscured: as when the sun, new
risen,
Looks thro' the horizontal misty air,
Shorn of his beams; or, from behind, the
moon,
In dim eclipse, disastrous twilight sheds
On half the nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes monarchs. Darkened fo, yet those
Above them all th’ Archangel.

Here a variety of sources of the sublime are joined together: the principal object superlatively great; a high
superior nature, fallen indeed, but
raising itself against distress; the gran-
deur of the principal object heightened,
by connecting it with so noble an idea
as that of the sun suffering an eclipse;
This picture shaded with all those images of change and trouble, of darkness and terror, which coincide so exquisitely with the sublime emotion; and the whole expressed in a style and verification familiar, natural, and simple, but magnificent.

Besides simplicity and conciseness, strength is essentially requisite to sublime writing. The strength of description proceeds, in a great measure, from a simple conciseness; but it implies something more, namely, a judicious choice of circumstances in the description, so as to exhibit the object in its full and most advantageous point of view. For every object has several faces, if the expression be allowed, by which it may be presented to us, according to the circumstances with which we surround it; and it will appear superlatively sublime, or otherwise, in proportion as all these circumstances...
stances are happily chosen, and of a sublime kind. In this the great art of the writer consists; and is, indeed, the principal difficulty of sublime description. If the description be too general, and divested of circumstances, the object is shewn in a faint light; it makes either a feeble impression, or no impression at all, on the reader. At the same time, if any insignificant or improper circumstances are mingled, the whole is degraded.

The nature of that emotion which is aimed at by sublime description, admits of no mediocrity, and cannot subsist in a middle state; but must either highly transport us, or, if unsuccessful in the execution, leave us exceedingly disgusted and displeased. We endeavour to rise along with the writer; the imagination is awakened, and put upon the stretch; but it ought to be supported; and if, in the midst of its effort,
effort, it be deserted unexpectedly, it must descend with a painful shock.

When Milton, in his battle of the Angels, represents them as tearing up the mountains, and throwing them at one another; there are in his description, as Mr. Addison has remarked, no circumstances but what are truly sublime:

From their foundations loosing to and free,
They pluck'd the seated hills, with all their load,
Rocks, waters, woods; and by the shaggy tops
Uplifting, bore them in their hands.

This idea of the giants throwing the mountains, which is in itself so grand, is rendered by Claudian burlesque and ridiculous; by this single circumstance, of one of his giants with the mountain Ida upon his shoulders, and a river which flowed from the mountain, running down the giant's back, as he held it up in that posture. Virgil, in his description,
SUBLIMITY IN WRITING.

scription of Mount Ætna, has been guilty of a flight inaccuracy of this kind. After several magnificent images, the poet concludes with personifying the mountain under this figure,

"Eruptans viscera cum gemitu"—

"belching up his bowels with a groan;" which, by making the mountain resemble a sick or drunken person, degrades the majesty of the description. The debasing effect of the idea which is here presented, will appear in a stronger light, by observing what figure it makes in a poem of Sir Richard Blackmore; who, through an extravagant perversity of taste, had selected this for the principal circumstance in his description; and thereby (as Dr. Arbuthnot humourously observes) had represented the mountain as in a fit of the cholic.

Ætna, and all the burning mountains, find
Their kindled stores, with inbred storms of wind,

D Blown
50 SUBLIMITY IN WRITING.

Blown up to rage, and roaring out, complain,
As torn with inward gripes and torturing pain,
Labouring, they cast their dreadful vomit round,
And with their melted bowels spread the ground.

Such instances show how much the sublime depends upon a proper selection of circumstances; and with how great care every circumstance must be avoided, which, by approaching in the smallest degree to the mean, or even to the gay or the trifling, changes the tone of the emotion.

What is commonly called the sublime style, is, for the most part, a very bad one; and has no relation whatever to the true Sublime. Writers are apt to imagine, that splendid words, accumulated epithets, and a certain swelling kind of expression, by rising above what is customary or vulgar, contributes to, or even forms, the sublime: yet nothing is, in reality, more false. In the instances of sublime writing, which
which have been mentioned, nothing of this kind appears. "God said, let there be light; and there was light." This is truly striking and sublime: but put it into what is usually called the sublime style; "The Sovereign Arbiter of Nature, by the potent energy of a single word, commanded the light to exist;" and, as Boileau has justly observed, the style is indeed raised, but the thought is degraded. In general it may be observed, that the sublime lies in the thought, not in the words; and when the thought is really noble, it will generally clothe itself in a native majesty of language.

The faults opposite to the Sublime are principally two; the Frigid and the Bombast. The Frigid consists in degrading an object, or sentiment, which is sublime in itself, by a mean conception of it; or by a weak, low, or puerile description of it. This betrays
entire absence, or at least extreme poverty of genius. The Bombast lies in forcing a common or trivial object out of its rank, and endeavouring to raise it into the sublime; or, in attempting to exalt a sublime object beyond all natural and just bounds.
BEAUTY, AND OTHER PLEASURES OF TASTE.

BEAUTY, next to Sublimity, affords, undoubtedly, the highest pleasure to the imagination. The emotion which it raises, is easily distinguished from that of Sublimity. It is of a more gentle kind; more calm and soothing; does not elevate the mind so much, but produces a pleasing serenity. Sublimity excites a feeling, too violent to be lasting; the pleasure proceeding from Beauty admits of longer continuance. It extends also to a much greater variety of objects than Sublimity; to a variety indeed so great, that the sensations which beautiful objects produce differ exceedingly, not in degree only, but
but also in kind, from each other. Hence, no word is used in a more unde
determined signification than Beauty: it is applied to almost every exter
nal object which pleases the eye or the ear; to many of the graces of writing;
to several dispositions of the mind; nay, to some objects of mere abstract science. We speak frequently of a beautiful tree or flower; a beautiful poem; a beauti
ful character; and a beautiful theorem in mathematics.

Colour seems to afford the simplest instance of Beauty. Association of ideas; it is probable, has some influence on the pleasure which we receive from colours. Green, for example, may appear more beautiful, by being con
nected in our ideas with rural scenes and prospects; white, with innocence; blue, with the serenity of the sky. Independent of associations of this sort, all that we can farther observe respec

ing
ing colours is; that those chosen for Beauty are commonly delicate, rather than glaring: such are the feathers of several kinds of birds, the leaves of flowers, and the fine variation of colours shown by the sky at the rising and setting of the sun.

Figure opens to us forms of Beauty more complex and diversified. Regularity first offers itself to be noticed as a source of Beauty. By a regular figure is understood, one which we perceive to be formed according to some certain rule; and not left arbitrary or loose, in the construction of its parts. Thus a circle; a square, a triangle, or a hexagon, give pleasure to the eye, by their regularity; as beautiful figures: yet a certain graceful variety is perceived to be a much more powerful principle of Beauty. Regularity seems to appear beautiful to us, chiefly, if not entirely, on account of its suggesting the ideas of
of fitness, propriety, and use, which have always a more intimate connection with orderly and proportioned forms, than with those which appear not constructed according to any certain rule. Nature, who is the most graceful artist, hath, in all her ornamental works, pursued variety, with an apparent disregard of regularity. Cabinets, doors, and windows, are made after a regular form, in cubes and parallelograms, with an exact proportion of parts; and thus formed, they please the eye for this just reason; that being works of use, they are, by such figures, the better adapted to the ends for which they were designed. Yet plants, flowers, and leaves, are full of variety and diversity. A straight canal is an insipid figure, when compared with the meanders of rivers. Cones and pyramids have their degree of beauty; but trees growing in their natural wildness, have infinitely
infinitely more beauty than when trimmed into pyramids and cones. The apartments of a house must be disposed with regularity, for the convenience of its inhabitants; but a garden, which is intended merely for beauty, would be extremely disgusting, if it had as much uniformity and order as a dwelling-house.

Motion affords another source of Beauty, distinct from figure. Motion of itself is pleasing; and bodies in motion are, "caeteris paribus," universally preferred to those at rest. Gentle motion, however, only belongs to the Beautiful; for when it is swift, or very powerful, such as that of a torrent, it partakes of the Sublime. The motion of a bird gliding through the air, is exquisitely beautiful; the swiftness with which lightning darts through the sky, is magnificent and astonishing. And here it is necessary to observe, that the
sensations of sublime and beautiful are not always distinguished by very distant boundaries; but are capable, in many instances, of approaching towards each other. Thus, a gently running stream is one of the most beautiful objects in nature: as it swells gradually into a great river, the beautiful, by degrees, is lost in the sublime. A young tree is a beautiful object; a spreading ancient oak is a venerable and sublime one. But to return to the beauty of motion: it will be found to hold very generally, that motion in a straight line is not so beautiful as in a waving direction; and motion upwards is commonly also more pleasing than motion downwards. The easy curling motion of flame and smoke, is an object singularly agreeable. Mr. Hogarth observes very ingeniously, that all the common and necessary motions for the purposes of life, are performed by men
PLEASURES OF TASTE.

in straight or plain lines; but that all the graceful and ornamental movements are made in curve lines; an observation worthy of the attention of those who study the grace of gesture and action.

Colour, figure, and motion, though separate principles of Beauty; yet in many beautiful objects they meet together, and thereby render the beauty both greater and more complex. Thus in flowers, trees, and animals, we are entertained at the same time with the delicacy of the colour, with the gracefulness of the figure, and sometimes also with the motion of the object. The most complete assemblage of beautiful objects which can any where be found, is presented by a rich natural landscape, where there is a sufficient variety of objects: fields in verdure, scattered trees and flowers, running water, and animals grazing. If to these be added, some of the productions of art, which are
are proper for such a scene; as a bridge with arches, over a river, smoke rising from cottages in the midst of trees, and the distant view of a fine building discovered by the rising sun; we then enjoy, in the greatest perfection, that gay, chearful, and placid sensation which characterizes Beauty.

The Beauty of the human countenance is more complex than any that we have yet examined. It comprehends the Beauty of colour, arising from the delicate shades of the complexion; and the Beauty of figure, arising from the lines which constitute the different features of the face: but the principal Beauty of the countenance depends upon a mysterious expression which it conveys of the qualities of the mind; of good sense, or good humour; of candour, benevolence, sensibility, or other amiable dispositions. It may be observed, that there are certain qualities of
of the mind which, whether expressed in the countenance, or by words, or by actions, always raise in us a feeling similar to that of Beauty. There are two great classes of moral qualities; one is of the high and the great virtues, which require extraordinary efforts, and is founded on dangers and sufferings; as heroism, magnanimity, contempt of pleasures, and contempt of death. These, as was observed in a former Lecture, produce in the spectator an idea of sublimity and grandeur. The other class is chiefly of the social virtues, and such as are of a softer and gentler kind; as compassion, mildness, and generosity. These excite in the beholder a sensation of pleasure so nearly allied to that produced by beautiful external objects, that, though of a more exalted nature, it may without impropriety be classed under the same head.

Beauty of Writing, used in its more definite
Definite sense, characterizes a particular manner; when it is to signify a certain grace and amenity in the turn either of style or sentiment, for which some authors have been particularly distinguished. In this sense, it comprehends a manner neither remarkably sublime, nor extravagantly passionate, nor uncommonly sparkling; but such as excites in the reader an emotion of the gentle placid kind, resembling that which is raised by the contemplation of beautiful objects in nature; which neither lifts the mind very high, nor agitates it to excess; but spreads over the imagination an agreeable and pleasing serenity. Mr. Addison is a writer entirely of this character; and is one of the most proper examples which can be given of it. Fenelon, the author of Telemachus, may be considered as another example. Virgil also, though very capable of rising occasionally into the sublime,
PLEASURES OF TASTE.

sublime, yet generally is distinguished by the character of beauty and grace, rather than of sublimity. Among orators, Cicero has more of the beautiful than Demosthenes, whose genius carried him wholly towards vehemence and strength.

This much it is necessary to have said upon the subject of Beauty; since, next to Sublimity, it is the most copious source of the Pleasures of Taste. But objects do not only delight the imagination by appearing under the forms of sublime or beautiful: they likewise derive their power of giving it pleasure from several other principles.

Novelty, for example, has been mentioned by Mr. Addison, and by every writer on this subject. An object which has no other merit than being uncommon or new, by means of this quality alone, raises in the mind a vivid and an agreeable emotion. Hence that passion
passion of curiosity, which prevails so universally among mankind. Objects and ideas to which we have been long accustomed, make too faint an impression to give an agreeable exercise to our faculties. New and strange objects rouse the mind from its dormant state, by giving it a sudden and pleasing impulse. Hence, in a great measure, the entertainment we receive from fiction and romance. The emotion raised by Novelty is of a more lively and awakening nature than that produced by Beauty; but much shorter in its duration. For if the object has in itself no charms to retain our attention, the shining gloss spread over it by Novelty soon wears off.

Imitation is also another source of pleasure to Taste. This gives rise to what Mr. Addison calls, the Secondary Pleasures of Imagination; which form, undoubtedly, a very extensive class.
For all imitation conveys some pleasure to the mind; not only the imitation of beautiful or sublime objects, by recalling the original ideas of beauty or grandeur which such objects themselves exhibited; but even objects which have neither beauty nor grandeur; nay, some which are terrible or deformed, give us pleasure in a secondary or represented view.

The pleasures of melody and harmony belong likewise to Taste. There is no delightful sensation we receive either from beauty or sublimity, but what is capable of being heightened by the power of musical sound. Whence the charms of poetical numbers; and even of the more concealed and looser measures of prose. Wit, humour, and ridicule, also open a variety of pleasures to Taste, quite different from any that we have yet considered.

At present, it is unnecessary to pursue
fue any farther the subject of the Pleasures of Taste. We have opened some of the general principles; it is time now to apply them to our chief subject. If it be asked, to what class of those Pleasures of Taste which have been enumerated, that pleasure is to be referred, which we receive from poetry, eloquence, or fine writing? The answer is, not to any one, but to them all. This peculiar advantage writing and discourse possess, that they encompass so large and fruitful a field on all sides, and have power to exhibit, in great perfection, not a single set of objects only, but almost the whole of those which give pleasure to taste and imagination; whether that pleasure arise from sublimity, from beauty in its various forms, from design and art, from moral sentiment, from novelty, from harmony, from wit, humour, and ridicule. To which ever of
of these the peculiar inclination of a person's taste lies, from some writer or other he has it always in his power to receive the gratification of it.

It has been usual among critical writers, to speak of discourse as the chief of all the imitative or mimetic arts; they compare it with painting and with sculpture, and in many respects prefer it justly before them. But it must be observed, that imitation and description differ considerably in their nature from each other. Words have no natural resemblance to the ideas or objects which they are employed to signify; but a statue or a picture has a natural likeness to the original.

As far, however, as a poet or a historian introduces into his work persons really speaking, and by the words which he puts into their mouths, represents the conversation which they might be supposed to hold; so far his art may more justly be called imitative: and
this is the case in every dramatic composition. But in narrative or descriptive works it cannot with propriety be called so. Who, for example, would call Virgil's description of a tempest, in the first Aeneid, an imitation of a storm? If we heard of the imitation of a battle, we might naturally think of some mock-fight, or representation of a battle on the stage; but would never imagine, that it meant one of Homer's descriptions in the Iliad. We must allow, at the same time, that imitation and description agree in their principal effect, of recalling, by external signs, the ideas of things which we do not see. But, though in this they coincide, yet it should be remembered, that the terms themselves are not synonymous; that they import different means of producing the same end; and consequently make different impressions on the mind.
ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE.

To form an adequate idea of the Rise and Origin of Language, we must contemplate the circumstances of mankind in their earliest and rudest state. They were then a wandering, scattered race; no society among them except families; and the family society also very imperfect, as their mode of living, by hunting or pasture, must have separated them frequently from each other. In such a situation, how could any one set of sounds or words be universally agreed on as the signs of their ideas? Supposing that a few, whom chance or necessity threw together, agreed, by some means, upon certain signs; yet by what authority could
could these be propagated among other tribes or families, so as to spread, and grow up into a language? One would imagine, that men must have been previously gathered together in considerable numbers, before language could be fixed and extended; and yet, on the other hand, there seems to have been an absolute necessity of speech, previous to the formation of society: for, by what bond could any multitude of men be kept together, or be connected in the prosecution of any common interest, until, by the assistance of speech, they could communicate their wants and intentions to each other? So that, either how society could subsist previous to language, or how words could rise into a language, previous to the formation of society, seem to be points attended with equal difficulty. And when we consider farther, that curious analogy which prevails in the con-
construction of almost all languages, and that deep and subtile logic on which they are founded, difficulties increase so much upon us, on all sides, that there seems to be no small reason for referring the first origin of all language to divine inspiration.

But supposing language to have a divine original, we cannot, however, imagine, that a perfect system of it was all at once given to man. It is much more natural to suppose, that God taught our first parents only such language as suited their present occasions; leaving them, as he did in other respects, to enlarge and improve it as their future necessities should require: consequently those first rudiments of speech must have been poor and narrow; and we are at full liberty to enquire in what manner, and by what steps, language advanced to the state in which we now find it.

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Should we suppose a period to exist before any words were invented or known, it is evident that men could have no other method of communicating their feelings to others, than by the cries of passion, accompanied by such motions and gestures as were farther expressive of passion. These, indeed, are the only signs which nature teaches all men, and which are understood by all. One who saw another going into some place where he himself had been frightened, or exposed to danger, and who wished to warn his neighbour of the danger, could contrive no other method of doing it than by uttering those cries, and making those gestures, which are the signs of fear: just as two men, at this day, would endeavour to make themselves understood by each other, who should be thrown together on a desolate island, ignorant of each other's language. Those exclamations, therefore,
therefore, by grammarians called inter-
jections, uttered in a strong and pas-
sonate manner, were, undoubtedly, the first elements or beginnings of
speech.

When more enlarged communication
became requisite, and names began to
be applied to objects, how can we sup-
pose men to have proceeded in this ap-
plication of names, or invention of
words? Certainly, by imitating, as
much as they could, the nature of the
object which they named, by the sound
of the name which they gave to it. As
a painter, who would represent grass,
must make use of a green colour; so in
the infancy of language, one giving a
name to any thing harsh or boisterous,
would of course employ a harsh or
boisterous sound. He could not act
otherwise, if he desired to excite in the
hearer the idea of that object which he
wished to name. To imagine words
invented,
invented, or names given to things, in a manner purely arbitrary, without any ground or reason, is to suppose an effect without a cause. There must always have been some motive, which led to one name rather than another; and we can suppose no motive which would more generally operate upon men in their first efforts towards language, than a desire to paint by speech the objects which they named, in a manner more or less complete, according as it was in the power of the human voice to effect this imitation.

Wherever objects were to be distinguished, in which sound, noise, or motion were concerned, the imitation by words was sufficiently obvious. Nothing was more natural than to imitate, by the sound of the voice, the quality of the sound or noise which any external object produced; and to form its name accordingly. Thus, in all languages, we
OF LANGUAGE.

we discover a multitude of words which are evidently constructed upon this principle. A certain bird is called the Cuckoo, from the sound which it emits. When one sort of wind is said to whistle, and another to roar; when a serpent is said to hiss; a fly to buzz, and falling timber to crash; when a stream is said to flow, and hail to rattle; the resemblance betwixt the word and the thing signified is plainly discernible. But in the names of objects which address the sight only, where neither noise nor motion are concerned, and still more in the terms appropriated to moral ideas, this analogy appears to fail. Yet many learned men have imagined, that, tho' in such cases it becomes more obscure, it is not altogether lost; but that throughout the radical words of all languages, there may be traced some degree of correspondence with the object signified.

This
This principle, however, of a natural relation between words and objects, can only be applied to language in its most simple and early state. Though in every tongue some remains of it can be traced, it were utterly in vain to search for it throughout the whole construction of any modern language. As the multitude of terms increase in every nation, and the vast field of language is filled up, words, by a thousand fanciful and irregular methods of derivation and composition, deviate widely from the primitive character of their roots, and lose all resemblance in sound to the things signified. This is the present state of language. Words, as we now use them, taken in the general, may be considered as symbols, not as imitations; as arbitrary or instituted, not natural signs of ideas. But there seems to be no doubt, that language, the nearer we approach to its rise among men, will
will be found to partake more of a natural expression.

Interjections, it has been shown, or passionate exclamations, were the first elements of speech. Men laboured to communicate their feelings to each other, by those expressive cries and gestures which nature taught them. After words, or names of objects began to be introduced, this mode of speaking by natural signs could not be all at once dispersed: for language, in its infancy, must have been extremely barren; and there undoubtedly was a period, among all rude nations, when conversation was carried on by a very few words, intermixed with many exclamations and earnest gestures. The inconsiderable stock of words which men as yet possessed, rendered those helps entirely necessary for explaining their conceptions; and rude, uncultivated men, not having always ready even
even the few words which they knew, would naturally labour to make themselves understood, by changing their tones of voice, and accompanying their tones with the most expressive gesticulations they could make.

To this mode of speaking necessity first gave rise. But we must observe, that after this necessity had, in a great degree, ceased, by language becoming, in process of time, more extensive and copious, the ancient manner of speech still subsisted among many nations; and what had arisen from necessity, continued to be used for ornament. In the Greek and Roman languages, a musical and gesticulating pronunciation was retained in a very high degree. Without having attended to this, we shall be at a loss in understanding several passages of the Classics, which relate to the public speaking and the theatrical entertainments of the ancients. Our modern
 dern pronunciation would have seemed to them a lifeless monotony. The declamation of their orators, and the pronunciation of their actors upon the stage, approached to the nature of recitative in music; was capable of being marked in notes, and supported with instruments; as several learned men have fully demonstrated.

With regard to gestures, the case was parallel; for strong tones and animated gestures, we may observe, always go together. The action both of the orators and the players in Greece and Rome, was far more vehement than what we are accustomed to. To us, Roscius would have appeared a madman. Gesture was of such consequence upon the ancient stage, that there is reason for believing, that on some occasions the speaking and the acting part were divided; which, according to our ideas, would form a strange exhibition:

one
one player spoke the words in the proper tones, while another expressed the corresponding motions and gestures. Cicero tells us, that it was a contest between him and Roscius, whether he could express a sentiment in a greater variety of phrases, or Roscius in a greater variety of intelligible significant gestures. At last gesture engrossed the stage entirely; for under the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, the favourite entertainment of the Public was the Pantomime, which was carried on by gesticulation only. The people were moved, and wept at it as much as at tragedies; and the passion for it became so violent, that laws were instituted for restraining the senators from studying the pantomime art. Now, though in declamations and theatrical exhibitions, both tone and gesture were undoubtedly, carried much farther than in common discourse; yet public speaking
ling of any kind must, in every country, bear some proportion to the manner which is used in conversation; and such public entertainments could never have been relished by a nation, whose tones and gestures, in discourse, were as languid as ours.

The early language of mankind being entirely composed of words descriptive of sensible objects, became, of necessity, extremely metaphorical. For, to signify any desire or passion, or any act or feeling of the mind, they had no fixed expression which was appropriated to that purpose; but were obliged to paint the emotion or passion which they felt, by alluding to those sensible objects which had most connection with it, and which could render it, in some degree, visible to others.

It was not, however, necessity alone which gave rise to this pictured style. In the infancy of all societies, fear and
surprise, wonder and astonishment, are the most frequent passions of mankind. Their language will necessarily be affected by this character of their minds. They will be apt to paint every thing in the strongest and most glowing colours. Even the manner in which the first tribes of men uttered their words, would have considerable influence on their style. Wherever strong exclamations, tones, and gestures, are connected with conversation, the imagination is always more exercised; a greater effort of fancy and passion is excited. Thus the fancy being kept awake, and rendered more sprightly by this mode of utterance, operates upon style, and gives it additional life and spirit.

As one proof, amongst many others which might be produced, of the truth of these observations, we shall transcribe a speech from Colden's History of the Five Indian Nations, which was delivered
vered by their Chiefs, when entering on a treaty of peace with us, in the following language: 

"We are happy in having buried under ground the red axe, that has so often been dyed with the blood of our brethren. Now, in this fort, we inter the axe, and plant the tree of peace. We plant a tree, whose top will reach the sun; and its branches spread abroad, so that it shall be seen afar off. May its growth never be stilled and choaked; but may it shade both your country and ours, with its leaves! Let us make fast its roots, and extend them to the utmost of your colonies. If the French should come to shake this tree, we would know it by the motion of its roots, reaching into our country. May the Great Spirit allow us to rest in tranquility upon our mats, and never again dig up the axe to cut down the tree"
tree of peace! Let the earth be
trod hard over it, where it lies buried.
Let a strong stream run under the
pit, to wash the evil away out of our
sight and remembrance. The fire
that had long burned in Albany is
extinguished. The bloody bed is
washed clean, and the tears are wiped
from our eyes. We now renew the
covenant chain of friendship. Let it
be kept bright, and clean as silver,
and not suffered to contract any rust.
Let not any one pull away his arm
from it."

As Language, in its progress, began
to grow more copious, it gradually lost
that figurative style which was its ori-
ginal characteristic. The vehement
manner of speaking by tones and ges-
tures became less universal. Instead of
Poets, Philosophers became the in-
structors of mankind; and in their rea-
soning on all subjects, introduced that
plainer
OF LANGUAGE.

plainer and more simple style of composition, which we now call Prose. Thus the ancient metaphorical and poetical dress of Language was, at length, laid aside from the intercourse of men, and reserved for those occasions only on which ornament was professedly studied.
RISE AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE AND OF WRITING.

If we examine the order in which words are arranged in a sentence, we find a very remarkable difference between the ancient and modern tongues. The consideration of this will serve to unfold farther the genius of Language, and to discover the causes of those alterations which it has undergone, in the progression of society.

To conceive distinctly the nature of this alteration, we must go back, as before, to the most early period of Language. Let us figure to ourselves a Savage, beholding some object, such as fruit, which he earnestly desires, and requests another to give it to him. Suppose
pose him unacquainted with words; he would then strive to make himself understood by pointing eagerly at the object which he desired, and uttering at the same time a passionate cry. Supposing him to have acquired words, the first word which he uttered would, consequently, be the name of that object. He would not express himself according to our order of construction, "Give me fruit;" but according to the Latin order, "Fruit give me," — "Fructum da mihi:" for this evident reason, that his attention was wholly directed towards fruit, the object of his desire. From hence we might conclude, a priori, that this would be the order in which words were most commonly arranged in the infancy of Language; and accordingly we find, in reality, that in this order words are arranged in most of the ancient tongues, as in the Greek and the Latin; and it is said likewise, in the Russian,
Russian, the Slavonic, the Gaëlle, and several of the American tongues.

The modern languages of Europe have adopted a different arrangement from the ancient. In their prose compositions, very little variety is admitted in the collocation of words; they are chiefly fixed in one order, which may be called the Order of the Understanding. They place first in the sentence the person or thing which speaks or acts, next, its action; and finally, the object of its action. Thus an English Writer, paying a compliment to a great man, would say, "It is impossible for me to pass over in silence such distinguished mildness, such unusual and unheard of clemency, and such uncommon moderation in the exercise of such prenial power." Here is first presented to the person who speaks, "It is impossible for me;" next, what the same person is to do; "impossible

"for
"for him to pass over in silence;" and lastly, the object which excites him to action, "the mildness, clemency, and moderation of his patron." Cicero, from whom these words are translated, exactly changes this order; he begins with the object, places that first, which was the exciting idea in the speaker's mind, and ends with the speaker and his action. "Tantam manuetudinem, tam invitatam inauditamque clementiam, tantamque in summis potestatis rerum omnium modum, tacitus nullo modo præterire possum." Here, it must be observed, the Latin order is more animated; the English more clear and distinct.

Our language naturally allows a greater liberty for transposition and inversion in poetry than in prose. Even there, however, that liberty is confined within narrow limits, in comparison of
the ancient languages. In this respect the modern tongues vary from each other. The Italian approaches the nearest in its character to the ancient transposition; the English has more inversion than the rest; and the French has the least of all.

Writing is an improvement upon Speech, and consequently was posterior to it in order of time. Its characters are of two kinds; either signs for things, or signs for words. Thus the pictures, hieroglyphics, and symbols, employed by the Ancients, were of the former sort; the alphabetical characters, now employed by Europeans, of the latter.

Pictures were, certainly, the first attempt towards writing. Mankind, in all ages and in all nations, have been prone to imitation. This would soon be employed for giving imperfect descriptions of events, and for recording their remembrance. Thus, to signify that
that one man had killed another, they painted the figure of a dead man lying on the ground, and of another standing over him, with a hostile weapon in his hand. When America was first discovered, this was the only kind of writing with which the Mexicans were acquainted. It was, however, a very imperfect mode of recording facts; since, by pictures, external events could only be delineated.

Hieroglyphical characters may be considered as the second stage of the Art of Writing. They consist in certain symbols, which are made to represent invisible objects, on account of a resemblance which such symbols were supposed to bear to the objects themselves. Thus, an eye represented knowledge; a circle, having neither beginning nor end, was the symbol of eternity. Egypt was the country where this kind of writing was most studied, and
and brought into a regular art. In these characters all the boasted wisdom of their Priests was conveyed. They pitched upon animals to be the emblems of moral objects, according to the qualities with which they supposed them to be endowed. Thus, imprudence was denominated by a fly; wisdom by an ant; and victory by a hawk. But this sort of writing was in the highest degree enigmatical and confused, and consequently a very imperfect vehicle of knowledge.

From hieroglyphics mankind gradually advanced to simple arbitrary marks, which stood for objects, though without any resemblance or analogy to the objects signified. Of this nature was the manner of writing among the Peruvians. They used small cords of different colours, and by knots upon these, of different sizes, and variously arranged, they invented signs for giving informa-
information, and communicating their thoughts to one another. The Chinese, at this day, use written characters of this nature. They have no alphabet of letters, or simple sounds, of which their words are composed; but every single character which they use is expressive of an idea; it is a mark which signifies some one thing or object. The number of these characters must, consequently, be immense. They are said, indeed, to amount to seventy thousand. To be perfectly acquainted with them is the business of a whole life; which must have greatly retarded, among them, the progress of every kind of science.

It is evident, that the Chinese characters are, like hieroglyphics, independent of Language; are signs of things, and not of words. For we are told, that the Japanese, the Tonquinese, and the Cordans, who speak different languages from each other, and from
from the inhabitants of China, employ; however, the same written characters with them, and thus correspond intelligibly with one another in writing, though ignorant of the language spoken in their respective countries. Our arithmetical figures, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. are an example of this sort of writing. They have no dependance on words; each figure represents the number for which it stands; and consequently, is equally understood by all the nations who have agreed in the use of these figures.

The first step to remedy the imperfection, the ambiguity, and the tediousness of each of these methods of communication which have been mentioned, was the invention of signs, which should stand not directly for things, but for the words by which things were named and distinguished. An alphabet of syllables seems to have been
been invented previous to an alphabet of letters. Such an one is said to be retained, at this day, in Æthiopia, and some countries of India. But it must have been, at best, imperfect and ineffectual; since the number of characters, being very considerable, must have rendered both reading and writing very complex and laborious.

To whom we are indebted for the sublime and refined discovery of Letters, is not determined. They were brought into Greece by Cadmus the Phœnician, who, according to Sir Isaac Newton's Chronology, was contemporary with King David. His alphabet consisted only of sixteen letters. The rest were afterwards added, according as signs for proper sounds were found to be wanting. The Phœnician, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman alphabets, agree so much in the figure, the names, and the arrangement of the letters, as
Amounts to a demonstration, that they were derived originally from the same source.

The ancient order of writing was from the right hand to the left. This method, as appears from some very old inscriptions, prevailed even among the Greeks. They afterwards used to write their lines alternately from the right to the left, and from the left to the right. The inscription on the famous Sigean Monument is a testimony of this mode of writing, which continued till the days of Solon, the celebrated Legislator of Athens. At length, the motion from the left hand to the right being found more natural and convenient, this order of writing was adopted throughout all the nations of Europe.

Writing was first exhibited on pillars, and tables of stone, and afterwards on plates of the softer metals, such as lead; as it became practised more extensively, the
the leaves, and the bark of certain trees, were used in some countries; and in others, tablets of wood, covered with a thin coat of hot wax, on which the impression was made with a stylus of iron. Parchment, made of the hides of animals, was an invention of later times. Paper was not invented till the fourteenth century.
THE usual division of speech into eight parts; "nouns," "pronouns," "verbs," "particules," "adverbs," "prepositions," "interjections," and "conjunctions," might easily be proved not to be very accurate; since, under the general term of nouns, it comprehends both substantives and adjectives, which are parts of speech entirely distinct; while it makes a separate part of speech of participles, which are only verbal adjectives. Yet, as we are most accustomed to this division, and as logical exactness is not necessary to our present design, we shall adopt those terms which habit has made familiar to us.

Substantive nouns are the foundation of Grammar, and are the most ancient part.
part of speech. When men had got beyond simple interjections or exclamations of passion, and began to communicate their ideas to each other, they would be obliged to assign names to the objects by which they were surrounded. Whichever way he looked, forests and trees would meet the eye of the beholder. To distinguish the trees by separate names would have been endless. Their common qualities, such as springing from a root, and bearing branches and leaves, would suggest a general idea, and a general name. The genus, a tree, would afterwards be subdivided into its several species of oak, elm, ash, &c. by experience and observation.

Still, however, only general terms of speech were adopted. For the oak, the elm, and the ash, were names of whole classes of objects, each of which comprehended an immense number of undistinguished individuals. Thus when
the terms man, lion, or tree, were mentioned in conversation, it could not be known which man, lion, or tree was meant, amongst the multitude comprehended under one name. Hence arose a very useful and curious contrivance, for determining the individual object intended, by means of that part of speech called the Article. In our language we have two articles, *a* and *the*; *a* is more general, *the* more definite. The Greeks have but one, *ὁ ή το*, which agrees with our definite article *the*. They supply the place of our article *a*, by the absence of their article: Thus, Ἀνθρωπός signifies *a* man; *ὁ Ἀνθρώπος*, *the* man. The Latins have no article, but supply its place with the pronouns hic, ille, iste. This, however, seems to be a defect in their language, since articles certainly contribute much to accuracy and precision.

To illustrate this remark, we may observe
observe the different imports of the following expressions: "The friend of a king—the friend of the king—a friend of the king's." Each of these three phrases has a separate meaning, too obvious to be misunderstood. In Latin, "amicus regis" is entirely undetermined; it may bear any of the three senses which have been mentioned, and requires other words to ascertain its meaning.

Besides this quality of being distinguished by the article, three affections belong to substantive nouns: number, gender, and case, which deserve to be considered.

Number distinguishes nouns as one, or many, of the same kind, called the singular and plural; a distinction found in all tongues, and which must, indeed, have been coeval with the first origin of language; since there were few things which men had more frequent necessity of
of expressing than the distinction be-
tween one and many. In the Hebrew,
Greek, and some other ancient lan-
guages, we find not only a plural, but
a dual number; the origin of which
may very naturally be accounted for,
from separate terms of numbering be-
ing yet undiscovered, and one, two,
and many, being all, or at least the
principal numeral distinctions which
mankind, at first, had any occasion to
make use of.

Gender, which is founded on the
distinction of the two sexes, can, with
propriety, be applied to the names of
living creatures only. All other sub-
stantive nouns ought to belong to what
is called by Grammarians the neuter
gender. Yet, in most languages, a
great number of inanimate objects have
been ranked under the like distinctions
of masculine and feminine. Thus, for
instance, in the Latin tongue, ensis, a
swor...
sword, is masculine; sagitta, an arrow, is feminine; and this assignation of sex to inanimate objects seems to be entirely casual and capricious. In the Greek and Latin, however, all inanimate objects are not ranked amongst the masculine and feminine; but many of them are likewise classed where all of them ought to have been, under the neuter gender, as saxum, a rock; mare, the sea. But in the French and Italian tongues, the neuter gender is entirely unknown, and all their names of inanimate objects are put upon the same footing with those of living creatures; and distributed without reserve into masculine and feminine. In the English language, when we use common discourse, all substantive nouns that are not names of living creatures, are neuter, without exception. And ours is, perhaps, the only tongue in the known world (except the Chinese, which is said
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said to resemble it in this particular) in which the distinction of gender is properly and philosophically attended to.

Case, in declension, declares the state or relation which one object bears to another, denoted by some variation made upon the name of that object; generally in the final letters, and by some languages, in the initial. All tongues, however, do not agree in this mode of expression. Declension is used by the Greek and Latin, but in the English, French, and Italian, it is not found; or at most, exists in a very imperfect state. These languages express the relations of objects, by means of the words called prepositions, which are the names of those relations, prefixed to the name of the object. English nouns have no case whatever, except a sort of genitive, usually formed by the addition of the letter S to the noun.
noun; as when we say "Pope's Dunciad," meaning the Dunciad of Pope. Our personal pronouns have likewise a case, which corresponds with the accusative of the Latin; I, me—he, him—who, whom. This, however, is but a diminutive resemblance of that declension which is used in the ancient languages.

Whether the moderns have given beauty or utility to language, by the abolition of cases, may perhaps be doubted; they have, however, certainly rendered it more simple, by removing that intricacy which arose from the different forms of declension, of which the Romans had no less than five; and from all the irregularities in these several declensions. By obtaining this simplicity, it must be confessed, we have filled language with a multitude of those little words called prepositions, which are perpetually recurring in every sentence,
ence, and seem to have encumbered speech by an addition of terms; and by rendering it more prolix, to have enervated its force. The sound of modern language has also become less agreeable to the ear, by being deprived of that variety and sweetness which arose from the length of words, and the change of terminations, occasioned by the cases in the Greek and Latin. But, perhaps, the greatest disadvantage we sustain by the abolition of cases, is the loss of that liberty of transposition in the arrangement of words, which the ancient languages enjoyed.

Pronouns are the representatives of substantive nouns, and are subject to the same modifications with them of number, gender, and case. We may observe, however, that the pronouns of the first and second person, I and thou, have had no distinction of gender in any language; for, since they always refer
to persons who are present to each other when they speak, their sex must be visible, and therefore needs not to be distinguished by a masculine or feminine pronoun. But, as the third person may be absent, or unknown, the distinction of gender there becomes requisite, and consequently in our language, it hath all the three genders belonging to it; he, she, it. With respect to cases; even those languages which do not admit them in substantive nouns, sometimes retain more of them in pronouns, for the greater readiness in expressing relations; since pronouns occur so frequently in discourse. The personal pronouns, in English, are allowed by Grammarians to possess two cases besides the nominative; a genitive and an accusative: I, mine, me; thou, thine, thee; he, his, him; who, whose, whom.

Adjectives, or terms of quality, such as strong, weak, handsome, ugly, are
are the plainest and most simple of all that class of words which are called attributive. They are common to all languages, and must have been very early invented; since objects could neither be distinguished nor treated of in discourse, till names were assigned to their different qualities.
STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE.

ENGLISH TONGUE.

Of all the parts of speech, Verbs are by far the most complex and useful. From their importance we may justly conclude, that they were coeval with the origin of language; though a long time must have been requisite to rear them up to that accuracy in which they now are found. It is highly probable, as Dr. Smith has observed, that the radical verb, or the earliest form of it, in most languages, would be what we now call the impersonal verb: "It rains; it thunders; it is light;" and the like; as this is the most simple form of the verb, and merely declaratory of the existence of an event, or of a state of
of things. After pronouns were first invented, such verbs became gradually personal, and were extended through all the variety of tenses and moods.

The tenses are contrived to imply the several distinctions of time. We think, in general, of no more than its three great divisions, the past, the present, and the future; and we might suppose, that if verbs had been so contrived as merely to express these, no more was necessary. But language proceeds with much greater art and subtilty: it divides time into its several moments; it regards time as never standing still, but always flowing; things past, as more or less perfectly completed; and things future, as more or less distant, by different gradations. Hence the variety of tenses which are found in almost every language.

The present may, indeed, be always regarded as one indivisible point, which
admits of no variety. "I walk, or I am walking, ambulo." But it is very
different with the past. Even the poorest
language has two or three tenses to ex-
press its varieties. Ours has no less
than four: 1. A past action may be
regarded as left unfinished; which
forms the imperfect tense, "I was
walking, ambulabam." 2. As just now
finished: this constitutes the proper
perfect tense, which, in English, is al-
ways expressed by the help of the auxiliary
verb, "I have walked." 3. It may be
considered as finished some time since;
the particular time left undetermined:
"I walked; ambulavi;" which may
either signify, "I walked yesterday,
or, I walked a twelvemonth ago." This is what Grammarians call an aorist,
or indefinite past. 4. It may be con-
 sidered as finished before something else
which is also past. This is the plus-
quamperfect. "I had walked; ambu-
lavaram."
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Avèram. I had walked before you did me the favour of calling upon me." Our language, we must perceive with pleasure, has here an advantage over the Latin, which has only three variations upon the past time.

The varieties in the future time are chiefly two; a simple or indefinite future: "I shall walk, ambulabo;" and a future having reference to something else, which is likewise future: "I shall have walked; ambulaverò." I shall have walked before he pays me a visit.

Besides tenses, verbs admit the distinction of voices, viz. the active and passive; according as the affirmation regards something that is done, or something that is suffered: "I love, or I am loved." They admit likewise the distinction of moods, which are intended to express the affirmation, whether active or passive, under different forms. The indicative mood simply declares a propo-
ENGLISH TONGUE.

proposition: "I write; I have written."
The imperative requires, commands, threatens: "Write thou; let him write."
The subjunctive expresses the proposition under the form of a condition, or as subordinate to some other thing, to which a reference is made: "I might write; I could write; I should write, if the matter were so and so." This mode of expressing an affirmation, under so many various forms, together also with the distinction of the three persons, I, thou, and he, constitutes what is called the conjugation of verbs, which forms so extensive a proportion of the grammar of all languages.

Conjugation is reckoned most perfect in those languages which, by changing either the termination or the initial syllable of the verb, express the greatest number of important circumstances, without the assistance of auxiliary verbs. In the Eastern tongues, the verbs have few
few tenses; but their moods are so con-
structed, as to express an extensive va-
riety of circumstances and relations.
In the Hebrew, they say in one word,
without the aid of an auxiliary, not
only, "I have taught," but, "I have
taught exactly, or frequently; I have
been commanded to teach; I have
taught myself." The Greek, which is
the most perfect of all languages, is
very regular and complete in all the
moods and tenses. The Latin, though
formed on the same model, is not so
perfect; particularly in the passive
voice, which forms most of the tenses,
by the aid of the auxiliary "fam."
In the modern European tongues, con-
jugation is very defective. The two
great auxiliary verbs, to have, and to
be, with those other auxiliaries which
we use in English, do, shall, will, may,
and can, prefixed to the participle, su-
percede, in a great measure, the differ-
ent
ent terminations of moods and tenses, which formed the ancient conjugations.

The other parts of speech, as they admit of no variations, will require only a short discussion.

Adverbs are an abridged mode of speech, expressing, by one word, what might, by a circumlocution, be resolved into two or more words belonging to the other parts of speech: "Valiantly," for instance, is the same as, "with valour or courage." Hence, adverbs seem to be less necessary, and of later introduction into speech than many other classes of words; and consequently, the generality of them are derived from other words, previously invented and established in the language.

Prepositions and conjunctions serve to express the relations which things bear to one another, their mutual influence, dependencies, and coherence; and join words together into intelligible and signif-

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significant propositions. Conjunctions are commonly employed for connecting sentences, or members of sentences; as, and, because, and the like. Prepositions are used for connecting words, by showing the relation which one substantive noun bears to another; as, of, from, to, &c. The beauty and strength of every language depends, in a great degree, on the proper use of conjunctions, prepositions, and also those relative pronouns, which serve the same purpose of connecting the different parts of discourse.

Having thus briefly considered the Structure of Language in general, we will now enter more particularly into an examination of our own Language.

The English which was spoken after the Norman Conquest, and continues to be spoken now, is a mixture of the ancient Saxon and the Norman French, together with such new and foreign words
words as commerce and learning have, in a succession of ages, gradually introduced. From the influx of so many streams, from the connection of so many dissimilar parts, it naturally follows, that the English, like every compounded language, must be somewhat irregular. We cannot expect from it, that complete analogy in structure, which may be found in those simpler languages which have been constructed, in a manner, within themselves, and built on one foundation. Hence, our syntax is confined, since there are few marks in the words themselves, which can show their relation to each other, or point out either their concordance or their government in the sentence. But, if these be disadvantages in a compound language, they are balanced by other advantages which attend it; particularly by the number and variety of words with which such a language is com-

H 3 monly
monly enriched. Few languages are, in reality, more copious than the English. In all grave subjects particularly historical, critical, political, and moral, no complaint can justly be made of the barrenness of our tongue. We are rich likewise in the language of poetry: our poetical style differs considerably from prose, not with respect to numbers only, but in the very words themselves; which proves, what a compass and variety of words we can select and employ, suited to those different occasions. In this we have an infinite superiority over the French, whose poetical language, if it were not distinguished by rhyme, would not appear to differ much, or considerably, from their ordinary prose. Their language, however, far surpasses ours in expressing whatever is delicate, gay, and amusing. It is, certainly, the happiest language for conversation in the known world;
but, on the higher subjects of composition, the English is justly considered as far superior to it.

The flexibility of a language, or its power of becoming either grave and strong, or easy and flowing, or tender and gentle, or pompous and magnificent, as occasions require, is a quality of great consideration in speaking and writing. This seems to depend on the copiousness of a language; the different arrangements of which its words are susceptible, and the variety and beauty of the sound of those words, so as to correspond to many different subjects. The Greek possessed these requisites in a higher degree than any other language. It superadded the graceful variety of its different dialects; and thereby readily assumed every kind of character which an author could wish, from the most simple and familiar, to the most formal and majestic. The Latin,
Latin, though exceedingly beautiful, is inferior, in this respect, to the Greek; it has more of a settled character of stateliness and gravity; and is supported by a certain senatorial dignity, of which it is difficult for a writer occasionally to divest it. Among the modern tongues, the Italian possesses much more flexibility than the French; and seems to be, on the whole, the most perfect of all the modern dialects which have arisen on the ruins of the ancient. Our language, though unequal to the Italian in flexibility, yet is not destitute of a considerable degree of this quality. Whoever considers the diversity of style which appears in some of our best writers, will discover, in our tongue, such a circle of expression, such a power of accommodation to the various tastes of men, as redounds, in the highest degree, to its reputation.
Our language has been thought to be very deficient in harmony of sound: yet the melody of its versification, its power of supporting poetical numbers without the assistance of rhyme, is a sufficient proof, that it is far from being unharmonious. Even the hissing sound of which it has been accused, obtains less frequently than has been suspected; in the final syllables especially, where the letter s is transformed into a z, which is one of the sounds on which the ear rests with pleasure; as in has, these, loves, bears, &c.

It must, indeed, be admitted, that smoothness is not the distinguishing characteristic of the English tongue. Strength and expressiveness, rather than grace and melody, constitute its character. It possesses, however, this property, of being the most simple, in its form and construction, of all the European dialects. It is free from the intricacy of cases,
cases, declensions, moods, and tenses. Its words are subject to fewer variations from their original form, than those of any other language. Its substantives have no distinction of gender, except what is made by nature; and but one variation in case. Its adjectives admit not of any change, except what expresses the degree of comparison. Its verbs, instead of the varieties of ancient conjugation, admit no more than four or five changes in termination. A few prepositions and auxiliary verbs supply all the purposes of significance in meaning; whilst the words, in general, preserve their form unaltered. Hence our language acquires a simplicity and facility, which is the cause of its being frequently written and spoken with inaccuracy. We imagine that a competent skill in it may be acquired without any study; and that in a syntax so narrow and limited as ours, there is nothing which
which requires attention. But the fundamental rules of syntax are common to the English as well as to the ancient tongues; and a regard to them is absolutely requisite for writing or speaking with any degree of purity or propriety.

Be the advantages or defects of our language what they may, it certainly deserves, in the highest degree, our study and attention. The Greeks and Romans, in the meridian of their glory, bestowed the highest cultivation on their respective languages. The French and Italians have employed considerable industry upon theirs; and their example is, indeed, highly laudable, and worthy of imitation. For, whatever knowledge may be gained by the study of other languages, it can never be communicated with advantage, unless by those who can write and speak their own language with propriety and skill. If the matter of an author be ever so good and useful,
useful, his compositions will always suffer in the public esteem, if his expression be deficient in purity and elegance. At the same time, the attainment of a correct and polished style, is an object which demands application and labour. If any one supposes he can catch it merely by the ear, or acquire it by a hasty perusal of some of our good authors, he will find himself much disappointed. The many grammatical errors, the many impure expressions, which are to be found in authors who are far from being contemptible, demonstrate, that an attentive study of the language is previously requisite to the writing of it with propriety and elegance.
STYLE—PERSPICUITY AND PRECISION.

STYLE is the peculiar manner in which a man expresses his conceptions, by means of language. It is a picture of the ideas which rise in his mind, and of the order in which they are there produced.

The qualities of a good style may be ranked under two heads; perspicuity and ornament. It will readily be admitted, that perspicuity ought to be essentially connected with every kind of writing. Without this, the brightest ornaments of style only glimmer through the dark; and perplex, instead of pleasing the reader. If we are forced to follow a writer with much care, to pause, and to read over his sentences a second
a second time, in order to understand them fully, he will never please us long. Mankind are too indolent to be fond of so much labour. Though they may pretend to admire the author's depth, after having discovered his meaning, they will seldom be inclined to look a second time into his book.

The study of perspicuity claims attention, first, to single words and phrases, and then to the construction of sentences. When considered with respect to words and phrases, it requires these three qualities: purity, propriety, and precision.

Purity and propriety of language are often used indiscriminately for each other; and, indeed, they are very nearly allied. A distinction, however, should be made between them: Purity consists in the use of such words and such constructions as belong to the idiom of the language which we speak; in opposition
opposition to those words and phrases which are imported from other languages, or which are obsolete, or new-coined, or employed without proper authority. Propriety is the choice of such words as the best and most established usage has appropriated to those ideas which we intend to express by them. It implies their correct and judicious application, in opposition to vulgar or low expressions; and to words and phrases, which would be less significant of the ideas that we intend to convey. Style may be pure, that is, it may be entirely English, without Scotticisms or Gallicisms, or ungrammatical expressions of any kind, and may, notwithstanding, be deficient in propriety. The words may be ill selected; not adapted to the subject, nor fully expressive of the author's meaning. He has taken them, indeed, from the general mass of English language; but
but his choice has been made unheaps
pily. Style, however, cannot be pro-
per without being pure; it is the
union of purity and propriety which
renders it graceful and perspicuous.

The exact meaning of precision may
be understood from the etymology of
the word. It is derived from "praex-
eidere," to cut off: It signifies retrench-
ing all superfluities, and pruning the
expression in such a manner, as to ex-
hibit neither more nor less than an ex-
act copy of his idea who uses it.

The words, which are employed to
express ideas, may be faulty in three
respects: They may either not express
that idea which the author means, but
some other which only resembles, or is
related to it; or, they may express that
idea, but not fully and completely; or,
they may express it, together with some-
thing more than he designs. Precision
is opposed to these three faults, but
particularly
particularly to the last; into this, feeble writers are very apt to fall. They employ a multitude of words to make themselves understood, as they think, more distinctly; and they only confound the reader. The image, as they place it before you, is always seen double; and no double image is distinct. When an author tells us of his hero's courage in the day of battle, the expression is precise, and we understand it fully. But if, from a desire of multiplying words, he will praise his courage and fortitude, at the moment he joins these words together, our idea begins to waver. He intends to express one quality more strongly; but he is, in fact, expressing two. Courage resists danger; fortitude supports pain. The occasion of exerting each of these qualities is different; and being induced to think of both together, when only one of them should engage our attention, our view
view is rendered unsteady, and our conception of the object indistinct.

The great source of a loose style in opposition to precision, is the inaccurate and unhappy use of those words called synonymous. Scarcely, in any language, are there two words which express precisely the same idea; a person perfectly acquainted with the propriety of the language, will always be able to observe something by which they are distinguished. In our language, very many instances might be given, of a difference in meaning, among words which are thought to be synonymous; and as the subject is of importance, we shall point out a few of them.

Surprized, astonished, amazed, confounded. We are surprised with what is new or unexpected; we are astonished at what is vast or great; we are amazed with what we cannot comprehend; we are
Perspicuity and Precision. 131

confounded by what is shocking or terrible.

Pride, vanity. Pride makes us esteem ourselves; vanity makes us desire the esteem of others.

Haughtiness, disdain. Haughtiness is founded on the high opinion we have of ourselves; disdain on the low opinion we entertain of others.

To weary, to fatigue. The continuance of the same thing wearies us; labour fatigues us. A man is weary with standing; he is fatigued with walking.

To abhor, to detest. To abhor, imports, simply, strong dislike; to detest, imports likewise strong disapprobation. I abhor being in debt; I detest treachery.

To invent, to discover. We invent things which are new; we discover what has been hidden. Galileo invented the telescope; Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood.
Entire, complete. A thing is entire, when it wants none of its parts; complete, when it wants none of the appendages which belong to it. A man may occupy an entire house; though he has not one complete apartment.

Tranquillity, peace, calm. Tranquillity signifies a situation free from trouble, considered in itself; peace, the same situation, with respect to any causes which might interrupt it; calm, with respect to a disturbed situation going before, or following it. A good man enjoys tranquillity in himself; peace with others; and calm after the storm.

Enough, sufficient. Enough relates to the quantity which we wish to have of any thing. Sufficient relates to the use that is to be made of it. Hence, enough commonly signifies a greater quantity than sufficient does. The covetous man never has enough; though he has what is sufficient for nature.

These
These are a few among many, instances of words in our language, which, by careless writers, are apt to be mistaken for synonymous. The more the distinction in the meaning of such words is weighed and attended to, the more accurately and forcibly shall we speak and write.
A proper construction of sentences is of such importance in every species of composition, that we cannot be too strict or minute in our attention to it. For, whatever be the subject, if the sentences be constructed in a clumsy, perplexed, or feeble manner, it is impossible that a work, composed of such sentences, can be read with pleasure, or even with profit. But, by an attention to the rules which relate to this part of style, we acquire the habit of expressing ourselves with perspicuity and elegance; and if a disorder happen to arise in some of our sentences, we immediately discover where it lies, and are able to correct it.

The properties most essential to a perfect sentence seem to be the four following:
STRUCTURE OF SENTENCES. 183


Ambiguity is opposed to clarity and precision, and arises from two causes; either from a wrong choice of words; or a wrong collocation of them. Of the choice of words, as far as regards perspicuity, we have already spoken. Of the collocation of them we are now to treat. From the nature of our language, a leading rule in the arrangement of our sentences is, that the words or members most nearly related, should be placed in the sentence as near to each other as possible; so as to make their mutual relation clearly appear. This rule is too frequently neglected even by good writers. A few instances will show both its importance and its application.

In the position of adverbs, which are used to qualify the signification of something which either precedes or follows them,
them, a good deal of nicety is to be ob-
served, "By greatness," says Mr. Addi-
sion, "I do not only mean the bulk of
any single object, but the largeness
of a whole view." Here the situa-
tion of the adverb only renders it a limi-
tation of the following word, mean.
"I do not only mean"—The question
may then be asked, What does he more
than mean? Had it been placed after
bulk, still it would have been improp-
erly situated; for it might then be
asked, What is meant besides the bulk?
Is it the colour, or any other property?
Its proper place is, certainly, after the
word object: "By greatness I do not
mean the bulk of any single object
only;" for then, when it is asked, What
does he mean more than the bulk of a
single object? The answer comes out
precisely as the author intends; "the
largeness of a whole view." "Theism,"

fays
fays Lord Shaftesbury, "can only be opposed to polytheism, or atheism." It may be asked then, is theism capable of nothing else, except being opposed to polytheism, or atheism? This is what the words literally mean, through the improper collocation of only. He ought to have said, "Theism can be opposed only to polytheism, or atheism." These kind of inaccuracies may have no material inconvenience in conversation, because the tone and emphasis used in pronouncing them generally serve to show their reference, and to make the meaning perspicuous: but in writing, where a person speaks to the eye, and not to the ear, he ought to be more accurate; and should so connect those adverbs with the words which they qualify, that his meaning cannot be mistaken on the first inspection.

When a circumstance is interposed in the middle of a sentence, it sometimes requires
requires art to place it in such a manner as to divest it of all ambiguity. For instance, "Are these designs," says Lord Bolingbroke, Dissert. on Parties, Dedic. "which any man, who is born a Briton, in any circumstances, in any situation, ought to be ashamed or afraid to avow?" Here we are in doubt, whether words, "in any circumstances, in any situation," are connected with "a man born in Britain, in any circumstances or situation," or with that man's "avowing his designs, in any circumstances, or situation, into which he may be brought?" If the latter, as seems most likely, was intended to be the meaning, the arrangement ought to have been in this form: "Are these designs, which any man who is born a Briton ought to be ashamed or afraid, in any circumstances, in any situation, to avow?"

Still more attentive care is requisite to the proper disposition of the relative pronouns.
PRONOUNS, WHO, WHICH, WHAT, WHOSE; and of all those particles which express the connection of the parts of speech with one another. Since all reasoning depends upon this connection, we cannot be too accurate with regard to it. A trifling error may obscure the meaning of the whole sentence; and even where the meaning is apparent, yet where these relative particles are misplaced, we always find something awkward and disjointed in the structure of the sentence. The following passage in Bishop Sherlock’s Sermons (vol. 2., ferm. 15) will exemplify these observations: “It is folly to pretend to arm ourselves against the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures, which nothing can protect us against, but the good providence of our Heavenly Father.” Which always refers grammatically to the immediately preceding substantive, which here is, "treasures."
"treasures," and this would convert
the whole period into nonsense. The
sentence should have been thus con-
structed: "It is folly to pretend, by
heaping up treasures, to arm our-
selves against the accidents of life,
which nothing can protect us against
but the good providence of our
Heavenly Father."

We now proceed to the second qua-

ty of a well arranged sentence, which
we termed its Unity. This is an in-
dispensable property. The very nature
of a sentence implies one proposition
to be expressed. It may consist, in-
deed, of parts; but these parts must
be so intimately knit together, as to
make the impression upon the mind
of one object, not of many.

To preserve this unity, we must first
observe, that during the course of the
sentence, the scene should be changed
as little as possible. There is genera-
ly,
ly, in every sentence, some person or thing, which is the governing word. This should be continued so, if possible, from the beginning to the end of it. Should a man express himself in this manner: "After we came to anchor, they put me on shore, where I was saluted by all my friends, who received me with the greatest kindness." Here, though the objects are sufficiently connected, yet by this mode of representation, by shifting so often the place and the person, we, and they, and I, and who, they appear in such a disunited view, that the sense of connection is nearly lost. The sentence is restored to its proper unity, by constructing it after the following manner: "Having come to an anchor, I was put on shore, where I was saluted by all my friends, who received me with the greatest kindness."

Another
Another rule is, never to crowd into one sentence, things which have so little connection, that they might bear to be divided into two or more sentences. The transgression of this rule never fails to hurt and displease a reader. Its effect, indeed, is so disgusting, that, of the two, it is the safest extreme, to err rather by too many short sentences, than by one that is overloaded and confused. The following sentence, from a translation of Plutarch, will justify this opinion: "Their march," says the author, speaking of the Greeks under Alexander, "was through an uncultivated country, whose savage inhabitants fared hardly, having no other riches than a breed of lean sheep, whose flesh was rank and unavoury, by reason of their continual feeding upon sea-fish." Here the scene is repeatedly changed. The march
march of the Greeks, the description of the inhabitants through whose country they passed, the account of their sheep, and the reason of their sheep being disagreeable food, make a jumble of objects, slightly related to each other, which the reader cannot, without considerable difficulty, comprehend under one view.

Another rule for preserving the unity of sentences is, to keep clear of all parentheses in the middle of them. These may, on some occasions, have a spirited appearance, as prompted by a certain vivacity of thought, which can glance happily aside, as it is going along. But, in general, their effect is extremely bad; being a perplexed method of disposing of some thought, which a writer has not art enough to introduce in its proper place. It is needless to produce any instances, since they
they occur so frequently among incorrect writers.

We shall add only one rule more for the unity of a sentence; which is, to bring it always to a full and perfect close. It need hardly be observed, that an unfinished sentence is no sentence at all, with respect to any of the rules of grammar. But sentences often occur, which are more than finished. When we have arrived at what we expected to be the conclusion; when we have come to the word on which the mind is naturally led, by what went before, to rest; unexpectedly some circumstance arises, which ought to have been left out, or to have been disposed of after another manner. Thus, for instance, in the following sentence, from Sir William Temple, the advection to the sentence is entirely foreign to it. Speaking of Burnet's Theory of the Earth, and Fontenelle's Plurality of
of Worlds: "The first," says he, "could not end his learned treatise without a panegyric of modern learning, in comparison of the ancient; and the other falls so grossly into the censure of the old poetry, and preference of the new, that I could not read either of these strains without some indignation, which no quality among men is so apt to raise in me as self-sufficiency." The word "indignation" ought to have concluded the sentence; what follows is altogether new, and is added after the proper close.
STRUCTURE OF SENTENCES.

We proceed now to the third quality of a correct sentence, which we called Strength. By this is meant, such a disposition of the several words and members as shall exhibit the sense to the best advantage; as shall render the impression which the period is intended to make, most full and complete; and give every word and every member its due weight and importance. To the production of this effect, perspicuity and unity are, no doubt, absolutely necessary; but they are not of themselves sufficient. For a sentence may be obviously clear; it may also be sufficiently compact, or have the required unity; and yet, by some unfavourable circumstance in the structure
Structure, it may be deficient in that strength or liveliness of impression, which a more happy collocation would have produced.

The first rule which we shall give for promoting the strength of a sentence, is, to take from it all redundant words. Whatever can be easily supplied in the mind, is better omitted in the expression: Thus, "Content with deserving a triumph, he refused the honour of it;" is better than to say, "Being content with deserving a triumph, he refused the honour of it."

It is certainly, therefore, one of the most useful exercises of correction, on a view of what we have written or composed, to contract that round-about mode of expression, and to cut off those useless excrecences which are usually found in a first draught. But we must be careful not to run into the opposite extreme, of pruning too close, as to give

K 2 a hard-
a hardness and dryness to the style. Some leaves must be left to shelter and adorn the fruit.

As sentences should be freed from superfluous words, so also they should appear without superfluous members. In opposition to this, is the fault we so frequently meet with, of the last member of a period being no other than the repetition of the former, in a different dress. For example; speaking of beauty, "The very first discovery of it," says Mr. Addison, "strikes the mind with inward joy, and spreads delight through all its faculties." In this instance, scarce any thing is added by the second member of the sentence to what was already expressed in the first: And though the elegant style of Mr. Addison may palliate such negligence; yet it is generally true, that language, divested of this prolixity,
lixity, becomes more strong, and more beautiful.

The second direction we shall give for promoting the strength of a sentence is, to pay a particular attention to the use of copulatives, relatives, and all the particles employed for transition and connection. Some observations on this subject, which appear to be worthy of particular remembrance, shall here be mentioned.

What is termed splitting of particles, or separating a preposition from the noun which it governs, is ever to be avoided: As if we should say, "Though virtue borrows no assistance from, yet it may often be accompanied by, the advantages of fortune." In such instances, a degree of dissatisfaction arises, from the violent separation of two things, which, from their nature, ought to be intimately united.

K 3

The
The simplicity of style is much injured by the unnecessary multiplication of relative and demonstrative particles: Thus if a writer should say, "There is nothing which disgusts me sooner than the empty pomp of language," he would express himself less simply than if he had said, "Nothing disgusts me sooner than the empty pomp of language." The former mode of expression, in the introduction of a subject, or in laying down a proposition to which particular attention is demanded, is exceedingly proper; but, in the ordinary current of discourse, the latter is to be preferred.

With regard to the omission or insertion of the relative, we shall only observe, that in conversation and epistolary writing, it may be often omitted with propriety; but in compositions of a serious or dignified kind, it should constantly be inserted.
On the copulative particle and, which occurs so often in all kinds of composition, several observations are to be made. It is evident, that the unnecessary repetition of it enfeebles style. By omitting it entirely, we often mark a closer connection, a quicker succession of objects, than when it is inserted between them. “Veni, vidi, vici;”—“I came, I saw, I conquered;” expresses with more spirit the rapidity of conquest, than if connecting particles had been used. When, however, we desire to prevent a quick transition from one object to another, and when we are enumerating objects which we wish to appear as distinct from each other as possible, copulatives may be multiplied with peculiar advantage. Thus Lord Bolingbroke says, with elegance and propriety, “Such a man might fall a victim to power; but
but truth, and reason, and liberty,
would fall with him."

A third rule for promoting the
strength of a sentence is, to dispose
of the principal word, or words, in that
place of the sentence where they will
make the most striking impression.
Perpiciuity ought first to be studied;
and the nature of our language allows
no extensive liberty in the choice of
collocation. In general, the important
words are placed in the beginning of
the sentence. Thus Mr. Addison;
"The pleasures of the imagination,
taken in their full extent, are not
so gross as those of sense, nor so re-
fined as those of the understanding."
This order seems to be the most plain
and natural. Sometimes, however,
when we propose giving weight to a
sentence, it is proper to suspend the
meaning for a while, and then bring
it out full at the close: "Thus," says
Mr.
Mr. Pope, "on whatever side we con-
template Homer, what principally
strikes us, is his wonderful inven-
tion."

A fourth rule for the strength of sen-
tences is, to make the members of
them go on rising in their importance
above one another. This kind of ar-
angement is called a climax, and is
ever regarded as a beauty in compo-
sition. Why it pleases, is sufficiently
evident. In all things, we naturally
love to advance to what is more and
more beautiful, rather than to follow
the retrograde order. Having viewed
some considerable object, we cannot,
without pain, be pulled back to attend
to an inferior circumstance. "Caven-
dum est," says Quintilian, "ne de-
crescat oratio, et fortiori subjungatur
aliquid infirmius."—"We must take
care that our composition shall not
fall off, and that a weaker expres-

tion shall not follow one of more
strength." When a sentence consists
of two members, the longest should,
in general, be the concluding one.
Hence the pronunciation is rendered
more easy; and the shortest member of
the period being placed first, we carry
it more readily in our memory as we
proceed to the second, and see the
connection of the two more clearly.
Thus, to say, "When our passions
have forsaken us, we flatter our-
elves with the belief that we have
forsaken them," is both more grace-
ful and more perspicuous, than to be-
gin with the longest part of the proposi-
tion: "We flatter ourselves with the
belief, that we have forsaken our
passions, when they have forsaken
us."

A fifth rule for constructing sentences
with proper strength, is, to avoid con-
cluding them with an adverb, a prepo-
sition
structure of sentences.

fiction, or any insignificant word. By such conclusions style is always weakened and degraded. Sometimes, indeed, where the stress and significance rest chiefly upon words of this kind, they may, with propriety, have the principal place allotted them. No fault, for example, can be found with this sentence of Bolingbroke: "In their prosperity, my friends shall never hear of me; in their adversity, always;" where never and always, being emphatical words, are so placed, as to make a strong impression. But when those inferior parts of speech are introduced as circumstances, or as qualifications of more important words, they should invariably be disposed of in the least conspicuous parts of the period.

We should always avoid with care, the concluding with any of those particles which distinguish the cases of nouns; of, to, from, with, by. Thus
it is much better to say, "Avarice is a crime of which wise men are often guilty," than to say, "Avarice is a crime which wise men are often guilty of." This kind of phraseology all correct writers endeavour sedulously to avoid.

Verbs used in a compound sense, with some of these prepositions, are likewise ungraceful conclusions of a period; such as, bring about, lay hold of, come over to, clear up, and many others of the same kind: instead of which, if a simple verb can be employed, the sentence is always terminated with more strength. Even the pronoun it, especially when joined with some of the prepositions, as, with it, in it, to it, cannot, without a violation of grace, be the conclusion of a sentence. Any phrase which expresses a circumstance only, cannot conclude a sentence without great imperfection and inelegance.
Circumstances are, indeed, like unshapely stones in a building, which try the skill of an artist, where to place them with the least offence. We should carefully avoid crowding too many of them together, but rather intersperse them in different parts of the sentence, joined with the principal words on which they depend. Thus, for instance, when Dean Swift says, "What I had the honour of mentioning to your Lordship, sometime ago, in conversation, was not a new thought."—(Letter to the Earl of Oxford). These two circumstances, sometime ago, and in conversation, which are here joined, would have been better separated thus: "What I had the honour, sometime ago, of mentioning to your Lordship in conversation."

The last rule which we shall mention concerning the strength of a sentence is, that in the members of it, where two things
things are compared or contrasted to one another; where either a resemblance or an opposition is designed to be expressed; some resemblance in the language and construction ought to be observed. The following passage from Pope's preface to his Homer, beautifully exemplifies the rule we are now giving: "Homer was the greater genius; Virgil the better artist: in the one, we admire the man; in the other, the work. Homer hurries us with a commanding impetuosity; Virgil leads us with an attractive majesty. Homer scatters with a generous profusion; Virgil bestows with a careless magnificence. Homer, like the Nile, pours out his riches with a sudden overflow; Virgil, like a river in its banks with a constant stream. And when we look upon their machines, Homer seems like his own Jupiter in his terrors, shaking Olym-
"Olympus, scattering the lightenings,
and firing the heavens; Virgil, like
the same power, in his benevolence,
counselling with the Gods, laying
plans for empires, and ordering his
whole creation." Periods of this
kind, when introduced with propriety,
and not too frequently repeated, have
a sensible and attractive beauty: but
if such a construction be aimed at in all
our sentences, it betrays into a dis-
agreeable uniformity; produces a re-
gular jingle in the period, which tires
the ear, and plainly discovers afecta-
tion.
HAVING treated of sentences, with regard to their meaning, under the heads of Perspicuity, Unity, and Strength; we will now consider them with respect to their sound, their harmony, or agreeableness to the ear.

In the harmony of periods two things are to be considered: First, agreeable sound, or modulation in general, without any particular expression: Next, the sound so ordered, as to become expressive of the sense. The first is the more common; the second, the superior beauty.

The beauty of musical construction, it is evident, will depend upon the choice of words, and the arrangement of them.
Those words are most pleasing to the ear, which are composed of smooth and liquid sounds, where there is a proper intermixture of vowels and consonants, without too many harsh consonants rubbing against each other, or too many open vowels in succession, to produce a hiatus, or unpleasing aperture of the mouth. Long words are generally more pleasing to the ear than monosyllables; and those are the most musical, which are not wholly composed of long or short syllables, but of an intermixture of them; such as, delight, amuse, velocity, celebrity, beautiful, impetuous. If the words, however, which compose a sentence, be ever so well chosen and harmonious, yet, if they be unskilfully arranged, its music is entirely lost. As an instance of a musical sentence, we may take the following from Milton, in his Treatise on Education: “We shall conduct you to a hill-side, laborious, indeed, at
the first ascent; but else, so smooth,
so green, so full of goodly prospects
and melodious sounds on every side,
that the harp of Orpheus was not
more charming." Every thing in
this sentence conspires to render it har-
onious. The words are well chosen;
laborious, smooth, green, goodly, melo-
dious, charming; and are besides so
happily arranged, that no alteration
could be made, without injuring the me-
loidy.

There are two things on which the
music of a sentence principally depends:
these are, the proper distribution of the
several members of it, and the close or
cadence of the whole.

First, we observe, that the distribution
of the several members should be care-
fully attended to. Whatever is easy and
pleasing to the organs of speech, always
sounds grateful to the ear. While a pe-
riod is going on, the termination of each
of its members forms a pause in the pronunciation; and these pauses should be so distributed as to make the course of the breathing easy; and should likewise fall at such distances as to bear a certain musical proportion to each other. This will be best illustrated by examples. The following passage is taken from Archbishop Tillotson: "This different course concerning the easiness of God's commands does, all along, I suppose, and acknowledge the difficulties of the first entrance upon a religious course; except, only in those persons who have had the happiness to be trained up to religion by the easy and insensible degrees of a pious and virtuous education." This sentence is far from being harmonious; owing chiefly to this, that there is, properly, no more than one pause in it, falling between the two members into which it is divided; each of which is so long
long as to require a considerable stretch of the breath in pronouncing it. Let us observe now, on the contrary, the grace of the following passage, from Sir William Temple, in which he speaks sarcastically of man: "But, "God be thanked, his pride is greater than his ignorance; and what he wants in knowledge, he supplies by sufficiency. When he has looked about him, as far as he can, he concludes there is no more to be seen; when he is at the end of his line, he is at the bottom of the ocean; when he has shot his best, he is sure none ever did; or ever can, shoot better, or beyond it. His own reason he holds to be the certain measure of truth; and his own knowledge, of what is possible in nature." Here every thing is, at the same time, easy to the breath, and grateful to the ear. We must, however, observe, that if compo-
composition abounds with sentences which have too many rests, and these placed at intervals too apparently measured and regular, it is apt to favour of affectation.

The next thing which demands our attention is, the close or cadence of the whole sentence. The only important rule which can here be given, is, that when we aim at dignity or elevation, the sound should increase to the last; the longest members of the period, and the fullest and most sonorous words, should be employed in the conclusion. As an instance of this, the following sentence of Mr. Addison may be given: "It fills the mind," speaking of sight, "with the largest variety of ideas; converses with its objects at the" greatest distance; and continues the "longest in action without being tired "or fatiated with its proper enjoy" ments." Here every reader must be
sensible of a beauty, both in the just division of the members and pauses, and the manner in which the sentence is rounded, and brought to a full and harmonious close.

It may be remarked, that little words, in the conclusion of a sentence, are as injurious to melody, as, we have already shown, they are inconsistent with strength of expression. A musical close in our language seems, in general, to require either the last syllable, or the last but one, to be a long syllable. Words which consist chiefly of short syllables, as contrary, particular, retro skeptic, seldom terminate a sentence harmoniously, unless a run of long syllables, before, has rendered them pleasing to the ear.

Sentences, however, which are so constructed as to make the sound always swell and grow towards the end, and to rest either on a long or a penult
long syllable, give a discourse the tone of declamation. If melody be not varied, the ear soon becomes acquainted and cloyed with it. Sentences constructed in the same manner, with the pauses at equal intervals, should never succeed each other. Short sentences must be blended with long and swelling ones, to render discourse sprightly, as well as magnificent.

We now proceed to treat of a higher species of harmony; the sound adapted to the sense. Of this we may remark two degrees: First, the current of sound suited to the tenor of a discourse: Next, a peculiar resemblance effected between some object and the sounds that are employed in describing it.

Sounds have, in many respects, an intimate correspondence with our ideas; partly natural, partly produced by artificial associations. Hence, any one mo-
dulation of sound continued, stamps on our style a certain character and expression. Sentences constructed with the Ciceronian fulness and swell, excite an idea of what is important, magnificent, and sedate. They suit, however, no violent passion, no eager reasoning, no familiar address. These require measures brisker, easier, and more concise. It were as ridiculous to write a familiar epistle and a funeral oration in a style of the same cadence, as to set the words of a tender love-song to the tune of a warlike march.

Besides that general correspondence which the current of sound has with the current of thought, a more particular expression may be attempted, of certain objects, by resembling sounds. In poetry this resemblance is chiefly to be looked for: It obtains sometimes, indeed, in prose composition; but there in a more faint and inferior degree.

The
The sounds of words may be employed to describe chiefly three classes of objects; first, other sounds; secondly, motion; and thirdly, the emotions and passions of the mind.

In most languages it will be found, that the names of many particular sounds are so formed as to bear some resemblance to the sound which they signify; as with us, the whistling of winds, the buzz and hum of insects, the hiss of serpents, and the crash of falling timber; and many other instances, where the word has been plainly constructed from the sound it represents. A remarkable example of this beauty we shall produce from Milton, taken from two passages in his Paradise Lost, describing the sound made in the one, by the opening of the gates of hell; in the other, by the opening of those of heaven. The contrast between the two, exhibits, to great advantage, the art of
of the poet. The first is the opening of hell's gates:

On a sudden, open fly,
With impetuous recoil, and jarring sound,
Th' infernal doors; and on their hinges grate
Harsh thunder.

Observe the smoothness of the other:

Heaven opened wide
Her ever-during gates, harmonious sound!
On golden hinges turning.

The second class of objects, which the sound of words is frequently employed to imitate, is motion; as it is swift or slow, violent or gentle, uniform or interrupted, easy or accompanied with effort. Between sound and motion there is no natural affinity; yet, in the imagination, there is a strong one; as is evident from the connection between music and dancing. The poet can, consequently, give us a lively idea of the kind of motion he would describe, by the help of sounds which correspond,
HARMONY.

Long syllables naturally excite the idea of slow motion; as in this line of Virgil:

Olli inter seque magna vi brachia tollunt.

A succession of short syllables gives the impression of quick motion; as,

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus.

The works of Homer and Virgil abound with instances of this beauty; which are so often quoted, and so well known, that it is unnecessary to produce them.

The third set of objects, which we mentioned the sound of words as capable of representing, consists of the emotions and passions of the mind. Between sense and sound there appears, at first view, to be no natural resemblance. But if the arrangement of syllables, by the sound alone, calls forth
forth one set of ideas more readily
than another, and disposes the mind
for entering into that affection which
the poet intends to raise; such arrange-
ment may, with propriety, be said to
resemble the sense, or be similar and
correspondent to it. Thus when plea-
sure, joy, and agreeable objects, are
described by one who sensibly feels his
subject, the language naturally runs
into smooth, liquid, and flowing num-
bers:

Namque ipsa decoram
Caesariem nato genetrix, lumenque juventae
Purpureum, et laetos oculis afflarat honores.
Æn. I.

Brisk and lively sensations excite
quicker and more animated numbers:

Juvenum manus emicat ardens
Littus in Hesperium.

En. VII.

Melancholy
Melancholy and gloomy subjects are naturally connected with slow measures and long words:

In those deep solitudes and awful cells,
Where heavenly pensive contemplation dwells.

Abundant instances of this kind will be suggested by a moderate acquaintance with the good poets, either ancient or modern.
FIGURES may be defined to be that language which is suggested either by the imagination or by the passions. They are commonly divided by rhetoricians into two great classes, figures of words, and figures of thought. The former are generally called tropes, and consist in a word's being used to signify something that is different from its original meaning. Hence, if the word be altered, the figure is destroyed: Thus, for instance, "Light ariseth to the upright in darkness." Here the trope consists in "light and darkness" not being taken literally, but intended to express comfort and adversity; to which conditions of life they are supposed
posed to bear some analogy or resemblance. The other class, called figures of thought, supposes the figure to consist in the sentiment only, whilst the words are used in their literal signification; as in exclamations, interrogations, apostrophes, and comparisons; where, though the words be varied, or translated from one language into another, the same figure, notwithstanding, is still preserved. This distinction, however, is of small importance, since practice cannot be assisted by it; nor is it in itself always sufficiently perspicuous.

Trope derives their origin, in some degree, from the barrenness of language, but more extensively from the influence which the imagination possesses over every kind of speech. The imagination never contemplates any one idea as single and alone, but as accompanied by other ideas, which may
be considered as its accessories. These accessories often operate more forcibly upon the mind than the principal idea itself. They are, perhaps, in their nature more agreeable; or more familiar to our conceptions, or remind us of a greater variety of important circumstances. Hence the name of the accessory or correspondent idea is employed; although the principal has a proper and well-known name of its own. Thus, for example, when we design to point out the period at which a state enjoyed most reputation and glory, we might easily employ the proper words for expressing this; but as this, in our imagination, is readily connected with the flourishing period of a plant or tree, we prefer this correspondent idea, and say, "The Roman Empire flourished most under Augustus." The leader of a faction, is a plain expression; but, because the
head is the principal part of the human figure, and is considered as directing all the animal operations; from this resemblance we figuratively say, "Cataline was the head of his party."

We will now examine, why tropes or figures contribute to the beauty and grace of style. By them language is enriched, and becomes more copious. Hence words and phrases are multiplied for expressing every species of ideas; for describing even the smallest differences; the most delicate shades and colours of thought; which by proper words alone could not possibly have been expressed. They also give dignity to style, which is degraded by the familiarity of vulgar expressions. Figurative language has the same connection with an elevated subject, that a rich and splendid apparel has with a person of rank and dignity. In prose compositions, assistance of this kind is often
often requisite; from poetry it is inseparable: To say, "the sun rises," is trite and common; but it becomes a magnificent image, when expressed as Mr. Thomson has done:

But yonder comes the powerful king of day
Rejoicing in the east——

Figures furnish the pleasure of enjoying two objects presented, at the same time, to our view, without confusion; the principal idea, together with its accennory, which gives it the figurative appearance. When, for example, instead of "youth," we say, the "morning of life;" the fancy is instantly entertained with all the corresponding circumstances which occur between these two objects. At the same instant, we behold a certain period of human life, and a certain time of the day, so connected with each other, that the imagination plays between them.
them with delight, and views at once two similar objects, without embarrassment or confusion.

Besides, figures are attended with this additional advantage; of affording a more clear and striking view of the principal object, than could be had if it were expressed in simple terms, and freed from its accessory idea: They communicate to the object on which they are employed, a picturesque appearance; they can transform an abstract conception, in some degree, into an object of sense; they surround it with circumstances, which enable the mind to lay hold of it steadily, and to contemplate it fully. By a well adapted figure, even a conviction is affisted, and a truth is impressed upon the mind with additional liveliness and force. Thus, in the following passage of Dr. Young: "When we dip too deep in pleasure, we always stir a sediment
"that renders it impure and noxious."

When an image presents such a resemblance between a moral and a sensible idea, it serves, like an argument from analogy, to enforce what the author advances, and to produce conviction.

All tropes being founded on the relation which one object bears to another, the name of the one can be substituted for that of the other; and by this, the vivacity of the idea is generally intended to be increased: The relation between a cause and its effect, is one of the first and most obvious. Hence the cause is sometimes figuratively put for the effect. For instance, Mr. Addison, writing of Italy, says,

Blossoms, and fruits, and flowers, together rise,
And the whole year in gay confusion lies.

Here the "whole year" is plainly meant to signify the effects or produce of
of all the seasons of the year. The effect is also often put for the cause; as "grey hairs" for "old age," which produces grey hairs; and "shade" for the "trees," which cause the shade. The relation which subsists between the container and the thing contained, is so intimate and apparent, as naturally to give rise to tropes:

——— Ille impiger hausit
Spumantem pateram, & pleno se prodit auro.

Where it is obvious, that the cup and gold, are put for the liquor that was contained in the golden cup. The name of a country is also often used to signify its inhabitants. To pray for the assistance of Heaven is the same as to pray for the assistance of God, who is thought to reside in Heaven. The relation between a sign and the thing signified, is another source of tropes. Thus:

Cedant arma toga; concedat laures huciae.
Here, the "toga," which is the badge of the civil professions, and the "laurel," that of military honours, are each of them put for the civil and military characters themselves, Tropes, which are founded on these several relations of cause and effect, container and contained, sign and thing signified, are called by the name of *metonymy*.

When the trope is founded on the relation betwixt an antecedent and its consequent, it is called a *metalepsis*; as when the Romans used to say, "fuit," or "vixit," to signify that one was dead. "Fuit Ilium et ingens gloria, "Teucrum," expresses, that the glory of Troy is no more.

If the whole is put for a part, or a part for the whole; a genus for a species, or a species for a genus; the singular number for the plural, or the plural for the singular; in general, if any thing less, or any thing more, is substituted
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE. 183

substituted for the precise object meant, the figure is then termed a synecdoche. We say, for instance, "A fleet of so many sail," in the place of "ships;" we frequently use the "head" for the "person," the "pole" for the "earth," the "waves" for the "sea." An attribute is often used for its subject; as "youth and beauty," for the "young and beautiful;" and sometimes, a subject for its attribute. But it is unnecessary to insist longer on this enumeration. The Metaphor, which is founded on the relation of similitude and resemblance, which is by far the most fruitful of tropes, shall be considered in the next chapter.

M 4 METAPHOR.
METAPHOR is founded entirely on the resemblance which one object bears to another. It is, therefore, nearly allied to simile or comparison; and differs only from it in being expressed in a shorter form. When we say of a great minister, "that he up-holds the state, like a pillar which supports the weight of a mafly edifice," we evidently make a comparison; but when we say of such a man, that he is "the pillar of the state," it becomes a metaphor.

Of all the figures of speech, none approaches so near to painting as the metaphor. It gives light and strength to description; makes intellectual ideas, in some degree, visible to the eye, by
giving them colour, and substance, and sensible qualities. To produce this effect, however, a delicate hand is requisite; for, by a little inaccuracy, we may introduce confusion, instead of promoting perspicuity. Several rules, therefore, must be given for the proper management of metaphors.

The first which we shall mention is, that they be suited to the nature of the subject; neither too numerous, nor too gay, nor too elevated for it; that we neither endeavour to force the subject, by the use of them, into a degree of elevation which is not natural to it, nor, on the contrary, suffer it to fall below its proper dignity. Some metaphors are beautiful in poetry, which would be absurd and unnatural in prose; some are graceful in orations, which would be highly improper in historical or philosophical compositions. Figures are, indeed, the dress of sentiment. They
They should, consequently, be adapted to the character of that style which they are intended to adorn.

The second rule respects the choice of objects, from whence metaphors are to be drawn. The field for figurative language is very extensive: All nature opens its stores to us, and allows us to gather them without restraint. But scarce must be taken not to use such allusions as raise in the mind disagreeable, mean, low, or unclean ideas. To render a metaphor perfect, it must not only be apt, but pleasing; it must entertain as well as enlighten. Mr. Dryden, therefore, can hardly escape the imputation of a very unpardonable breach of delicacy, when, in the dedication of his Juvenal, he observes to the Earl of Dorset, that "some bad poems carry their owners' marks about them—some brandl' or other on this back; or that ear; that"
"it is notorious who are the owners of the cattle." The most pleasing metaphors are those which are derived from the more frequent occurrences of art or nature, or the civil transactions and customs of mankind. Thus how expressive, yet at the same time how familiar, is that image which Otway has put into the mouth of Metellus, in his play of Caius Marius, where he calls Sulpicius

That mad, wild bull, whom Marius lets loose
On each occasion, when he'd make Rome feel him,
To toss our laws and liberties i' th' air!

In the third place, a metaphor should be founded on a resemblance which is clear and perspicuous, and not on one which is far-fetched, or difficult to be discovered. Harsh or forced metaphors are always displeasing, because they perplex the reader; and instead of ill
Illustrating the thought, render it intricate and confused. Thus, for instance, Cowley, speaking of his mistress, expresses himself in the following forced and obscure verses:

Wo to her stubborn heart, if once mine come
Into the self-same room,
'Twill tear and blow up all within,
Like a granada, shot into a magazine.
Then shall love keep the ashes and torn parts
Of both our broken hearts;
Shall out of both one new one make;
From her's th'alloy, from mine the metal take;
For of her heart, he from the flames will find
But little left behind;
Mine only will remain entire;
No dross was there to perish in the fire.

Metaphors borrowed from any of the sciences, especially such of them as belong to particular professions, are almost continually faulty by their obscurity.

In the fourth place, we must observe, never to jumble metaphorical and plain language.
language together; never to construct a period in such a manner, that part of it must be understood metaphorically, part literally; which always introduces a most disagreeable confusion. Though the works of Ossian abound with beautiful and correct metaphors, yet they afford an instance of the fault we are now censuring: "Trothal went forth with the stream of his people, but they met a rock; for Fingal stood unmoved; broken they rolled back from his side: Nor did they roll in safety; the spear of the king pursued their flight." The metaphor, at the beginning, is exceedingly beautiful: The "stream," the "unmoved rock," the "waves rolling back broken," are expressions perfectly agreeable to the proper and consistent language of figure; but, in the conclusion, when we are told, "they did not roll in safety, because the spear of the king pur-
"sued their flight," the literal meaning is injudiciously mixed with the metaphor; they are, at the same moment, represented as waves that roll, and as men that may be pursued and wounded with a spear.

In the fifth place, we must take care not to make two different metaphors meet on the same subject. This, which is called mixed metaphor, is one of the grossest abuses of this figure. Shakespeare's expression, for example, "to take arms against a sea of troubles," makes a most unnatural medley, and entirely confounds the imagination. More correct writers than Shakespeare are sometimes guilty of this error. Mr. Addison, in one of his numbers in the Spectator, says, "There is not a single view of human nature, which is not sufficient to extinguish the seeds of pride." Here a view is made to extinguish, and to extinguish seeds.
In examining the propriety of metaphors, it seems to be a good rule, to form a picture upon them, and consider how the parts would agree, and what kind of figure the whole would present, when delineated with a pencil.

Metaphors, in the sixth place, should not be crowded together on the same object. Though each of them be distinct, yet if they be heaped on one another, they produce confusion. The following passage from Horace will exemplify this observation:

Motum ex Metello consule civicum
Bellique causas, et vitia, et modos,
Ludumque fortuna, gravesque
Principum amicitias, et arma
Nondum expiatis uncta cruentibus,
Periculoæ plenum opus aleæ,
Tractas, et incedis per ignes
Suppositos cineri doloso.

L. 2. 1.

This passage, though highly poetical, is rendered harsh and obscure by three
three distinct metaphors being crowded together: First, "arma unēta cruori-
bus nondum expiatis;" next, "opus plenum periculose aëre;" and then,
"incedis per ignes suppositos cineri doloso."

The last rule which we shall suggest concerning metaphors, is, that they
should not be too far pursued: For when the resemblance, which is the foundation
of the figure, is long dwelt upon, and carried into all its minute circumstances, an
allegory is produced instead of a metaphor; the reader is wearied, and the
discourse becomes obscure. This is termed, straining a metaphor. Doctor
Young, whose imagination was more distinguished by strength than delicacy,
is often guilty of running down his metaphors. Thus, speaking of old
age, he says, it should

Walk thoughtful on the silent solemn shore
Of that vast ocean it must fail so soon;

And
And put good works on board; and wait the wind

That shortly blows us into worlds unknown.

The two first lines are extremely beautiful; but when he continues the metaphor, by "putting good works on board, and waiting the wind," it becomes strained, and sinks in dignity.

Having treated thus fully of the metaphor, we shall conclude this chapter with a few words concerning allegory.

An allegory is a continued metaphor; it is the representation of one thing by another which has a resemblance to it. Thus Prior, in his Henry and Emma, makes Emma, in the following allegorical manner, describe her constancy to Henry:

Did I but purpose to embark with thee
On the smooth surface of a summer’s sea,
While gentle zephyrs play with prosperous gales,

And fortune's favour fills the swelling sails;

N

But
But would forfake the ship; and make the shore,
When the winds whistle, and the tempests roar?

The same rules that were given for metaphors, may be also applied to allegories, on account of the affinity which subsists between them. The only material difference, besides the one being short, and the other prolonged, is, that a metaphor always explains itself by the words that are connected with it, in their proper and natural signification: As when we say, "Achilles was a lion;" "an able minister is the pillar of the state." The lion and the pillar are here sufficiently interpreted by the mention of Achilles and the minister, which are joined to them; but an allegory may be allowed to stand less connected with the literal meaning; the interpretation not being so plainly pointed out, but left to our own reflection.
HYPERBOLE—PERSONIFICATION—

APOSTROPHE.

HYPERBOLE consists in magnifying an object beyond its natural bounds. This figure occurs very frequently in all languages, and makes a part even of common conversation: As swift as the wind; as white as the snow; and the like; and our usual forms of compliment are, in general, only extravagant hyperboles. These exaggerated expressions, however, from habit, are seldom considered as hyperbolical.

Hyperboles are of two kinds; either such as are employed in description, or such as are suggested by the ardour of passion. Those are the best which are the effect of passion; since it not only gives rise to the most daring figures,
but often, at the same time, renders them natural and just. Hence the following passage in Milton, though extremely hyperbolical, contains nothing but what is natural and proper. It exhibits the mind of Satan agitated with rage and despair:

Me miserable! which way shall I fly.
Infinite wrath, and infinite despair.
Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell;
And in the lowest depth, a lower deep
Still threatening to devour me, opens wide,
To which the Hell I suffer seems as Heaven.

In simple description hyperboles must be used with greater caution. When an earthquake or a storm is described, or when our imagination is carried into the midst of a battle, we can bear strong hyperboles without displeasure: But when only a woman in grief is presented to our view, it is impossible not to be disgusted with such wild exaggeration.
as the following, in one of our dramatic poets:

——I found her on the floor,
In all the storm of grief, yet beautiful;
Pouring forth tears at such a lavish rate,
That, were the world on fire, they might have

drown'd
The wrath of Heaven, and quench'd the mighty

ruin.

This is the genuine bombast. The person herself who laboured under the distracting agitations of grief, might be permitted to express herself in strong hyperbole; but the spectator, who only speaks the language of description, cannot be permitted an equal liberty. The just boundary of this figure cannot be ascertained by any precise rule: Good sense and an accurate taste must ascertain the limit, beyond which, if it pass, it becomes extravagant.
PERSONIFICATION.

WE proceed now to the examination of those figures which lie altogether in the thought; where the words are taken in their common and literal sense. We shall begin with personification, by which life and action are attributed to inanimate objects. All poetry, even in its most gentle and humble forms, is much indebted to this figure. From prose it is by no means excluded; nay, even in common conversation frequent approaches are made to it. When we say, the earth thirsts for rain, or the fields smile with plenty; when ambition is said to be restless, or a disease to be deceitful, such expressions shew the facility with which the mind can accommodate the pro-
properties of living creatures to things that are inanimate, or to abstract conceptions.

There are three different degrees of this figure; which it is requisite to remark and distinguish, in order to determine the propriety of its use. The first is, when some of the properties or qualities of living creatures are ascribed to inanimate objects; the second, when those inanimate objects are described as acting like such as have life; and the third, when they are exhibited either as speaking to us, or as listening to what we say to them.

The first and lowest degree of this figure, which consists in communicating to inanimate objects some of the qualities of living creatures, raises the style so little, that the humblest discourse will admit it without any force. Thus, "a raging storm, a deceitful disease, a cruel disaster," are familiar...
and simple expressions. This, indeed, is such an obscure degree of personification, as might not, perhaps, be improperly classed with plain metaphors, which almost escape our observation.

The second degree of this figure is, when we represent inanimate objects acting like those that have life. Here we advance a step higher, and the personification becomes sensible. According to the nature of the action which we ascribe to those inanimate objects, and the particularity with which we describe it, such is the strength of the figure. When pursued to a considerable length, it belongs only to laboured harangues; when slightly touched, it may be admitted into less elevated compositions. Cicero, for example, speaking of the cases where killing a man is lawful in self-defence, uses the following expression: "Alii \* quando nobis gladius ad occidendum homi-
"hominem ab ipsis porrigitur legis "
"bus." Here the laws are beautifully
personified, as stretching forth their
hand to give us a sword for putting a
man to death.

In poetry personifications of this
kind are extremely frequent, and, in-
deed, constitute its essence. In the de-
scriptions of a poet who has a lively
fancy, every thing becomes animated.
Homer, the father of poetry, is re-
markable for the use of this figure.
War, peace, darts, rivers, every thing,
in short, is alive in his writings. Mil-
ton and Shakespeare resemble him in
this particular. No personification is
more striking, or introduced on a more
proper occasion, than the following of
Milton, upon Eve's eating the forbid-
den fruit:

So saying, her rash hand, in evil hour,
Forth reaching to the fruit, she pluck'd, she
eat;
Earth felt the wound; and nature, from her seat
Sighing, thro' all her works gave signs of woe,
That all was lost.

B. ix. l. 780.

The third and highest degree of this figure is yet to be mentioned; when inanimate objects are represented not only as feeling and acting, but as speaking to us, or hearing and attending when we address ourselves to them. This is the boldest of all rhetorical figures; it is the style of strong passion only; and, consequently, should never be attempted, except when the mind is very much heated and agitated. Milton affords us a very beautiful example of this figure, in that moving and tender address which Eve makes to Paradise, immediately before she is compelled to leave it:

Oh! unexpected stroke, worse than of death.
Must I thus leave thee, Paradise! thus leave
Thee,
Thee, native soil, these happy walks and shades,
Fit haunt of Gods! where I had hopes to spend
Quiet, though fad, the respite of that day
Which must be mortal to us both. O flowers!
That never will in other climate grow,
My early visitation, and my last
At ev'n, which I bred up with tender hand,
From your first op'ning buds, and gave you names!
Who now shall rear you to the sun, or rank
Your tribes, and water from the ambrosial fount?

B, ii. l. 268.

This is the real language of nature,
and of female passion.

In the management of this sort of personification two rules are to be observed. First, never to attempt it unless prompted by strong passion, and never to continue it when the passion begins to subside. The second rule is, never to personify an object which has not some dignity in itself, and which is incapable of making a proper figure in the
the elevation to which we raise it. To address the corpse of a deceased friend, is natural; but to address the clothes which he wore, introduces low and degrading ideas. So likewise, addressing the several parts of one's body, as if they were animated, is not agreeable to the dignity of passion. For this reason, the following passage in Mr. Pope's Eloisa to Abelard is liable to censure:

Dear fatal name! rest ever unreveal'd,
Nor pass these lips in holy silence seal'd.
Hide it, my heart, within that close disguise,
Where, mix'd with Gods, his lov'd idea lies;
Oh! write it not, my hand!—his name appears
Already written—Blot it out, my tears!

Here the name of Abelard is first personified; which, as the name of a person often stands for the person himself, is exposed to no objection: Next, Eloisa personifies her own heart; and as the heart is a dignified part of the human frame, and is often put for the mind
mind or affection, this also may pass without censure: But when she addresses her hand, and tells it not to write his name; this is strained and unnatural. Yet the figure becomes still worse, when she exhorts her tears to blot out what her hand had written. The two last lines are, indeed, altogether unsuitable to the native passion and tenderness which breathe through the rest of that inimitable poem.

A P O
APOSTROPHE.

APOSTROPHE is an address to a real person; but one who is either absent or dead, as if he were present, and attentive to us. This figure is, in boldness, a degree lower than the address to personified objects; since it requires a less effort of imagination to suppose persons present who are dead or absent, than to animate insensible beings, and direct our discourse to them. The poems of Ossian abound with the most beautiful instances of this figure. "Weep on the rocks of roaring winds, O Maid of Inistore! Bend thy fair head over the waves, thou fairer than the ghost of the hills, when it moves in a sun-beam at noon over the silence of Morven! He is fallen! Thy youth is low; pale beneath the sword of Cuchullin!"
COMPARISON, ANTITHESIS, INTERROGATION, EXCLAMATION, AND OTHER FIGURES OF SPEECH.

A Comparison or simile is, when the resemblance between two objects is expressed in form, and usually pursued more fully than the nature of a metaphor admits: As when we say, "The actions of princes are like those great rivers, the course of which every one beholds, but their springs have been seen by few." This short instance will shew, that a fortunate comparison is a sort of sparkling ornament, which adds lustre and beauty to language.

All comparisons may be reduced under two heads: explaining and embellishing.
Using comparisons. For when a writer compares the object of which he treats with any other thing, it always is, or at least ought to be, with a view either to make us understand that object more clearly, or to render it more pleasing and engaging. Even the most abstract reasoning admits of explaining comparisons. For instance, the distinction between the powers of sense and imagination in the human mind, are, in Mr. Harris's Hermes, illustrated by similes, in the following manner: "As wax," says he, "would not be adequate to the purpose of signification, if it had not the power to retain as well as to receive the impression, the same holds of the soul with respect to sense, and imagination. Sense is its receptive power, and imagination its retentive. "Had it sense without imagination, it would not be as wax, but as water; while, though all impressions become instantly
"stately made, yet as soon as they
are made, they are instantly lost."
In comparisons of this kind, perspicuity
and usefulness are chiefly to be studied.
But embellishing comparisons, which
are introduced to adorn the subject of
which we treat, are those which most
frequently occur. Resemblance, it has
been observed, is the foundation of this
figure. Yet resemblance must not be
taken, in too strict a sense, for actual
similitude or likeness of appearance.
Two objects may raise a train of similar
or concordant ideas in the mind, though
they resemble each other, strictly speak-
ing, in nothing. For example, to de-
scribe the nature of soft and melancholy
music, Ossian says, "The music of
"Carryl was, like the memory of joys
"that are past, pleasant and mournful
"to the soul." This is just and beau-
tiful; yet no kind of music bears any
relem-
resemblance to a feeling of the mind, such as the memory of past joys.

We will now consider when comparisons may be introduced with propriety. Since they are the language of imagination rather than of passion, an author can hardly commit a greater fault, than in the midst of passion to introduce a simile. Our writers of tragedies are often culpable in this respect. Thus Mr. Addison, in his Cato, makes Portius, just after Lucia had bid him farewell for ever, express himself in a studied and affected comparison:

Thus, o'er the dying lamp th' unsteady flame
Hangs quiv'ring on a point, leaps off by fits,
And falls again, as loth to quits its hold.
Thou must not go; my soul still hovers o'er thee,
And can't get loose.

Though comparison be not the style of strong passion, so neither, when de-
Comparison

Signify as an embellishment, is it the language of a mind totally unmoved. Being a figure of dignity, it always demands some elevation in the subject, to make it proper: It supposes the imagination to be uncommonly enlivened, though the heart be not agitated by passion. The language of simile seems to lie between the highly pathetic and the very humble style, at the same distance from each. It is, however, a sparkling ornament; and must consequently dazzle and fatigue, if it should recur too often. Similes should, even in poetry, be employed with moderation; but, in prose, much more; otherwise the style will grow disgustingly luscious, and the ornament lose its beauty and effect.

We will now consider the nature of those objects from which comparisons should be drawn; supposing them introduced in their proper order.

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In
In the first place, they must not be drawn from things which have too intimate and obvious a resemblance to the object with which they are compared. The pleasure which we receive from the act of comparing, arises from the discovery of likenesses among things of different species, where we should not, at first sight, expect a resemblance.

But, in the second place, as comparisons ought not to be founded on likenesses too apparent, much less ought they to be founded on those which are too faint and distant. These, instead of assisting, strain the fancy, to comprehend them, and throw no light upon the subject.

In the third place, the object from which a comparison is drawn ought never to be an unknown object, or one of which few people can have a clear idea. Similes, therefore, founded on philosophical discoveries, or on any thing
thing with which persons of a particular trade only, or a particular profession, are acquainted, produce not their proper effect. They should be drawn from those illustrious and noted objects, which the generality of readers have either seen, or can strongly conceive.

In the fourth place, we must observe, that in compositions of a grave or elevated kind, similes should never be drawn from low or mean objects. These have a tendency to degrade and vilify; whereas similes are generally intended to embellish and to dignify; and, therefore, except in burlesque writings, or where an object is meant to be diminished, mean ideas should never be submitted to our observation.
ANTITHESIS is founded on the contrast or opposition of two objects. By contrast, objects opposed to each other appear in a stronger light. Beauty, for instance, never appears so charming as when contrasted with ugliness and deformity. Antithesis, therefore, may, on many occasions, be used advantageously, to strengthen the impression which we propose that any object should make. Thus Cicero, in his defence of Milo, representing the improbability of Milo's attempting to take away the life of Clodius, when every thing was unfavourable to such a design, after he had omitted many opportunities of effecting such a purpose, heightens our conviction of this improbability.
ability, by a judicious use of this figure?
"Quem igitur omnium gratiâ interisti
cere noluit, hunc voluit cum aliquo-
rum querelâ? Quem jure, quem loco,
quem tempore, quem impune, non
est ausus, hunc injuriâ, iniquo loco,
alieno tempore, periculo capitis, non
dubitavit occidere?" Here the anti-
thetis is rendered complete, by the
words and members of the sentence, ex-
pressing the contrasted objects, being si-
milarly constructed, and made to cor-
respond to each other.

We must, however, acknowledge,
that the frequent use of antithesis, par-
ticularly where the opposition in the
words is nice and quaint, is apt to make
style unpleasing. A maxim, or moral
saying, very properly receives this
form; both because it is supposed to
be the effect of meditation, and is de-
signed to be engraven on the memory,
which recals it more easily by the aid

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of such contrasted expressions. But where a number of such sentences succeed each other; where this is an author's favourite and prevailing mode of expression, his style is exposed to censure.
INTERROGATION AND EXCLAMATION.

INTERROGATIONS and Exclamations are passionate figures. The literal use of interrogation is to ask a question; but when men are prompted by passion, whatever they would affirm or deny with great earnestness, they naturally put in the form of a question, expressing thereby the firmest confidence of the truth of their own opinion; and appealing to their hearers for the impossibility of the contrary. Thus, in scripture: "God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent. Hath he said it? And shall he not do it? Hath he spoken it? And shall he not make it good?"
Interrogations may be employed in the prosecution of some close and earnest reasoning; but exclamations belong only to stronger emotions of the mind; to surprise, anger, joy, grief, and the like. These being natural signs of a moved and agitated mind, always when they are properly employed, make us sympathise with those who use them, and enter into their feelings. Nothing, however, has a worse effect than the frequent and unseasonable use of exclamations. Young, unexperienced writers suppose, that by pouring them forth plenteously, they render their compositions warm and animated. But quite the contrary is the case. They render them frigid to excess. When an author is always calling upon us to enter into transports which he has said nothing to inspire, he excites our disgust and indignation.

VISION
ANOTHER figure of speech, first only for animated composition, is what some writers call Vision; when instead of relating something that is past, we use the present tense, and describe it as if passing immediately before our eyes. Thus Cicero, in his fourth oration against Cataline: "Videor enim hanc urbe videre, lucem orbis terrarum atque arcem omnium gentium, subito uno incendio concidentem; cerno animo sepulta in patria miseris atque inspeltos acervos civium; versatur mihi ante oculos aspectus Cethegi, et furor, in vestra caede bacchantis." This figure has great beauty when it is well executed, and
and when it flows from the true spirit of genuine enthusiasm. If it be suggested by affectation, it shares the same fate with all feeble attempts towards passionate figures; that of throwing ridicule upon the author, and leaving the reader more cool and uninterested than he was before.
THE last figure which we shall mention, and which is of frequent use among all public speakers, is called a Climax. It consists in an artful exaggeration of all the circumstances of some object or action which we wish to place in a strong light. It operates by a gradual rise of one circumstance above another, till our idea be raised to the highest pitch. We shall give an instance of this figure, from a printed pleading of a celebrated Scotch Lawyer, Sir George Mackenzie. It is in a charge to the jury, in the case of a woman who was accused of murdering her own child. "Gentlemen, if one man had any how slain another; if an adversary had killed his opposer; or a woman
woman occasioned the death of her enemy; even these criminals would have been capitally punished by the Cornelian law: But, if this guiltless infant, who could make no enemy, had been murdered by its own nurse, what punishments would not then the mother have demanded? With what cries and exclamations would she have stunned your ears? What shall we say then, when a woman, guilty of homicide, a mother; of the murder of her innocent child, hath comprised all those misdeeds in one single crime; a crime, in its own nature, detestable; in a woman, prodigious; in a mother, incredible; and perpetrated against one whose age called for compassion, whose near relation claimed affection, and whose innocence deserved the highest favour? Such regular climaxes as these, though they have great beauty, yet,
yet, at the same time, have the appearance of art and study; and, consequently, though they may be admitted into formal harangues, yet they are not the language of passion, which seldom proceeds by such regular and measured steps.
GENERAL CHARACTERS OF
STYLE—DIFFUSE, CONCISE;
FEEBLE, NERVOUS; DRY;
PLAIN; NEAT; ELE-
GANT; FLOWERY.

THAT different subjects ought to be
treated in different kinds of style,
is a position so self-evident, that it re-
quires not illustration. Every one is
convinced, that treatises of philosophy
should not be composed in the same
style with orations. It is equally appa-
rent; that different parts of the same
composition require a variation in the
style and manner. Yet amidst this va-
riety, we still expect to find, in the
composition of any one man, some de-
gree of uniformity or consistency with
himself, in manner; we expect to find
some
Some prevailing character of style impressed on all his writings, which shall be suited to, and shall distinguish, his particular genius and turn of mind. The orations in Livy differ considerably in style, as they ought to do, from the rest of his history. The same thing may be observed in those of Tacitus. Yet in the orations of both these elegant historians, the distinguishing manner of each may be clearly traced; the splendid fulness of the one, and the sententious brevity of the other. Wherever there is real and native genius, it prompts a disposition to one kind of style rather than another. Where this is wanting; where there is no marked nor peculiar character which appears in the compositions of an author, we are apt to conclude, and not without cause, that he is a vulgar and trivial author, who writes from imitation, and not from the impulse of original genius.
One of the first and most obvious distinctions of the different sorts of style arises from an author’s expanding his thoughts more or less. This distinction constitutes what are termed the diffuse and the concise styles. A concise writer compresses his ideas into the fewest words; he employs none but the most expressive; he lops off all those which are not a material addition to the sense. Whatever ornament he admits, is adopted for the sake of force, rather than of grace: The same thought is never repeated. The utmost precision is studied in his sentences; and they are generally designed to suggest more to the reader’s imagination than they immediately express.

A diffuse writer unfolds his idea fully. He holds it out in a variety of lights, and assists the reader, as much as possible, in comprehending it completely. He is not very anxious to express.
press it at first in its full strength, because he intends repeating the impression; and what he wants in strength, he endeavours to supply by copiousness. His periods naturally flow into some length, and having room for ornament of every kind, he gives it free admittance.

Each of these styles has its peculiar advantages; and each becomes faulty when carried to the extreme. Of conciseness carried as far as propriety will allow, perhaps in some cases farther, Tacitus the historian, and Montesquieu, in "l'Esprit de Loix," are remarkable examples. Of a beautiful and magnificent diffuseness, Cicero is, undoubtedly, the noblest instance which can be given. Addison also, and Sir William Temple, may be ranked in some degree under the same class.

To determine when to adopt the concise, and when the diffuse manner, we must
must be guided by the nature of the composition. Discourses which are to be spoken, require a more diffuse style than books which are to be read. In written compositions, a proper degree of conciseness has great advantages. It is more lively; keeps up attention; makes a stronger impression on the mind; and gratifies the reader by supplying more exercise to his conception. Description, when we wish to have it vivid and animated, should be in a concise strain. Any redundant words or circumstances encumber the fancy, and render the object we present to it confused and indistinct. The strength and vivacity of description, whether in prose or poetry, depend much more upon the happy choice of one or two important circumstances, than upon the multiplication of them. When we desire to strike the fancy, or to move the heart, we should be concise; when
to inform the understanding, which is more deliberate in its motions, and wants the assistance of a guide, it is better to be full. Historical narration may be beautiful, either in a concise or a diffuse manner, according to the author's genius. Livy and Herodotus are diffuse; Thucydides and Sallust are concise; yet they are all agreeable.

The nervous and the feeble are generally considered as characters of style, of the same import with the concise and the diffuse. They do, indeed, very frequently coincide; yet this does not always hold; since there are instances of writers, who, in the midst of a full and ample style, have maintained a considerable degree of strength. Livy is an instance of the truth of this observation. The foundation, indeed, of a nervous or weak style, are laid in an author's manner of thinking: If he conceives an object forcibly, he will express it
with strength; but if he has an indistinct view of his subject, this will clearly appear in his style. Unmeaning words and loose epithets will escape him; his expressions will be vague and general; his arrangement indistinct and weak; and our conception of his meaning will be faint and confused. But a nervous writer, be his style concise or extended, gives us always a strong idea of his meaning; his mind being full of his subject, his words are, consequently, all expressive; every phrase and every figure which he uses, renders the picture which he would set before us, more striking and complete.

It must, however, be observed, that too great a study of strength, to the neglect of the other qualities of style, is apt to betray writers into a harsh manner. Harshness proceeds from uncommon words, from forced inversions in the construction of a sentence, and too great
great a neglect of smoothness and ease. This is imputed as a fault to some of our earliest Classics in the English language; such as Sir Walter Raleigh, Sir Francis Bacon, Hooker, Harrington, Cudworth, and other writers of considerable reputation in the days of Queen Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I. These writers had nerves and strength in a considerable degree; and are to this day distinguished by that quality in style. But the language, in their hands, was very different from what it is at present, and was, indeed, entirely formed upon the idiom and construction of the Latin, in the arrangement of sentences. The present form which the language has assumed, has, in some degree, sacrificed the study of strength to that of ease and perspicuity. Our arrangement has become less forcible, perhaps, but more plain and natural; and this is now considered as the genius of our tongue.

P 4 Hitherto
Hitherto style has been considered under those characters which regard its expressiveness of an author's meaning; we will now consider it in another view, with respect to the degree of ornament employed to embellish it. Here the style of different authors seems to rise in the following gradation: A dry, a plain, a neat, an elegant, a flowery, manner. Of these we will treat briefly, in the order in which they stand.

A dry manner excludes every kind of ornament. Satisfied with being understood, it aims not to please, in the least degree, either the fancy or the ear. This is tolerable only in pure didactic writing; and even there to make us bear it, great solidity of matter is necessary, and entire perspicuity of language.

A plain style advances one degree above a dry one. A writer of this character employs very little ornament of any
any kind, and rests almost entirely upon his sense. But, though he does not engage us by the arts of composition, he avoids disgusting us like a dry and a harsh writer. Besides perspicuity, he observes propriety, purity, and precision in his language; which form no inconsiderable degree of beauty. Liveliness and force are also compatible with a plain style; and consequently, such an author, if his sentiments be good, may be sufficiently agreeable. The difference between a dry and a plain writer is, that the former is incapable of ornament; the latter goes not in pursuit of it. Of those who have employed the plain style, Dean Swift is an eminent example.

A neat style is next in order; and here we are advanced into the region of ornament; but that ornament is not of the most sparkling kind. A writer of this character shews that he does not despise the
the beauty of language, by his attention to the choice of his words, and to their graceful collocation. His sentences are always free from the incumbrance of superfluous words; are of a moderate length; rather inclining to brevity than a swelling structure; and closing with propriety. There is variety in his cadence; but no appearance of studied harmony. His figures, if any, are short and accurate, rather than bold and glowing. Such a style may be attained by a writer whose powers of fancy or genius are not extensive, by industry and attention. This sort of style is not unsuitable to any subject whatever. A familiar epistle, or a law paper, on the driest subject, may be composed with neatness; and a sermon, or a philosophical treatise, in a neat style, will be read with satisfaction.

An elegant style admits a higher degree of ornament than a neat one; and possesses
possesses all the virtues of ornament, without any of its defects or defects. Complete elegance implies great perspicuity and propriety; purity in the choice of words; and carefulness and skill in their harmonious and happy arrangement. It implies farther, the beauty of imagination spread over style, as far as the subject allows it; and all the illustration which figurative language affords when properly employed.

An elegant writer, in short, is one who delights the fancy and the ear, while he informs the understanding; and who clothes his ideas with all the beauty of expression, but does not overload them with any of its misplaced finery.

A florid style comprehends the excess of ornament. This, in a young composer, is not only pardonable, but is often a symptom of a bold and inventive genius. But, although it may be allowed to youth, in their first attempts, it
it must not receive the same indulgence from writers of more experience. In them, judgment should chasten imagination, and reject every ornament which is unsuitable or redundant. That tinsel splendour of language, which some writers perpetually affect, is truly contemptible. With these it is a luxuriancy of words, not of fancy. They forget that, unless it be founded on sense and solid thought, the most florid style is but a childish imposition on ignorant and unthinking readers.
STY LE—SIMPLE; AFFECTED;
VEHEMEN T—DIRECTI ON S
FOR FORMING A PROPER
STY LE.

SIMPLICITY, applied to writing,
is a term very commonly used; but,
like many other critical terms, it is
often used vaguely, and without pre-
cision. The different meanings given
to the word simplicity, have been the
chief cause of this inaccuracy: It will
not, therefore, be improper to make a
distinction between them; and shew in
what sense simplicity is a proper attri-
but e of style. There are four different
acceptations in which this term is taken.
The first is simplicity of composition,
which is opposed to too great a variety
of parts. This is the simplicity of plan
in a tragedy, as distinguished from double plots, and crowded incidents; the simplicity of the Iliad, in opposition to the digressions of Lucan; the simplicity of Grecian architecture, in opposition to the irregularity of the Gothic. Simplicity, in this sense, is the same as unity.

The second sense, is simplicity of thought, in opposition to refinement. Simple thoughts are those which flow naturally; which are easily suggested by the subject or occasion; and which, when once suggested, are universally understood. Refinement in writing, means a less obvious and natural turn of thought, which, when carried too far, approaches to intricacy, and is unpleasing, by the appearance of being far sought. Thus we should say, that Mr. Parnell is a poet of much greater simplicity, in his turn of thought, than Mr. Cowley.

A third sense of simplicity, is that in which
simplicity.

which it regards style; and is opposed to too much ornament, or pomp of language. Thus we say, Mr. Locke is a simple, Mr. Harvey a florid, writer.

There is a fourth sense of simplicity, which also respects style; but it regards not so much the degree of ornament employed, as the easy and natural manner in which language is expressive of our thoughts. In this sense, simplicity is compatible with the highest ornament. Homer, for example, has this simplicity in the greatest perfection; and yet no writer possesses more ornament and beauty. This simplicity, which is now the object of our consideration, stands opposed, not to ornament, but to affectation of ornament; and is a superior excellency in composition.

A writer who has attained simplicity, has no marks of art in his expression; it appears the very language of nature. We see not the writer and his labour, but
but the man in his own natural character: He may possess richness of expression; he may be full of figures and of fancy; but these flow from him without difficulty; and he seems to write in this manner, not because he has studied it, but because it is the mode of expression most familiar and easy to him. With this character of style, a certain degree of negligence is not inconsistent; it is even not ungraceful; for too accurate an attention to words is foreign to it. Simplicity of style possesses this considerable advantage, that, like simplicity of manners, it shews us a man's sentiments and turn of mind laid open without disguise. A more studied and artificial mode of writing, however beautiful, has always this disadvantage, that it exhibits an author in form, like a man at court, where the splendour of dress, and the ceremonial of behaviour, conceal those peculiarities which distinguish
Simplicity—Affectation. 241

distinguish one individual from another. But reading an author of simplicity, is like conversing with a person of rank at home, and with ease, where we see his natural manners and his real character.

With regard to simplicity; in general, we may observe, that the ancient original writers are always the most eminent for it: This proceeds from a very obvious cause, that they wrote from the dictates of natural genius, and were not formed upon the labours and writings of others.

Of affectation in style, which is opposed to simplicity, we have a remarkable instance in our language. Lord Shaftesbury, though an author of considerable merit, can express nothing with simplicity. He seems to have considered it as vulgar, and beneath the dignity of a man of fashion, to speak like other men. Hence, he is perpetually
ally in buskins; replete with circumlocutions and artificial elegance. In every sentence, the marks of labour are visible; no appearance of that ease, which expresses a sentiment coming natural and warm from the heart. He abounds with figures and ornament of every kind; is sometimes happy in them; but his fondness for them is too conspicuous; and having once seized some metaphor or allusion that pleased him, he knows not how to part with it. He possessed delicacy and refinement of taste, to a degree that may be called excessive and fickle; but he had little warmth of passion; and the coldness of his character suggested that artificial and flatteringly manner which appears in his writings. No author is more dangerous to the tribe of imitators than Shaftsbury, who, amidst several very considerable blemishes, has, at the same time, many dazzling and imposing beauties.
Simplicity—Affectation. 243

It is possible, however, for an author to write with simplicity, and yet to be destitute of beauty. He may be free from affectation, and not have merit. The beautiful simplicity supposes an author in possession of real genius; and capable of writing with solidity, purity, and brilliancy of imagination. In this case, the simplicity of his matter is the crowning ornament; it gives lustre to every other beauty; it is the dress of nature, without which all beauties are but imperfect. But if the mere absence of affectation were sufficient to constitute the beauty of style, weak and dull writers might often have pretensions to it. A distinction, therefore, must be made, between that simplicity which accompanies true genius, and which is entirely compatible with every proper ornament of style; and that which is the effect only of carelessness and inattention.

Q.2  Another
Another character of style, different from those which have been already mentioned, is the vehement. This always supposes strength; and is not, in any respect, incompatible with simplicity. It is distinguished by a peculiar ardour; it is the language of a man whose imagination and passions are glowing and impetuous. With a negligence of lesser graces, he pours himself forth with the rapidity and plenitude of a torrent. The vehement belongs to the higher kinds of oratory; and is rather expected from a man who is speaking, than from one who is writing in his closet. Demosthenes is the most full and perfect example of this species of style.

Having determined and explained the different characters of style, we shall conclude our observations with a few directions for the attainment of excellence in writing.
FORMING A PROPER STYLE.

The first direction proper to be observed, is, to study clear ideas on the subject concerning which we are to write or to speak. What we conceive clearly and feel strongly, we shall naturally express with clearness and with strength. We should, therefore, think closely on the subject, till we have attained a full and distinct view of the matter which we are to clothe in words; till we become warm and interested in it; then, and then only, shall we find a proper expression begin to flow.

In the second place, in the acquisition of a good style, the frequency of composing is indispensibly requisite. But it is not every kind of composing which will improve style. By a careless and hasty habit of writing, a bad style will be acquired; more trouble will afterwards be necessary to unlearn faults, and correct negligence, than to endeavour, from a state of entire ignorance, to
rance, to become acquainted with the first rudiments of composition. In the beginning, therefore, we ought to write with deliberation and with care. Facility and speed are the fruit of practice and experience. We must be cautious, however, not to retard the course of thought, nor cool the ardour of imagination, by pausing too long on every word we employ. On certain occasions, there is a glow of composition which must be kept up, if we expect to express ourselves happily, though at the expense of some inaccuracies. A more severe examination must be the work of correction. What we have written, should be laid by for some time, till the ardour of composition be subsided; till the partiality for our expressions be weakened, and the expressions themselves be forgotten; and then examining our work with a cool and critical eye, as if it were the performance of another,
another, we shall discover many imperfections which at first escaped our notice.

In the third place, an acquaintance with the style of the best authors is peculiarly requisite. Hence a just taste will be formed; and a copious fund be supplied of words on every subject. No exercise, perhaps, will be found more useful for acquiring a proper style, than to translate some passage from an elegant author, into our own words. Thus to take, for instance, a page of one of Mr. Addison's Spectators, and read it attentively two or three times, till we are in full possession of the thoughts it contains; then to lay aside the book; to endeavour to write out the passage from memory, as well as we can; and then to compare what we have written with the style of the author, such an exercise will, by comparison, shew us our own defects; will teach us to
to correct them; and, from the variety of expression which it will exhibit, will conduct us to that which is most beautiful and perfect.

In the fourth place, a caution must be given against a servile imitation of any one author whatever. A desire of imitating hampers genius; and generally produces a stiffness of expression. They, who follow an author minutely, commonly copy his faults as well as his beauties. No one will ever become an accomplished writer or speaker, who has not some confidence in his own genius. We ought carefully to avoid using any author's particular phrases, or transcribing passages, from him: Such an habit will be fatal to all genuine composition. It is much better to possess something of our own, though of inferior beauty, than to endeavour to shine in borrowed ornaments, which will, at last, betray the utter barrenness of our genius.

In
A PROPER STYLE.

In the fifth place, it is a plain, but important rule, with regard to style, that we always endeavour to adapt it to the subject, and likewise to the capacity of our hearers, if we are to speak in public. To attempt a poetical, florid style, when it should be our business only to argue and reason, is in the highest degree awkward and absurd. To speak with elaborate pomp of words, before those who cannot comprehend them, is equally ridiculous and useless. When we begin to write or speak, we should previously impress on our minds a complete idea of the end to be aimed at; keep this steadily in view, and adapt our style to it.

We must, in the last place, recommend, that an attentive regard to style do not occupy us so much, as to detract from a higher degree of attention to the thoughts. This rule is the more necessary, since the present taste of the age
age seems to be directed more to style than to thought. It is much more easy to dress up trifling and common thoughts with some ornament of expression, than to afford a fund of vigorous, ingenious, and useful sentiments. The latter requires genius; the former may be attained by industry, with the aid of very superficial parts. Hence the crowd of writers who are rich in words, but poor in sentiments. Custom obliges us not to be inattentive to the ornaments of style, if we wish that our labours should be read and admired. But he is a contemptible writer, who looks not beyond the dress of language; who lays not the chief stress upon his matter; and who does not regard ornament as a secondary and inferior recommendation.
HAVING insisted rather copiously on the subject of language in general, we will now enter on a critical analysis of the style of some good author. This will suggest observations which we have not hitherto had an opportunity of making, and will shew in a proper light, some of those which have been made.

Mr. Addison, though one of the most beautiful writers in our language, is not the most correct; a circumstance which makes his composition the more proper subject of our present criticism. We proceed, therefore, to examine No. 411.
411, the first of his admired essays on the pleasures of the imagination, in the sixth volume of the Spectator. It begins thus:

Our sight is the most perfect, and most delightful of all our senses.

This sentence is clear, precise, and simple. The author, in a few plain words, expresses the proposition which he is going to illustrate. A first sentence should seldom be long, and should never be difficult to be understood.

He might have said, our sight is the most perfect, and the most delightful. But in omitting to repeat the particle the, he has been more judicious; since between perfect and delightful, in the present case, there being no contrast, such a repetition was unnecessary. He proceeds:

It fills the mind with the largest variety of ideas, converses with its objects at the greatest distance, and continues the longest in
in action, without being tired or satiated with its proper enjoyments.

This sentence is remarkably harmonious, and well constructed. It is completely conspicuous. It is not loaded with unnecessary words. That quality of a good sentence which we termed its unity, is here entirely preserved. The members of it grow, and rise above each other in sound, till it is conducted to one of the most harmonious closes which our language admits. It is figurative, without being too much so for the subject. There is no fault whatever, except that a severe critic might perhaps object, that the epithet large, which he applies to variety, is more commonly applied to extent than to number. It is evident, that he employed it to avoid the repetition of the word great, which occurs immediately afterwards.

The sense of feeling can, indeed, give as a notion of extension, shape, and all other
other ideas that enter at the eye, except colours; but, at the same time, it is very much straitened and confined in its operations, to the number, bulk, and distance of its particular objects.

This sentence is not so happy as the preceding. *Extension* and *shape* cannot, with propriety, be called *ideas*; since they are properties of matter. Neither can we properly speak of any sense giving us a notion of *ideas*; because our senses give us the ideas themselves. The latter part is still more confused. The sense of feeling, we are told, is confined in its operations, to the number, bulk, and distance of its particular objects. But is not every sense confined, as much as the sense of feeling, to the number, bulk, and distance of its own objects? The turn of expression is also here very inaccurate; and it requires the two words, *with regard*, to be inserted after the word *operations*, in order that the sense
sense should be rendered, at all, clear and intelligible. The epithet particular seems to be used instead of peculiar; but these words, though often confounded, are of very different import. Particular is opposed to general; peculiar stands opposed to what is possessed in common with others.

Our sight seems designed to supply all these defects, and may be considered as a more delicate and diffusive kind of touch, that spreads itself over an infinite multitude of bodies, comprehends the largest figures, and brings into our reach some of the most remote parts of the universe.

This sentence is perspicuous, graceful, well arranged, and highly harmonious. Its construction is so similar to that of the second sentence, that, had it immediately succeeded it, the ear would have been sensible of a faulty monotony. Another sentence being interposed,
terposed, however, prevents this unpleasing effect.

It is this sense which furnishes the imagination with its ideas; so that by the pleasures of the imagination or fancy, (which I shall use promiscuously), I here mean such as arise from visible objects, either when we have them actually in view, or when we call up their ideas into our minds by paintings, statues, descriptions, or any the like occasion.

The parenthesis in the middle of this sentence, is not sufficiently clear: It should have been, terms which I shall use promiscuously; since the verb use is not referred to the pleasures of the imagination, but to the terms of fancy and imagination, which were meant to be synonimous. To call a painting or a statue an occasion, is not an accurate expression; nor is it very just to speak of calling up ideas by occasions. The common
common phrase, any such means, would have been more natural and proper.

We cannot indeed have a single image in the fancy, that did not make its first entrance through the sight; but we have the power of retaining, altering, and compounding those images which we have once received, into all the varieties of picture and vision that are most agreeable to the imagination; for, by this faculty, a man in a dungeon is capable of entertaining himself with scenes and landscapes more beautiful than any that can be found in the whole compass of nature.

In one member of this sentence there is an inaccuracy in syntax. It is proper to say, altering and compounding those images which we have once received, into all the varieties of picture and vision: But we cannot with propriety say, retaining them into all the varieties; and yet the arrangement requires this construction. This error would have been avoided.
CRITICAL EXAMINATION

avoided by arranging the passage in the following manner: "We have the power of retaining, altering, and compounding those images which we have once received; and of forming them into all the varieties of picture and vision."—The latter part of the sentence is perspicuous and elegant.

There are few words in the English language, which are employed in a more loose and uncircumscribed sense, than those of the fancy and the imagination.

Except when some assertion of consequence is advanced, these little words, it is, and there are, ought to be avoided as redundant and enfeebling. The two first words of this sentence, therefore, would have been much better omitted. The article prefixed to fancy and imagination, should also have been left out, since he does not mean the power of the fancy and the imagination, but the words only. It had better been thus,
thus expressed: "Few words in the English language are employed in a more loose and uncircumscribed sense, than fancy and imagination."

I therefore thought it necessary to fix and determine the notion of these two words, as I intend to make use of them in the thread of my following speculations, that the reader may conceive rightly what is the subject which I proceed upon.

The words fix and determine, though they may appear so at first sight, are not synonymous. We fix what is loose; we determine what is uncircumscribed. They may be viewed, therefore, as applied here, with peculiar delicacy.

The notion of these words, is rather harsh, and is not so commonly used as the meaning of these words—as I intend to make use of them in the thread of my speculations—this is evidently faulty. A metaphor is improperly mixed with the words, in the literal sense. The subject which
which I proceed upon, is an ungraceful close of a sentence; it should have been, the subject upon which I proceed.

I must therefore desire him to remember, that by the pleasures of the imagination, I mean only such pleasures as arise originally from sight, and that I divide these pleasures into two kinds.

This sentence begins in a manner too similar to the preceding—I mean only such pleasures—the adverb only is not here in its proper place: It is not designed to qualify the verb mean, but such pleasures, and ought consequently to have been placed immediately after the latter.

My design being, first of all, to discourse of those primary pleasures of the imagination, which entirely proceed from such objects as are before our eyes; and, in the next place, to speak of those secondary pleasures of the imagination, which flow from the ideas of visible objects, when the objects
Objects are not actually before the eye, but are called up into our memories, or formed into agreeable visions of things, that are either absent or fictions.

This sentence is somewhat clogged by a tedious phraseology;—My design being first of all to discourse—in the next place to speak of—such objects as are before our eyes—things that are either absent or fictions. Several words might have been here omitted, and the style rendered more neat and compact.

The pleasures of the imagination, taken in their full extent; are not so gross as those of sense, nor so refined as those of the understanding.

This sentence is clear and elegant.

The last are indeed more preferable, because they are founded on some new knowledge or improvement in the mind of man: Yet it must be confessed, that those of the imagination are as great and as transporting as the other.

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The phrase, *more preferable*, is so palpable an inaccuracy, that one is surprized how it could have escaped the observation of Mr. Addison. The proposition contained in the last member of this sentence, is neither clearly nor elegantly expressed—It must be confessed, that those of the imagination are as great, and as transporting as the other. In the beginning of this sentence, he had called the pleasures of the understanding, the last; and he concludes with observing, that those of the imagination are as great and transporting as the other. Besides that the other makes not a proper contrast with the last, it is left doubtful, whether by the other, are meant the pleasures of the understanding or the pleasures of sense; though no doubt it was intended to refer to the pleasures of the understanding only.

*A beautiful prospect delights the soul as much as a demonstration, and a description*
In Homer has charmed more readers than a chapter in Aristotle.

This is a good illustration of what has been asserted, and is expressed with that elegance by which Mr. Addison is distinguished:

Besides, the pleasures of the imagination have this advantage above those of the understanding, that they are more obvious, and more easy to be acquired.

This sentence is unexceptionable.

It is but opening the eye, and the scene enters.

Though this is lively and picturesque, yet we must remark a small inaccuracy—A scene cannot be said to enter; an actor enters; but a scene appears, or presents itself.

The colours paint themselves on the fancy, with very little attention of thought or application of mind in the beholder.

This is beautiful and elegant, and well suited to those pleasures of the ima-


gination,
gination, of which the author is treating.

We are struck, we know not how, with the symmetry of any thing we see; and immediately assent to the beauty of an object, without enquiring into the particular causes and occasions of it.

We assent to the truth of a proposition; but cannot, with propriety, be said to assent to the beauty of an object. In the conclusion, both particular and occasions are superfluous words; and the pronoun it, is in some measure doubtful, whether it refers to beauty or to object.

A man of a polite imagination is let into a great many pleasures, that the vulgar are not capable of receiving.

It may here, perhaps, be objected, that the word polite is oftener applied to manners, than to the imagination.—The use of that instead of which is too common with Mr. Addison. Except in cases where it is necessary to avoid an ungraceful
ungraceful repetition, which is esteemed preferable to that, and was undoubtedly so in the present instance.

He can converse with a picture, and find an agreeable companion in a statue. He meets with a secret refreshment in a description; and often feels a greater satisfaction in the prospect of fields and meadows, than another does in the possession. It gives him, indeed, a kind of property in every thing he sees; and makes the most rude uncultivated parts of nature administer to his pleasures: So that he looks upon the world, as it were, in another light, and discovers in it a multitude of charms that conceal themselves from the generality of mankind.

This sentence is easy, flowing, and harmonious. We must, however, observe a slight inaccuracy—It gives him a kind of property—to this is there is no antecedent in the whole paragraph. To discover its connection, we must look back
back to the third sentence preceding, which begins with, a man of a polite imagination. This phrase, polite imagination, is the only antecedent to which it can refer; and even that is not a proper antecedent, since it stands in the genitive case, as the qualification only of a man.

There are, indeed, but very few, who know how to be idle and innocent, or have a relish of any pleasures that are not criminal; every diversion they take is at the expense of some one virtue or another; and their very first step out of business is into vice and folly.

This sentence is truly elegant, musical, and correct.

A man should endeavour, therefore, to make the sphere of his innocent pleasures as wide as possible, that he may retire into them with safety, and find in them, such a satisfaction as a wise man would not blush to take.

This
This is a proper sentence, and exposed to no objection.

Of this nature are those of the imagination, which do not require such a bent of thought as is necessary to our more serious employments, nor, at the same time, suffer the mind to sink into that indolence and remissness, which are apt to accompany our more sensual delights; but like a gentle exercise to the faculties, awakens them from sloth and idleness, without putting them upon any labour or difficulty.

The beginning of this sentence is incorrect—Of this nature, says he, are those of the imagination. It might be asked, of what nature? For the preceding sentence had not described the nature of any class of pleasures. He had said, that it was every man's duty to make the sphere of his innocent pleasures as extensive as possible, in order that, within that sphere, he might find a safe retreat and a laudable satisfaction.

The
The transition, therefore, is made loosely. It would have been better if he had said, "This advantage we gain," or "This satisfaction we enjoy," by means of the pleasures of the imagination. The rest of the sentence is beautiful and unexceptionable.

We might here add, that the pleasures of the fancy are more conducive to health than those of the understanding, which are worked out by dint of thinking, and attended with too violent a labour of the brain.

A minute critic might here observe, that worked out by dint of thinking, is a phrase which borders too much on the style of common conversation, to be admitted, with propriety, into a polished composition.

Delightful scenes, whether in nature, painting, or poetry, have a kindly influence on the body, as well as the mind; and not only serve to clear and brighten the imagination,
of Mr. Addison's Style, 269

imagination, but are able to disperse grief and melancholy, and to set the animal spirits in pleasing and agreeable motions. For this reason, Sir Francis Bacon, in his Essay upon Health, has not thought it improper to prescribe to his reader a poem, or a prospect, where he particularly dissuades him from knotty and subtile disquisitions, and advises him to pursue studies that fill the mind with splendid and illustrious objects, as histories, fables, and contemplations of nature.

In the latter of these two sentences, a member of the period is improperly placed—Where he particularly dissuades him from knotty and subtile disquisitions;—these words should have been placed in the following manner: Sir Francis Bacon, in his Essay upon Health, where he particularly dissuades the reader from knotty and subtile speculations, has not thought it improper, &c.

I have, in this paper, by way of introduction,
CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c.

introduction, settled the notion of those pleasures of the imagination, which are the subject of my present undertaking; and endeavoured, by several considerations, to recommend to my readers the pursuit of those pleasures; I shall, in my next paper, examine the several sources from whence these pleasures are derived.

These two concluding sentences furnish examples of the proper collocation of circumstances in a period. We have formerly shewed, that a judicious collocation of them is a matter of difficulty. Had the following incidental circumstances—by way of introduction—by several considerations—in this paper—in the next paper—been placed in any other situation, the sentence would neither have been so neat nor so clear as it is by the present construction.

ELOQUENCE.
ELOQUENCE.  
ORIGIN OF ELOQUENCE;  
grecian eloquence;  
demosthenes.

ELOQUENCE is the art of persuasion. Its most essential requisites are, solid argument, clear method, an appearance of sincerity in the speaker, joined with such graces of style and utterance, as shall invite and command attention. Good sense must be its foundation. Without this, no man can be truly eloquent; since fools can persuade none but fools. Before we can persuade a man of sense, we must convince him. Convincing and persuading, though sometimes confounded, are of very different import. Conviction affects the understanding only; persuasion, the will and the practice.
It is the business of the philosopher to convince us of truth; it is that of the orator to persuade us to act conformably to it, by engaging our affections in its favour. Conviction is, however, one avenue to the heart; and it is that which an orator must first attempt to gain; for no persuasion can be stable, which is not founded on conviction. But the orator must not be satisfied with convincing; he must address himself to the passions; he must paint to the fancy, and touch the heart; and hence, beside solid argument and clear method, all the captivating and interesting arts, both of composition and pronunciation, enter into the idea of eloquence.

Eloquence may be considered as consisting of three kinds, or degrees. The first, and most inferior, is that which endeavours only to please the hearers. Such, in general, is the eloquence of panegyrics, inaugural orations, ad-
dress'd to great men, and other harangues of this kind. This ornamental sort of composition may innocently amuse and entertain the mind; and may be connected, at the same time, with very useful sentiments. But it must be acknowledged, that where the speaker intends only to shine and to please, there is no small danger of art being strained into ostentation, and of the composition becoming tiresome and insipid.

A second, and a superior degree of eloquence is, when the speaker proposes, not merely to please, but likewise to inform, to instruct, to convince; when his art is employed in removing prejudices against himself and his cause; in selecting the most proper arguments, stating them with the greatest force, disposing of them in the best order, expressing and delivering them with propriety and beauty; and thereby preparing us to pass that judgment, or favours
vour that side of the cause, to which he desires to bring us. Within this degree, chiefly, is employed the eloquence of the bar.

Yet there remains a third, and still higher degree of eloquence, by which we are not only convinced, but are interested, agitated, and carried along with the speaker; our passions rise with his; we share all his emotions; we love, we hate, we resent, as he inspires us; and are prepared to resolve, or to act, with vigour and warmth. Debate, in popular assemblies, opens the most extensive field for the exercise of this species of eloquence; and the pulpit likewise admits it.

It is necessary to remark, that this high species of eloquence is always the offspring of passion. By passion, we mean that state of the mind in which it is agitated and fired by some object it has in view. Hence the universally acknowledged
acknowledged effect of enthusiasm in public speakers, for affecting their audience. Hence all studied declamation, and laboured ornaments of style, which shew the mind to be cool and unmoved, are so incompatible with persuasive eloquence. Hence every kind of affectation in gesture and pronunciation, diminish so much the merits of a speaker.

Hence, in fine, the necessity of being, and of being believed to be, disinterested and in earnest, in order to persuade.

In tracing the origin of eloquence, it is not necessary to go far back into the early ages of the world, or search for it among the monuments of Eastern or Egyptian antiquity. In those ages, it is true, there was a certain kind of eloquence; but it was more nearly allied to poetry than to what we properly call oratory. Whilst the intercourse among men was unfrequent, and force and strength were the principal means employed
employed in deciding controversies, the arts of oratory and persuasion, of reasoning and debate, could be little known. The first empires that arose, the Assyrian and Egyptian, were of the despotic kind. A single person, or at most a few, held the reins of government. The multitude were accustomed to a blind obedience; they were driven, not persuaded; and, consequently, none of those refinements of society, which make public speaking an object of importance, were as yet introduced.

It is not till the origin of the Grecian Republics, that we perceive any remarkable appearances of eloquence as the art of persuasion; and these opened to it such a field as it never had before, and, perhaps, has never again since that time experienced. Greece was divided into a number of little states: These were governed, at first,
by kings, who were not unmeaningly termed tyrants, and who being successively, by the wisdom of the people, expelled from their dominions, there sprung up a multitude of democratical governments, founded nearly upon the same plan, animated by the same glorious spirit of freedom, mutually jealous, and rivals of each other. Among these, Athens shone forth with a superior lustre. In this state, arts of every kind, but especially eloquence was brought to the highest perfection. We shall pass over the orators who flourished in the early period of this Republic, and take a view of the great Demosthenes, in whom eloquence shone forth with the highest and most unrivalled splendour. Not formed by nature either to please or to persuade, he struggled with, and surmounted, the most formidable impediments. He shut himself up in a cave, that he might study with
with less distraction. He declaimed by the sea-shore, that he might be used to the noise of a tumultuous assembly; and with pebbles in his mouth, that he might correct a defect in his speech. He practised at home with a naked sword hanging over his shoulder, that he might check an ungraceful motion to which he was subject. Hence, the example of this great man affords the highest encouragement to every student of eloquence, since it shews how far art and application could avail, for acquiring an excellence which nature appeared willing to have denied.

No orator had ever a finer field than Demosthenes, in his Olynthiacs and Philippics, which are his capital orations; and undoubtedly, to the greatness of the subject, and to that integrity and public spirit which breathe in them, they owe a large portion of their merit. The subject is, to excite the indignation,
tion of his countrymen against Philip of Macedon, the public enemy of the liberties of Greece; and to guard them against the treacherous measures, by which that crafty tyrant endeavoured to lull them into a neglect of their danger. To attain this end, we see him use every proper means to animate a people, distinguished by justice, humanity, and valour; but in many instances become corrupt and degenerate. He boldly accuses them of venality, indolence, and indifference to the public good; while, at the same time, he reminds them of their former glory, and of their present resources. His cotemporary orators, who were bribed by Philip, and who persuaded the people to peace, he openly reproaches as traitors to their country. He not only prompts to vigorous measures, but reaches how they are to be carried into execution. His orations are strongly animated,
animated, and full of the impetuosity and ardour of public spirit. His composition is not distinguished by ornament and splendour. It is an energy of thought, peculiarly his own, which forms his character, and raises him above his species. He seems not to attend to words, but to things. We forget the orator, and think of the subject. He has no parade and ostentation; no studied introductions; but is like a man full of his subject, who, after preparing his audience by a sentence or two, for the reception of plain truths, enters directly on business.

The style of Demosthenes is strong and concise; though sometimes, it must be confessed, harsh and abrupt. His words are highly expressive, and his arrangement firm and manly. Negligent of lesser graces, he seems to have aimed at that sublime which lies in sentiment. His action and pronunciation are
are said to have been uncommonly vehement and ardent; which, from the manner of his writings, we should readily believe. His character appears to have been of the austere, rather than of the gentle kind. He is always grave, serious, passionate; never degrading himself, nor attempting any thing like pleasantriy. If his admirable eloquence be in any respect faulty, it is that he sometimes borders on the hard and dry. He may be thought to want smoothness and grace; which is attributed to his imitating too closely the manner of Thucydides, who was his great model for style, and whose history he is said to have transcribed eight times with his own hand. But these defects are more than atoned for, by that masterly force of masculine eloquence, which, as it overpowered all who heard it, cannot, in the present day, be read without emotion.
HAVING treated of the state of eloquence among the Greeks, we now proceed to consider its progress among the Romans; where we shall find one model, at least, of eloquence, in its most splendid and cultivated form. The Romans derived their eloquence, poetry, and learning from the Greeks, and were, consequently, far inferior to them in genius for all these accomplishments. They had neither their vivacity nor sensibility; their passions were not so easily moved, nor their conceptions so vigorous; in comparison of them, they were a phlegmatic people. Their language bore a resemblance to their character; it was regular, firm, and
and stately; but wanted that expressive simplicity; that flexibility to suit every different species of composition, for which the Greek tongue is peculiarly distinguished. And hence, by comparison, we shall always find, that in the Greek productions there is more native genius; in the Roman, more regularity and art.

Since the Roman government, during the Republic, was of the popular kind, public speaking, no doubt, became early the means of acquiring power, honour, and distinction. But in the rude, unpolished times of the state, their speaking could hardly deserve the name of eloquence. It was not till a short time preceding the age of Cicero, that the Roman orators rose into any note. Crassus and Antonius seem to have been the most eminent; but as none of their productions are extant, nor any of Hortensius's, who was...
was Cicero's rival at the bar, it is not necessary to transcribe what Cicero has said of them, and of the character of their eloquence.

The object most worthy of our attention is Cicero himself, whose name alone suggests to us whatever is splendid in oratory. With his life and character, in other respects, we are not at present concerned. We shall view him only as an eloquent speaker, and endeavour to remark both his virtues and his defects. His virtues are, beyond doubt, superlatively great. In all his orations his art is conspicuous. He begins, commonly, with a regular exordium, and with much address possesses the hearers, and studies to gain their affections. His method is clear, and his arguments are arranged with exact propriety. In a superior clearness of method, he has an advantage over Demosthenes. Every thing appears in its
Its proper place; he never tries to move till he has attempted to convince; and in moving, particularly the softer passions, he is highly successful. No one ever knew the force of words better than Cicero. He rolls them along with the greatest beauty and magnificence; and in the structure of his sentences, is eminently curious and exact. He is always full and flowing; never abrupt. He amplifies every thing; yet though his manner is generally diffuse, it is often happily varied, and accommodated to the subject. When an important public object roused his mind, and demanded indignation and force, he departs considerably from that loose and declamatory manner to which he at other times is addicted, and becomes very forcible and vehement.

This great orator, however, is not without his defects. In most of his orations there is too much art, even carried
carried to a degree of ostentation. He seems often desirous of obtaining admiration, rather than of operating conviction. He is sometimes, therefore, showy rather than solid; and diffuse where he ought to have been urgent. His sentences are always round and sombre; they cannot be accused of monotony, since they possess variety of cadence; but from too great a fondness for magnificence, he is on some occasions deficient in strength. Though the services which he had performed to his country were very considerable, yet he is too much his own panegyrist. Ancient manners, which imposed fewer restraints on the side of decorum, may in some degree excuse, but cannot entirely justify, his vanity.

Whether Demosthenes or Cicero be the most perfect orator, is a question on which critics are by no means agreed. Fenelon, the celebrated Archbishop of Cam-
Cambray, and author of Telemachus, seems, in our opinion, to have stated their merits with great justice and perspicuity. His judgment is given in his Reflections on Rhetoric and Poetry. We shall translate the passage, though not, it is to be feared, without losing much of the spirit of the original. "I do not hesitate to declare," says he, that I think Demosthenes superior to Cicero. I am persuaded no one can admire Cicero more than I do. He adorns whatever he attempts. He does honour to language. He disposest of words in a manner peculiar to himself. His style has great variety of character. Whenever he pleases, he is even concise and vehement; for instance, against Catiline, against Verres, against Anthony. But ornament is too visible in his writings. His art is wonderful, but it is perceived. When the orator is
providing for the safety of the Rep-
public, he forgets not himself, nor
permits others to forget him. De-
omosthenes seems to escape from him-
selt, and to see nothing but his
country. He seeks not elegance of
expression; unsought for he possess-
it. He is superior to admiration.
He makes use of language, as a
modest man does of dress, only to
cover him. He thunders, he lightens.
He is a torrent which carries every
thing before it. We cannot cri-
ticise, because we are not ourselves.
His subject enchains our attention,
and makes us forget his language.
We lose him from our sight: Philip
alone occupies our minds. I am de-
lighted with both these orators; but
I confess that I am less affected by the
infinite art and magnificent elo-
quence of Cicero, than by the rapid
simplicity of Demosthenes.

The
The empire of eloquence, among the Romans, was exceedingly short. It expired with Cicero. Nor can we wonder at this being the case, since liberty was no more; and since the government of Rome was delivered over to a succession of the most execrable tyrants that ever disgraced and scourged the human race.

In the decline of the Roman Empire, the introduction of Christianity gave rise to a new kind of eloquence, in the apologies, sermons, and pastoral writings of the fathers: But none of them afford very just models of eloquence. Their language, as soon as we descend to the third or fourth century, becomes harsh; and they are, generally, infected with the taste of that age, a love of swollen and strained thoughts, and of the play of words.

As nothing occurs that deserves attention in the middle age, we pass now to
to the state of eloquence in modern times. Here it must be acknowledged, that in no European nation, public speaking has been valued so highly, or cultivated with so much care, as in Greece and Rome. The genius of the world appears, in this respect, to have undergone some alteration. The two nations where we might expect to find most of the spirit of eloquence, are France and Great Britain: France, on account of the distinguished turn of its inhabitants towards all the liberal arts, and of the encouragement which, for more than a century past, those arts have received from the public: Great Britain, on account of its free government, and the liberal spirit and genius of its people. Yet in neither of these countries has the talent of oratory risen near to the degree of its ancient splendour.
Several reasons may be given, why modern eloquence has been so confined, and humble in its efforts. In the first place, it seems, that this change must, in part, be ascribed to that accurate turn of thinking, which has been so much cultivated in modern times. Our public speakers are obliged to be more reserved than the ancients, in their endeavours to elevate the imagination and warm the passions: and, by the influence of prevailing taste, their own genius is, perhaps, in too great a degree, rendered chaste and delicate. It is probable also, that we ascribe to our correctness and good sense, what is chiefly owing to the phlegmatic and natural coldness of our disposition. For the vivacity and sensibility of the Greeks and Romans, more particularly of the former, seem to have been much superior, though and to have commu-
nicated to them a higher relish for all the beauties of oratory.

Though the Parliament of our own nation be the noblest field which Europe at present affords to a public speaker, yet eloquence has ever been there a more feeble instrument than in the popular assemblies of Greece and Rome. Under some former reigns, the iron hand of arbitrary power checked its efforts; and, in later times, ministerial influence has generally rendered it of small importance. At the bar, our disadvantage, in comparison of the ancients, is considerable. Among them, the judges were commonly numerous; the laws were few and simple; the decision of causes was left, in a great measure, to equity, and the sense of mankind. Hence the field for judicial eloquence was large and ample. But at present, the system of law is become
some much more complicated. The knowledge of it is rendered so laborious an attainment, as to constitute the business of a man's life. Speaking is, therefore, only a secondary accomplishment, for which he has little leisure.

With respect to the pulpit, it has been highly disadvantageous, that the habit of reading sermons, instead of repeating them, has prevailed so universally in England. By this, indeed, accuracy may have been introduced, but eloquence has been much enfeebled. Another circumstance, too, has been prejudicial: The sectaries and fanatics, before the Restoration, used a warm, zealous, and popular manner of preaching; and their adherents afterwards continued to distinguish themselves by a similar ardour. A hatred of these sects drove the established church into the
opposite extreme, of a studied coarseness of expression. Hence, from the art of persuasion, which preaching ought ever to be, it has passed, with us, into mere reasoning and instruction.
ELOQUENCE OF POPULAR ASSEMBLIES.

The foundation of every species of eloquence, is good sense, and solid thought. It should be the first study of him who means to address any popular assembly, to be previously master of the business on which he is to speak; to be well provided with matter and argument; and to rest upon these the chief stress. This will give to language an air of manliness and strength, which is a principal instrument of persuasion. Ornament, if there be a genius for it, will succeed of course; at any rate, it deserves only a secondary regard.

To become a persuasive speaker in a popular assembly, it seems to be a ca-

T 4 capital
pital rule, that a man should always be persuaded of whatever he recommends to others. Never, if it can be avoided, should he espouse any side of the argument, but what he believes to be the just one. All high eloquence must be the offspring of real, unaffected passion. This makes every man persuasive, and gives a force to his genius, which it cannot otherwise possess.

Debate, in popular assemblies, seldom allows the speaker that previous preparation, which the pulpit always, and the bar sometimes, admits. A general prejudice prevails, and not an unjust one, against set speeches in public meetings. At the opening of a debate, they may, indeed, sometimes be introduced with propriety; but as the debate advances, they become improper; they commonly lose the appearance of being suggested by the business that is going on; study and ostentation are
are apt to be too conspicuous; and, consequently, though admired as elegant, they are seldom so persuasive as more free and unconstrained discourses.

This, however, does not by any means prohibit a premeditation of the subject on which we intend to speak. With respect to the matter, we cannot be too accurate in our preparation; but, with regard to words and expression, it is very possible to be so affiduous, as to render our speech stiff and precise. A few short notes of the substance of the discourse, are, however, not only allowable, but of considerable service, to those, especially, who are beginning to speak in public. They will teach them a degree of accuracy, which, if they speak frequently, they are in danger too soon of losing. They will accustom them to a distinct arrangement, without which, eloquence, however great, cannot produce entire conviction.
Popular assemblies afford scope for the most animated manner of public speaking. Passion is easily excited in a great assembly, where the movements are communicated by mutual sympathy between the orator and the audience. That ardour of speech, that vehemence and warmth of sentiment, which proceed from a mind animated and inspired by some great and public object, constitute the peculiar character of popular eloquence, in its highest degree of perfection.

The warmth, however, which we express, must be always suited to the subject; since it would be ridiculous to introduce great vehemence concerning a matter, which is either of small importance, or which, by its nature, requires to be treated with calmness. We must also be careful not to counterfeit warmth without feeling it. The best rule is, to follow nature; and never
never to attempt a strain of eloquence which is not prompted by our own genius. A speaker may acquire both reputation and influence, by a calm argumentative manner. To reach the pathetic and the sublime of oratory, requires those strong sensibilities of mind, and that high power of expression, which are the lot of a very small portion of mankind.

Even when vehemence is justified by the subject, and prompted by genius; when warmth is felt, not feigned; we must, however, be cautious, lest impetuosity carry us beyond the bounds of prudence and propriety. If the speaker lose the command of himself, he will soon cease to influence his hearers. He should begin with moderation; and endeavour to warm his audience gradually and equally with himself. For if their passions be not in unison with his; the discord will soon become
become disagreeable and offensive. Respect for his hearers should always lay a decent restraint upon his warmth, and prevent it from carrying him beyond proper limits. When this is the case, when a speaker is so far master of himself as to preserve close attention to argument, and even to some degree of accurate expression; this self-command, this effort of reason, in the midst of passion, contributes in the highest degree, both to please and to persuade. The advantages of passion are afforded for the purposes of persuasion, without that confusion and disorder which are its usual attendants.

In the most animated strain of popular speaking, we must always preserve a due regard to what the public ear will receive without disgust. Without an attention to this, an injudicious imitation of ancient orators might betray a speaker into a boldness of manner, with which
which the coolness of modern taste would be dissatisfied and displeased. It is also necessary, to attend with care to all the decorums of time, place, and character. No ardour of eloquence can atone for the neglect of these. No one should attempt to speak in public, without forming to himself a just and strict idea of what is suitable to his own age and character; what is suitable to the subject, the hearers, the place, and the occasion. On this idea he should adjust the whole train and manner of his elocution.

What degree of conciseness or diffuseness is suited to popular eloquence, it is not easy to determine with precision. A diffuse manner is generally considered as the most proper. It seems, however, that there is danger of erring in this respect; and that, by too diffuse a style, public speakers often lose more in point of strength, than they gain by the
the fulness of their illustration. Excessive conciseness, indeed, must be cautiously avoided. We must explain and inculcate; but confine ourselves within certain limits. We should never forget, that however we may be delighted with hearing ourselves speak, every audience is apt to tire; and the moment they grow weary, our eloquence becomes useless. It is better, in general, to say too little than too much; to place our thought in one strong point of view, and rest it there, than by shewing it in every light, and pouring forth a profusion of words upon it, exhaust the attention of our hearers, and leave them languid and fatigued.
ELOQUENCE OF THE BAR.

The objects of eloquence at the bar, and in popular assemblies, are commonly different. In the latter, the orator endeavours principally to persuade; to determine his hearers to some choice, or conduct, as good, fit, or useful. He consequently applies himself to every principle of action in our nature; to the passions and to the heart, as well as to the understanding. At the bar, however, conviction is the principal object. There, the speaker's duty is not to persuade the judges to what is good or useful, but to exhibit what is just and true; and consequently, it is to the understanding that his eloquence is chiefly to be addressed.

At the bar, speakers address themselves to one, or to a few judges, who are,
are, generally, persons of age, gravity, and dignity of character. These, those advantages which a mixed and numerous assembly affords for the exercise of all the arts of eloquence, are not admissible. Passion does not rise so easily; the speaker is heard with greater coolness; he is watched with more severity; and would expose himself to ridicule, should he adopt that high and animated tone which is suited only to a crowded and mixed assembly. Besides, at the bar, the field of speaking is very limited and confined. Law and statute are the ramparts, beyond which it is not allowed to pass. Imagination is fettered. The advocate sees before him the line, the square, and the compass. These, it is his chief business to be constantly applying to the subjects under debate.

Hence the eloquence of the bar is of a much more limited, more sober, and chastised kind, than that of popular assemblies.
femilities; and consequently the judicial orations of the ancients, must not be considered as exact models of that kind of speaking which is adapted to the present state of the bar. With them, strict law was much less an object of attention than it is at present. In the times of Demosthenes and Cicero, the municipal statutes were few, simple, and general; and the decision of causes was left, in a great measure, to the equity and common sense of the judges. Eloquence, rather than jurisprudence, was the study of the pleaders. Cicero informs us, that three months' study would make a complete civilian; nay, it was even thought, that a man might be a good pleader without any previous application. Among the Romans, there was a set of men called Pragmatici, whose office it was to supply the orator with all the law knowledge which his cause required, and which he disposed of in
that popular form, and ornamented with those colours of eloquence, which were most fitted for influencing the judges.

It may also be observed, that the civil and criminal judges, both in Greece and Rome, were usually much more numerous than with us, and formed a kind of popular assembly. The celebrated tribunal of the Areopagus at Athens, consisted of fifty judges at the least. In Rome, the \textit{Judices Selecti}, as they were called, were always numerous, and had the office and power of both judge and jury. In the noted cause of Milo, Cicero spoke to fifty-one \textit{Judices Selecti}; and thus had the advantage of addressing his whole pleading, not to one, or to a few learned judges, of the point of law, as at present, but to an assembly of Roman citizens. Hence those arts of popular eloquence which he employed with such success. Hence certain
certain practices, which would be considered as theatrical by us, were common at the Roman bar; such as introducing not only the accused person, dressed in deep mourning, but presenting to the judges his family, and his young children, endeavouring to excite pity by their cries and tears.

The foundation of a lawyer's reputation and success, must, in the present times, be always laid in a profound knowledge of his profession. If his abilities as a speaker be ever so eminent, yet if his knowledge of the law be reckoned superficial, few will choose to engage him in their defence. Besides previous study, and an ample stock of acquired knowledge, another thing inseparable from the success of every pleader is, a diligent and painful attention to every cause with which he is entrusted, so as to be completely master of all the facts and circumstances with which
which it is connected. By this means, he will, in a great measure, be prepared for the arguments of his opponents; and being previously acquainted with the weak parts of his own cause, he will be able to fortify them in the best manner, against the attacks of his adversaries.

Though the ancient popular and vehement manner of pleading be now in a great measure superseded, we must not conclude, that there is no room for eloquence at the bar, and that the study of it is become superfluous. There is, perhaps, no scene of public speaking where eloquence is more requisite. The dryness and subtility of the subjects usually agitated at the bar, require, more than any other, a certain kind of expression, in order to command attention; to give proper weight to the arguments that are employed, and to prevent whatever the pleader advances from
from passing unregarded. The effect of
good speaking is always highly conspi-
cuous: There is as much difference in
the impression we receive from a cold,
dry, and confused speaker, and that
made upon us by one who pleads the same
cause with elegance, order, and strength,
as there is between our conception of
an object, when viewed by the glimmer-
ing of twilight, and when beheld by
the wide effulgence of a summer's noon.

Purity and neatness of expression is,
in this species of eloquence, chiefly to
be studied; a style perspicuous and
proper, not needlessly overcharged with
the pedantry of law terms, nor affec-
edly avoiding these, when they are suit-
able and requisite. Verbosey is a fault
of which men of this profession are fre-
quently accused; and into which the
habit of speaking and writing so hafti-
ly, and with so little preparation as
they are often obliged to do, almost

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unavoidably
unavoidably betrays them. It cannot, therefore, be too earnestly recommended to those who are beginning to practice at the bar, that they should early endeavour to guard against this, whilst they have full leisure for preparation. Let them form themselves to the habit of a strong and correct style; which will become natural to them afterwards, when compelled by a multiplicity of business to compose with more precipitation. Whereas, if a loose and negligent style has been suffered to become familiar, they will not be able, even upon occasions when they wish to make an unusual effort, to express themselves with force and elegance.

Distinctness, in speaking at the bar, is peculiarly necessary. It should be shewn, first, in stating the question; in exhibiting clearly the point in debate; in shewing what we admit; what we deny; and where the line of division begins.
begins between us and the adverse party. Next, it should appear in the order and arrangement of all the parts of the pleading. A clear method is of the highest consequence in every species of oration; but in those intricate cases which belong to the bar, it becomes infinitely essential.

The narration of facts should always be as concise as the nature of them will admit. They are always very necessary to be remembered, and, consequently, tediousness in relating them, and an unnecessary minuteness, clogs and overloads the memory. Whereas, if a pleader omit all superfluous circumstances in his recital, he adds strength to the material facts; he gives a clearer view of what he relates, and makes the impression of it more lasting. In argumentation, however, a more diffuse manner seems requisite at the bar, than on some other occasions. For, in
popular assemblies, where the subject of debate is commonly plain and obvious, arguments gain strength by their conciseness. But the intricacy of law points frequently requires the arguments to be expanded, and exposed in different lights, in order to be completely apprehended.

Candour in stating the arguments of his adversary, cannot be too much recommended to every pleader. Should he disguise them, or place them in a false light, the artifice will be soon discovered; and the judge and the hearers will conclude, that he either wants discernment to perceive, or wants fairness to admit, the strength of his opponents reasoning. But if he state with accuracy and candour, the arguments used against him, before he endeavours to confute them, a strong prejudice will prevail in his favour: He will appear to have an entire confidence in his own cause,
cause, since he does not attempt to support it by artifice and concealment. The judge will consequently be inclined to receive much more readily, the impressions made upon him by a speaker who appears, at the same time, both candid and intelligent.

Wit may sometimes be serviceable at the bar, particularly in a lively reply; by which ridicule may be thrown on what an adversary has advanced. But a young pleader should be cautious how he admits too freely the indulgence of this dazzling talent. His office is not to excite laughter, but to produce conviction; nor, perhaps, ever did any one rise to eminence in his profession, by being a witty lawyer.

Since an advocate personates his client, he must plead his cause with a proper degree of warmth. He must be cautious, however, of prostituting his earnestness and sensibility, by an equal degree
degree of ardour on every subject. There is a dignity of character which it is highly important for every one of this profession to support. An opinion of probity and honour in the pleader, is his most powerful instrument of persuasion. He should always, therefore, decline embarking in causes which are odious and manifestly unjust; and, when he supports a doubtful cause, he should lay the chief stress upon the arguments which appear to his judgment the most tenable; reserving his zeal and indignation for cases where injustice and iniquity are notorious.
HAVING already treated of the eloquence of popular assemblies, and of that of the bar, we shall now consider the strain and spirit of that eloquence which is suited to the pulpit. This field of public speaking has, evidently, several advantages peculiar to itself. The dignity and importance of its subjects must be allowed to be superior to any other. They admit the highest embellishments in description, and the greatest warmth and vehemence of expression. In treating his subject, the preacher has also peculiar advantages. He speaks not to one or a few judges, but to a numerous assembly. He is not afraid of interruption. He chooses his subject at leisure; and has all the assistance which the most accurate premedi-
tation can afford him. The disadvantages, however, which attend the eloquence of the pulpit, are by no means inconsiderable. The preacher, it is true, has no contention with an adversary; but debate awakens the genius, and excites attention. His subjects, though noble, are trite and common. They are become so familiar to the public ear, that it requires no ordinary genius in the preacher, to fix the attention of his hearers. Nothing is more difficult, than to bestow on what is common, the grace of novelty. Besides, the subject of the preacher usually confines him to abstract qualities, to virtues and vices; whereas, that of other popular speakers leads them to treat of persons; which is a subject generally more interesting to the hearers, and which occupies more forcibly the imagination. We are taught by the preacher to detest only the crime; by the pleader to detest the criminal.
criminal. Hence it happens, that though the number of moderately good preachers is great, there are so few who have arrived at eminence. Perfection is very distant, indeed, from modern preaching. The object, however, is truly noble and illustrious; and worthy of being pursued with attention, ardour, and perseverance.

To excel in preaching, it is necessary to have a fixed and habitual view of its end and object. This, undoubtedly, is to persuade men to become good. Every sermon ought, consequently, to be a persuasive oration. It is not to discuss some abstruse point, that the preacher ascends the pulpit. It is not to teach his hearers something new, but to make them better; to give them at the same time, clear views, and persuasive impressions of religious truth.

The principal characteristics of pulpit eloquence, as distinguished from the other
other kinds of public speaking, appear to be these two—gravity and warmth. It is neither easy nor common to unite these characters of eloquence. The grave, when it is too predominant, becomes a dull, uniform solemnity. The warm, when it wants gravity, approaches too near the theatrical and light. A proper union of the two, forms that character of preaching which the French call **Onction**; that affecting, penetrating, and interesting manner, flowing from a strong sense in the preacher, of the importance of those truths which he delivers, and an earnest desire that they may make full impression on the hearts of his hearers.

With regard to the composition of a sermon, a principal circumstance which must be attended to, is its unity. By this we mean, that there should be some main-point to which the whole tenour of the sermon shall refer. It must not be
be a pile of different subjects heaped upon each other, but one object must predominate through the whole. Hence, however, it must not be understood, that there should be no divisions or separate heads in the discourse; or that one single thought only should be exhibited in different points of view. Unity is not confined by such narrow limits; it admits of some variety; it requires only that union and connection be so far preserved, as to make the whole concur in some one impression on the mind. Thus, for instance, a preacher may employ several different arguments to enforce the love of God; he may also enquire into the causes of the decay of this virtue; still one great object is presented to the mind: But, if because his text says, "He that loveth God, must love his brother also," he should therefore mix in the same discourse arguments for the love of God, and for the
the love of our neighbour, he would offend very much against unity, and leave a very confused impression on the minds of his hearers.

Sermons are always the more striking, and generally the more useful, in proportion as the subject of them is more precise and particular. Unity can never be so complete in a general, as in a particular subject. General subjects, indeed, such as the excellency or the pleasures of religion, are often chosen by young preachers as the most showy, and the easiest to be handled; and no doubt general views of religion should not be neglected, since on several occasions they have great propriety. But these subjects produce not the high effects of preaching. Attention is much more commanded, by taking some particular view of a great object, and employing on that the whole force of argument and eloquence. To recommend some
Some one virtue, or inveigh against a particular vice, affords a subject not deficient in unity or precision; but if that virtue or vice be considered as assuming a particular aspect, as it appears in certain characters, or affects certain situations in life; the subject becomes still more interesting. The execution is certainly less easy, but the merit and the effect are higher.

A preacher should be cautious not to exhaust his subject; since nothing is more opposite to persuasion than an unnecessary and tedious fulness. There are always some things which he may suppose to be known, and some which require only a brief attention. If he endeavour to omit nothing which his subject suggests, he must unavoidably encumber it, and debilitate its force.

To render his instructions interesting to his hearers, should be the grand object of every preacher. He should bring home
home to their hearts the truths which he inculcates, and make each suppose, that himself is particularly addressed. He should, consequently, avoid all intricate reasonings; avoid expressing himself in general speculative propositions; or laying down practical truths in an abstract, metaphysical manner. A discourse ought to be carried on in the strain of direct address to the audience; not in the strain of one writing an essay, but of one speaking to a multitude, and studying to connect what is called application, or what immediately refers to practice, with the doctrinal and didactic parts of the sermon,

It is always highly advantageous to keep in view the different ages, characters, and conditions of men, and to accommodate directions and exhortations to each of these different classes. Whenever you advance what a man feels to touch his own character, or to be
be applicable to his own circumstances, you are sure of his attention. No study, therefore, is more necessary for a preacher, than the study of human life, and of the human heart. To be able to discover a man to himself, in a light in which he never saw his own character before, produces a wonderful effect. Those sermons, though the most difficult in composition, are not only the most beautiful, but also the most useful, which are founded on the illustration of some peculiar character, or remarkable piece of history, in the sacred writings; by the pursuit of which, we may trace, and lay open, some of the most secret windings of the human heart. Other topics of preaching have become trite and common; but this is an extensive field, which has hitherto been little explored, and possesses all the advantages of being curious, new, and in the highest degree useful. Bishop Butler’s sermon
sermon on the character of Balaam, is an example of this kind of preaching.

Fashion, which operates so extensively on human manners, has given to preaching, at different times, a change of character. This, however, is a torrent which swells to-day and subsides to-morrow. Sometimes poetical preaching is fashionable; sometimes philosophical: at one time it must be all pathetic; at another all argumentative; according as some celebrated preacher has afforded the example. Each of these modes in the extreme, is very defective; and he who conforms himself to it, will both confine his genius, and corrupt it. Truth and good sense are the only basis on which he can build with safety. Mode and humour are feeble and unsteady. No example, however admired, should be servilely imitated. From various examples, the preacher may
may collect materials for improvement; but the servility of imitation will extinguish his genius, and expose its poverty to his hearers.
HAVING already considered what is peculiar to the three great fields of public speaking; popular assemblies, the bar, and the pulpit; we shall now treat of what is common to them all; and explain the conduct of a discourse, or oration, in general.

The parts which compose a regular formal oration, are these fix; the exordium or introduction; the state and the division of the subject; narration or explication; the reasoning or arguments; the pathetic part; the conclusion. It is not necessary that these must enter into every public discourse, or that they must
must always be admitted in the order which we have mentioned. There are many excellent discourses in which some of these parts are altogether omitted. But as they are the natural and constituent parts of a regular oration, and as, in every discourse, some of them must occur; it is agreeable to our present purpose, to examine each of them distinctly.

The design of the introduction is to conciliate the good opinion of the hearers; to excite their attention; and to render them open to persuasion. When a speaker is previously secure of the good will, the attention, and the docility of his audience, a formal introduction may, without any impropriety, be omitted. Respect for his hearers will, in that case, only require a short exordium, to prepare them for the other parts of his discourse.

The introduction, where it is necessary, is that part of a discourse which requires
requires no inferior case: It is always important to begin well; to make a favourable impression at first setting out, when the minds of the hearers, as yet vacant and free, are more easily prejudiced in favour of the speaker. We must add also, that a good introduction is frequently found to be extremely difficult. Few parts of a discourse give more trouble to the composer, or require more delicacy in the execution.

An introduction should be easy and natural. It should always be suggested by the subject. The writer should not plan it, till after he has meditated in his own mind the substance of his discourse. By taking an opposite course, and composing in the first place an introduction, the writer will often find, that he is either led to lay hold of some commonplace topic, or that, instead of the introduction being accommodated to the discourse, he is under the necessity of
of accommodating the whole discourse to the introduction which he had previously written.

In this part of a discourse, correctness of expression should be carefully studied. This is peculiarly requisite on account of the situation of the hearers. At the beginning, they are more disposed to criticize than at any other period; they are then unoccupied with the subject or the arguments; their attention is entirely directed to the speaker's style and manner. Care, therefore, is requisite, to prepossess them in his favour; though too much art must be cautiously avoided, since it will then be more easily detected, and will derogate from that persuasion which the other parts of the discourse are intended to produce.

Modesty is also an indispensable characteristic of every judicious introduction. If the speaker begin with an air of arrogance and ostentation, the self-love
love and pride of his hearers will be presently awakened, and will follow him with a very suspicious eye through the rest of his discourse. His modesty should appear not only in his expressions, but in his whole manner; in his looks, in his gestures, and in the modulation of his voice. Every audience is flattered by those marks of respect and awe which are paid them by the person who addresses them. The modesty, however, of an introduction, should betray nothing mean or abject. Together with modesty and deference to his hearers, the orator should shew a certain sense of dignity, arising from a persuasion of the justice or importance of the subject on which he is to speak.

Except in particular cases, the orator should not put forth all his strength at the beginning; but should rise and grow upon his hearers as his discourse advances. The introduction is seldom the place
place for vehemence and passion. The audience must be gradually prepared, before the speaker can venture on strong and empassioned sentiments. Yet when the subject is of such a nature, that the very mention of it naturally awakens some passionate emotion; or when the unexpected presence of some person or object, in a popular assembly, inflames the speaker; either of these will justify an abrupt and vehement exordium. Thus the appearance of Cataline in the Roman Senate, renders the violent opening of Cicero’s first oration against him very natural and proper. “Quousque tandem, Catalina, abutere patientiâ nostrâ?” And Bishop Atterbury, in preaching from this text, “Blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me,” ventures on this bold exordium: “And can any man, then, be offended in thee, blessed Jesus?” Which address to our Saviour he continues for some time, till he enters on the division
division of his subject. But these introductions should be attempted by very few, since they promise so much vehemence and ardour through the rest of the discourse, that it is extremely difficult to satisfy the expectation of the hearers.

An introduction should not anticipate any material part of the subject. When topics or arguments, which are afterwards to be enlarged upon, are hinted at, and in part exhibited in the introduction, they lose, upon their second appearance, the grace of novelty. The impression intended to be made by any principal idea, is always made with the greatest advantage, when it is made entire, and in its proper place.

The last circumstance which we shall observe with regard to an introduction, is, that it be proportioned both in length and in kind to the discourse which follows it: In length, since nothing would be
be more absurd than to erect an extensive portico before a diminutive building; and in kind, since it would be no less ridiculous to load with glittering ornaments the vestibule of a plain dwelling-house; or to make the approach to a monument as gay and lively as that to an arbour.

After the introduction, what generally succeeds next in order, is, the proposition or enunciation of the subject; concerning which we shall only observe, that it should be as clear and distinct as possible, and expressed without affectation, in the most concise and simple manner. To this commonly succeeds the division, or the laying down the method of the discourse; in the management of which, the following rules should be carefully attended to.

First, That the parts into which the subject is divided, be really distinct from each other; that is, that no one include another.
another. It were a ridiculous division, for example, if a speaker should propose to explain first the advantages of virtue, and next, those of justice or temperance; because, the first head plainly comprehends the second, as a genus does the species. Such a method of proceeding will, therefore, involve the subject in indistinctness and disorder.

Secondly, We must be careful always to follow the order of nature; beginning with the most simple points, such as are most easily understood, and necessary to be first discussed; and proceeding thence to those which are built upon the former, and which suppose them to be known. The subject, in fine, must be divided into those parts into which it is most easily and naturally resolved.

Thirdly, The members of a division ought to exhaust the subject, otherwise the division is incomplete; the subject is exhibited by pieces and corners only, without
without any plan being offered by which
the whole may be displayed.

Fourthly, Let conciseness and preci-
sion be peculiarly studied. A division
will always appear to the most advan-
tage, when the several heads are ex-
pressed in the clearest, most forcible, and
at the same time, the fewest words pos-
sible. This never fails to make an
agreeable impression on the hearers; and
contributes also to make the divisions
more easily remembered.

Fifthly, An unnecessary multiplica-
tion of heads should be cautiously avoid-
ed. To divide a subject into a great
many minute parts, by endless divisions
and subdivisions, produces always a bad
effect in speaking. In a logical treatise
this may not be improper; but it ren-
ders an oration hard and dry, and unne-
cessarily fatigues the memory. A ser-
mon may admit from three to five, or
NARRATION OR EXPLICATION.

Six heads, including subdivisions, seldom are more allowable.

The next constituent part of a discourse, which we mentioned, was narration or explication. These two are joined together, both because they fall nearly under the same rules, and because they generally answer the same purpose; serving to illustrate the cause, or the subject of which one treats, before proceeding to argue either on one side or the other, or to endeavour to interest the passions of the hearers.

To be clear and distinct, to be probable, and to be concise, are the qualities which critics chiefly consider as essential to narration. Distinctness is requisite to the whole of the discourse, but belongs especially to narration, which ought to throw a light on all that follows. At the bar, a fact, or a single circumstance, left in obscurity, or misunderstood by the judge, may destroy the effect of all the argument and reasoning which the
the pleader employs. If his narration be improbable, it will be disregarded; if it be tedious and diffuse, it will fatigue, and be forgotten. To render narration distinct, a particular attention is requisite in ascertaining clearly the names, the dates, the places, and every other important circumstance of the facts recounted. In order to be probable in narration, it is necessary to exhibit the characters of those persons of whom we speak, and to shew that their actions proceeded from such motives as are natural, and likely to gain belief. To be as concise as the subject will admit, all superfluous circumstances must be rejected, by which the narration will be rendered both more forcible and more clear.

In sermons, explication of the subject to be discoursed on, occupies the place of narration at the bar, and is to be conducted in a similar manner. It must be
be concise, clear, and distinct; in a style correct and elegant, rather than abounding with ornament. To explain the doctrine of the text with propriety; to give a full and clear account of the nature of that virtue or duty which forms the subject of the discourse, is properly the didactic part of preaching; on the right execution of which much depends, for what comes afterward in the way of persuasion. In order to succeed, the preacher must meditate profoundly on the subject, so as to place it in a clear and striking point of view. He must consider what light it may derive from other passages of scripture; observe whether it be a subject nearly allied to some other from which it ought to be distinguished; whether it can be advantageously illustrated by comparing, or opposing it to some other thing; by searching into causes, or tracing effects; by pointing out examples, or appealing
appealing to the hearts of the hearers; that thus, a determined, precise, and circumstantial view, may be afforded of the doctrine to be inculcated. By such distinct and apt illustrations of the known truths of religion, a preacher may both display great merit as a composer, and, what is infinitely more valuable, render his discourses weighty, instructive, and beneficial.
SINCE the great end for which men speak on any serious occasion, is to convince their hearers that something is either true, or right, or good; and consequently to influence their practice; reason and argument must constitute the foundation of all manly and persuasive eloquence.

With regard to arguments, three things are necessary to be observed: First, the invention of them; secondly, their proper disposition and arrangement; and thirdly, the expressing them in the most forcible style and manner. Invention is, undoubtedly, the most material, and the basis of the rest. But in
in this, art can afford only small assistance. It can aid a speaker, however, in arranging and expressing those arguments which his knowledge of the subject has discovered.

Supposing the arguments properly chosen, we must avoid blending those confusedly together, that are of a separate nature. All arguments whatever, are intended to prove one of these three things; that something is true; that it is right or fit; or that it is profitable and good. Truth, duty, and interest, are the three great subjects of discussion among mankind. But the arguments employed upon either of them are generically distinct; and he who mixes them all under one topic, which he calls his argument, as in sermons is too frequently done, will render his reasoning indistinct and inelegant.

With respect to the different degrees of strength in arguments, the common rule
The argumentative part

Rule is to advance in the way of climax, from the weakest to the most forcible. This method is to be recommended, when the speaker is convinced that his cause is clear, and easy to be proved. But this rule must not be universally observed. If he be apprehensive of his cause, and has but one material argument on which to lay the stress, putting less confidence in the rest, in this case it is often proper to place his most forcible argument in the front; to prejudice his hearers as early as possible in his favour, and dispose them to pay attention to the weaker reasoning which he may afterwards introduce. When, amidst a variety of arguments, there is one or two more feeble than the rest, though proper to be used, Cicero advises that they be placed in the middle, as a situation less conspicuous than either the beginning or the end of the train of reasoning.

When
When arguments are strong and satisfactory, the more distant they are separated, the better. Each can then bear to be introduced alone, placed in its full light, amplified and contemplated. But when they are of a doubtful or presumptive nature, it is safer to crowd them together, to form them into a phalanx, that though individually weak, they may mutually support each other.

Arguments should never be extended too far, or multiplied too much. This serves rather to render a cause suspicious, than to increase its strength. A needless multiplicity of arguments, both oppresses the memory and diminishes the weight of that conviction, which a few well chosen arguments might not fail to produce. To expand them, also, beyond the bounds of reasonable illustration, is always enfeebling. When a speaker endeavours to expose a favourite argument in every possible poin
of view, it generally happens, that, fatigued with the effort, he loses the spirit with which he set out, and ends with feebleness what he began with force.

Having attended thus far to the proper arrangement of arguments, we proceed to another essential part of a discourse, the pathetic; in which, if anywhere, eloquence reigns, and exerts its power. On this head we shall offer the following directions, which appear worthy of being remembered.

To consider carefully, whether the subject admits the pathetic, and render it proper; and if it does, what part of the discourse is the most fit for its admission. In determining these points, good sense is the only just criterion. Many subjects admit not the pathetic at all, and even in those that are susceptible of it, an attempt to excite the passions in the wrong place, may expel the
the orator to ridicule. It may in general be observed, that if we expect any emotion which we raise to have a lasting effect, we must secure in our favour the understanding and judgment. The hearers must be satisfied, that there are sufficient grounds for their engaging in the cause with zeal and ardour. When argument and reasoning have produced their full effect, the pathetic is admitted with the greatest force and propriety.

A speaker should cautiously avoid giving his hearers warning that he intends to excite their passions. Every previous preparation of this kind chills their sensibility. There is also a material difference between shewing mankind that they ought to be moved, and actually exciting their passions. To every emotion or passion, nature has adapted certain corresponding objects; and without setting these before the mind,
mind, it is impossible for an orator to excite that emotion. We are warned with gratitude, we are touched with compassion, not when a speaker shews us that these are noble dispositions, and that it is our duty to feel them, or when he exclaims against us for our indolence and coldness. He has hitherto addressing only our reason or conscience. He must paint to us the kindness and tenderness of our friend; he must exhibit the distress suffered by the person for whom he would interest us; then, and not till then, our hearts begin to be touched, our gratitude or our compassion begin to flow. The basis, therefore, of all successful execution in pathetic oratory, is, to paint the object of that passion which we desire to raise, in the most natural and striking manner; to describe it with such circumstances as are likely to awaken it in the minds of others.
To succeed in the pathetic, it is necessary to attend to the proper language of the passions. This, if we attend to nature, we shall ever find is unaffected and simple. It may be animated with bold and strong figures, but it will have no ornament or finery. There is a material difference between painting to the imagination, and to the heart. The one may be done with deliberation and coolness; the other must always be rapid and ardent. In the former, art and labour may be suffered to appear; in the latter, no proper effect can be produced, unless it seem to be the work of nature only. Hence all digressions should be avoided, which may interrupt or turn aside the swell of passion. Hence comparisons are always dangerous, and commonly quite improper in the midst of the pathetic. It is also to be observed, that emotions which are violent cannot be lasting. The pathetic, therefore, should
Should not be prolonged and extended too much. A due regard should always be preserved to what the audience will bear; for he that attempts to carry them farther in passion, than they will follow him, annihilates his purpose.—By endeavouring to warm them in the extreme, he takes the surest method of freezing them completely.

Concerning the peroration or conclusion of a discourse, a few words will be sufficient. Sometimes the whole pathetic part comes in most properly at the conclusion. Sometimes, when the discourse has been altogether argumentative, it is proper to conclude with summing up the arguments, placing them in one point of view, and leaving the impression of them, full and strong, on the minds of the hearers. For the principal rule of a conclusion, and what nature obviously suggests, is, to place that last, on which we chuse that the strength of our cause should rest.

In
THE PERORATION.

In every kind of public speaking, it is important to hit the precise time of concluding, so as to bring the discourse just to a point; neither ending abruptly and unexpectedly, nor disappointing the expectation of the hearers, when they look for the discourse being finished. The close should always be concluded with dignity and spirit, that the minds of the hearers may be left warm, and that they may depart with a favourable impression of the subject and of the speaker.
PRONUNCIATION OR DELIVERY.

The great objects to which every public speaker should direct his attention, in forming his delivery, are, First, to speak so as to be fully and easily understood by his hearers; and next, to express himself with such grace and energy, as to please and to move them.

To be fully and easily understood, the chief requisites are, a due degree of loudness of voice, distinctness, flow-ness, and propriety of pronunciation.

To be heard is undoubtedly the first requisite. The speaker must endeavour to fill with his voice, the space occupied by the assembly. Though this power of voice is, in a great measure, a natural talent, it may receive considerable assistance from art. Much depends on the proper pitch and manage-
ment of the voice. This may be distinguished by three gradations; the high, the middle, and the low one.—The high is used in calling aloud to some one at a distance: The low approaches to a whisper. The middle is that which is employed in common conversation, and which should generally be used in public speaking: For it is erroneous to suppose, that the highest pitch of the voice is requisite to be well heard by a great assembly. This is confounding two things materially different, loudness, or strength of sound, with the key or note on which we speak. The voice may be rendered louder without altering the key; and, the speaker will always be able to give most body, most persevering force of sound, to that pitch of voice to which in conversation he is accustomed. Whereas, if he begin on the highest pitch of his voice, he will fatigue himself, and speak with
with pain; and whenever a man speaks with pain to himself, he is always heard with pain by his audience. To the voice, therefore, may be given full strength and swell of sound; but it should always be pitched on the ordinary speaking key; a greater quantity of voice should never be uttered than can be afforded without pain; and without any extraordinary effort. To be well heard, it is useful for a speaker to fix his eye on some of the most distant persons in the assembly, and to consider himself as speaking to them. We naturally and mechanically express our words with such a degree of strength, as to be heard by one to whom we address ourselves, provided he be situated within the reach of our voice. This will be the case in public speaking, as well as in common conversation. But it must be remembered, that speaking too loud is peculiarly offensive. The ear is wounded when
when the voice comes upon it in rumbling indistinct masses; besides, it appears as if assent were demanded by mere vehemence and force of sound.

To being well heard and clearly understood, distinctness of articulation is more conducive, perhaps, than mere loudness of sound. The quantity of sound requisite to fill even a large space, is less than is generally supposed; and with distinct articulation, a man of a weak voice will make it extend farther than the strongest voice can reach without it. This, therefore, demands peculiar attention. The speaker must give every sound which he utters its due proportion, and make every syllable, and even every letter, be heard distinctly. To succeed in this, a rapidity of pronunciation must be avoided. A lifeless, drawling method is, however, by no means to be adopted. To pronounce with a proper degree of slowness,
and with full and clear articulation, cannot be too industriously studied, or too earnestly recommended. Such a pronunciation gives weight and dignity to language. It affords the voice, by the pauses and rests which it permits, it more easily to make; and enables the speaker to dwell all his sounds, both with more energy and more music. He may, by this means, preserve a due command over himself, and avoid that flutter of spirit produced by a rapid and hurried delivery, which is destructive of all just and finished oratory.

The propriety of pronunciation, nothing is more conducive than an attentive, deliberate giving to every word which we utter, that sound which the most polite usage of the language appropriates to it, in opposition to broad, vulgar, or provincial pronunciation. On this subject, however, written instructions will avail nothing. But there is one observation which
which it may be useful to make: In our language, every word of more syllables than one, has one accented syllable. The genius of the language requires the voice to mark that syllable by a stronger percussion, and to pass more slightly over the rest. The same accent should be given to every word in public speaking as in common discourse. In this respect, many persons are apt to err. When they speak in public, and with solemnity, they pronounce differently from what they do at other times. They dwell upon syllables, and protract them; they multiply accents on the same word, from a false idea, that it gives gravity and strength to their discourse, and increases the pomp of public declamation. But this is one of the greatest faults which can be committed in pronunciation; it constitutes what is termed a theatrical, or mouthing manner, and gives an

Z 2  arti-
artificial, affected air to speech, which detracts, in a great degree, from its agreeableness and its impression.

We shall now mention those higher parts of delivery, by studying which, a speaker endeavours not merely to render himself intelligible, but to give grace and force to what he utters. These may be comprehended under four heads; emphasis, pauses, tones, and gestures.

By emphasis is meant, a fuller and stronger sound of voice, by which we distinguish the accented syllable of some word on which we intend to lay a particular stress, and to shew how it affects the rest of the sentence. To acquire the proper management of the emphasis, the principal, and indeed the only rule which can be given is, that the speaker study to acquire a just conception of the force and spirit of those sentiments which he intends to deliver.
In all prepared discourses, it would be extremely useful, if they were read over or repeated in private, with a view of searching for the proper emphasis, before they were pronounced in public; marking, at the same time, the emphatical words in every sentence, or at least in the most important parts of the discourse, and fixing them well in memory. A caution, however, must at the same time be given, against multiplying the emphatical words too much. They only become striking when used with a prudent reserve. If they recur too frequently; if a speaker endeavours to render every thing which he says of high importance, by a multitude of strong emphases, they will soon fail to excite the attention of his hearers.

Next to emphasis, pauses demand attention: They are of two kinds; first, emphatical pauses; and secondly, such as mark the distinctions of sense.
sense. An emphatical pause is made, after something has been said of peculiar moment, and on which we want to fix the hearers' attention. Sometimes a matter of importance is preceded by a pause of this nature. Such pauses have the same effect as strong emphases, and are subject to the same rules; particularly to the caution just now given, of not repeating them too frequently. For since they excite particular attention, and consequently raise expectation, if this be not fully answered, they will occasion disappointment and disgust.

But the most common, and the principal use of pauses, is to mark the divisions of the sense, and at the same time to permit the speaker to draw his breath; and the just and graceful management of such pauses, is one of the most delicate and difficult articles in delivery. A proper command of the breath is peculiarly,
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liarly requisite to be acquired. To obtain this, every speaker should be very careful to provide a full supply of breath for what he is to utter. It is a great mistake to suppose, that the breath must be drawn only at the end of a period, when the voice is allowed to fall. It may easily be gathered at the intervals of a sentence, when the voice suffers only a momentary suspension; and hence a sufficient supply may be obtained for carrying on the longest period, without improper interruptions.

Pauses in public discourse, must be formed upon the manner in which we express ourselves in common, sensible conversation, and not upon the stiff artificial manner which we acquire from perusing books, according to the common punctuation. The general method of punctuation is very arbitrary; often capricious and false; and dictates an uniformity of tone in the pauses, which
is extremely unpleasing: For it must be observed, that to make pauses graceful and expressive, they must not only fall in the right places, but be accompanied by a proper tone of voice; by which the nature of these pauses is intimated, much more than by their length, which can never be precisely measured. Sometimes it is only a slight and simple suspension of the voice which is proper; sometimes a degree of cadence is requisite; and sometimes that peculiar tone and cadence, which marks the conclusion of the sentence. In all these cases, a speaker is to regulate himself by attending to the manner in which nature teaches him to speak, when engaged in real and earnest discourse with others.

In reading or reciting verse, there is a difficulty in making the pauses with propriety. There are two kinds of pauses which belong to the music of verse;
verse; one at the end of the line, and
the other in the middle of it. Rhyme
always renders the former sensible, and
compels an observance of it in the pro-
nunciation. In blank verse it is less
perceivable; and when there is no sus-
pension in the sense, it has been doubl-
ed, whether in reading it with pro-
priety, any regard should be paid to
the close of a line? On the stage, in-
deed, where the appearance of speaking
in verse should be avoided, the close of
such lines as make no pause in the sense,
should not be rendered perceptible to
the ear. On other occasions, it were
better, for the sake of melody, to read
blank verse in such a manner as to
make each line sensibly distinct. In at-
tempting this, however, every appear-
ance of ring-pong and tone must be cau-
tiously avoided. The close of the line,
where there is no pause in the meaning,
should be marked only by such a slight
suspension of sound, as may distinguish the passage from one line to another, without injuring the sense.

The pause in the middle of the line falls after the 4th, 5th, 6th, or 7th syllables, and no other. When it happens that this pause coincides with the slightest division in the sense, the line can be read with ease; as in the two first verses of Pope's Messiah:

Ye nymphs of Solyma! begin the song;
To heavenly themes, sublimer strains belong.

But if it happen that words, which have such an intimate connexion as not to admit even a momentary separation, be divided from each other by this pause in the middle of the verse, we then perceive a conflict between the sense and the sound, which renders it difficult to read such lines with grace and harmony. In such cases, it is always better to sacrifice sound to sense.

Thus,
Thus, for instance, in the following line of Milton;

What in me is dark,
Illumine; what is low, raise and support.

The sense evidently dictates the pause after "illumine," which ought to be observed; though if the melody only were to be regarded, "illumine" should be connected with what follows, and no pause be made till after the 4th or 6th syllable. So also in the following line of Pope's Epistle to Arbuthnot:

I fit, with sad civility I read.

The ear points out the pause as falling after "sad," the fourth syllable. But to separate "sad" and "civility," would be very injudicious reading. The sense allows no other pause than after the second syllable, "fit," which therefore is the only one that ought to be observed.

We
We proceed next to treat of tones in pronunciation, which are different both from emphasis and pauses; consisting in the modulation of the voice, the notes or variations of sound which are employed in public speaking. The most material instructions which can be given on this subject is, to form the tones of public speaking upon the tones of sensible and animated conversation. Every one who is engaged in speaking on a subject which interests him nearly, has an eloquent or persuasive tone and manner. But when a speaker departs from his natural tone of expression, he is sure to render his discourse frigid and unpersuasive. Nothing is more absurd than to suppose, that as soon as a speaker ascends a pulpit, or rises in a public assembly, he is immediately to lay aside the voice with which he expresses himself in private, and to assume a new, studied tone,
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tone, and a cadence altogether different from his natural manner. This has vitiated all delivery, and has given rise to cant and tedious monotony. Let every public speaker be prepared against this error. Whether he speak in private, or in a great assembly, let him not forget that he still speaks. Let him take nature for his guide, and she will teach him to express his sentiments and feelings in such a manner, as to make the most forcible and pleasing impression upon the minds of his hearers.

It now remains for us to treat of gesture, or what is called action, in public discourse. The best rule is, to recommend attention to the looks and gestures, in which earnestness, indignation, compassion, or any other emotion, discovers itself to most advantage in the common intercourse of men; and let these be the model for imitation. A public speaker
speaker must, however, adopt that manner which is most natural to himself. His motions and gestures ought all to exhibit that kind of expression which nature has dictated to him; and unless this be the case, no study can prevent their appearing stiff and ungraceful. But though nature be the basis on which every grace in gesture and action must be founded, yet the ornamental improvements which art can supply, must not be neglected. The study of action consists chiefly in guarding against awkward and disagreeable motions, and in learning to perform such as are natural to the speaker, in the most graceful manner. Numerous are the rules which writers have laid down for the attainment of a proper gesticulation. But it is to be feared, that written instructions on this subject can be of little service. To become useful, they must be well exemplified.
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A few of the simplest precepts, however, may be attended to with advantage. Thus, every speaker should study to preserve as much dignity as possible in the whole attitude of his body. He should generally prefer an erect posture; his position should be firm, so as to have the fullest and freest command of all his motions; if any inclination be used, it should be forward towards the hearers, which is a natural expression of earnestness. The countenance should correspond with the nature of the discourse; and when no particular emotion is expressed, a serious and manly look is always to be preferred. The eyes should never be fixed entirely on any one object, but move easily round the audience. In the motions made with the hands, consists the principal part of gesture in speaking. It is natural that the right hand should be employed more frequently
sequently than the left. Warm emotions require the exercise of them both together. But whether a speaker gesticulates with one or with both his hands, it is an important rule, that all his motions should be easy and unrestrained. Narrow and confined movements are usually ungraceful; and consequently motions made with the hands, should proceed from the shoulder rather than from the elbow. Perpendicular movements, in a straight line, up and down, which Shakespeare calls, "Sawing the air with the hand," are to be avoided. Oblique motions are the most pleasing and graceful. Too sudden and rapid motions are seldom good. Earnestness can be fully expressed without their assistance.

We cannot conclude our observations on this subject, without earnestly admonishing every speaker to guard against all affectation, which is the destruction
struction of good delivery. Let his manner, whatever it be, be his own; neither imitated from another, nor taken from some imaginary model which is unnatural to him. Whatever is native, though attended by several defects, is likely to please; because it shows us a man; because it has the appearance of proceeding from the heart. To attain a delivery extremely correct and graceful, is what few can expect; since so many natural talents must concur in its formation. But to acquire a forcible and persuasive manner, is within the power of the generality of mankind. They must only unlearn false and corrupt habits; they must follow nature; and they will speak in public as they do in private, when they speak in earnest and from the heart.
To those who are anxious to excel in any of the higher kinds of oratory, nothing is more necessary than to cultivate habits of the several virtues, and to refine and improve all their moral feelings. A true orator must possess generous sentiments, and his mind turned towards the admiration of all these great and high objects, which mankind are, by nature, prone to venerate. Connected with the mainly virtues, he should have a strong and tender sensibility to all the injuries, distresses, and sorrows, of his fellow-creatures.

Next to moral qualifications, what is most requisite for an orator is a fund of knowledge,
knowledge. There is no art by which eloquence can be taught, in any sphere, without a sufficient acquaintance with what belongs to that sphere. Attention to the ornaments of style can only assist the orator in setting off to advantage the stock of materials which he possesses; but the materials themselves must be derived from other sources than from rhetoric. The pleader must make himself completely acquainted with the law; he must possess all that learning and experience which can be useful in his profession, for supporting a cause, or convincing a judge. The preacher must apply himself closely to the study of divinity, of practical religion, of morals, of human nature; that he may be rich in all the subjects both of instruction and of persuasion. He who wishes to excel as a member of the supreme council of the nation, or of any public assembly, should be minutely
minutely acquainted with the business which belongs to such assembly, and should attend with accuracy to all the facts which may be the subject of question or deliberation.

Besides the knowledge which is more peculiarly connected with his profession, a public speaker should make himself acquainted with the general circle of polite literature. Poetry he will find useful for the embellishment of style, for affording lively images, or pleasing illusions. History may be still more advantageous; since the knowledge of facts, of eminent characters, and of the course of human affairs, must find place on many occasions. A deficiency of knowledge, even in subjects not immediately connected with his profession, will expose a public speaker to many disadvantages, and give his rivals, who are better qualified, a decided superiority.
To every one who wishes to excel as a public speaker, a habit of application and industry cannot be too much recommended. This is inseparably connected with the attainment of every species of excellence. No one ever became a distinguished pleader, or preacher, or speaker in any assembly, without previous labour and application. Industry, indeed, is not only necessary to every valuable acquisition, but it is designed by Providence as the seasoning of every pleasure, without which life would become flat and insipid. No enemy is so destructive both to honourable attainments, and to the real and animated enjoyment of life, as that relaxed state of mind which proceeds from indolence and dissipation. He who is destined to excel in any art, will be distinguished by an enthusiasm for that art; which firing his mind with the object in view, will dispose him...
him to endure every necessary degree of industry and perseverance. This was the characteristic of the great men of antiquity; and it must distinguish the moderns, who would imitate their bright examples. Only those who are studying oratory, this honourable enthusiasm should be cultivated with the most lively attention. If it be wanting to youth, manhood will flag exceedingly.

An attention to the best models contributes greatly towards improvement in the arts of speaking or writing. Every one, indeed, should endeavor to have something that is his own, that is peculiar to himself; and that distinguishes his composition and style. Genius is certainly depressed, and its poverty betrayed, by a slavish imitation. But yet, there is no genius for original, but may receive improvement from proper examples, in style, composition,
tion, and delivery. They always afford some new ideas, and contribute to enlarge and correct our own. They accelerate the current of thought, and excite the ardour of emulation.

In imitating the style of any favourite author, a material distinction should be observed between written and spoken language. These are, in reality, two different modes of communicating ideas. In books, we expect correctness, precision, all redundancies pruned, all repetitions avoided, language completely polished. Speaking allows a more easy, copious, style, and less confined by rule; repetitions may often be requisite, parentheticals may sometimes be ornamental; the same thought must often be exhibited in different points of view; since the hearers can catch it only from the mouth of the speaker, and have not the opportunity, as in reading, of turning
turning back again, and of contemplating what they do not entirely comprehend. Hence the style of some good authors would seem stiff, affected, and even obscure, if transferred into a popular oration. How unnatural, for instance, would Lord Shaftesbury's sentences sound in the mouth of a public speaker? Some kinds of public discourse, indeed, such as that of the pulpit, where a more accurate preparation and a more studied style are allowable, would admit such a manner better than others, which are expected to approach nearer to extemporaneous speaking. But yet there is, generally, so great a difference between speaking, and a composition intended only to be read, as should caution us against a close and improper imitation.

The composition of some authors approaches nearer to the style of speaking than others; and they can, therefore,
fôre, be imitated with more propriety. In our own language, Swift and Bolingbroke are of this description. The former, though correct, preserves the easy and natural manner of an unaffected speaker; and this is an excellence by which he is peculiarly distinguished. The style of the latter is more splendid; but still it is the style of speaking, or rather of declamation. Bolingbroke, indeed, may be studied with singular advantage by those who are desirous of attaining the natural elegance and the graces of composition.

Frequent exercise both in composing and speaking must be recommended as a necessary mean of improvement. That kind of composition is, undoubtedly, most useful, which is connected with the profession, or sort of public speaking, to which persons devote themselves. This they should ever keep in view, and be gradually habituating.
tuating themselves to it. At the same

time they should be cautious not to al-

low themselves to compose negligently

on any occasion. He who wishes to

write, or to speak correctly, should,

in the most trifling kind of compo-

sition, in writing a letter, or even in

common conversation, endeavour to

express himself with propriety. By

this we do not mean, that he is never

to write, or to speak, but in studied and

artificial language. This would intro-

duce a stiffness and affectation, infinite-

ly worse than the greatest negligence.

But we must observe, that there is in

every thing a proper and becoming man-

ner; and, on the contrary, there is

also an awkward performance of the

same thing. That manner which is

becoming, is often the most light, and

apparently the most careless; but taste

and attention are requisite to possess

the just idea of it. That idea, when
once acquired, should be kept constantly in view, and upon it should be formed whatever we write or speak.

Exercises of speaking have always been recommended to students in elocution: and, when under proper regulation, must, undoubtedly, be of the greatest use. Those public and miscellaneous societies, in which numbers are brought together, who are frequently of low stations and occupations, who are connected by no common bond of union, except a ridiculous rage for public speaking, and have, no other object in view, than to exhibit their supposed talents, are institutions not only of an useless, but of an injurious nature. They are calculated to become seminaries of licentiousness, petulance, and faction. Even the allowable meetings, into which students of oratory may form themselves, must be under proper direction,
matter, in order to be rendered useful. If their subjects of debate be improperly selected; if they support extravagant or indecent topics; if they indulge themselves in loose and flimsy declamation; or accustom themselves, without preparation, to speak pertly on all subjects; they will unavoidably acquire a very faulty and vicious taste in speaking. It should, therefore, be recommended to all those who are members of such societies, to attend to the choice of their subjects; to take care that these be useful and manly, either connected with the course of their studies, or related to morals and taste, to action and life. They should be temperate in the practice of speaking; not to speak too frequently, nor on subjects of which they are ignorant; but only when they have laid up proper materials for a discourse, and have previously considered and digested the subject.
subject. In speaking, they should be cautious always to keep good sense and persuasion in view; rather than a shew of eloquence. By these means, they will adopt the best method of forming themselves gradually to a manly, correct, and persuasive elocution.

It may now be asked, of what use will the study of critical and rhetorical writers be, for the improvement of those who wish to excel in eloquence? They ought certainly not to be neglected; and yet, perhaps, very much cannot be expected from them. It is, however, from the original ancient writers that the greatest advantage can be derived; and it is a disgrace to any one, whose profession calls him to speak in public, to be unacquainted with them. In all the rhetorical writers among the ancients, there is, indeed, one defect; they are too systematical; they endeavour to perform too much; they
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they aim at reducing rhetoric to a perfect art, which may supply invention with materials on every subject; so that one would suppose they expected to make an orator by rule, in the same manner as a mechanic would learn his business. But, in reality, all that can be done, is to assist and enlighten taste, and to point out to genius the path in which it ought to tread.

Aristotle seems to have been the first who took rhetoric out of the hands of the sophists, and founded it on reason and solid sense. Some of the most subtle observations which have been made on the passions and manners of men, are to be found in his Treatise on Rhetoric; though in this, as in all his writings, his great conciseness often renders him obscure. The Greek rhetoricians who succeeded him, most of whom are now lost, improved on the foundation which he had laid. Two of them
them are still existing, Demetrius Phalerus, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Both have written on the construction of sentences, and deserve to be consulted; particularly Dionysius, who is a very accurate and able critic.

To recommend the rhetorical writings of Cicero, would be superfluous. Whatever, on the subject of eloquence, is suggested by so great an orator, must be worthy of attention. His most extensive work on this subject is that De Oratore, in three books. None of his writings are more highly finished than this treatise. The dialogue is politely conducted, the characters are well supported, and the management of the whole is beautiful and pleasing. The Orator ad M. Brutum is also a valuable treatise; and, indeed, throughout all Cicero's rhetorical works, there are seen those elevated and sublime ideas of eloquence, which are well calculated to form
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form a just taste, and to inspire that enthusiasm for the art, which is highly conducive to the attainment of excellence.

Among all the ancient writers on the subject of oratory, none, perhaps, is more instructive, and more useful, than Quintilian. His Institutions abound with valuable knowledge, and discover a taste in the highest degree just and accurate. He has well digested the ancient ideas concerning rhetoric, and has delivered his instructions in elegant and polished language.

FINIS.